Without the US in WWI there would have been further global warfare anyway. The details would have been different but it still would have happened. My view is the economic problems of the 1920s & 30s made renewed warfare inevitable. Both in Europe & Asia. These decades were the bottom of global economic collapse that was underway before WWI. Combine the economic problems with resentment towards whomever finally won the Great War and the stage is set. While the US could try for political neutrality economicly it has been from the start tied to the global economy. The prosperity of US citizens has largely derived from exports of raw materials, agricultral products, and some manufactors. In both WWI & II the disruption of US exports threatned long term problems. Sitting off court did not insulate us from those or prevent them from getting worse.

I am assuming that warfare around the world just following 1913 was to be a given. I am questioning the wisdom of the US joining in instead of letting the war in Europe take its course. Once the warring nations were defeated or depleted of all resources or toppled by revolutions, they would be easier to deal with for economic purposes. And then there is that "resentment" you refer to. The French were determined to get even with the Germans for 1870. The Germans later wanted to get even with the French for Versailles. The Turks hated the Armenians who probably hated the Turks. Serbs and Bosnians and Croatians couldn't get along. The Brits had the Black and Tans in Ireland. There was a anger in India against the British. I don't believe President Wilson had the whole problem of a grand strategy of the US completely in his grasp. I don't believe he had a clear idea of where this country needed to go. And I believe the Senate rejected the League of Nations at least partly because of this. It may be that lasting peace among nations is possible if those nations have foot of a dominating power of their necks. The Roman Empire maintained peace pretty well. The only other possibility is if a country which has many ethnic groups living together in prosperous circumstances can be a model for a war-weary world.

Sure I'll agree the US might have made a better example, although the ethnic problems here were not small in 1914 and threatened to become larger. The race riots of that era were not disimilar to the Jewish pogroms of those years. Wilsons actions were based on his idealistc academic background. I cant debate his strategy, but his execution was not the best. It is tough to compare his performance in forigen policy with that of Roosevelt. It is not hard to see Roosevelt as eventuallly sending a US Army into WWI, but coming out of it with better results. As for the US becoming a dominating power in 1918 or a decade later. Between the power of the isolationists, and the extrodinary political skill required to do such a thing. I'm not sure it would have been possible. Further the realative military power of the US was very poor in the 1920s. Even after the devastation of the Great War Most European armys easily outclaassed the US Army. At sea the Japanese Navy was trouble, even if smaller.

I'll grant you your points except perhaps one. It is my impression, either correct or not, than the pogroms were preplanned official or camoflaged official persecutions of the Jews where the race riots were more or less spontaneous translations of peoples' baser passions into violence. In Konrad Heiden's "Der Fuhrer" where he writes about the origination of the tract "Protocols of the Wisemen of Zion", Heiden describes the motivation for it to be to convince the Czar to authorize a full blown official persecution of Russia's Jews. The Czar would not lend his imprimatur to the project so the head of the Okrana (Czarist secret police) who had composed the "Protocols" proceeded on other lines. The other lines took the form of the early 20th century Pogrom(or pogroms?). It is ironic that the tract later came into the hands of Alfred Rosenberg when he was a university student in Moscow and that from there it served as a strategic roadmap for the Nazis' rise to power in Germany. Rosenberg became the Nazi Party's theoretician.

I think that World War I and its aftermath were very instructive to the following generation of US leaders. The US under the leadership of FDR, Truman and Eisenhower had a much better grasp of actons and consequences than Wilson and Harding. The US was both more generous and more ruthless than in World War I. The "Great War" taught them that it wasn't enough to just win a war, you also had to win the peace, which (by and large) they did.

I'll go along with that. Thos someone of TR Roosevelts caliber might have done far better than Wilson or Harding, or even Coolidge.

>>Thos someone of TR Roosevelts caliber might have done far better than Wilson or Harding, or even Coolidge.<< you'll get no argument from me about the capabilities of TR

I think that people are too severe about Wilson. I realy think that after WW1, he settle something very good to avoid a new war. Versailles treaty was far to be a bad one to keep peace. Indeed, this treaty reduced the military capacity of Germany, the trouble maker of Europe, and put in place the "Société des nations", which was a very innovating system to avoid conflit. So, according to me, Wilson realy try to win peace and not only war. By the way, I think that it is not fair to compare Wilson's peace accomplishment to Roosevelt's peace accomplishment because one can count on an atomic bomb to be respected and not the other.

>>I think that people are too severe about Wilson. I realy think that after WW1, he settle something very good to avoid a new war.<< I certainly agree that Wilson's intentions were good. However, in the US there is a saying that "politics is the art of the possible". He needed to be able to convince some very jaded, very prosaic leaders (on both sides of the Atlantic) on his goals and he just wasn't the man to do it.

>>I think that people are too severe about Wilson. I really think that after WW1, he settle something very good to avoid a new war.<< No one is accusing Wilson of not trying, or of having ambitions that were anything less than noble. It’s just that Wilson needed to convince jaded and prosaic leaders (on both sides of the Atlantic) that his goals were preferable. This involved salesmanship, and a spirit of give and take, that the stiff, old university professor was just not capable of indulging in. There is an old saying in American politics, “politics is the art of the possible.” Wilson kept insisting on the perfect, and so he missed being able to accomplish the possible. >>Versailles treaty was far to be a bad one to keep peace. Indeed, this treaty reduced the military capacity of Germany, the trouble maker of Europe,<< The Germans considered the Versailles treaty to be a terrible humiliation; which it was. It was not as harsh as the German terms at Brest-Litovsk, and it was not as harsh as the terms they would have given to the Western Allies had they won. It was, however, still harsh, and this harshness was in direct contradiction to Wilson’s rhetoric in 1917 and 1918. They felt betrayed by this. The Germans did not consider themselves to be militarily defeated. This was a lie, of course. But lies sometimes have a life of their own. >>I think that it is not fair to compare Wilson's peace accomplishment to Roosevelt's peace accomplishment because one can count on an atomic bomb to be respected and not the other.<< 1) America’s relative position in 1945 had a lot more to do with economic power than having sole possession of the atomic bomb. The rest of the world was devastated, bankrupt, or both. America was basically self sufficient in industrial raw materials, it had the largest agricultural sector in the world and the most advanced production base. 2) FDR, Truman and Eisenhower learned from Wilson and Harding’s mistakes, and a generation of political leaders who came of age in the Great War learned along with them. I think their initiatives were more broadminded, flexible and generous than Wilson’s. This might have been because they themselves were more broadminded, flexible and generous. It may have been because the rest of the political leaders had learned the lessons of the Great War too, and so the initiatives were easier to sell.