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Subject: What sort of land force does Australia really need?
Volkodav    8/19/2008 8:19:53 AM
Continental defence suggests light armour and motorised infantry. Regional commitments suggest air mobile light infantry. Extra regional coalition operations suggest heavy armour. We need to be capable in all areas but how can we achieve a balanced capable force with our small recruitment base? What solutions may we be seeing in the Defence White Paper?
 
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Barracuda       8/25/2008 9:53:31 AM





The link suggests that Hasting's has a history of passing his own interpretations on events to which he is not privy. Irrespective of whether or not he was on the Falklands he would not have been privy to the reasons behind the commanders decision's, especially to those of the commander of a unit to which he was not attached. Do you seriously believe that the British Army would have said to a journalist "we've called off the march of the Guards because they are too unfit". Seriously? He might have gotten a few second hand mutterings by paratroopers passing their own interpretations on events, but he wouldn't have had to full picture. The senior British officers who ran the operation still can't agree between themselves about how the operation ran, so Hastings is hardly and expert witness on the matter.



 Anyway, here is an article that gives a different version of why the guards were taken to Bluff Cove by sea. It indicates that the decision was made because it was the quickest way to reinforce the Para's who had gone there by Chinook, against orders. The article also suggests that had that not happened then the Guards would have marched into action like all the other troops. Go's to show that you can't take any one source as gospel, hey.



 



.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_84/ai_n14699964













Hastings had access to everyone at the higher levels of the operation, he was there and he had no barrow to push, as such he is certainly an impartial witness.

 

From the article you quote - "The sailors were shocked at the condition of the Welsh Guards when they returned after just a night or so ashore--wet, filthy, miserable--and obviously ineffective." why do you think that the Guards were up to a route march when all the evidence suggests otherwise?

 

Having read the article, unfortunately it ignores reality - the Guards CO ordered his troops back after convincing 5 Bde that "it was uneconomic to exhaust the battalion merely to get them to Goose Green".  It can certainly be argued that moving by ship was the fastest way to advance the Guards, since they were not up to walking - but that hardly suggests that the plan was to ship them forward.

 

Re the Guards COs article, he does have a bit of a vested interest in the matter, wouldn't you say?


Sorry there is no such thing as an unbiased source.  Hasting's bias is to sell his book, books need controversy therefore Hastings used his sources to create a tone or bias.  All historians do this. Look at us we are all biased.
As to the Commander of the Guards Brigade, he had boats why not sail them around the island. His idea was sound, why walk when you can drive/sail.  Why dirk the men around.  The Task Force Commander could have said no.
 
I have a good friend who was in the Welsh Guards who did the attack on Goose Green with eleven rounds in his mag. So did most of his mates  I think he would take  offence to say his Battalion was ineffective.  By the time they came down they were all fit, they didn't just sit around in the cruise liners.  they ran and pack marched.
 
The reason he says they looked "wet, filthy, miserable" because the Falklands Is were "wet, filthy, miserable".  He always suggested the problems were boots not toughness.  The Guards wore hobnails with no tongue with gaiters, whilst the Paras wore Jump Boots.  His main aim was find an Argie with the same size boots.
 
Consider also they only had one Chinook becasue they all went down in the Atlantic Conveyer.  Boat much quicker, much smarter.
 
I really think your argument is redundent and I must agree with AG.  Oh the pain!
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Raven   8/25/2008 9:59:09 AM
I know light infantry can learn to do combined arms - but the point is they shouldn't have to learn it - it should be ingrained into their training at all levels at all times. It is ironic that the rapid deployment force should come from the bde that is least prepared for modern warfare.
 
They are only ill prepared for the operations that you think they should be doing, that being armoured operations off in Afghanistan or Iraq. The fact of the matter is that the Australian government who have the mandate to establish what the military should be based on their foriegn policy objectives, don't require 3 Brigade (or indeed anybody else) to conduct armoured combat operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. At the most they are going to ask them to do force protection out of the back of Bushmasters. What the Australian government does require of them is to be a light infantry force capable of quickly deploying in our region. They do that brilliantly and they are quite capable of combined arms work with the other arms that principally support them in that role, those being field artillery and aviation. That is the reality of modern warfare in our region, armour is reletively less important than it is in Afghanistan and Iraq. Given that we have on average deployed in this region more than once a decade since the begining of WW2 in the Pacific, I would suggest to you that the government is being wise by maintainng the type of force that can do it well.
 
 
Vietnam is actually a very poor example of Australian infantry and armour working well together. Australian infantry and armour basically didn't work together at all until forced to by Vietnam experiences. There was only about 3 combined armour/infantry exercises between the Korean war and when C sqn deployed to Vietnam in 1968. It took literally years before the infantry and armour really got comfortable working with each other. There are lots of examples of the tanks being left home on operations in Vietnam because it was deemed too hard to involve them. If the 1ATF went to Vietnam with the orbat and skill at combined arms they had won by the end, casualties would have been a fraction of what they were. It shouldn't take a painful lesson in another war to teach us combined arms.
 
Without knowing why the tanks were left at home on specific occasions (terrain might have had something to do with it on some occasions perhaps?), I can't comment beyond noting that both Coral and Bihn Ba happenned within a year of the deployment of C Squadron and they were outstandingly successful. That said of course it is desirable for units to undertake as much practice with other units as they can. However, you have to be realistic about how often a formation like 3 Bde, whose job is primarily as a light infantry formation and who have a high rate of deployment, can afford to be practicing what for them are secondary tasks. Personally I would like to see an independent tank battalion formed so that more of this training can be conducted more often and to beef up armoured support on operations, but that would come down the list of necessary extra items for the Army.
 
I'm also not overstating the complexities of my own speciality, but the complexities of combined arms warfare in general. The armoured corp is not immune. As I said, I've never worked with helicopters in Australia. I haven't worked with artillery since I did my all arms call for fire down in Pucka. Yet on ops I was supposed to be proficent at calling in a medivac, talking an Apache onto a target, and calling in fire from arty if required. I'm just glad I never had to do them, as I would have sucked at it.
 
I think you would find that with any of those tasks being able to read a map and talk into a radio are 80% of the challenge. Naturally if you were to deploy where you need to know that stuff they should give you some practice first, but it isn't so hard that you couldn't pick it up.
 
The Australian Army is not resource limited. We are personnel limited, but we are certainly not resource limited. The only country that has a higher defence budget per soldier is Kuwait. For the relatively tiny size of our army and the relatively massive budget we have, we should have a far, far more capable army. To limit our army to light infantry because of resources is taking the politically easy way out. Since we are personnel limited, we should be looking to get the most combat power we can out of our formations. The units with the most combat power is certainly not light infantry.

When I talk about resources I'm also talking ab

 
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Aussiegunneragain    Barracuda   8/25/2008 10:11:55 AM


I really think your argument is redundent and I must agree with AG.  Oh the pain!


Another soul for the collection .... BWA, HA, HA, HA, HA!!!

 
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Aussiegunneragain    Raven   8/25/2008 10:29:20 AM
With cavalry, I?d have a serious look at their role. The way 2 Cav and 2/14 are organised now is as divisional recon battalions. Why we need two divisional recon battalions in an army with less than one division is beyond me. Each brigade only needs a company/squadron worth of cavalry to provide medium reconnaissance. As such, I?d look at restructuring the cav regt. One a squadron would specialise in the reconnaissance role, being equipped with vehicles similar to the current ASLAV. The other two squadrons would go to a more old school/US style fighting cavalry. These would be equipped with larger vehicles able to carry more dismounts, like the NZLAV. These squadrons would be similar to mech infantry, with the difference that the cavalry would be primarily a mounted force with the dismounts supporting the vehicles, whereas mech infantry has vehicles supporting dismounts. These squadrons would be far better suited to current cavalry tasks on ops than the current organisation.
 
That clarifies for me what you are talking about with respect to organic dismount elements in the Cavalry. I still think overall the plan is the wrong one though. I can't for the life of me see the point in restructuring our entire army to be able to be able to better perform the "current tasks" of open terrain armoured warfare off on the other side of the world when:
 
a. we aren't actually performing them because the Government doesn't want us to and in reality haven't performed those sort of ops on any scale since Korea;
b. it is going to mean a reduction in our ability to perform the type of jungle and island operations in our own region that we have performed on a regular basis for the last 60 years.
 
 
 
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Raven22       8/25/2008 12:25:23 PM

I think the biggest problem, AG, is that we want an army for different things. I want a modern combined arms army able to fight a modern mechanised or counter-insurgency war in concert with our allies anywhere in the world. You want an army able to patrol the jungles in our ?region? and not much more. Fair enough.

I will say, however, army is mandated by government to be able to deploy and support a brigade sized force in medium intensity warfare in concert with our allies anywhere in the world. We currently can?t do that. Your army of light infantry won?t be able to do that. A more balanced light-mechanised force like the one I mentioned will. On the other hand, a light mechanised army can patrol the jungles of our region just as well as the current light infantry army. Simply leave the IFVs at home and patrol dismounted ? the same as we?ve had engineers, artillery and tankers acting as infantrymen in the region lately.

BTW, this statement is just plain wrong.

I think you would find that with any of those tasks being able to read a map and talk into a radio are 80% of the challenge. Naturally if you were to deploy where you need to know that stuff they should give you some practice first, but it isn't so hard that you couldn't pick it up.

That sort of coordination that I listed is some of the hardest things to do in modern warfare. Saying ?it isn?t so had you shouldn?t be able to pick it up? is how people die waiting for the medivac chopper to come (Sig McArthy) or how your own artillery lands on your head (lots and lots of times), or how 10 French soldiers are killed and the survivors pinned down for hours because they didn't know how to call in air support or even reinforcements. In war, now more than ever, simple things are hard, hard things even harder. As I said, I?m just glad I didn?t have to do those things in Iraq, because wouldn?t have been very good.

 
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Yimmy       8/25/2008 2:48:16 PM


I think the biggest problem, AG, is that we want an army for different things. I want a modern combined arms army able to fight a modern mechanised or counter-insurgency war in concert with our allies anywhere in the world. You want an army able to patrol the jungles in our ?region? and not much more. Fair enough.


I'm not sure those two wants are mutually exclusive are they? 
 
There is no reason why a "modern combined arms army" should be incapable of patrolling jungles in the region, at worst it has to leave some of its heavier assets at home.  If you can't take a tank, take a supercat instead.  This is common practice in the British army, where a squadron may find during pre-deployment training its CVR(T) vehicles replaced by Mastiff, through being more appropriate to the regions requirements.
 
On the other hand, I rather doubt a modern combined arms army (basically tailored for fighting the German Africa Corps or Soviet Shock Army) to be the best bet for fighting a counter-insurgency operation, where light infantry is what you want.  Jary in "18 Platoon" commented that he found his infantry to be far more effective used with the element of surprise and keeping the initiative, than in combined arms operations, and when the enemy don't have tanks I would argue that is a fair bet.  
 
I have often wondered why the British army doesn't have a specialised Counter-Insurgency wing, based on the lessons of Malaya, Northern Ireland and now Afghanistan, especially when tactics of fighting an insurgency compared to classical warfighting are as different as equipment from Warrior to Mastiff. 
 
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Kevin Pork       8/25/2008 9:39:00 PM

 the Guards CO ordered his troops back after convincing 5 Bde that "it was uneconomic to exhaust the battalion merely to get them to Goose Green".  It can certainly be argued that moving by ship was the fastest way to advance the Guards, since they were not up to walking - but that hardly suggests that the plan was to ship them forward.

 

Ah, the story changes. Originally you said that the guards couldn't make it to Goose Green, now you tell us that the commander decided against the march because there was no point exhausting them. That supports my original suggestion that they were able to route march, just not as fast as the Paras or Marines.

 

The story doesn't change, you are just grabbing at straws. fact: the Guards set out to walk to Goose Green. Fact: their CO, after 12hrs marching convinced 5Bde that they should not continue to Goose Green as it was going to exhaust the Bn. Fact - they were incapable of doing the march.
 
There is no point doing the march if you are not fit to fight at the end. the Guards failed, that failure led to almost 200 casualties in the Galahad disaster.   The facts are easy to find, flailing about to pretend otherwise is not helpful.
 
Your "point" that they could have made it but not as fast as the Paras or Marines is frankly contemptible - my mother could march from San Carlos to Goose Green, "just not as fast as the Paras or Marines", it doesn't make her an effective light infantryman.
 
 
"I'm rather bemused that I find myself contesting you in your attempt to use a journalist as an impartial expert witness. I probably hold the media in higher esteem than most people on this board but I certainly don't take the word of one as  gospel. I certainly don't see any evidence that the Guard's commander was biased in the article. In a nutshell all he said was "We weren't as fit as the Paras and Royal Marines because they are elite light troops and because we have to Guard Buck House, but we still did the job". If he thought that being carrier troops was a major part of the reason for their poorer performance I'm sure that he would have said so. "
 
 
The fact is they DIDN'T do the job - the job was to route march forward and thus present a dispersed target to air attack. their inability to do so resulted in almost 200 unneccessary casualties, to say otherwise is a whitewash.

 "Anyway, you keep right on taking the words of one journalist as gospel because it suits your argument to do so. I'll continue to take a more open mind. "
 
Yes, I'll listen to the journo who was there, had access at all levels and doesn't have a personal or regimental barrow to push, you listen to the guy who has to put a positive spin on the failure of his unit, under his command, that resulted in almost 200 casualties - why would he possibly distort the facts?
 
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Kevin Pork       8/25/2008 10:03:12 PM

As to the Commander of the Guards Brigade, he had boats why not sail them around the island. His idea was sound, why walk when you can drive/sail.  Why dirk the men around.  The Task Force Commander could have said no.

 

I have a good friend who was in the Welsh Guards who did the attack on Goose Green with eleven rounds in his mag. So did most of his mates  I think he would take  offence to say his Battalion was ineffective.  By the time they came down they were all fit, they didn't just sit around in the cruise liners.  they ran and pack marched.

 

The reason he says they looked "wet, filthy, miserable" because the Falklands Is were "wet, filthy, miserable".  He always suggested the problems were boots not toughness.  The Guards wore hobnails with no tongue with gaiters, whilst the Paras wore Jump Boots.  His main aim was find an Argie with the same size boots.

 

Consider also they only had one Chinook becasue they all went down in the Atlantic Conveyer.  Boat much quicker, much smarter.

 

I really think your argument is redundent and I must agree with AG.  Oh the pain!


Why walk when you can drive/sail? air attack. the Brits, having already lost a number of ships to air attack were keenly aware of the danger that it posed to shipping.  Walking, 300 men present a very dispersed target, packed into a ship they are a gift.
Your good friend who was in the Welsh Guards, who attacked Goose Green with only 11 rds in the mag - he is a bullshot artiste, the welsh guards never attacked goose green. 2 Para did. re the pack marching on a cruise liner, clearly they didn't do enough - they were incapable of marching to Goose Green.
The reason he says they looked "wet, filthy, miserable" because the Falklands Is were "wet, filthy, miserable".  yet the navy who stated the above pointed out that the Cdos (for example, were not) -  he also pointed out that they were "clearly ineffective".
 
The Boots Argument - given that it seems likely that he wasn't there (what with attacking Goose Green and all), I'll wait for credible info on that.
 
 Consider also they only had one Chinook becasue they all went down in the Atlantic Conveyer.  Boat much quicker, much smarter.   Quicker? if it makes it, Atlantic Conveyor and Galahad certainly didn't.  Smarter? 200 casualties on Galahad would probably disagree - I haven't bothered looking, but I'd guess that that is more casualties than all of 3 Cdo Bde took to air attack (once ashore) in the entire war, dispersed targets are much smarter against air attack.
 
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Barracuda       8/26/2008 12:16:28 AM
Why walk when you can drive/sail? air attack. the Brits, having already lost a number of ships to air attack were keenly aware of the danger that it posed to shipping.  Walking, 300 men present a very dispersed target, packed into a ship they are a gift.
 
Yes but the RN thought they could defend them, otherwise they would not have gone. That is a very ordinary come back.  Light infantry will never walk if they can help it.
Your good friend who was in the Welsh Guards, who attacked Goose Green with only 11 rds in the mag - he is a bullshot artiste, the welsh guards never attacked goose green. 2 Para did. re the pack marching on a cruise liner, clearly they didn't do enough - they were incapable of marching to Goose Green.
 
Not a bullshit artist quite the opposite.  My mistake, I always get Goose Green and the Assault on the Hills above Port Stanley (MT Tumbledown) misled up.  But I do like your measured response.  Nice. 
The reason he says they looked "wet, filthy, miserable" because the Falklands Is were "wet, filthy, miserable".  yet the navy who stated the above pointed out that the Cdos (for example, were not) -  he also pointed out that they were "clearly ineffective".
 
You are not serious are you.  How is the opinion of the Navy on the Marines, who were trying to recover from the bad press of losing the islands in tone first place relevant.
 
The Boots Argument - given that it seems likely that he wasn't there (what with attacking Goose Green and all), I'll wait for credible info on that.
 
Yeah Yeah.  Its not true, but what would I know.  Consider the Guards took terrible injuries from mines due to the nails in their boots. Additional fact as a result the British ARmy changed boots soon after.
 
 Consider also they only had one Chinook because they all went down in the Atlantic Conveyer.  Boat much quicker, much smarter.   Quicker? if it makes it, Atlantic Conveyor and Galahad certainly didn't.  Smarter? 200 casualties on Galahad would probably disagree - I haven't bothered looking, but I'd guess that that is more casualties than all of 3 Cdo Bde took to air attack (once ashore) in the entire war, dispersed targets are much smarter against air attack.
 
The Galahad was a poor command decision and had nothing to do with dispersement.  The CO of the Welsh Guards would not get off until air defence was achieved..
 
You are making the arguments based in the findings of a journalist who had limited access to the troops and who had a very limited understanding of conducting military operations.  Additionally the book was very rushed to the market.  There are much better accounts.
 
Got to go will get back to this later.
 
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Barracuda       8/26/2008 12:48:41 AM

Right I am back...and am continuing completely off the thread
 
The story doesn't change, you are just grabbing at straws. fact: the Guards set out to walk to Goose Green. Fact: their CO, after 12hrs marching convinced 5Bde that they should not continue to Goose Green as it was going to exhaust the Bn. Fact - they were incapable of doing the march.
 
There is no point doing the march if you are not fit to fight at the end. the Guards failed, that failure led to almost 200 casualties in the Galahad disaster.   The facts are easy to find, flailing about to pretend otherwise is not helpful.
 
Your "point" that they could have made it but not as fast as the Paras or Marines is frankly contemptible - my mother could march from San Carlos to Goose Green, "just not as fast as the Paras or Marines", it doesn't make her an effective light infantryman.
 
But you are missing the point.  It is not a question of exhaustion but a question of timings. The CO had to make the march and attack in a certain time.  He could have made the march but not made the timings because the required process would have exhausted the men to meet those timings.  They were required to move across the isalnd, much further then 2 PARA at Goose Green. (Thanks again for pointing out my mistake) Doing a Brigade advance to contact is time consuming, it is not a route march, therefore he looked at other options hence the naval move, thus achieving his higher commanders intent... the capture of Tumbledown.
 
You are drawing perhaps the wrong conclusions from Hastings.  As for the HMS Galahad and losing 200 men that is an opportunity cost argument.  A different command issue, although reprehensible.
 
To prove your argument you need to prove that the Paras or Marines could have made the march ... How would you do that? Immpossible, and Hastings is not a credible source.  Find a British General who will back you up.
 
 
 
 
 
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