Excellent reference, Smitty. In Afghanistan, the fact that the howitzers had 3 times the range was crucial, supporting one SP post and disputing another. Range might mean less in Iraq, with all the urban fighting. Also very interesting is the fact that howitzers are more accurate, and can thus be aimed closer to friendly forces, a critical point. In general, teh military is probably going to have to be careful about becoming to obsessed with "lightness". I know it goes off topic to say so, but based on history, I'm skeptical of the light tank. Nonetheless, the concept is gaining ground in the US military. I prefer thinking about "heavier air transport". We have world air dominance, why not build a giant damn flying bus and fly the stuff where it is needed? The problem to be solved is runways. Possibly vertical takeoff & landing. Or better yet, why not rig up an airfield like an aircraft carrier and have the planes grab onto metal straps with hooks?

Modern transport aircraft such as the A400M can carry loads of 30 tonnes; and such a weight (being about 5 tonnes heavier than a Warrior), is fine for a medium tank..

I'm with you guys on that note: going to an almost entirely all-light force is S T U P I D ! and could mean the deaths of hundreds of crewmembers if we get into an IED- and ATGM-infested area. And on the note of medium-weight AFVs (30 ton-class), I still criticize the DoD and USAF for sticking with the 1950s-designed C-130. We should've aquired the AMST program years ago (the YC-15 was a valuable test vehicle which gave us the C-17, and the YC-14 certainly influenced the An-72/74 Coaler aircraft.) These platforms (the AMSTs) were designed to the requirement of 27,000 pounds in STOL from a 2000ft strip, or 62,000 pounds from a standard runway. The Boeing YC-14 was actually capable of 81,000 pounds from a standard airfield, more than capable of handling the Bradley vehicle in any up-armored version (to 40 tons.) Being jet powered, both these aircraft had a considerable speed advantage over the C-130 (518mph for the YC-14, and 535mph for the YC-15.) Certainly these aircraft would be of greater value to the US Armed Forces than the aging C-130s, capable of carrying a greater payload than the Herc, but not needing the support requirements associated with the larger C-17s. I've always wondered that, as the USN stayed with the general purpose 127mm gun, why was there never interest in the Army and USMC for such a weapon, which offers greater effect than 105mm, but is lighter than 155mm. We could even have reached a very potent commonality with separate-loading ammo: US Army and USMC tanks could fire the same projectiles as artillery, only differing in the volume of propellant charge (so tanks could get higher velocities.) And certainly, a 127mm sabot APFSDS round would've granted considerable anti-armor capability (slipping bands on the sabot petals would alleviate any concerns over smoothbore vs rifled barrel accuracy), and the rifled barrel would allow very capable HE support rounds. A great amount could've been saved on logistics chains as well (only one or two types of ammo resupply vehicles would be needed, with common-sized racks, and Army, Navy, and USMC elements would have ammo commonality: a long-term cost savings.) And considering that ATK's 5inch ANSR can reach 100km, range is not too much an issue (the Mk 45 Mod 4 62-caliber gun can reach over 24km with standard (not base bleed) ammo, and certainly a base bleed round could cross 30km (on par with US 155mm requirements.) There was also the 5inch laser seeking round available (often known as "Deadeye"), and this would have afforded SP guns a useful self-defense and PGM round (although limited in range to about 16-24km.) From the handful of articles I've found on the FV433 Abbot 105mm SP gun (based on the roughly M113-sized FV432 chassis), its roughly 18 ton weight was capable of absorbing the recoil of a 105mm gun without large hull stabilizers (something 28 ton M109s with 155mm guns don't like doing), so surely a 30-ton chassis/hull could handle a 127mm piece. I oft suggested the Bradley vehicle chassis would've formed an ideal medium-weight AFV family (everything from APC/IFV, logistics, recovery, engineer, tank, SP gun, etc), and these would've fit nicely into one of the AMST aircraft (it always amazed me that Americans in general are so militarily ignorant that we elect people into our government who have little or no long-term planning abilities, especially where military matters are concerned.) Even a Bradley chassis with one of the new long range 105mm guns would suffice (place the bets that the NLOS-C FCS gets severely cut) for a medium SP artillery gun. Maybe the same gun on the UDLP CTD for the NLOS-C would work also (the M777 155mm UltraLightweight Field Howitzer), but such a concept should only be pursued when the NLOS-C program bellies-up. Personally, I think the C-130 transport limitation has been the problem with so many systems for decades. 20 ton vehicles are just too light for many applications. And a decent SP artillery gun is one of them. Ideally, except for MBTs, you do not build a chassis designing it for only one AFV application. Perhaps the US should pursue a derivative of the Russian SP 120mm mortar vehicles (2S9 and 2S31) affording the 120mm a better mobility/firing capability than the current M1064A3 carriers (yes, put it in a turret with direct-fire capability.) We should use any of the product-improved M113 hulls, to keep weight in ideal limits. Light artillery is very valuable for support, but towed guns are limited in their mobility (all fine and dandy if your Chinooks don't come under fire while moving your M119s. Chinooks can't take much 7.62mm fire, whereas an armored SP gun can.) I don't see why a Bradley based medium tank, at about 32 tons with add-on armor, couldn't easily handle a 105mm, even 120mm, low recoil gun. (Think of it as a modern Sherman: not the best MBT, but an ideal general purpose assault/fire support vehicle, which does not suffer the infrastructure and transport lim

dogtag wrote: "And on the note of medium-weight AFVs (30 ton-class), I still criticize the DoD and USAF for sticking with the 1950s-designed C-130." Even with a larger theater transport, moving & supporting large amounts of armor by air would still be a tremendous challenge.

Ideally, the weapon should be capable of moving itself for a considerable distance, hence the growing preferrence of self-propelled weapons over towed guns. And more 30-ton class medium vehicles can be moved for the same number of flights that are transporting the heavy stuff. The same goes for maritime and rail transport as well: even with their vast bulk and internal volume, ships also, like aircraft, have a cargo envelope they must stay inside for safety concerns of the vessel. Perhaps the overall point I'm going for is that some of the FCS variants are too heavy for all the more light capability that is needed (fast scouts), but not heavy enough for some of the medium and heavy work they will inevitably be tasked with (line of sight cannon). The US tried to pursue a family of light vehicles as far back as the 1950s with the L, TS, and TL series family of vehicles, and politics and technicalities killed those programs, so forgive me if I don't see the FCS program becoming all it is hoped for also. If we expect to make our Army more mobile and at a faster rate, we are going to need transport aircraft capable of meeting the Army's ground requirements; we should NOT be designing the Army's future ground capabilities around what the USAF says is all it can afford to carry. Or perhaps if the USAF feels that transporting Army ground equipment is becoming too beneath them, then maybe, like attack helicopters, a suitable transport aircraft program needs to be under the Army's control, not the USAF's. Fancy, expensive fighter jets are nice for securing airspace, but armies are needed to secure ground. And unless adequate enough ground equipment is fielded in sufficient numbers in adequate timeframes by capable cargo platforms (air or sea), the troops who have to hold the ground will be the ones suffering, not the USAF flyboys and girls who most likely have nice safe bases to return to, with all the amenities of home that the frontline grunts don't have the luxury of. I'm not looking to get the fires of inter-service rivalry stoked up: I'm just trying to bring up the justifications why the US Army does not have the most capable and adequate equipment to do the job. Out of curiosity, what's the last big-budget program the USAF has to sacrifice? The Army lost the Crusader and Comanche (perhaps because the USAF thinks it can provide the same capabilities?), but the USAF gets to keep its F-22s and F-35s. Ground elements need artillery in THEIR hands and at THEIR disposal; they need not be put on hold while waiting for the nearest aircraft to vector in, aircraft which are often severely limited by inclement weather. Certainly artillery's performance is also reduced, but the Army still has something at their disposal. Nor am I advocating CAS can be done better with artillery: combined ops wins wars. But US artillery capabilities (in light and medium platforms) are severely lacking when compared to others, and we only have so many MLRS rockets at our disposal at any one time. Our lighter elements are definitely lacking adequate fire support when compared to potential adversaries, as we only have a handful of towed 105mm gun and 120mm mortars. Perhaps if the FCS program does bear worthwhile fruit, we should pursue both 155mm AND 105mm variants of the NLOS-C. .

doggtag wrote:"And more 30-ton class medium vehicles can be moved for the same number of flights that are transporting the heavy stuff. " Yes, but it remains to be seen if moving more than token quantities of ANY type of armor by air is viable, logistically, even with larger transports. doggtag wrote:"I'm not looking to get the fires of inter-service rivalry stoked up: I'm just trying to bring up the justifications why the US Army does not have the most capable and adequate equipment to do the job." Well, for not looking to do so, you're sure using a lot of inflamatory rhetoric. doggtag wrote:"Out of curiosity, what's the last big-budget program the USAF has to sacrifice? The Army lost the Crusader and Comanche (perhaps because the USAF thinks it can provide the same capabilities?), but the USAF gets to keep its F-22s and F-35s." Well, the F-22 program used to be slated for 700 aircraft. Now we're looking at barely 200. I wouldn't be surprised if one of the two tacair programs gets cancelled. The tanker deal was squashed. The Army finally realized that Crusader and Comanche were not where they should be spending their money. These cancellations were in no way the USAF's fault. dogtag wrote:"Perhaps the overall point I'm going for is that some of the FCS variants are too heavy for all the more light capability that is needed (fast scouts), but not heavy enough for some of the medium and heavy work they will inevitably be tasked with (line of sight cannon)." I agree with you here. So how did they came up with the "magic" 20 ton weight mark? 20 tons is too heavy for a C-130. It must be based on some logistics planning factor. dogtag wrote"Nor am I advocating CAS can be done better with artillery: combined ops wins wars. But US artillery capabilities (in light and medium platforms) are severely lacking when compared to others, and we only have so many MLRS rockets at our disposal at any one time." "Others"? Others being who? Heavy forces? Of course light and medium forces will have less artillery than heavy units. Others being other countries? I'd say our light forces stack up pretty well with foreign light forces in this area. doggtag wrote:"Our lighter elements are definitely lacking adequate fire support when compared to potential adversaries, as we only have a handful of towed 105mm gun and 120mm mortars." Well part of the problem is, besides armor, artillery is one of the great eaters of logistics backend. It takes a lot of tonnage to keep 155mms well fed. If you plus up light units to compare more favorably with their heavier counterparts, they'll cease being light.

If we are still debating on a suitable 105mm-155mm lightweight weapon, and assuming the 18-20 ton NLOS-C FCS variant is going to be too much vehicle, and assuming that normally Humvees and LMTVs (4x4) vehicles will be the prime movers for towed guns (and carrying some ammo), then perhaps this solution is more readily achievable: basing a conceptual vehicle off the lightweight CVR(T) series hull/chassis (because it's even lighter than M113s, although we could utilize the same road wheels, engines, and transmissions), we could configure an aft platform-mounted gun (105mm certainly, and inter-changeable with a 120mm mortar, but 155mm might be too much shoe-horning), as similar to the bigger Russian SM-240/2S4/M-1975 SP mortar, where the vehicle does little more than carry a stowed weapon, the gun crew, and some ammo, and the gun platform is lowered to the ground for firing. A similar concept was at one time conceptualized for mounting high performance 105mm gun-howitzers or lightweight 155mm howitzers on the Stryker chassis (or even the wheeled FCS chassis), with the weapon firing in the aft direction with a limited amount of traverse. Utilizing a firing platform of this type channels most of the recoil into the ground through the base plate/firing pedestal, not into the chassis like many SP guns do. (the favored design now for a 105mm weapon is in turreted form, and has been trialled with the Denel LEO 105 in an installation on a LAV III vehicle.) A crew platform could be shaped so as to form a clam-shell-type aft hull section when the gun is retracted: this would mean there is an open hull where the crew can seek shelter from overhead shell fragments and limited small arms protection if they come under fire while the gun is deployed. Such a chassis, based off a Spartan chassis, could, at full fuel and ammo, easily crawl in and out of a C-130, and empty could still be carried by Chinkook or CH-53 (it wouldn't exceeed 12 tons "clean".) The Spartan APC can accomodate 7 people total, and combat weight is about 18,000lbs. A 105mm M119 weighs about 4000lbs, and a compliment of crew stores, some fuel, and maybe 2-3 dozen rounds and charges (just guessing here until we dteremine exact internal volume and crew compliment of 4-5 men), with a modified firing platform, should still keep the weight below the 26,000lb limit of CH-47D models (and USMC CH-53Es?) This lightweight fire support vehicle would afford the gun some decent mobility, as well as at least minimal small arms and shrapnel protection for the crew. Or, the vehicle could be given the appearance of a sub-scale M110 (although slightly bigger than the M104 I mentioned earlier), firing over the frontal arc. This platform could be even lighter, as it would not have a built-up hull for crew and ammo. But that's not really gaining any advantage, because other vehicles would be necessary for the crew, stores, and ammo, not much better than the current situation. When I was mentioning that the US was severely lacking in light-to-medium artillery capablities, I was implying when compared to the majority of our most-likely adversaries being Soviet supplied armies: they have a range of useful weapons from 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, and 122mm guns in addition to the big 152/155mm pieces, in addition to 82mm, 120mm, 160, and the big 240mm mortars (all are both towed and mobile variations.) Whereas the US has 81mm and 120mm mortars, albeit in much smaller numbers, and either 105mm howitzers in limited numbers or 155mm M198s. If US forces ever found themselves in a serious shooting match where air cover was not sufficiently available, and heavier elements were not present (MLRS), most likely we would lose in such an all-out artillery slugfest. I certainly believe that US combined ops DOES have room for considerable improvement, as I think that we have a few too many systems too dependent on each other to fully make our military effective (like the general overall lack of anti-air elements in the US inventory, when compared to the field units of other nations. So we have to depend almost entirely on the USAF and USN to keep the skies clean. So far, we have been fortunate that we haven't faced off against threats with competent air assets. Then when our over-worked, stimulant-consuming pilots accidentally kill friendlies, we wonder what the hell went wrong with the system.) One thing that makes people like me very unfavorable in the eyes of my government: I am a fairly well-informed taxpayer, and feel it is certainly my duty to demand justification when all manner of government contracts go over budget and have much less to show for themselves than was promised. Any number of defense projects alone deserve higher scrutiny (too bad the same people harping over the Boeing tanker scandal aren't all up in arms about GDLS and their Stryker program.) The debate there?: certainly Strykers are providing credible service in Iraq... but troops in Afgha

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/puma_tracked/index.html This German IFV is ideal for air-transportation, it has obviously been designed with the A400M aircraft in mind. Four aircraft could carry four vehicles at 31.45 tonnes; or four aircraft could carry three vehicles at 31.45 tonnes, with the fourth aircraft carrying armour modules to up the vehicle weight to 41 tonnes. What with the 30mm cannon in an unmanned module turret, I am sure it is ideal where customisation is concerned, with the 30mm cannon being replaced by perhaps a British 40mm CTWS, a 120mm mortar, or a 105mm light gun etc... What do you think?

doggtag wrote:"When I was mentioning that the US was severely lacking in light-to-medium artillery capablities, I was implying when compared to the majority of our most-likely adversaries being Soviet supplied armies: they have a range of useful weapons from 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, and 122mm guns in addition to the big 152/155mm pieces, in addition to 82mm, 120mm, 160, and the big 240mm mortars (all are both towed and mobile variations.)" Variety does not equal capability. The superiority of U.S. C4ISR can counterbalance significant numerical inferiority in these areas. doggtag wrote:"The debate there?: certainly Strykers are providing credible service in Iraq... but troops in Afghanistan certainly could have used an effective artillery piece, in numbers, more than what they had in 120mm mortars and the handful of 105mm towed guns at their disposal (it might even have cut back on the numbers of CAS sorties the USAF and USN were needed to perform.)" The problem in Afghanistan was not the lack of artillery (tubes or types) as much as the lack of helilift assets to move it around & keep it fed (At least this was the case in Op Anaconda. Or was it Tora Bora? I get those confused..). Rather than buying additional numbers and/or types of arty, perhaps we should invest in a UH-60 (or follow on) that doesn't suck at high altitude.

The US Marine corp have been trying to determine this themselves for quite a while now and have finally decided that it is a 120 mortar. It will be the system that fulfulls their Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) requirement, a USMC publication quotes the EFSS as follows "It will be the primary indirect fire support system for the vertical assault element of the ship-to-objective maneuver force." When this system enters service it will leave the USMC Artillery community in a very good state, New M777A1 (The digital fire control equiped version of the M777), HIMARS and the EFSS