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Subject: What sort of land force does Australia really need?
Volkodav    8/19/2008 8:19:53 AM
Continental defence suggests light armour and motorised infantry. Regional commitments suggest air mobile light infantry. Extra regional coalition operations suggest heavy armour. We need to be capable in all areas but how can we achieve a balanced capable force with our small recruitment base? What solutions may we be seeing in the Defence White Paper?
 
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Yimmy       8/24/2008 11:52:43 AM

 I am also sure the Guards unit was capable of meeting their minimum fitness requirements, if this was insufficient to allow them to achieve their operational taskings,  then we have yet another Command failure.

Indeed, which means every man in the battalion should have been capable of tabbing 8 miles with 55 pounds in under 2 hours, unless standards have changed.  That makes for four miles per hour.  In which case, even given the terrain and heavier loads of war fighting operations, I fail to see why they wouldn't be able of doing the quoted 18 miles in 12 hours, making for one-and-a-half miles per hour.
 
As an aside - tabbing isn't even much of a physical thing, it is rather a mental thing.  If you can stand and tab with the weight for one mile, you can sustain it for multiple miles with some will power and determination.  All infantry soldiers should be fit and healthy at any time, and while peak fitness is not sustainable, it only takes half a dozen weeks to get there from a solid basic standard.
 
 
Also, if you could clarify something for me, how do you define the difference between Mechanised, Motorised and Armoured Infantry?  As per my understanding, Motorised Infantry are just Light Role Infantry who are given trucks, while Mechanised Infantry are equipped with M113/Bulldog/Mastiff type vehicles, with the emphasis still being on just using them as battlefield taxis, while Armoured Infantry use IFV's akin to Warrior/CV90/Bradley/BMP, and are capable of fighting alongside their vehicles mounted or otherwise.  Does Australia do it differently?
 
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Raven22       8/24/2008 12:34:02 PM

That comment is ironic considering that the other discussion I am having on this thread is with a former light infantryman who is absolutely convince that only light infantry can do what they do. Now you are telling me that light infantry specialists can't possibly learn how to work with their supporting arms if the situation requires it, despite the fact that they are doing so in a limited way now and have done so very successfully in past conflicts. Binh Ba and Coral are names that spring to mind when I think of light infantry who spent most of their time patrolling, working very well with tanks when required. It would seem that overstating the complexities associated with ones own specialty is an Army-wide affliction.

I know light infantry can learn to do combined arms - but the point is they shouldn't have to learn it - it should be ingrained into their training at all levels at all times. It is ironic that the rapid deployment force should come from the bde that is least prepared for modern warfare.

Vietnam is actually a very poor example of Australian infantry and armour working well together. Australian infantry and armour basically didn't work together at all until forced to by Vietnam experiences. There was only about 3 combined armour/infantry exercises between the Korean war and when C sqn deployed to Vietnam in 1968. It took literally years before the infantry and armour really got comfortable working with each other. There are lots of examples of the tanks being left home on operations in Vietnam because it was deemed too hard to involve them. If the 1ATF went to Vietnam with the orbat and skill at combined arms they had won by the end, casualties would have been a fraction of what they were. It shouldn't take a painful lesson in another war to teach us combined arms.

I'm also not overstating the complexities of my own speciality, but the complexities of combined arms warfare in general. The armoured corp is not immune. As I said, I've never worked with helicopters in Australia. I haven't worked with artillery since I did my all arms call for fire down in Pucka. Yet on ops I was supposed to be proficent at calling in a medivac, talking an Apache onto a target, and calling in fire from arty if required. I'm just glad I never had to do them, as I would have sucked at it.

Personally I agree with the decision to shape our resource limited force in a way that is appropriate for operations in our region, that being mostly light-infantry based.

The Australian Army is not resource limited. We are personnel limited, but we are certainly not resource limited. The only country that has a higher defence budget per soldier is Kuwait. For the relatively tiny size of our army and the relatively massive budget we have, we should have a far, far more capable army. To limit our army to light infantry because of resources is taking the politically easy way out. Since we are personnel limited, we should be looking to get the most combat power we can out of our formations. The units with the most combat power is certainly not light infantry.

With respect to the modern challenge, I wonder how many Chinooks, V-22's and ARH's we could buy for the value of all these extra AFV's that you guy's seem convinced that we need? I personally think we need to spend some money making our armoured forces more effective, but I'd weigh our forces towards extra airlift and airborne firepower if we had to make a choice.

Helicopters are vastly more expensive than armoured vehicles. If you want maximum combat power for your dollar the answer isn't helicopters. Australia's current paltry aviation force soaks up fully a third of the Army budget - yet currently has all of half a dozen helicopters on ops. Great return for investment there. It would be far cheaper to turn our army into a mech/mot force than it would be to rely on helicopters to give combat power to the light infantry. Of course we shouldn't be going to either extreme, we need a balanced force.

Reducing the number of battalions would be an absolute, unmitigated disaster. Do you know that in East Timor we were so short of infantry that we had to put gunners into the battalions to beef up the numbers? Cavalry is important in COIN operations but at the end of the day you have to have enough troops on foot to man the checkpoints, search the houses and conduct sweeps in complex terrain.

No it wouldn't, reducing the number of infantry battalions for more cavalry would simply be a logical response to the requirements of current operations. Turning infantry soldiers into armoured soldiers wouldn't have affected how many soldiers we could send to Timor at all, they

 
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StevoJH       8/24/2008 12:40:54 PM




 I am also sure the Guards unit was capable of meeting their minimum fitness requirements, if this was insufficient to allow them to achieve their operational taskings,  then we have yet another Command failure.





Indeed, which means every man in the battalion should have been capable of tabbing 8 miles with 55 pounds in under 2 hours, unless standards have changed.  That makes for four miles per hour.  In which case, even given the terrain and heavier loads of war fighting operations, I fail to see why they wouldn't be able of doing the quoted 18 miles in 12 hours, making for one-and-a-half miles per hour.

 

As an aside - tabbing isn't even much of a physical thing, it is rather a mental thing.  If you can stand and tab with the weight for one mile, you can sustain it for multiple miles with some will power and determination.  All infantry soldiers should be fit and healthy at any time, and while peak fitness is not sustainable, it only takes half a dozen weeks to get there from a solid basic standard.

 

 

Also, if you could clarify something for me, how do you define the difference between Mechanised, Motorised and Armoured Infantry?  As per my understanding, Motorised Infantry are just Light Role Infantry who are given trucks, while Mechanised Infantry are equipped with M113/Bulldog/Mastiff type vehicles, with the emphasis still being on just using them as battlefield taxis, while Armoured Infantry use IFV's akin to Warrior/CV90/Bradley/BMP, and are capable of fighting alongside their vehicles mounted or otherwise.  Does Australia do it differently?


We don't have anything along the lines of Armoured Cavalry. We have light infantry, bushmaster mounted infantry and M113 Mounted infantry. In terms of Armour we have light armour for recon (ASLAV) and a single regiment of M1A1's. Just to make a point, an Australian Armoured Regiment is based upon the UK model, in that it is made up of 50-60 ranks, rather then multiple squadrons of around that number.
 
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Enterpriser       8/24/2008 12:44:17 PM




 I am also sure the Guards unit was capable of meeting their minimum fitness requirements, if this was insufficient to allow them to achieve their operational taskings,  then we have yet another Command failure.





Indeed, which means every man in the battalion should have been capable of tabbing 8 miles with 55 pounds in under 2 hours, unless standards have changed.  That makes for four miles per hour.  In which case, even given the terrain and heavier loads of war fighting operations, I fail to see why they wouldn't be able of doing the quoted 18 miles in 12 hours, making for one-and-a-half miles per hour.

 

As an aside - tabbing isn't even much of a physical thing, it is rather a mental thing.  If you can stand and tab with the weight for one mile, you can sustain it for multiple miles with some will power and determination.  All infantry soldiers should be fit and healthy at any time, and while peak fitness is not sustainable, it only takes half a dozen weeks to get there from a solid basic standard.

 

 

Also, if you could clarify something for me, how do you define the difference between Mechanised, Motorised and Armoured Infantry?  As per my understanding, Motorised Infantry are just Light Role Infantry who are given trucks, while Mechanised Infantry are equipped with M113/Bulldog/Mastiff type vehicles, with the emphasis still being on just using them as battlefield taxis, while Armoured Infantry use IFV's akin to Warrior/CV90/Bradley/BMP, and are capable of fighting alongside their vehicles mounted or otherwise.  Does Australia do it differently?



Technically, it seems as though we do it along similar lines. However, in practice we do not operate anything in the right categories to do it properly. Perhaps the size of the army limits this a little (although so does the inability of the Pollies to decide that 1st Brigade should be a capable and equipped Mech Brigade). We currently have no vehicles to equip anything in the Armoured Infantry Category (due to lack of IFV), but we have turreted M113AS4 (?) which is to equip Mech infantry. We also have Bushmasters which are more armoured than trucks that would be associated with Motorised Infantry but really are not supposed to be Mech Infantry vehicles. Its all a little confusing. So AI= no. Mech I= M113AS4 (5 & 7 RAR). Mot I = Bushmaster (6 & 8/9 RAR). LI = Footsloggers (1, 2 & 3 [once 3 re-rolled from Para] RAR).
Hope this helps a little until AD etc arrive with a more complete answer.
 
Brett.
 
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Raven22       8/24/2008 2:22:43 PM

That comment is ironic considering that the other discussion I am having on this thread is with a former light infantryman who is absolutely convince that only light infantry can do what they do. Now you are telling me that light infantry specialists can't possibly learn how to work with their supporting arms if the situation requires it, despite the fact that they are doing so in a limited way now and have done so very successfully in past conflicts. Binh Ba and Coral are names that spring to mind when I think of light infantry who spent most of their time patrolling, working very well with tanks when required. It would seem that overstating the complexities associated with ones own specialty is an Army-wide affliction.

I know light infantry can learn to do combined arms - but the point is they shouldn't have to learn it - it should be ingrained into their training at all levels at all times. It is ironic that the rapid deployment force should come from the bde that is least prepared for modern warfare.

Vietnam is actually a very poor example of Australian infantry and armour working well together. Australian infantry and armour basically didn't work together at all until forced to by Vietnam experiences. There was only about 3 combined armour/infantry exercises between the Korean war and when C sqn deployed to Vietnam in 1968. It took literally years before the infantry and armour really got comfortable working with each other. There are lots of examples of the tanks being left home on operations in Vietnam because it was deemed too hard to involve them. If the 1ATF went to Vietnam with the orbat and skill at combined arms they had won by the end, casualties would have been a fraction of what they were. It shouldn't take a painful lesson in another war to teach us combined arms.

I'm also not overstating the complexities of my own speciality, but the complexities of combined arms warfare in general. The armoured corp is not immune. As I said, I've never worked with helicopters in Australia. I haven't worked with artillery since I did my all arms call for fire down in Pucka. Yet on ops I was supposed to be proficent at calling in a medivac, talking an Apache onto a target, and calling in fire from arty if required. I'm just glad I never had to do them, as I would have sucked at it.

Personally I agree with the decision to shape our resource limited force in a way that is appropriate for operations in our region, that being mostly light-infantry based.

The Australian Army is not resource limited. We are personnel limited, but we are certainly not resource limited. The only country that has a higher defence budget per soldier is Kuwait. For the relatively tiny size of our army and the relatively massive budget we have, we should have a far, far more capable army. To limit our army to light infantry because of resources is taking the politically easy way out. Since we are personnel limited, we should be looking to get the most combat power we can out of our formations. The units with the most combat power is certainly not light infantry.

With respect to the modern challenge, I wonder how many Chinooks, V-22's and ARH's we could buy for the value of all these extra AFV's that you guy's seem convinced that we need? I personally think we need to spend some money making our armoured forces more effective, but I'd weigh our forces towards extra airlift and airborne firepower if we had to make a choice.

Helicopters are vastly more expensive than armoured vehicles. If you want maximum combat power for your dollar the answer isn't helicopters. Australia's current paltry aviation force soaks up fully a third of the Army budget - yet currently has all of half a dozen helicopters on ops. Great return for investment there. It would be far cheaper to turn our army into a mech/mot force than it would be to rely on helicopters to give combat power to the light infantry. Of course we shouldn't be going to either extreme, we need a balanced force.

Reducing the number of battalions would be an absolute, unmitigated disaster. Do you know that in East Timor we were so short of infantry that we had to put gunners into the battalions to beef up the numbers? Cavalry is important in COIN operations but at the end of the day you have to have enough troops on foot to man the checkpoints, search the houses and conduct sweeps in complex terrain.

No it wouldn't, reducing the number of infantry battalions for more cavalry would simply be a logical response to the requirements of current operations. Turning infantry soldiers into armoured soldiers wouldn't have affected how many soldiers we could send to Timor at all, they

 
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StevoJH       8/24/2008 2:37:35 PM










 I am also sure the Guards unit was capable of meeting their minimum fitness requirements, if this was insufficient to allow them to achieve their operational taskings,  then we have yet another Command failure.













Indeed, which means every man in the battalion should have been capable of tabbing 8 miles with 55 pounds in under 2 hours, unless standards have changed.  That makes for four miles per hour.  In which case, even given the terrain and heavier loads of war fighting operations, I fail to see why they wouldn't be able of doing the quoted 18 miles in 12 hours, making for one-and-a-half miles per hour.



 



As an aside - tabbing isn't even much of a physical thing, it is rather a mental thing.  If you can stand and tab with the weight for one mile, you can sustain it for multiple miles with some will power and determination.  All infantry soldiers should be fit and healthy at any time, and while peak fitness is not sustainable, it only takes half a dozen weeks to get there from a solid basic standard.



 



 



Also, if you could clarify something for me, how do you define the difference between Mechanised, Motorised and Armoured Infantry?  As per my understanding, Motorised Infantry are just Light Role Infantry who are given trucks, while Mechanised Infantry are equipped with M113/Bulldog/Mastiff type vehicles, with the emphasis still being on just using them as battlefield taxis, while Armoured Infantry use IFV's akin to Warrior/CV90/Bradley/BMP, and are capable of fighting alongside their vehicles mounted or otherwise.  Does Australia do it differently?







We don't have anything along the lines of Armoured Cavalry. We have light infantry, bushmaster mounted infantry and M113 Mounted infantry. In terms of Armour we have light armour for recon (ASLAV) and a single regiment of M1A1's. Just to make a point, an Australian Armoured Regiment is based upon the UK model, in that it is made up of 50-60 ranks, rather then multiple squadrons of around that number.

Ok, i was wrong, i suppose the ASLAV can just about be considered an IFV. ;)

 
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Kevin Pork       8/24/2008 7:04:02 PM


The link suggests that Hasting's has a history of passing his own interpretations on events to which he is not privy. Irrespective of whether or not he was on the Falklands he would not have been privy to the reasons behind the commanders decision's, especially to those of the commander of a unit to which he was not attached. Do you seriously believe that the British Army would have said to a journalist "we've called off the march of the Guards because they are too unfit". Seriously? He might have gotten a few second hand mutterings by paratroopers passing their own interpretations on events, but he wouldn't have had to full picture. The senior British officers who ran the operation still can't agree between themselves about how the operation ran, so Hastings is hardly ane expert witness on the matter.

 Anyway, here is an article that gives a different version of why the guards were taken to Bluff Cove by sea. It indicates that the decision was made because it was the quickest way to reinforce the Para's who had gone there by Chinook, against orders. The article also suggests that had that not happened then the Guards would have marched into action like all the other troops. Go's to show that you can't take any one source as gospel, hey.

 

findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_84/ai_n14699964





Hastings had access to everyone at the higher levels of the operation, he was there and he had no barrow to push, as such he is certainly an impartial witness.
 
From the article you quote - "The sailors were shocked at the condition of the Welsh Guards when they returned after just a night or so ashore--wet, filthy, miserable--and obviously ineffective." why do you think that the Guards were up to a route march when all the evidence suggests otherwise?
 
Having read the article, unfortunately it ignores reality - the Guards CO ordered his troops back after convincing 5 Bde that "it was uneconomic to exhaust the battalion merely to get them to Goose Green".  It can certainly be argued that moving by ship was the fastest way to advance the Guards, since they were not up to walking - but that hardly suggests that the plan was to ship them forward.
 
Re the Guards COs article, he does have a bit of a vested interest in the matter, wouldn't you say?
 
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Aussiegunneragain    KP   8/25/2008 7:57:43 AM
 the Guards CO ordered his troops back after convincing 5 Bde that "it was uneconomic to exhaust the battalion merely to get them to Goose Green".  It can certainly be argued that moving by ship was the fastest way to advance the Guards, since they were not up to walking - but that hardly suggests that the plan was to ship them forward.
 
Ah, the story changes. Originally you said that the guards couldn't make it to Goose Green, now you tell us that the commander decided against the march because there was no point exhausting them. That supports my original suggestion that they were able to route march, just not as fast as the Paras or Marines.
 
I'm rather bemused that I find myself contesting you in your attempt to use a journalist as an impartial expert witness. I probably hold the media in higher esteem than most people on this board but I certainly don't take the word of one as  gospel. I certainly don't see any evidence that the Guard's commander was biased in the article. In a nutshell all he said was "We weren't as fit as the Paras and Royal Marines because they are elite light troops and because we have to Guard Buck House, but we still did the job". If he thought that being carrier troops was a major part of the reason for their poorer performance I'm sure that he would have said so.
 
Anyway, you keep right on taking the words of one journalist as gospel because it suits your argument to do so. I'll continue to take a more open mind.
 
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Raven22       8/25/2008 9:42:21 AM

With a bit of thought, this is how I?d restructure the Army:

The first thing is to homogenise the brigades as much as possible. The current brigades aren?t organised with any thought at all ? just whatever units happened to be in that city at the time were grouped into a brigade, which is no way to run an army. Of course, it isn?t really possible to make the brigades identical, as there are some capabilities it doesn?t make sense to split. The tanks are one example; it would cost massive amounts of money to have the infrastructure in each brigade to maintain a squadron of tanks.  It also wouldn?t make sense from a training view point. Other capabilities like ARH and Chinook fall into this category. More homogenised brigades will make it much easier to train with and much easier to deploy with.

If you want to make it realistic, we can?t really increase the size of the Army in terms of manoeuvre units. The Army 2016 plan will not see the Army grow in liability (ie total number of soldiers authorised) until current vacancies are filled in around 2011. After this time, any increase is personnel will simply be going to bringing units smaller than they should be up to a more reasonable strength. Australia will not be able to increase the number of manoeuvre units until after 2016. I have planned with this in mind.

I?d also restructure the general makeup of the army from 1 tank/2 cav/7 inf to a more logical, flexible and powerful 1 tank/3 cav/6 inf. The makeup of the regts and battalions themselves can be looked at.

To me there are two types of infantry ? mechanised and light/motorised. The difference between the two is the vehicle.  In mech units the vehicles are the basis of their firepower - they take part in the fight and vehicle crews take significantly away from dismount strength. To me light/motorised infantry are basically the same. The basis of the units firepower is centred on the dismounted soldier. They still patrol on foot, fight on foot etc. Whether they use Bushmasters(motorised) or helicopters/unimogs(light) to get to the fight doesn?t really change the way they do business.

As such, I?d have a 50/50 split between mech/mot, and each brigade would have a battalion of each. Mech bns would be equipped with proper tracked IFVs, and each light bn would have access to a full battalion complement of Bushmasters. As such, the light battalions can either take part in mechanised battles in Bushmaster, or do the light thing out of helicopters etc.

With cavalry, I?d have a serious look at their role. The way 2 Cav and 2/14 are organised now is as divisional recon battalions. Why we need two divisional recon battalions in an army with less than one division is beyond me. Each brigade only needs a company/squadron worth of cavalry to provide medium reconnaissance. As such, I?d look at restructuring the cav regt. One a squadron would specialise in the reconnaissance role, being equipped with vehicles similar to the current ASLAV. The other two squadrons would go to a more old school/US style fighting cavalry. These would be equipped with larger vehicles able to carry more dismounts, like the NZLAV. These squadrons would be similar to mech infantry, with the difference that the cavalry would be primarily a mounted force with the dismounts supporting the vehicles, whereas mech infantry has vehicles supporting dismounts. These squadrons would be far better suited to current cavalry tasks on ops than the current organisation.

The aviation force is a bit tricky. Ideally an army of threes should have three ARH squadrons and three Chinook squadrons, which would allow one of each to be posted to each brigade. However, it would be unsustainable to split the ARH/Chinooks over three brigades anyway, so you would probably have to keep them concentrated into a single brigade. However it is much easier to fly, say, three ARH from Darwin to Townsville for an exercise than it is to fly, say, a tank troop, so it?s not that big a deal. The MRH90/LUH force could be split over at least two brigades I should think.

The tanks are fine. A third tank sqn will be raised in 2011, which will fit in nicely with the army of threes. However, it is not smart to split the tanks over three brigades, so I would keep them concentrated in a single brigade, and accept the fact they we will have to ship them to the East coast as required for exercises.

The artillery should have 9-10 batteries to support each manoeuvre unit, although it currently looks like we will have only 6. These can be split between SPGs and towed, with a battery of each in each brigade.

This would leave the army with a general structure of:

1 Bde
Tank Regt
Cav Regt
Mech Inf Bn
Light Inf Bn
Arty Regt
Aviation Regt (ARH and LUH)
 
3 Bde
Cav Regt
Mech Inf Bn
 
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Barracuda       8/25/2008 9:48:08 AM





The link suggests that Hasting's has a history of passing his own interpretations on events to which he is not privy. Irrespective of whether or not he was on the Falklands he would not have been privy to the reasons behind the commanders decision's, especially to those of the commander of a unit to which he was not attached. Do you seriously believe that the British Army would have said to a journalist "we've called off the march of the Guards because they are too unfit". Seriously? He might have gotten a few second hand mutterings by paratroopers passing their own interpretations on events, but he wouldn't have had to full picture. The senior British officers who ran the operation still can't agree between themselves about how the operation ran, so Hastings is hardly and expert witness on the matter.



 Anyway, here is an article that gives a different version of why the guards were taken to Bluff Cove by sea. It indicates that the decision was made because it was the quickest way to reinforce the Para's who had gone there by Chinook, against orders. The article also suggests that had that not happened then the Guards would have marched into action like all the other troops. Go's to show that you can't take any one source as gospel, hey.



 



.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_84/ai_n14699964













Hastings had access to everyone at the higher levels of the operation, he was there and he had no barrow to push, as such he is certainly an impartial witness.

 

From the article you quote - "The sailors were shocked at the condition of the Welsh Guards when they returned after just a night or so ashore--wet, filthy, miserable--and obviously ineffective." why do you think that the Guards were up to a route march when all the evidence suggests otherwise?

 

Having read the article, unfortunately it ignores reality - the Guards CO ordered his troops back after convincing 5 Bde that "it was uneconomic to exhaust the battalion merely to get them to Goose Green".  It can certainly be argued that moving by ship was the fastest way to advance the Guards, since they were not up to walking - but that hardly suggests that the plan was to ship them forward.

 

Re the Guards COs article, he does have a bit of a vested interest in the matter, wouldn't you say?


Sorry there is no such thing as an unbiased source.  Hasting's bias is to sell his book, books need controversy therefore Hastings used his sources to create a tone or bias.  All historians do this. Look at us we are all biased.
As to the Commander of the Guards Brigade, he had boats why not sail them around the island. His idea was sound, why walk when you can drive/sail.  Why dirk the men around.  The Task Force Commander could have said no.
 
I have a good friend who was in the Welsh Guards who did the attack on Goose Green with eleven rounds in his mag. So did most of his mates  I think he would take  offence to say his Battalion was ineffective.  By the time they came down they were all fit, they didn't just sit around in the cruise liners.  they ran and pack marched.
 
The reason he says they looked "wet, filthy, miserable" because the Falklands Is were "wet, filthy, miserable".  He always suggested the problems were boots not toughness.  The Guards wore hobnails with no tongue with gaiters, whilst the Paras wore Jump Boots.  His main aim was find an Argie with the same size boots.
 
Consider also they only had one Chinook becasue they all went down in the Atlantic Conveyer.  Boat much quicker, much smarter.
 
I really think your argument is redundent and I must agree with AG.  Oh the pain!
 
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