|It seems that Israeli special ops forces had troops on the ground several hundred km into Syria both before and during the IAF air strike against the North Korean reactor being built in Syria. This undoubtedly means operators from the two top tier special ops units, Sayeret Matkal and/or Sayeret Shaldag. Shaldag is an air force unit that specialises in BDA and laser target designation, so it's highly likely that they were there during the strike. And according to published reports IDF troops visited the site prior to the air raid to take soil samples and gather other evidence to show Washington that Israel's intel was rock solid (pun intended). Those troops were most likely Sayeret Matkal, whose forte is deep penetration intel gathering.
This is pretty standard stuff for Matkal, which goes deep into enemy territory on a semi-regular basis - at least several times a year. With all due respect to the Brits, when I contrast Matkal's SOP with that of Bravo Two Zero, the SAS doesn't come off too well by comparison. As McNab describes it (yes I am aware that his version of events is subject to controversy), the operational planning of the op was amateurish and haphazard. Not only did they have only the vaguest idea of the terrain and enemy forces in their zone of operation, but the decision to go in dismounted was reckless in the extreme. They went in semi-blind and with no capacity to get themselves out of trouble if their luck went bad. Pretty shoddy all around. Especially given the fact that they had weeks to prepare.
As previously stated, Matkal regularly does very deep penetration intel collection ops throughout the Mid East and no one ever hears about them. And even when they don't have the luxury of lengthy planning processes, as during last year's war in Lebanon, they still don't get themselves into situations they can't get out of. The Matkal/Shaldag raid north of Ba'albek in the Bek'a Valley (150 km north of the Israeli border) went pear shaped when they encountered greater than anticipated resistance... but the troops were equipped with heavily armed vehicles and they drove their way out of trouble to extraction at an alternate LZ. The only fatality they had was the Lt. Col. in command of the operation (that is a reflection of the IDF's unique command philosophy of having senior officers lead from the front - but that's another topic).