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Subject: Our defenceless force
Volkodav    3/30/2009 8:56:45 PM
I wonder if the new white paper will be any better than previous efforts or whether we will see more of the same. Cameron Stewart | March 31, 2009 Article from: The Australian IF there were a moment when the fragile relationship between Joel Fitzgibbon and the defence establishment finally snapped, it might have been the surprise attack the minister launched on his own flock in Brisbane last October. On that day Fitzgibbon did what previous defence ministers have rarely done: he gave his own defence force a blunt public spray about its big-picture priorities and its lack of preparedness for battle. Fitzgibbon was angry about not having the option of deploying the army's Black Hawk helicopters into Afghanistan. The minister had been taking political heat over an inadequate number of NATO medical evacuation choppers available for Australian troops at their base in Tarin Kowt, in Oruzgan province. "If we do see a strategic and tactical justification for sending Black Hawks to Afghanistan tomorrow, we would be unable to do so as they lack the electronic warfare self-protection they require," Fitzgibbon lamented. "We spend a lot of time thinking and talking about important capability as we look far out into the future, but we seem to spend much less time talking about the capability we need to do the things we do right now and on a regular basis." The minister's comments broke the rules of keeping such criticism in-house. Defence likes to see its ministers keep a stiff upper lip in public, confining any criticism to private meetings. Fitzgibbon put his department offside on that day, but he also made a telling point. Few Australians are fully aware that tens of billions of dollars' worth of front-line weaponry from the navy, air force and army cannot be sent to war today unless it is a low-level, low-risk operation. As the Government puts the finishing touches to the new defence white paper, it is gearing up for a public relations blitz about the futuristic, sleek and powerful Australian Defence Force of tomorrow. What the Defence Department won't tell you is that, as things stand, most of Australia's warplanes and ships cannot be sent to any conflict involving an opponent with a half-decent air defence system and modern anti-ship missiles. Across the entire ADF, an alarming amount of expensive military equipment is not in a suitable upgraded condition to be sent to war. This is the legacy of project mismanagement and a Defence Department mindset that focuses more heavily on the defence force of tomorrow than on the force of today. "It really is amazing how little (equipment) can be actually deployed overseas when we have a defence budget of more than $22billion," says Andrew Davies, an analyst withthe country's premier independent military think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Former senior defence official Allan Behm agrees: "I think the public would be absolutely astonished and gobsmacked to think we spend so much on defence every year and yet we can't send much (of) it into harm's way because it won't work or will not survive in acontest." As the Government considers its military options for an increased role in Afghanistan, the frustration of the Rudd Government at the depleted state of the ADF is growing. An investigation by The Australian reveals just how ill-prepared the ADF is for an immediate crisis. It finds much of the defence force's most powerful weaponry is awaiting future upgrades or promised replacements and is useful only for training purposes or deployment on operations where there is little or no risk of high-level conflict. This problem needs to be seen in context. No defence force keeps its entire inventory on war footing; such a practice would be prohibitively expensive and pointless when no enemy is apparent. All Western defence forces, including the ADF, are in a constant state of transition with armoury being upgraded and replaced as it becomes obsolete. But this long-term upgrading process must be balanced against existing requirements and future short-term contingencies. Experts say this balance has been lost. "The problem with readiness planning has arisen because of peacekeeping and other short-notice commitments (that) have seen us having to deploy assets quickly and put them in harm's way," says Daniel Cotterill, a defence analyst with Hill and Knowlton and until recently Fitzgibbon's chief of staff. "There is a bias within defence towards investing in the future force rather than giving government the fully functioning options they really need today." For example, if Australia were asked to provide warplanes for an immediate operation against a country with a functioning air defence system, it could not do so. The F-111 strike bomber, which will be retired next year, can't be deployed to a hot war zone because it has insufficient electronic warfare self-protection and is too easily detected by ene
 
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gf0012-aust       4/3/2009 10:44:23 PM

Maybe that's why new-build Chinooks have passed first Pass in the acquisition timeline and we are waiting for the backlog of F models to clear production, so we can get our own.

 
and in Apr 2 of the "Army" (Page 11) there is a nice little photo of Oz chooks in Kandahar.
 quote:
 
"we provide rotary wing support across regional Command South as  part of an American Task Force. So we work for the entire coalition, not just Australia"
 
It's the TST's 3rd tour.



 
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Volkodav       4/4/2009 2:24:15 AM
Extra Chooks would be great.
 
What chance we can order sufficient new build F's to replace our D's as well as increase numbers. With the current shortage of medium lift we could easily sell our D's to recoup some of the cost of the F's and then recoup more through the F's lower life cycle costs.
 
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gf0012-aust       4/4/2009 3:33:23 AM
to partially paraphrase old julius... "beware the ides" (of May)
 
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Aussie Diggermark 2       4/4/2009 3:46:09 AM
 

I'm obviously out of date because I thought that there were a couple of Chinooks in Afg and hadn't noticed that they'd returned.  As I understand it the Chinook waiting list is a long one.


You are not out of date, you just don't understand Australian defence issues, quite obviously. 
 
Yes we do have chooks in Afghanistan. However they are serving as part of the overall NATO airlift capability. Apart from the Special Forces detachment, they are the most significant force element group we have deployed to Afghanistan and if they were re-rolled to provide on-call medivac support soley for Australian forces, the value of our deployment to Afghanistan, in our allies, view, would diminish remarkably.
 
 
What I was pointing out was because of this requirement, we no longer have a Chinook capacity to deploy to Afghanistan to provide a medivac capability for ourselves, and won't until, and if I suppose, we gain greater Chinook numbers in the Australian Army fleet. Of course we will also have MRH-90 in-service within a few years (5x aircraft already, but IOC is still a year or 2 away) and that should provide other options, but is irrelevent right now.
  
The choice then is to provide an extremely expensive deployment of 2x Chinook helos to rather selfishly provide a medivac capability for ourselves, for the 1 or 2 callouts they might get per week, or do we contribute the same lift capability to the overall NATO mission and use it to increase the capability of the NATO alliance itself?
 
It is clearly obvious, the option the Australian Government has chosen...
 
 
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neutralizer       4/5/2009 2:47:57 AM

"What's this thing about V/STOL carriers for Fleet Air Defence during the Falklands conflict?  Sooo inadequate, sensible Navys like US use large Conventional Carriers, they can launch aircraft with adequate capabilities like the F-4, the Buccaneer and the Gannet .  It also means that pissant little military dictatorships like Argentina wouldn't have even thought of invading British territory. If I was the Minister I would have asked why this wasn't being done, but perhaps no one got around to telling him it's the best way."

Sound familiar? It is of course ridiculous to blame the Royal Navy for the fact that they were equipped with inadequate carriers during the Falklands due to the Government of the United Kingdom retiring their CTOL carriers, a fact that cost hundreds of lives in the ensuing Argentine Airstrikes. It is equally ridiculous of you to blame the Australian military for not using Chinooks for medivac when they don't have enough of them to do so, because our 12 aircraft fleet was sold off to save money and eventually only replaced with 6 updated models during the 1990's (see link). My suggestion for you would be to know your facts before you critisise, because you've just made yourself look very silly.
 
Incidentally, I've just had the pleasure of being visited by an ex-British officer with recent service in Afghanistan and Iraq. From what he has told me about some of the stupid policy's of current British Army Commanders, like still emphasising training for mass armoured warfare and trying to apply it to COIN ops because "if you can fight in a big conventional conflict on the German plain you can fight anywhere", I'd call into question the notion that the British Army is inherantly more "sensible" than Australia's. Both forces have their problems and their share of d1ckheads in charge, but the important thing is that they remain two of the most professional forces in the world. If you were making a serious analysis you would look at the strengths and weaknesses of both and consider how they can learn from each other, but instead I'm pretty quickly coming to expect nothing but juvenile competitiveness instead.  


I'm a tad pressed to see the relvance of FI, it suggests a total lack of understanding.  Rightly or wrongly UK planners never envisaged a FI type scenario.  The 'through deck cruisers' had the primary role of ASW in the N Atlantic, their air defence problem was Soviet Long Range Aviation flying big machines in small numbers mainly to deliver long range missiles, that had managed to get around the North of Norway and avoid the RNAF.  SeaHarriers were perfectly adequate for this task.  Its a good example of not wasting money on excessive capability.  If RN had tried to justify 'real' carriers and airgroups on the basis of defending the FI then HM Treasury would have wet themselves laughing and told them to piss off.
 
Mr Lewis Page (RN retd) also has views about the relevance of heavy equipment (tanks, SPs, etc, etc are all a waste of money all you need are light forces).  It's often said that armies train for the last war, and there is some truth in that.  The reality is that high tempo, combined arms warfare on a reasonable scale (I wouldn't call it mass) is the most demanding and expensive form.  It's also true that there are parts of the British Army that have never liked it for various reasons.  It's my understanding that UK military wisdom is that if you can perform it then its easier to convert to other conditions than the other way around.  Current senior officers all experienced the 1970s and later and this doubtless tells them that the current policy is correct.  No doubt there are more junior officers who disagree, twas ever thus.

 
 
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neutralizer       4/5/2009 3:04:52 AM


mate you run the same song everytime you come in and do your normal drive by.  its old, its tiresome - and quite frankly it makes you look an absolute prat as it always reinforces that you just can't help yourself.  Your inability to control yourself  is just tedious - anger evaporated some years ago when it was apparent that you had some self proclaimed mission to always slag off at the way that we do business tactically, strategically or procurement wise.  

as I said, I respect the insight that you bring on a number of issues, but, again, chucking in  barbs everytime you comment  is just very very old.  we know you have an issue, we know you can't help yourself, we know that you get some self satisfaction at having a go - but seriously it's like listening to a broken record.  
 
so, the only tosspot in here is you because you just can't seem to move on and engage in debate or contribution without reverting to form.  take your chip and convert it into something useful.  I'm sure with all your profound experience that the DefMin would appreciate getting someone more aggressive than his current naval flunky.
 
 So, yes we get it.  You're superior, you don't like us and you want to hilight your veiled contempt at any opportune moment.  Now that we've got it (again) can you see if its possible to engage like an adult rather than continue on like a busted 78.
 
Hell, if we carried on like you on the UK board people would have our guts for garters.   
 

Oh, dear, do try not to let your blood pressure get too high. 
 
The 'naval flunky' bit has gone clean over my head. 

 
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neutralizer       4/5/2009 3:31:28 AM


 



I'm obviously out of date because I thought that there were a couple of Chinooks in Afg and hadn't noticed that they'd returned.  As I understand it the Chinook waiting list is a long one.



 

You are not out of date, you just don't understand Australian defence issues, quite obviously. 

 Yes we do have chooks in Afghanistan. However they are serving as part of the overall NATO airlift capability. Apart from the Special Forces detachment, they are the most significant force element group we have deployed to Afghanistan and if they were re-rolled to provide on-call medivac support soley for Australian forces, the value of our deployment to Afghanistan, in our allies, view, would diminish remarkably. 

What I was pointing out was because of this requirement, we no longer have a Chinook capacity to deploy to Afghanistan to provide a medivac capability for ourselves, and won't until, and if I suppose, we gain greater Chinook numbers in the Australian Army fleet. Of course we will also have MRH-90 in-service within a few years (5x aircraft already, but IOC is still a year or 2 away) and that should provide other options, but is irrelevent right now. 
The choice then is to provide an extremely expensive deployment of 2x Chinook helos to rather selfishly provide a medivac capability for ourselves, for the 1 or 2 callouts they might get per week, or do we contribute the same lift capability to the overall NATO mission and use it to increase the capability of the NATO alliance itself?
 

My understanding is that all SH and AH are part of the overall ISAF resources, less for some that are part of the US national operation and those subject to national usage caveats (eg German).   Obviously with heli they aren't normally going to be used too far from their home turf for logistic/flight time reasons.  I think you'll find that the CH used for casevac are standard machines, they are not specialised, it's also my understanding that they have one on standby at Bastion although whether tis is permanent or just when deployed operations are going on is unclear to me.  I guess the good news is that the AS/NL casualty rate is just not high enough to justify a heli permanently tasked for casevac tasks, in someone's view.  Have NL got any of their CH in theatre?
Instead of bleating about Blackhawks I'd be asking about what discussions have taken place with NL forces about a joint effort.  But I confess I have no idea about their casualty numbers.
 
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gf0012-aust       4/5/2009 3:50:40 AM
Oh, dear, do try not to let your blood pressure get too high. 
my blood pressure is fine,  stop acting like a knob and we'll all be happier.  It shouldn't be that hard to do.
 The 'naval flunky' bit has gone clean over my head.  

his current MLO is a naval officer. 



 
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neutralizer       4/5/2009 4:28:01 AM

you are seriously out of touch about how procurement is done within the Australian Military - and the above comment shows that you actually don't have a clue as to how Kinnaird works.

btw - all the work I do is involved at the JOC level - I know you're speaking crap because I get to deal with it everyday. You'll be surprised to know that Labor (again) have this overwhelming desire to embrace UK profurement processes and yet we have UK Staff Officers advsing us to run screaming from that room - they think their own system is stuffed - in fact tyhe UK is currently providing procurement officers to look at how we run logistics and how we do Rapid Acquisition because they regard their model as busted.
 
If you knew anything about how projects and procurement is done here you'd know that no single entity has unilateral decision making except the Minister - and its the Minister who has elected to make some big ticket procurement decisions without even consulting the  uniforms or the suits.  You'd also know that in the 1st pass process that we have other divisions over sighting each step and that suits and uniforms from separate stakeholder areas have the right to veto.
 
So for all your bull about the uniforms being able to get stuff across the line sans civilian review is just unmitigated rubbish.
 
Please don't pretend to be knowledgeable about contemp australian  procurement processes when some of us are clearly first hand based to tell you that you're way off the planet.  You lose credibility straight away when its apparent that you aren't familiar of the checks and balances in place (and yes, there is a UK staff currently here looking at adopting some of those checks and balances in their own procurement processes) 

Well I do admit to having experienced the old MoD(PE), not forgetting Mrs T asking pertinent questions about why the serving officers only did 2 yr tours!  She was also smart enough to appoint a good businessman, Peter Levine, to run the show.  There may be a message here, although nowadays MoD like all UK govt depts, etc, has two outside directors on its managment board but whether that's enough to counter the military/civil service/politician mindset would have to be doubted. 
However, I'd also make some points, first every nation has a challenge with its defence procurement system - imagine having the German system where the Bunderstag has to vote on major acquisitions, but after all testing and trials have been completed and reported!  Next it's always a mistake to try and import someone else's processes because they are always influenced by factors outside their boundary and these are never the same in any two countries.  The third point, which always traps foreigners, is that the UK national sport is complaining - this means you don't believe it 100%, similarly Australia's national sport is bullshitting and you don't believe that 100% either!
 
UK's CADMID model is entirely reasonable and hardly novel (even if they did pay McKinsey's a pile for it).  I'd be totally unsuprised if it wasn't working to theory, there will always be too many people trying to get in on the act, not least Treasury despite their supposedly having a more hands-off role than previously.  Of course it can be argued that the real problem in government is not letting project managers manage, too many people elsewhere in the foodchain want in on the act.  MoD was naughty over its belated implementation of SROs, and it will be interesting to see if this is beneficial. Of course copying this in Canberra may not work, it hinges on failure being career threatening, and when senior staff are on individual contracts this becomes 'manageable' for the person concerned.
 
With any defence procument the really difficult bit is the requirements - getting them right and affordable and not changing them in the all too long acquisition process, and this often means ensuring that risks in all its forms are properly covered, optimistic estimates to get the show on the road are still not unknown, but in the end an estimate is just that and never easy to get right, and CADMID is trying to solve this but I've no doubt there are plenty of people complaining about it getting in the way.  Over the last several decades the UK has got quite good at developing the justification for a capability in terms of battlefield benefit, of course this includes heroic
 
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Aussiegunneragain       4/5/2009 4:32:58 AM
"I'm a tad pressed to see the relvance of FI, it suggests a total lack of understanding.  Rightly or wrongly UK planners never envisaged a FI type scenario.  The 'through deck cruisers' had the primary role of ASW in the N Atlantic, their air defence problem was Soviet Long Range Aviation flying big machines in small numbers mainly to deliver long range missiles, that had managed to get around the North of Norway and avoid the RNAF.  SeaHarriers were perfectly adequate for this task.  Its a good example of not wasting money on excessive capability.  If RN had tried to justify 'real' carriers and airgroups on the basis of defending the FI then HM Treasury would have wet themselves laughing and told them to piss off."
 
That's complete bullshit. The Invincible Class Carriers and Sea Harriers were completely inadequate for the task of defeating the Russian Naval bombers that would have gotten past the RNAF's short-ranged, Sidewinder armed F-16's in large numbers. I believe the question at the time was "how does a subsonic Harrier catch a supersonic Backfire?".  Answer? It wouldn't have. The best the SHAR might have done would have been to chase off a TU-95 before it could report the course and bearing of the convoy. What's more the UK Government was going to retire the Invincible class had the Falklands not come along. It's a very good example of how a military can be screwed over by the civilian government, just like has happenned with the Australian military and the Chinooks.
 
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