Threat Analysis Variables and the Vietnam War
by Terrance Jones ARNG/U.S. Navy
Yet if there was a problem with the pragmatism of the period, it was that there were simply too many foreign policy problems, too many crises, each crowding the others, demanding to be taken care of in that instant. There was too little time to plan, to think; one could only confront the most immediate problems and get rid of them piecemeal but as quickly as possible, ore at least postpone any action. Long-range solutions, thoughtful changes, would have to wait, at least until the second term. And thus it was the irony of the Kennedy Administration that John Kennedy, rationalist, pledged above all to rationality, should continue the most irrational of all major American foreign policies, that policy toward China (the refusal to acknowledge them as a globally viable nation) and the rest of Asia. He was aware of the change in the Communist world, he was aware of the split between the Chinese and the Russians; it was, he realized, something very important. But he would deal with it later.
“The Best and the Brightest” Chapter Seven page 102
While Mr. Halberstam works diligently to detail a foreign policy that was doomed from the start due to inept decision making amongst America’s brightest minds at the cabinet and Pentagon level, his own prose works against him and clearly details a global environment that demanded clear, yet complex solutions to a rapidly increasing and diverse set of multi regional threat variances in strategic areas of vital interest to America.
‘Yet if there was a problem with the pragmatism of the period, it was that there were simply too many foreign policy problems, too many crises, each crowding the others, demanding to be taken care of in that instant.’
Statements like these exude a concessionary mindset, as there is no such thing as too many threat analysis variables in world that is dramatically affected and manipulated by the constantly changing and ever evolving facultative variables of war. Contingencies are mandatory and diplomacy has been a foundational catalyst for threat reduction and neutralization over temporal, short and long term periods in all historical ages of war. Mr. Halberstam fails to understand that true to historical form of war and diplomacy, single theatre problems often contain a diverse matrix of threat variables that have the potential to predict future occurrences and trends and or detail the current enemy alliance based expansion ratios that pose severe threats to American initiatives abroad. During the Cold War/Vietnam War era, because of America’s superpower status, most threats to American initiatives abroad required an alliance of two proxy war facilitators and a proxy war subordinate in strategic points of intervention across the globe, as America would have a favorable chance of offsetting the strategic initiatives of Russia, the only other superpower in the world. Regardless of the seemingly frigid relationship between Russia and China, their actions towards Vietnam clearly prove that Russia and China remained cognizant of the fact that their individual goals demanded their concerted efforts in the aforementioned strategic points of intervention (Vietnam in this case). This assertion was proven when green berets launched the Son Tay raid and found Chinese and Russian military advisors 400 meters from the target area of the assault.
*I could go further with this on this board, but why bother without someone validating the need for me to do so. Look forward to reading about this topic in my next book. This is too broad a topic for me to continuously submit abstracts to this forum. I am not as wealthy as Mr. Halberstam. I have to work for a living.
I have to get back to my other projects. I have kids to support. Post your response and I will get to it as soon as possible.