1 -- Turkish casualties are the most critical, with immediate, and very negative, impact for Erdogan. It should be also be noted here that polls show a majority of the Turkish population does NOT want Turkey to become involved in Syria.2 -- Syrian casualties are next, because the Assad regime and the world press will play them up. Turkey can probably weather that in the West, but in the Arab world it will feed the Sunni-Shia conflict and the Arab fears of the return of the Ottoman Empire (the Turks having historically, and are still, even more capable than the Persians).3 -- The material cost is politically minor, mostly because it only becomes a factor after the rest is over. You can probably ignore it.
1 – US support. The US has the SEED capabilities to take out the missile sites with danger, plus US casualties are not a Turkish concern. However the Whitehouse is unwilling to commit without UN sanction, which will not be forthcoming due to Russian and Chinese vetoes. France might be convinced to lead an intervention, like they did in Libya, giving the US political cover to do the heavy lifting.2 – Turkey has to secure the open backing of the majority of the leaders of the Arab and Muslim states. At this time a majority want still more negotiation first, probably hoping that the situation will resolve itself before they have to be blamed for taking a stand.3 – get the US to do it.
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