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Subject: USMC perform atsame level or higher than comparable SOCOM units proven in head2head comparison: DET1
SCCOMarine    12/21/2006 7:01:59 PM
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 (MCSOCom Det 1) was created with a charter to examine the issue of a permanent Marine Corps force contribution to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Formally referred to as a "proof of concept," Det 1 completed a successful deployment under the operational control of USSOCom, demonstrated that Marines are fully capable of operating at the level of our Nation's other special operations forces (SOF), and paved the way for the creation of a Marine component to the USSOCom. As we prepare to case the colors of Det 1 and stand up U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MarSOC), it is appropriate to review and discuss what made Det 1 successful and any potential pitfalls to avoid as we move forward. Although the idea of a Marine Corps force contribution to USSOCom had been discussed since USSOCom's inception in the mid-1980s, it came to fruition only with the renewed emphasis placed on special operations in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. That fall, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen James L. Jones, and Commander, USSOCom (CdrUSSOCom), Gen Charles Holland, USAF, to explore ways for the Marine Corps and USSOCom to work more closely together in what came to be known as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The subject of assigning a Marine Corps unit-a force contribution-to USSOCom was raised early in the discussions and took on added significance in many Marine leaders' eyes when two of the Marine Corps' "crown jewels"-the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s)-were forced to sit on the sidelines during the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Resistance from SOF commanders already on the ground and indifference from the Navy chain of command under which they were operating left the 15th MEU(SOC) languishing offshore for over a month. Even when these and later Marine units did make it ashore they were most often employed piece-meal in supporting roles to provide capabilities that SOF were deficient in or lacked altogether. In October 2002 Gen Jones, in consultation with senior USSOCom decisionmakers, sought to answer the force contribution question and increase Marine Corps involvement in the GWOT by approving an initiative to establish a purpose-built Marine unit for employment by USSOCom. In a message to senior leaders in the Marine Corps, the CMC directed them to: . . . develop a plan to provide forces to the Special Operations Command on a permanent basis in order to cement the relationship of our two organizations at the institutional level and provide our nation with an expanded special operations capability.1 In response to the CMC's message, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) established a working group tasked with creating a rough table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E). The T/O they developed included only 86 line numbers divided among 4 sections-a 30-man reconnaissance element, a 29-man intelligence element, a 7-man fires element, and a lean headquarters. The intelligence element was further broken down into a 9-man radio reconnaissance team (RRT), a 6-man human intelligence (HumInt) exploitation team (HET), and a 12-man all-source fusion team. (See Figure 1.) The final administrative requirement was met in February 2003 when DC PP&O signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Deputy Commander, USSOCom. The MOA was jointly drafted by the Marine Corps and USSOCom and established the parameters for the proof of concept, including the mission, command relationships, and resourcing for Det 1. A ceremony held aboard Camp Pendleton on 19 June 2003 marked the official activation of Det 1. Execution of the detachment mission training plan began in earnest the week following the activation and culminated with a 3week capstone exercise at the Nevada Test Site and Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, NV in December 2003. After participating in an Navy special warfare (NSW) certification exercise and conducting additional sustainment training, Det 1 deployed to Baghdad for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) in April 2004, just over 9 months after its activation. While operating as part of an NSW task group (NSWTG), Det 1 executed a number of direct action, coalition support, and battlefield shaping missions under the regional combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF). By all accounts, Det 1 excelled and earned a reputation for professionalism, competence, and being "user friendly." A study conducted by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) found: The operational effectiveness of the MCSOCOM Det was high. . . . The trial deployment demonstrated the MCSOCOM Det could effectively conduct Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR) in conjunction with a Naval Special Warfare Task Group
 
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GOP       12/30/2006 7:05:06 PM
SCCOMarine,
 
As far as VBSS: The SEALs and KOMSUBIN basically invented the modern tactics involved in VBSS, and practice them very regularly. To say that Force Recon is better the the Teams at that is absolutely, positively, utterly, insanely riduculous.
 
As far as GOPLAT: One op in 89 (17+ years ago) doesn't prove that FR is better than the Teams at GOPLAT, it proves that FR did better than one unit in one op a long time ago. Theres a reason that SEALs got the call to take down the Iraqi oil platforms at the start of OIF. That's why.
 
As far as the others...that is extremely debatable. As I have said before, each individual unit withing SOCOM will be better or worse in those fields based on Experience, Leadership, and Deployment cycle (ie: what part of their workup they are in).
 
You use alot of official documents and personal biased opinion to try and prove something that is unprovable. Give it up.
 
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SCCOMarine       12/30/2006 7:12:20 PM

   "Lets see, Guadalcanal 1942-1943 2 Marine Divisions, 2 Army Divisions + an additional regiment. New Guinea, lets see, oh that was the Australians and oh yeah, the US Army. New Georgia and Bougainville, the Marines... and oooh wait for it... the US Army."

 

   If you read my post you'll see that it reads the army took parts in mission in the pacific.  Most of their independent actions, as I posted earlier, took place in the rear of the main action (the drive to the Jp main islands).  The army assaults in the Philippines, Burma and a few others were behind the main drive, and were only made possible after those Jp posts were seriously weakened b/c the Marines drive had destroyed their resources, caused the JPs to pull back to protect the MIs, and cut off the supply line to the posts.  The Jp colonial posts were essentially making last stands even early in the war.  They knew the MIs came first and, unlike the Germans and Italians, they’d die b4 surrender.  But all of this happened after the MC drive.  B4 the drive they all got smacked by the JPs; the US army, the Brit. Army, and the ANZACs(Aus/NZ army).  And as I said that they did play a part in the drive to Jp MIs, a small one.  Not small in the regards to size in numbers but in ROLE.

 

            This is why details matter. In your reading of these events did you take the time to distinguish ROLE.  You do it when you talk of the reg army and SOF combined missions, whether consciously or not, and this is why you have a understanding of the difference btw SOF and reg soldiers.  If you want to know the difference between Marines, SOF, and reg army, you have to do the same, know the roles these units played. 

I’ll explain the role of the portion of the army took part in the drive to the JP MIs lead by the Marines.  I highlighted that portion not to brag that the MC lead the drive, but b/c people on this site like to misinterpret and spin sentences.

 

            The total # of Marines (act/res) that served during WWII was less than 500,000 it sounds large but that’s much smaller than present day US Army.  The size of the US Army standing at any given time during the war was well over 3mil closer to 4.  The role the Army played during the drive was 2 fold. 1 was support. Mostly heavy weapon b/c although the MC had some heavy weapons it wasn’t many and they weren’t as large, they a strike force.  2nd was the Marines were a strike force spread across the pacific most units made landings on multiple Island fortress.  Each landing consisted of 4 main portions; assault, break-out, penetrate & destroy enemy lines, hold and clear.  It’s the Hold and clear that takes massive amounts of manpower.  Something the MC was in short supply of.  As the Marines would assault & crush the enemy lines the army came behind to sweep and clear.  Sometimes they’d advance along side the Marine units as flank security not as part of the assault force. Their role was b

 
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SCCOMarine       12/30/2006 7:25:56 PM
Clairification, someone ask me on another site if the Marines retreated NO, they have never retreated. The 24thID retreated the Marines hadn't landed yet!

President Truman (West Point Grad.) talking shit about Marines B4 they landed on Pusan when they had retreated the 1st time and let the whole country get overrun. The 24th ID was holding on to a small piece of territory and were about to be pushed into the sea.
The Marine Corps is the Navy’s police force and as long as I am president that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.
—President Harry S Truman, 29 Aug. 1950 letter to Congressman Gordon L. McDonough replying to his 21 Aug. 1950 suggestion that the Marine Corps be entitled to full recognition as a major branch of the armed forces.
 
 
 
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gf0012-aust       12/30/2006 7:52:18 PM

As far as VBSS: The SEALs and KOMSUBIN basically invented the modern tactics involved in VBSS, and practice them very regularly.
 


I think you're being a tad enthusiastic here.  The SEALs  are relative latecommers to VBSS (or Opposed Boarding as its know in other parts of the world).  The UK was basically writing the book on Opposed Boarding in the early 80's.
 
From personal experience, (on a recent contract that I was privy to review) the priority people that were preferred by some private maritime security companies are of the following disciplines.  It is a very specific list.
 
consideration was given to and higher regard was accorded to:
-ex Royal Marines/SAS/SBS
-ex Commando/TAG
-ex US Coast Guard
-ex Dutch Marines, -ex San Marco Regiment (Italy), ex Teseo Tesei (COMSUBIN)
-ex Water Police (Italian, Spanish, Canadian, Sth African, Australian, New Zealanders, GSG9 trained)
-ex Fisheries Officers (Canadian, Iceland, Norwegians, French, Sth African, Australian, New Zealanders)
-ex Customs maritime officers (Canadian, French, Sth African, Australian, New Zealanders)
-ex Ghorkas/Ghurkas (you'd be surprised at how many Ghurkas are involved in PMC's running in the Malaccas and Sth China Sea)
 
the contractor (a US parent company) we dealt with made it explicitly clear that ex-SEALs were not to be employed as there were too many difficulties in integrating them.
Some of the above mentioned regularly train for Opposed Boarding - and certainly in australia I can tell you that the TAG practice weekly against incoming vessels with the support of the vessel owners. On a dry run from Paloma in Italy to Sydney Australia one vessel was subjected to over a dozen opposed boarding training runs by various countries along the
route.
 
 
 
 
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Yimmy       12/30/2006 7:54:41 PM
SCCOMarine, what is your opinion of the new naval infantry the USN are forming?  Do you consider them to be stealing the job of the marines?

And Horsesoldier and Longrilfe, I sware I asked this in some thread recently but I can;t for the life of me find which, so sorry if I'm asking you to answer twice.  What were you two, both army infantry?


 
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GOP       12/30/2006 8:25:17 PM




As far as VBSS: The SEALs and KOMSUBIN basically invented the modern tactics involved in VBSS, and practice them very regularly.

 




I think you're being a tad enthusiastic here.  The SEALs  are relative latecommers to VBSS (or Opposed Boarding as its know in other parts of the world).  The UK was basically writing the book on Opposed Boarding in the early 80's.

 

From personal experience, (on a recent contract that I was privy to review) the priority people that were preferred by some private maritime security companies are of the following disciplines.  It is a very specific list.

 

consideration was given to and higher regard was accorded to:

-ex Royal Marines/SAS/SBS

-ex Commando/TAG

-ex US Coast Guard

-ex Dutch Marines, -ex San Marco Regiment (Italy), ex Teseo Tesei (COMSUBIN)
-ex Water Police (Italian, Spanish, Canadian, Sth African, Australian, New Zealanders, GSG9 trained)


-ex Fisheries Officers (Canadian, Iceland, Norwegians, French, Sth African, Australian, New Zealanders)

-ex Customs maritime officers (Canadian, French, Sth African, Australian, New Zealanders)

-ex Ghorkas/Ghurkas (you'd be surprised at how many Ghurkas are involved in PMC's running in the Malaccas and Sth China Sea)

 

the contractor (a US parent company) we dealt with made it explicitly clear that ex-SEALs were not to be employed as there were too many difficulties in integrating them.

Some of the above mentioned regularly train for Opposed Boarding - and certainly in australia I can tell you that the TAG practice weekly against incoming vessels with the support of the vessel owners. On a dry run from Paloma in Italy to Sydney Australia one vessel was subjected to over a dozen opposed boarding training runs by various countries along the

route.

 

 

 


I may be overly enthuasistic or biased, but I have heard that KOMSUBIN and SEALs basically developed the modern (as in, what is used today) VBSS boarding techniques, but the SBS may have developed the original VBSS tactics (and since KOMSUBIN, the SBS, and the Teams all train together, they may have adopted the same tactics around the same time).
As far as the whole PMC thing, that's not important. As long as SEALs prove they can do their job in SOCOM, then what one PMC thinks doesn't mean jack sh*t. There are plenty of SEALs employed by DynCorp and Blackwater.
 
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longrifle       12/30/2006 8:56:56 PM
Yimmy,

I was an Army paratrooper.  My military occupational specialty was 11B2P, or infantry skill level two (a fire team leader) plus parachutist. 

I think Horsesoldier was a cavalry (mechanized) scout.  I'm not sure about that though.

 
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gf0012-aust       12/30/2006 11:14:52 PM


As far as the whole PMC thing, that's not important. As long as SEALs prove they can do their job in SOCOM, then what one PMC thinks doesn't mean jack sh*t.

Don't be so quick to dimiss PMS companies.  They've actually been trialling some of the new "anti-pirate" tech that some in SOCOM are only just getting now. The tech companies realise that systems can get a proper work out at a trials level.  As an example, my daughter is SECO for a security team on a range of high value shipping assets. (65,000 tonne+)  They were trialling anti-pirate measures some 12 months prior to that tech being released to SOCOM.  In a twist of irony, she is actually higher certified for that gear than anyone in the SAS as we've only just bought "nn" units. 
 
So, actually it does mean jack schitt as you're promoting a capability that is run of the mill in some non SOCOM units and in other militaries.  To say that SEALs have been part and parcel of developing modern VBSS/OB techniques is somewhat enthusiastic as well as a stretch of the truth.  A typical USCG team assigned to Iraq or the South eastern side of America would conduct more OB events in a month than I suspect your ave SEAL team would do in a year.  All 3 task forces wandering around off Iraq do not use SEALs for atypical VBSS/OB work. At a US contribution level it is atypically USCG or USN 22 man "special"  team. They (SEALs) might have been singularly responsible within the US military - but not outside of the US.  I can think of a number of countries where more OB work is carried out than what SEALs would do.  Again, the issue is black to green ops.  OB and VBSS in the main is green. In fact, I do recall seeing a report recently where it was hilighted that the inclusion of USCG into the task forces off of Iraq had resulted in an improvement of US VBSS/OB techniques as it was their "standard fare".  That would also fit in with the view of some private maritime security companies responsible for asset protection in the Malaccas and Sth China Sea.  ex USCG personnel are highly valued.
 


 There are plenty of SEALs employed by DynCorp and Blackwater.

and there is a big world outside of DynCorp and Blackwater. (considerably bigger)  Maritime security is pretty fussy, and although my frame of reference is 9 months to 3 months current, I don't know any PMS companies that employ ex SEALs. at an operator level (incl US owned shipping companies).  The above "warm and verticals" shopping list is more or less standard.  Again, I can only go on what I've been provided with at specific meetings.


I may be overly enthuasistic or biased, but I have heard that KOMSUBIN and SEALs basically developed the modern (as in, what is used today) VBSS boarding techniques, but the SBS may have developed the original VBSS tactics (and since KOMSUBIN, the SBS, and the Teams all train together, they may have adopted the same tactics around the same time).

Well, generally speaking the only ones in the US who do black opposed boardings are SEAL's or units within SOCOM. (such as specials within the USMC).  In other militaries and even some paramilitaries that is bread and butter stuff.  In the US, atypically it will be USCG, USN specials or poss USMC specials, but most opposed boardings are green events. (compliant and/or non compliant)  If a compliant or non compliant event migrates to an active opposed event, then you don't swap out the team and bring in the specials, - the team is expected to be able to do the job - cradle to grave.  In the US case, I believe that transition from compliant/non comliant to adversarial OB then results in SEALs/USMC specials being called up.
 
I suspect that you're looking at black ops issues - Opposed boarding is generally not a black ops event.  Compliant and non compliant boarding is whats picked up by non SOCOM US units.  happy to be correcte
 
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Horsesoldier       1/1/2007 5:26:37 PM

Yimmy,

I was an Army paratrooper.  My military occupational specialty was 11B2P, or infantry skill level two (a fire team leader) plus parachutist. 

I think Horsesoldier was a cavalry (mechanized) scout.  I'm not sure about that though.


Right.  Cavalry scout in both armored cavalry and light (brigade reconnaissance troop) cavalry for quite a while.  Currently working in another, non-combat arms MOS, in an SF support company.
 
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Horsesoldier       1/1/2007 5:35:22 PM

As far as the whole PMC thing, that's not important. As long as SEALs prove they can do their job in SOCOM, then what one PMC thinks doesn't mean jack sh*t. There are plenty of SEALs employed by DynCorp and Blackwater.

Well, as I've pointed out in regards to their peers in SOCOM, there are a lot of people who will not work with the SEALs if they can avoid it.  PMCs are not that different -- whatever your opinion of their actual ability level and skills, the SEAL community has an attitude that many people find annoying and/or unsuitable to missions requiring high levels of professionalism and maturity.
Saying Blackwater employing SEALs indicates there is not a problem is kind of a cheat, I'd say, since Blackwater was founded by SEALs and is the PMC version of their institutional culture (which probably explains, in part, why they tend to be the only PMC that laypeople have heard of, for a number of reasons).  There are people who find the SEAL mentality no more acceptable or professional when filtered through Blackwater than they find it firsthand dealing with serving SEALs.

 
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