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Subject: Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small
PowerPointRanger    4/14/2006 12:12:51 PM
Recently a number of retired generals called on Donald Rumsfield to resign. Among their complaints was that we did not use enough troops in Iraq to put down the insurgency. I think at its heart, this is a debate over counter-insurgency doctrine. Do you use a large force and put it down with superior numbers (the traditional approach, as was used in Vietnam), or do you use an "economized" force (a smaller, but better equipped and trained force) to hold things together long enough to assemble a viable local government (who can finish the job). In the case of Iraq, it would have been a choice between the often mentioned 500,000 troops (a Vietnam-sized force) and ~135,000 (actual force size). While I can certainly accept that the big force could have done more to secure the country (such as occupying Fallugah), I reject the notion that it could have prevented looting or prevented the insurgency outright. The country is so big that even 500,000 troops can't cover everything. As for the insurgency, it is staging out of (and supported by) neighboring countries (Syria & Iran). The extra troops wouldn't have done any good (unless you intended to go into those neighboring countries). Traditional doctrine states that a 10-1 ratio of troops is enough to put down an insurgency. Even that, however, takes time and costs lives. The Rumsfield Doctrine of counter-insurgency seems to place more emphasis on building the support of the local population (even if it means temporarily ceding areas of the country to the enemy). While I can see from a strictly military point-of-view how our forces wouldn't like it, I can also see the prudence of it in terms of winning local support. It no longer is a matter of US troops vs Iraqi troops. It becomes a matter of the Iraqi government (US supported) vs Iraqi insurgents (al Qaeda supported). In short, it gives the Iraqis a stake in putting down the insurgency. In a strictly by-the-numbers sense, the Rumsfield doctrine is going to take longer because it requires building a local government from scratch (which can take years). Democracies don't like long wars, so it does raise the issue as to whether or not domestic support can be sustained long enough to finish the job. However, I think it has a better long-term chance of succcess.
 
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Herodotus    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/14/2006 3:10:00 PM
What I have seen in my own research on insurgencies is that the 10-1 force ratio basically holds true when it comes to defeating insurgents. For instance the prototypical counter-insurgecny Malaya circa 1948-1960, the British used their own troops, a Home Guard, and local Malaya police forces to subdue the MRLA, and MCP. The tie-down ratios were close to 40-1; and it still took 12 years to defeat the insurgency (and actually the MCP still raided across the Thai border up until 1989 when Ching Peng finally signed a peace agreement). Other counter-insrugency efforts haven't had the same luck; the Portuguese had a 3-1 force ratio and they lost all three of their insurgencies; likewise in Vietnam the force ratios were 5-1 or 6-1 with the ARVN included. If one includes part-time insurgents I suspect the actual size of the Iraqi insurgency is 50,000, which means at least 500,000 troops, in order to hold together a country the size of Iraq. 95 percent of these insurgents are Iraqis, so I don't buy the argument that Syria and Iran are sending insurgents into Iraq. Even if they were that is still not an excuse in not preventing the insurgency. In Boreno in 1963, the Indonesian government sent thousands of its own troops against the British to prevent the merger of Sarawak with Malaya. The Indonesian "insurgents" were of course defeated and Malaya became Malaysia. The problem with building up local forces during an insurgency are manifold. You have problems with training, you have problems with insurgent infiltration, you have questions about loyalty, you have corruption, graft, and a different culture to butt heads with. It would make sense if the occupying power understood the country it was occupying. But this administration has shown an appalling lack of understanding when it comes to Iraqis, their culture, and their politics. I prefer Powell's doctrine to Rummy's. If your going to occupy a country don't half-ass it and get it right the first time. Use overwhelming force to suppress any opposition, then when the fighting is actually done, worry about rebuilding the political infrastructure.
 
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Yimmy    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/16/2006 9:01:50 PM
I don't really think the number of troops matters that much, however it will of course depend on the unique circumstances of the insurgency. The word insurgency is a blanket term for those who oppose the countries regime and wage less than conventional warfare using small numbers. I doubt very much that you will find any two insurgencies which are exactly alike. Where the number of your troops is concerned, I believe that in general so long as your forces are sufficient to beat the insurgents in conventional warfare 100% of the time, you have enough men. Any additional men you require will depend directly on the tactics you intend to use to eliminate the insurgents using unconventional means ("hearts and minds", that sort of stuff). The current situation in Iraq is one where the insurgents can only cause damage to our forces using IED's, snipers and random mortar and rocket artillery attacks. We clearly have the conventional fight under control, and so we do not requite to up our force numbers much if at all. A major flaw in Americas strategy in fighting the VC/NVA in Southern and Central Vietnam was the lack of willingness to take the fight to them, while they were licking their wounds over the Cambodian border. By the time this line in the sand was removed, it was too late. I do not know if the insurgents in Iraq are hiding over the Syrian and Iranian borders, but I expect they are, especially concerning the Iranian border. If this is the case we have to pursue and destroy them there. Of course we should explain to Syria and Iran our intentions before infringing on their teritory, however we should not give them a choice in the matter regardless of what threat we require to face them with. Insurgents do not have logistics - yet they still keep themselves supplied and fed to keep in the good fight. They do this by going to ground, to lick their wounds. It is imperative that we use "hearts and minds" to get as much of the Iraqi population on side as possible, to prevent the insurgents their sanctuary in which to hide, and it is equally imperative that we pursue and eliminate the insurgents regardless of where they may go. Thats my take on it anyway. I would not give the same answer concerning Afghanistan, where the insurgents feel confident enough to attack us by conventional means in force (a large platoon size force of 46 wasn't it the other day?). Here I believe we need to increase our troop numbers to re-assert ourselves as King of the conventional battlefield.
 
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Herodotus    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/16/2006 10:15:23 PM
"The current situation in Iraq is one where the insurgents can only cause damage to our forces using IED's, snipers and random mortar and rocket artillery attacks. We clearly have the conventional fight under control, and so we do not requite to up our force numbers much if at all." Do you think this is unique in the annals of the history of insurgencies. If this was a conventional battle then we would need far less troops. The standard ratio for victory is 3-1. But since you do not know you're enemy, where he will strike next, and where he hides, an insurgency is more difficult to defeat thus the 7-1 or more accurately a 10-1 force ratio. "I do not know if the insurgents in Iraq are hiding over the Syrian and Iranian borders, but I expect they are, especially concerning the Iranian border. If this is the case we have to pursue and destroy them there. Of course we should explain to Syria and Iran our intentions before infringing on their teritory, however we should not give them a choice in the matter regardless of what threat we require to face them with." It seems unlikey that nationalist Sunni Arab Iraqi insurgents would be hidiing in Shiite Persian Iran. More likely they hide in plain sight in the Sunni Triangle and are funded by Syrian and Saudi elements to tie down the US and keep the Shiites from obtaining power.
 
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Yimmy    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/16/2006 10:37:25 PM
"Do you think this is unique in the annals of the history of insurgencies. If this was a conventional battle then we would need far less troops. The standard ratio for victory is 3-1. But since you do not know you're enemy, where he will strike next, and where he hides, an insurgency is more difficult to defeat thus the 7-1 or more accurately a 10-1 force ratio." You are trying to apply the lessons learned in conventional fighting with unconventional fighting. Ratios mean nothing, nadda. You do not need three times the number of men to win a conventional war, you need three times the men in each offensive battle. Insurgencies do not have any battles, and so why try to apply the same logic? "It seems unlikey that nationalist Sunni Arab Iraqi insurgents would be hidiing in Shiite Persian Iran" Perhaps, however I think Iran is trying to destabalise Iraq as a buffer zone to prevent too much attention being diverted to themselves. Maybe not a good comparison, but in the 1991 Gulf War Iraqi pilots were happy to find sanctuary in Iran remember.
 
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shek    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/17/2006 3:11:12 PM
Yimmy, Herodutus is correct in that there are historical ratios that tend to hold in successful counterinsurgency operations. What these numbers reflect aren't necessarily the numbers to find and destroy the insurgents, but the ability to secure the local populace so that the insurgents cannot find sanctuary among the populace or conduct attacks that would discredit the current government (after all, insurgencies are about politics).
 
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Yimmy    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/17/2006 3:52:23 PM
Herodutus is correct in that there are historical ratios that tend to hold in successful counterinsurgency operations. What these numbers reflect aren't necessarily the numbers to find and destroy the insurgents, but the ability to secure the local populace so that the insurgents cannot find sanctuary among the populace or conduct attacks that would discredit the current government I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but I do not think it a winning way. I don't think ratios hold much salt in unconventional warfare like this - it is hard to calculate any winning ratios for successful coin operations when in recent history there have been so few success stories to gain them from! Vietnam was a failure for America, Afghanistan was a failuire for the USSR with the jury still out on our involvement, even Northern Ireland is unfinished business. I do not believe numbers are the answer to securing the local pupulace from the insurgents. The answer is in a handful of doctors and other specialist personel getting the local populace firmly onside, so they are unwilling to shelter the insurgents.
 
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Herodotus    RE:Counter-Insurgency Footprint: Big vs Small   4/17/2006 4:06:45 PM
"I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but I do not think it a winning way. I don't think ratios hold much salt in unconventional warfare like this - it is hard to calculate any winning ratios for successful coin operations when in recent history there have been so few success stories to gain them from! Vietnam was a failure for America, Afghanistan was a failuire for the USSR with the jury still out on our involvement, even Northern Ireland is unfinished business." Vietnam and Afghanistan were failures because the ratios were too low. Northern Ireland is not unfinished business; the British won, and they did it with high force ratios, 30-1 in some years. "I do not believe numbers are the answer to securing the local pupulace from the insurgents. The answer is in a handful of doctors and other specialist personel getting the local populace firmly onside, so they are unwilling to shelter the insurgents." You need high force ratios to secure and protect the local populace. In a case where there are no troops to provide security the insurgency can and will take over (See Fallujah for details). Winning "hearts and minds" isnt always a good strategy, it worked in Malaya because the insurgecny was small and easily contained. The vast majority of troops in Malaya were used as portection for the local popualce while British SAS, and other SF forces pursued the MRLA through the jungle. Iraq is very big with a large population, and a large insurgency, thus you need more troops to conduct COIN operations and even more to provide general security for the population against the insurgency.
 
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PowerPointRanger    New Counter Insurgency model   4/26/2006 8:50:23 PM
I'd first like to point out that the US has a long history of successful counter insurgency operations (The Confederacy, Peru, Colombia, The Indian Wars, the Philippines, Greece, Guatemala, Oman, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Vietnam--the insurgency in Vietnam WAS put down; although a weakened South Vietnam later fell to a CONVENTIONAL invasion in 1975). But what's different about Iraq is that the US is using a different doctrine to fight this one. Rummy has long made clear his belief that a smaller force with more high-tech and training is superior to a larger force with less technology and training. Clearly a number of generals disagree. Let's assume the published numbers are right: ~135,000 Coalition + ~200,000 Iraqi forces vs. 20-40,000 insurgents. That's a 8-1 ratio or better. Rummy however would argue that US forces would count for more than their numbers because of superior training, equipment, and support (force multipliers). While it is difficult to say exactly how many insurgents there are, if it were at the higher end, they would probably control more than they do. Regardless, it's a favorable ratio for us. If one looks at coalition fatalites as an indicator of insurgent strength they peaked in Nov 2004. If one looks at Iraqi police/military, casualties peaked in summer of 2005. One combines all combat fatalities (Coalition & Iraqi Military & civilian casualties), the insurgency peaked in the quarter ending September 2005. It shows a pattern of the insurgents moving to progressively softer targets: Quarterly Fatalities Iraqi Iraqi Q of Pol/Mil Civ Coal Total Jun-05 754 1350 148 2252 Sep-05 819 2682 248 3749 Dec-05 584 1392 188 2164 Mar-06 540 2180 210 2930 In other words, the bad guys are getting steadily weaker. Add to this the fact that UBL has told his forces in Iraq to cut and run to Sudan... It's starting to look like Rummy is right.
 
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Herodotus    RE:New Counter Insurgency model   5/1/2006 5:27:05 PM
"I'd first like to point out that the US has a long history of successful counter insurgency operations (The Confederacy, Peru, Colombia, The Indian Wars, the Philippines, Greece, Guatemala, Oman, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Vietnam--the insurgency in Vietnam WAS put down; although a weakened South Vietnam later fell to a CONVENTIONAL invasion in 1975)." I think that some of your historical facts are not quite accurate. Since you seem to have some difficulty I will help you to understand the history of US COIN ops. The Indian Wars lasted for the better part of the nineteenth century, and for the most part there was not a decisive battle the Americans fought, nor any specific campaign that ended the Indian Wars. Rather it was the gradual but steady increase of white settlers into the areas once populated by Indians, and the introduction of new diseases and the depravation of the food supply that caused the Indians to eventually succumb to the white man. The Indian Wars were mostly a succession of harassments by the Indians against the US Calvary, and the US’s frustrated attempts to stem them. Population of Plains Indians Tribes: Arapaho 3,000 ( 1780) Omaha 3,000 ( 1802) Arikara 2,600 ( 1804) Osage 6,200 ( 1780) Assiniboin 8,000 ( 1829) Oto-Missouri 931 ( 1843) Blackfeet 7,600 ( 1855) Oto 500 ( 1895) Cheyenne 4,000 ( 1875) Pawnee 1,440 ( 1879) Comanche 6,000 ( 1816) Plains Cree 1,000 ( 1858) Crow 4,000 ( 1780) Ponca 800 ( 1780) Gros Ventre 3,000 ( 1780) Shoshoni (Snakes) 1,500 ( 1820) Hidatsa 2,100 ( 1804) Sioux 40,000 ( 1870) Kansa 866 ( 1861) Utes 4,500 ( 1845) Kiowa 2,000 ( 1780) Wichita 3,200 ( 1780) Mandan 252 ( 1855) Strength of US Army: 1849 10,320 1870 37,313 1850 10,315 1871 35,353 1851 10,334 1872 35,512 1852 10,299 1873 32,554 1853 10,248 1874 32,602 1854 10,329 1875 27,525 1855 12,729 1876 27,489 1856 12,698 1877 27,472 1857 12,688 1878 27,746 1858 12,923 1879 27,924 1859 12,943 1880 27,926 1860 12,931 1881 27,976 1861 13,024 1882 28,002 1862 43,332 1883 27,995 1863 43,562 1884 28,028 1864 43,562 1885 27,996 1865 43,246 1886 27,996 1866 43,059 1887 28,167 1867 54,641 1888 28,795 1868 52,922 1889 28,764 1869 52,935 1890 28,792 The US Army did not have a significant enough presence in the West to properly put down the insurrection. Source: A Guide to the Indian Wars of the West. Contributors: John D. McDermott - author. Publisher: University of Nebraska Press. Place of Publication: Lincoln, NE. Publication Year: 1998. The Confederacy of course was an insurrection put down brutally by the North, scorched earth policy that wouldn’t really work in Iraq. Likewise in the Philippines, the US brutally suppressed the local population, until victory could be assured. Regarding Vietnam; I have debated Shek on this in previous posts. One could debate the usefulness of the NLF in the PAVN invasion of the South; however no one can really debate their usefulness in getting the US to the bargaining table at the Paris Peace Conference. Soviet and Chinese military aid was cut to the NLF and to the North Vietnamese after the 1972 Paris peace accord, and the US Congress responded with their own cuts in aid to South Vietnam, so it is a simple cop out to state that the US abandoned South Vietnam. In truth the US did not have any success in Vietnam. I don’t know how one could argue the opposite---the strategic goal of the US was to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and to keep South Vietnam out of the hands of communist leaders, it failed miserably. In Greece there were at most a few military advisers helping institute the Truman Doctrine but their help was limited, the GDA was defeated in the field by the GNA. Table 5.1 GDA Recruitment, October 1948-June 1949 Month Recruits October 1948 3,600 November 1948 1,920 December 1948 1,848 January 1949 1,500 23 February-1 March 1949 1,500 May 1949 720 June 1949 100 Sources: Compiled from JUSMAPG monthly operations reports, Greek General Staff estimates, and U.S. Military Attaché--Greece reports. We see here how the decrease in GDA recruitment helped eliminate them as a threat. The US did give external support but no ground troops to help the Greeks. The Latin American Involvement: US involvement in Bolivia consisted of 17 Green Berets, and a small team of CIA agents who helped hunt down Che Guevara, it was not an insurgency. Colombia: There were no US troops present in Columbia to assist in the defeating of any insurgency. Peru: “After President Reagan signed a secret directive establishing international drug trafficking as a national security threat to the United States, the rules of the drug game changed. Now the U.S. military was used in the Andes to fight the battle against drug produc
 
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shek    RE:New Counter Insurgency model . . . is a failure   5/2/2006 10:05:02 AM
But what's different about Iraq is that the US is using a different doctrine to fight this one. Rummy has long made clear his belief that a smaller force with more high-tech and training is superior to a larger force with less technology and training. Clearly a number of generals disagree. Let's assume the published numbers are right: ~135,000 Coalition + ~200,000 Iraqi forces vs. 20-40,000 insurgents. That's a 8-1 ratio or better. Rummy however would argue that US forces would count for more than their numbers because of superior training, equipment, and support (force multipliers). While it is difficult to say exactly how many insurgents there are, if it were at the higher end, they would probably control more than they do. Regardless, it's a favorable ratio for us. *** In other words, the bad guys are getting steadily weaker. Add to this the fact that UBL has told his forces in Iraq to cut and run to Sudan... It's starting to look like Rummy is right. Technology doesn’t provide synergistic gains in the counterinsurgency environment. While my Stryker rifle company that took over nearly an entire battalion’s sector in Mosul had nearly the exact same offensive capability, if not better, to conduct raids and targeted missions to capture/kill bad guys as a force several times the size that had been their previous thanks to all the digital toys and mobility that the Strykers provided us, we had nowhere near the same counterinsurgency capability. Where I could only put out two squads to patrol and keep a presence to ensure security and disrupt the flow of bad guys through the battlespace, the company’s I replaced could put out an entire platoon and rotate platoons through to provide even longer coverage than I could dream of. The reduced presence meant that I couldn’t control the population and win it over to our side because I couldn’t provide the 24/7 coverage that existed before – citizens had to choose sides, and since insurgents/terrorists could live among the people, they could gain the other hand. If you look at where the terrorists and insurgents fled to once Fallujah kicked off, it was to Mosul and Tall Afar. While there are some other reasons, one of them is absolutely because you had a brigade operating where an entire division had been before. The doctrine of winning while minimizing costs has been detrimental to our operations in Iraq. It is only now, three years after having toppled the regime that we are finally producing enough ISF to be able to control some areas. However, because of the failed approach to the Iraqi security forces in 2003, we have an inbalanced ISF structure that is only now starting to bring the numbers of Sunni into the ISF that is required. So, the de facto strategy that resulted from not enough troops is still hampering our operations today.
 
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