No.  Georgia needed its hand slapped - and that's what it got.  It was Georgia who broke the treaty after all.

 

I hardly see why the rest of NATO should run to their defence - and risk total war with Russia.

Besides, the EU has shown it lacks capaiblity to deploy significant troops numbers outside of Europe anyway without U.S. logistical support.  The U.S. has NO spare troops.  If the U.S. sends them, they must come from somewhere else.  Afghanistan isnt going well and Iraq is starting to look good, you really want to pull troops away and further risk those theaters?  Not to mention starting a third theater is fracking stupid anyway.  Deploying troops is not possible.

 

No, as hard-faced as this is the proper response is to sit this out and work this out diplomatically.  Russia caught Georgia hook, line, and sinker, and graphically illustrated just how stretched thin the U.S. is now.  This is a statement to the old Soviet Bloc: Mother Russia is back, pay attention, the West is busy. 

 

This was a huge foreign policy failure on the U.S. part.  HUGE.  Everyone was saying just how stretched we were, this confirmed it. 

To add to my previous comment - Georgia would be very beneficial to NATO strategically, especially where European states are concerned what with the BP oil pipelines locality. 

 

Russia clearly has issues with the Nationalistic Saakashvili, and wants rid of him however, and if he were to stand down I would expect he would make a fair scape-goat, and so both appeasing Russia with a concession while allowing NATO to more easily accept Georgia under a new, less militaristic government.

Exactly what was our trangression in Kosovo, I mean without reference to Russia's vanity? 

 

If Russia moved into South Ossetia in order to protect people then good. But Russia is going beyond that, is going beyond what we did in Kosovo and does not have UN sanction.

 

As to how we don't need another "f--ing" war, my point is that we may not have an acceptable choice. If we acquiesce to Russia's setting this precedent the price will be higher next time and higher still the time after that. Either we pay less now or we pay more later.

 

Well maybe we can go to the negotiating table and talk them all to death. This kind of wrangling disgusts me anyway. Lets go back to 1916 in terms of foreign engagement.

 

 

The imagined transgression against Russia, was through Serbia being a historical ally of Russia, and Serbia claiming Kosovo as a domestic matter of sovereignty.  We didn't have any UN mandate or otherwise legitimising international actor to justify our involvement in Kosovo - instead we rallied under the banner of humanitarian rights - and we were right to do so.

 

 

Russia is now going well beyond pushing the Georgian forces out of South Ossetia - and are clearly claiming one thing (an acceptable interpretation of international law and their resulting actions), culminating in their forces now withdrawing, while acting on other imperatives of their own creation.  However the current Western demands of Georgian territorial integrity under UN agreements make little more sense.  Surely the status of South Ossetia and the other regions should be a matter for them only to decide (just as with Northern Ireland et al) - clearly the temporary arrangement on the end of the 92-94 civil war was not a practically acceptable one.

 

 

Now the Russian foreign minister is claiming that Russian forces are remaining in Georgia until the security situation is such that they can leave under the current agreement.  This may be me being overly simplistic - but in that case I don't see why we don't publicly congratulate Russia for enforcing the 94 agreement, and take over the now much defunct peacekeeping obligations ourselves in sending in British/Western peacekeepers under a UN banner to the border areas (both South Ossestia/Georgia proper and South Ossetia/Russia) - and speed along the Russian exit.

 

 

Us taking over the peacekeeping (or what's left of it in its current state), reduces any need for any Russian military involvement. Combine that with getting rid of the current Georgian government and hopefully ending the territorial dispute (rather more ambitious) and we could bring Georgia (and hence the pipeline) into NATO. 

"Combine that with getting rid of the current Georgian government and hopefully ending the territorial dispute (rather more ambitious) and we could bring Georgia (and hence the pipeline) into NATO."

 

And we would want to "get rid" of the Georgian government because --- ?

Frankly, we don't need to have Georgia (or the Ukraine) to actually be in NATO, it is enough to have them on a suitable phrased 'membership path' - no definitive security pledge, but rather a general pledge to rebuild their military.

 

The first and most important thing the West needs to do now is to invest very heavily in nuclear power. It is the only plausible way to replace the current dependence on Russian gas. The West can effectively blunt Russia's main weapon, i.e. its control over energy supplies; if the West can eliminate (or reduce significantly) its dependence on natural gas, Russia cannot just threaten to turn off the taps whenever they want to sabre rattle. This would be quite expensive, obviously, but it is very well worth it. The UK's total electrical generating capacity at the moment is around 80 GigaWatts; using the latest reactors, this would cost approximately $80-160bn to replace, depending on the reactor chosen. This could be done over around ten years, and eliminate the UK's dependence on foreign gas. Similarly, by adopting Fischer Tropsch synthetic fuel production, and Europe's natural coal supply (which is plentiful in Germany and Poland), we could even replace much of our dependence on foreign oil.

 

I know this isn't directly relevant to Georgia's membership in NATO, but it is a way in which Europe could fundamentally change its relationship with Russia. This would have more effect than sending a few troops to Tbilisi. It is, of course, important to make sure that Georgia is protected, and this should be a common effort, with primary emphasis on building up its genuine defences. For example, investment in good border control with both Russia and the two breakaway provinces. Frankly, I think Georgia would be a lot better off just giving away the two provinces, and then building pretty massive barrier walls between it and these provinces, to prevent cross-border raids. If you build an eight metre high wall, with a 1km no-mans land (i.e. build a tall fence on the actual border, and then one kilometre back, build the bloody big wall), then you can make any trouble making very difficult. Build in defensive lines around the major cities, e.g. Hesco barriers and rapidly-installable roadblocks, and you stand a much better chance of defending the cities. The ground forces should then be trained for the role, i.e. defensive warfare, plus commando style forces to set up ambush points around the country. Similarly, air defences will need beefing up, preferably with modern, highly mobile systems not requiring large fixed position radars.

 

One result of the conflict is likely to be creation of a two-tier NATO, with the Eastern Europeans recognising the need to rebuild their defences; meanwhile, the Western NATO nations are likely to stick with their status quo. I wouldn't be all that surprised to see a new 'Warsaw Pact', but this time as a bulwark against Russia, not allied with it. It may also be an alternative to offering Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership. Over the next few years, I suspect Poland, for example, will restart development of their next generation tank, and start the renewal of their ground and air forces; perhaps another batch of F-16s (even second hand ones, as a stop-gap pending the F-35 being available).

Paranoia? Did not the Russians interrupt the supply of natural gas to Ukraine and Western Europe? Have not the Russians advertised an intension to nuke Poland? Given the overall context, it is not paranoia to be concerned when Russian invades a sovereign country which it had at one time controlled.

 

"Russia defended its backyard"

 

Argentina could have been said to be concerned about its own backyard when it invaded the disputed Falklands. Yet we did not hear a train of justifications for what it did.

 

The US had to put up with Soviet bases on the island of Cuba. We could have invaded on the pretext of enforcing the long standing Monroe Doctrine or of stopping the excesses of police imprisonment and torture or of stopping the subversion of Latin America or on the grounds of national security but we did not.

 

However the Russians may have a security interest around its Caucasian frontier, Georgia has a right of self-determination.

 

"Georgia fired the first shot, and killed Russians peacekeepers, we should not forget that. "

 

This might be true although it might also be true that Georgia was manipulated by the Russians into appearing to initiate hostilities in order to justify that which the Russians had already decided to do. That would not have been all that difficult.

 

If what you say is true then don't you think the Russians would not have invaded Georgia proper and not just South Ossetia?

 

"Russians did not have T-72 in Ossetia,"

 

But did Russia have them already waiting at the border before hand?

 

 

"Thats why they got pounded by the Georgians the first day and had to retreat before Reeinforcements from Chechnya arrived."

 

Perhaps a necessary consideration on Russia's part.

 

 

What really worries me is the great amount apology on the behalf of Russia. People want to be totally blind to such transgressions. Everybody has forgotten about the Russian who died in London as a result of KGB style radiological poisoning too I guess.

 

You know, I don't think that is enough.  Building a few hesco walls certainly wouldn't keep the Russians out.  Geographically speaking Georgia will always be more so in Russias back yard than the Wests.  Unless Georgia can call upon article five of NATO - there is no guarantee that NATO would defend Georgia - and so Russia still enjoys play of the field.

Of course, if Europe can distance itself from energy reliance on Russia, then it may no longer be in our interests to bring Georgia into NATO, or risk anything over Georgias sovereignty - which in turn could lead to far longer lasting precedents.