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Subject: What sort of land force does Australia really need?
Volkodav    8/19/2008 8:19:53 AM
Continental defence suggests light armour and motorised infantry. Regional commitments suggest air mobile light infantry. Extra regional coalition operations suggest heavy armour. We need to be capable in all areas but how can we achieve a balanced capable force with our small recruitment base? What solutions may we be seeing in the Defence White Paper?
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Volkodav/AD   8/30/2008 11:39:58 PM
 AG I am getting the impression that your bias against the ASLAV and Bushmaster has more to do with the fact that they were ordered as part of the DOA policy than in any actual failing or fault with the platforms.
 
Partly correct. I don't think there is anything technically wrong with the vehicles, I just think that they don't suit Australia's priority needs.
 
At the end of the day we need the ability to self deploy meaningful combat forces over great distances in terrain that is hostile at the best of times and tracked vehicles just can't do it.
 
As much as I love heavy armour, helicopters and elite light infnatry (all the sexy movie stars) it is them that need to be the niche capability for special circumstances while wheeled AFV's form the core of our land force, not the other way around.  You simply can not ignore the fact that Australia, like the Middle East and Africa is a vast, sparcely populated and hosile environment where heavy armour lacks stratigic mobility and light infantry lacks the necessary organic firepower / load carrying capacity and tactical mobility to be effective.
 
What was designed to work in the Australian Outback whould work equally well in most of Africa, and Asia.  What was intended to work in tropical jungles and pin prick islands would be next to usless in the regions where are troops are actually fighting as opposed to peace keeping.
 
And,
 
Read the white Paper again AG. DoA is STILL the overwhelming priority for the ADF and wheeled vehicles are generally the most useful platform for Army's primary role.
 
Deploying ANYWHERE into our region or out of it is a secondary consideration. 
 
Yes, DOA IS our first priority. It is just that the purchase of 600 wheeled vehicles to conduct the task was completely unnecessary. What sort of force do you seriously think anybody (except the US) can or could previously put into Northern Australia? We used to train upon the basis that a hostile country to our North might be able to deploy and sustain a battalion of special forces there. Personally I think this is a vast over-estimation. How would anybody get that sized force into Australia without being detected by the JORN or our other ISR assets and destroyed by the Navy or Air Force? At the most I'd reckon they might get a company in on submarines or fishing boats. Even if they did how would they sustain that many troops over such vast distances? If they managed to do that they would face detection by the RSF battalions and the locals, who know the lie of the land better than any foriegner does and destroyed by an airborne QRF. If  they did manage to attack on a base, do you think that they are going to be able to mass enough troops to beat the number of ARES troops we would have in static defence of all of our (not very many and very widely spaced) vital facilities up there? Frankly the best that they could do would be to hit a few convoys with mines or IED's, but the moment the first one went off we'd fly so many light infantry into the area that they wouldn't be able to move without being killed or captured. Any effort of that nature by anybody isn't going to amount to more than a short-lived nusiance and I doubt that any opposing general is going to want to send a company of his best troops on what would frankly be a suicide mission. That certainly isn't the scenario upon which we should shape our entire defence force.
 
As to your "PNG Highlands" argument. Talk about a strawman. Could you please show me the tracked vehicle that could be used there? 
 
Depends on where you go in the highlands, tracks would be pretty useful along the various unimproved logging tracks there. Also the Japanese used their light tanks up there, so I don't see why we wouldn't be able to use our tracks. In any case the other half of what I am suggesting is that we should have beefed up our airbourne capability for those instances where the use of any land vehicle is precluded by terrain.
 
Then show me the ACTUAL likelihood of deploying there... 
 
A hell of a lot more than the likelihood of deploying in Northern Australia. I've already outlined quite realistic scenarios of how it might happen (drug/major opposing power funded rebellion, border dispute with future hostile Indones
 
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Aussiegunneragain    AD - PS   8/30/2008 11:45:09 PM

I'd note that given that any ability to attack Australia would be greatly enhanced by a foriegn force having a foothold in New Guinea, if we did let it go then we would be looking at a much greater prospect of fighting a credible DOA scenario. I'd rather the fight was there than here.

 
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Aussie Diggermark 2       8/31/2008 4:24:33 AM
AG,
 
Surely you don't BELIEVE that Defence capability acquisitions are as simplistic as "either/or"? When has Army EVER formally expressed a desire for an IFV?
 
If we didn't buy ASLAV/Bushmaster capabilities we'd be operating non-upgraded M113's now and NOTHING else, in my humble opinion. The M113AS3/4 program would still have progressed exactly as it has, with PERHAPS a bolt on "standoff armour" package to allow the buckets to be deployed on security ops in Iraq and the Ghan. A wonderful state of affairs...
 
As to Timor, sorry buddy, but 2 Cav and it's ASLAV's were there before B Sqn 3/4 Cav ever got there. 2nd Cav Regt was in fact the second non special operations arms corp unit on the ground in Timor behind 3RAR...

3RAR/2 Cav Regt in fact provided the inital QRF in support of the specwarrie units as the initial ASLAV's were flown in. The buckets were delivered when Jervis Bay first docked. After Dili harbor was already secured...  

 
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Aussiegunneragain    AD and others   8/31/2008 5:20:28 AM

AG,

Surely you don't BELIEVE that Defence capability acquisitions are as simplistic as "either/or"? When has Army EVER formally expressed a desire for an IFV?

If we didn't buy ASLAV/Bushmaster capabilities we'd be operating non-upgraded M113's now and NOTHING else, in my humble opinion. The M113AS3/4 program would still have progressed exactly as it has, with PERHAPS a bolt on "standoff armour" package to allow the buckets to be deployed on security ops in Iraq and the Ghan. A wonderful state of affairs...

As to Timor, sorry buddy, but 2 Cav and it's ASLAV's were there before B Sqn 3/4 Cav ever got there. 2nd Cav Regt was in fact the second non special operations arms corp unit on the ground in Timor behind 3RAR...

3RAR/2 Cav Regt in fact provided the inital QRF in support of the specwarrie units as the initial ASLAV's were flown in. The buckets were delivered when Jervis Bay first docked. After Dili harbor was already secured...  
 
I don't know if the Army ever formally expressed a desire for an IFV. My suspicion is that they wouldn't have bothered during the DOA debacle because they would have known that the answer would have been no. However, I would ask you, if they did have the choice do you seriously think they would have chosen Bushies and ASLAV's over tracked IFV's and CFV's? If you think so then you obviously served in a different army to the one I did, because I remember them being very keen on achieving greater combat power. From what I read here they still are. Had that doctrine not been in play then who know's, they may have had the confidence to put forward such a proposition. Leahy certainly did with the Abram's when the political environment became more favourable, though unfortunately the die was cast WRT our light vehicles at that stage.
 
I think you'll find that the terrain around Dili harbour is somewhat less challenging than the rest of East Timor. From what I heard (and I can't remember where from) the ASLAV's were initially deployed but their role was taken over by M-113's because of the challenges of the terrain. What I do know for certain is that the QRF later in the deployment was provided by M-113's, because I remember Cosgrove talking about them on TV at the time.
 
More generally there are a couple of elephants in the room that none of you guys are missing. The first is that all that I am suggesting is that the structure of the army that we had prior to DOA should have been updated rather than replaced. We used to have an APC regiment per brigade and that structure worked well for at least as far back as the 1960's. Why is it such a leap of logic to keep the same structure but with updated vehicles? What changed that we all of a sudden needed wheeled vehicles to defend Northern Australia from the late '80's? The only change that I can think of is that Hawke and Keating wanted to cut the defence budget by 25% and DOA was an excuse for that. Having read yours and Volkodav's posts over the years I'm dumbstruck that you are defending the ongoing costs to our capability that resulted from that flawed doctrine.
 
The second point is that even if we didn't have  a wheeled capability to send to the Iraq and Afghanistan, do you not think we could have made at least as good if not better a contribution with tracked IFV/CFV equipped units? We could have sent at least a mechanised battalion to fight in the actual invasion of Iraq, something which we couldn't do with the "Buckets". From what I can gather tracked IFVs have been making a solid ongoing contribution in some of the more challenging areas of operations in Iraq andAfghanistan as well. Just because we couldn't make the same contribution as the one that we are now, doesn't mean that we couldn't make a different and perhaps more valuable contribution if we were equipped with decent tracked vehicles.
 
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Raven22       8/31/2008 5:27:58 AM

I've already outlined quite realistic scenarios of how it might happen (drug/major opposing power funded rebellion, border dispute with future hostile Indonesian government).

You think those are realistic scenarios? Here's a realistic scenario - Australia deploys thousands of soliders to a conflict in the middle east. The conflict lasts for 5+ years and looks like it will last another 10. The deployment has support of both sides of parliament. Australian lives are saved because they have lots of new and effective wheeled armoured vehicles. The other Western powers decide those vehicles are so effective they decide to buy them themselves. A random bloke on the internet decides that those vehicles aren't effective because Australia doesn't really want to fight in the middle east anyway, but are saving themselves to battle the resurgent Imperial Japanese Army in the highlands of PNG.

As for training, lets not pretend that wheeled AFV's are much more than glorified armoured RV's.

Lets not pretend that you have any idea what you are talking about.

At least the APC's from your old unit that used to escort our gun tractors around SWBTA didn't seem to be doing much more than driving in front of us and looking out for Kamerian's.

It's not the mid 90's anymore champ. The replacement for those APCs are not escorting some gunners around a training area in Australia anymore - they are currently on ops saving Australian lives.

The Dutch have quickly integrated the Bushmaster into their force in Afghanistan, so I don't see why we couldn't.

This is senseless. The Dutch bought the Bushmaster off us! The Bushmaster is so well suited to current operations that other nations are buying them, or vehicles exactly like them, in the tens of thousands. Remind we again why it was a bad idea to design the Bushmaster?

M-113's are also based there now. Clearly the defence force isn't confident that wheels can do all the tasks required up there or they wouldn't be deploying tracks with all the associated costs.

The M-113s are the QRF for the Dili area and haven't been bush since they got there. Both ASLAV and Bushmasters could do exactly the same job. However, they are currently busy on operations where they are actually getting shot at, and don't have spare capacity to babysit a country where the biggest threat (without a word of a lie) is crossbows. The Queensland police force could do the same job in their commodore police cars.

Anyway, looking at current operations doesn't help your cause. Number of tracked AFVs deployed in the world now - 4. Number of wheeled AFVs deployed in the world now - >100.

BTW, you haven't answered my simple question. I'll repeat it:

Do you think you are right and the mainstream thought of the entire defence establishment is wrong?

 

 
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Aussiegunneragain    Raven   8/31/2008 5:51:47 AM

BTW, you haven't answered my simple question. I'll repeat it:

Do you think you are right and the mainstream thought of the entire defence establishment is wrong?
 
I'm not answering your questions because you are speaking sh1t about knowing the thoughts of the entire defence establishment, so I can't be arsed. Cheers.
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Respectable Defence Opinion    8/31/2008 7:20:09 AM
From a Parliamentary enquiry into the Army in 2000. The highlighted sections describe disagreement between the Army on one hand and the APA and individual troops interviewed on the other, about the deployability of the ASLAV and Bushmaster in our region (keeping in mind that this was just after ET). So much for speaking for the entire Defence establishment hey Raven.

>
 
The Bushmaster wheeled armoured vehicle appears to be optimised for the Defence of Australia (DoA) tasks assigned to the Army since 1987.

One press article noted that:

The Bushmaster ? is a vehicle that fits well the Army?s stated main role in defence of the Australian mainland ? the purpose-designed ability to traverse highways, second-class roads and bush tracks, and its limited cross-country capability auger well for operations across Australia?s north during the dry season.22

8.19 The concern is how effective will such a vehicle be if the majority of the Army?s tasks are not conducted in northern Australia or in the dry season?

The Australian Defence association was concerned that the new wheeled vehicles, ASLAV and Bushmaster, will not be effective in some of the terrain the Army will be forced to operate in.23 This concern did not appear to be shared by the Army. The Army?s Director General of Land Development noted that:

The northern Australian environment is very similar to most of the other areas in our region in which we might operate. So if we can operate in that environment, generally speaking we can operate offshore ? as long as we can support operations offshore.

24

Troops in the field, including personnel who had served in East Timor, expressed a view contrary to this.

25

Vehicle Protection

8.20 The levels of crew protection in Australian armoured vehicles were raised in both submissions and public hearing. The Army Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), the M113, was considered to provide inadequate protection

for modern combat.26 It was pointed out to us that the M113 currently provided protection against now outdated small arms ammunition. The Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and the Bushmaster appeared to be vulnerable to 50 calibre machine guns bullets and by armoured piercing bullets from standard infantry rifles.27  Even the Leopard tank was said to be vulnerable to heavy machine gun fire using a

 
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Aussiegunneragain    Correction   8/31/2008 7:22:12 AM
Note that the comments that I ascribed to APA in my last post were in fact made by the far more respected ADA.
 
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Aussie Diggermark 2       8/31/2008 7:33:58 AM




AG,



Surely you don't BELIEVE that Defence capability acquisitions are as simplistic as "either/or"? When has Army EVER formally expressed a desire for an IFV?



If we didn't buy ASLAV/Bushmaster capabilities we'd be operating non-upgraded M113's now and NOTHING else, in my humble opinion. The M113AS3/4 program would still have progressed exactly as it has, with PERHAPS a bolt on "standoff armour" package to allow the buckets to be deployed on security ops in Iraq and the Ghan. A wonderful state of affairs...




As to Timor, sorry buddy, but 2 Cav and it's ASLAV's were there before B Sqn 3/4 Cav ever got there. 2nd Cav Regt was in fact the second non special operations arms corp unit on the ground in Timor behind 3RAR...



3RAR/2 Cav Regt in fact provided the inital QRF in support of the specwarrie units as the initial ASLAV's were flown in. The buckets were delivered when Jervis Bay first docked. After Dili harbor was already secured...  



 

I don't know if the Army ever formally expressed a desire for an IFV. My suspicion is that they wouldn't have bothered during the DOA debacle because they would have known that the answer would have been no. However, I would ask you, if they did have the choice do you seriously think they would have chosen Bushies and ASLAV's over tracked IFV's and CFV's? If you think so then you obviously served in a different army to the one I did, because I remember them being very keen on achieving greater combat power. From what I read here they still are. Had that doctrine not been in play then who know's, they may have had the confidence to put forward such a proposition. Leahy certainly did with the Abram's when the political environment became more favourable, though unfortunately the die was cast WRT our light vehicles at that stage.

 

I think you'll find that the terrain around Dili harbour is somewhat less challenging than the rest of East Timor. From what I heard (and I can't remember where from) the ASLAV's were initially deployed but their role was taken over by M-113's because of the challenges of the terrain. What I do know for certain is that the QRF later in the deployment was provided by M-113's, because I remember Cosgrove talking about them on TV at the time.

 

More generally there are a couple of elephants in the room that none of you guys are missing. The first is that all that I am suggesting is that the structure of the army that we had prior to DOA should have been updated rather than replaced. We used to have an APC regiment per brigade and that structure worked well for at least as far back as the 1960's. Why is it such a leap of logic to keep the same structure but with updated vehicles? What changed that we all of a sudden needed wheeled vehicles to defend Northern Australia from the late '80's? The only change that I can think of is that Hawke and Keating wanted to cut the defence budget by 25% and DOA was an excuse for that. Having read yours and Volkodav's posts over the years I'm dumbstruck that you are defending the ongoing costs to our capability that resulted from that flawed doctrine.

 

The second point is that even if we didn't have  a wheeled capability to send to the Iraq and Afghanistan, do you not think we could have made at least as good if not better a contribution with tracked IFV/CFV equipped units? We could have sent at least a mechanised battalion to fight in the actual invasion of Iraq, something which we couldn't do with the "Buckets". From what I can gather tracked IFVs have been making a solid ongoing contribution in some of the more challenging areas of operations in Iraq andAfghanistan as well. Just because we couldn't make the same contribution as the one that we are now, doesn't mean that we couldn't make a different and perhaps more valuable contribution if we were equipped with decent tracked vehicles.


It ain't a matter of choice. Army makes it's capability acquisitions AFTER they've been approved by Government and after the capabilities themselves have been through a LONG capability dvelopment process. They DON'T get to choose themselves...
 
What Army wanted when I was in was:
 
3 Brigades, 
 
 
1x light mechanised.
&
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Aussiedigger, do you remember this?    8/31/2008 7:58:16 AM
 
>>
 
Aussie Digger
March 10th, 2004, 10:53 PM
 
Don't get me wrong Winter, there are operational issues that need to be overcome if you're going to operate tanks in a jungle. This not only includes actually manoevering the vehicle in such close country, but also includes such things as the engine filtration system (an issue that is equally important though different in Desert environments), internal temperatures (which affect the crew) inside the tank in the jungle climate etc. I was on a course once, where we operated M113's at Canungra in Queensland (the Australian Armie's Land Warfare centre). This training area was the primary training area where troops underwent their pre-deployment training for Vietnam, due to similar climate and environmental issues. The temperature inside the M113's was on average 52 degrees. Try operating in those conditions some time, it's not easy. Guys often went down with hyperthermia and literally fainted "behind the sticks"... However despite these difficulties the benefits of tanks still outway the difficulties in employing them. Both sides in Vietnam operated tanks of varied sort. As I mentioned, Australia used British manufactured Centurion tanks (the tank on which the Oliphant you mentioned was based). America used M-48 tanks and the NVA used PT-76 and T-54/55's. As you can see a pretty wide variety of tanks were successfully used by both sides. This is one of the recent examples I'm familiar with. The Australian Army has also widely operated M113's in East Timor which has some very foreboding jungle environments and has been extremely pleased with it's performance, unlike the ASLAV (Australian LAV -25) which has shown much less off-road ability than was expected...
 
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