Are you dense Rebrooku? Realpolitik was not comparing the strategy of WWII to the strategy of our day. He was comparing YOUR analysis of the present war with what YOUR logic would say about our strategy then. And his comments were meant ironically - for Europe hardly is ruled by us - military bases or no. While I began this comment in jest (very rare for me), I now think perhaps it is true: I think you really do not get it. This is not that complicated a situation, morally, logically, legally or militarily. But your mind is already made up - the motives of the Bush administration simply must be simplistic and misguided - so no testimony or fact contradicting what you know is taken seriously. But - for the record - I will repeat: the policy was systematically worked out, based on broad domestic and international consultation, and it is at its root well concieved. Errors there have been, but errors there must inevitably be in a war of any magnitude, much less a war of a sort we have no experience fighting. My nightmares, at least, did not come to pass: (1) I feared a crusade against Islam itself, and demonizing of the enemy - yet only on Strategypage forums have I ever encountered a tendency of anyone for that; (2) I feared a messy fight for Baghdad, complete with battles costing more lives a day than we have seen in a year; (3) I feared a situation developing requiring numbers of troops far from Iraq in the first year after the invasion. None of these things came to pass, and all were real and acceptable possibilities. Anyone who is not offering prayers of thanksgiving simply does not understand the situation. Anyone who is not glad we are fighting this particular war in this particular theater does not understand what the likely effects would be if we were not. We have focused the enemy on Iraq, and got them to put their credibility on the line over it. Further, it is three years since 911, and no credible attack in our homeland. The enemy is losing the critical psychological battle in the eyes of people who wish us ill: they have not demonstrated a credible capability to even give us a real contest. If and when they fail to stop the establishment of an effective regime in Iraq, it will further reduce their attractiveness to the kind of people who we really don't want them to recruit. If you do not grasp these matters, and more, you are not doing serious analysis. And once again I offer my thanksgiving prayers your non-strategy is not in charge.

It almost appears you are not speaking rational English. But perhaps it is what most serious disagreements usually boil down to: symantics. I think you simply are saying, in a very disrespectful way, that you don't agree with the definition of who the enemy is. As formally expressed, the administrations definition is one that the vast majority of people would agree with if they were to give the matter a couple of weeks serious study. You do not bring credit to yourself by rejecting this definition. You appear to wish to limit the enemy of 911 to Al Qaida itself, or possibly a small set of closely allied organizations and nations (Afghanistan for example). This concept has some merit, and was proposed and considered by the administration. But a consensus quickly formed it was an inadequate definition because it would leave in place a historic passive policy with respect to the entire set of problems which have involved a broader set of terrorist organizations in the Islamic world. While I have carefully distinguished Islam from terrorism, nevertheless, for several reasons, terrorism is finding roots in a number of Islamic societies, especially in the classical Near East. The administration elected to change the failed policy of leaving these problems to fester on their own, and recognized that a major change is required if they are to truly be resolved. Even if you are a friend of Islam, and a believer in true self rule for Arab and other Islamic peoples, it is clear no institutions in their societies, nor the United Nations, were going to be effective in causing the required changes even in the medium term. This problem has now reached the point of being a gigantic national security issue, and it is far better to face it honestly than to continue the previous sort of dithering and ineffective half measures. It is ironic you wish to blame the Bush administration for problems they did not cause, but are not saying anything about the role of previous administrations in allowing them to come to this point. It is even more ironic you do not seem to have much blame for the real enemies, both AQ related and not. I have yet to detect the slightest evidence you are on our side in any effective sense. If you really are opposed to the enemy, please start suggesting what really might bring all these organizations to an end? And I include Saddam's regime - which surely we should have ended - if this was not the right way - what was? If this was not the right time, when would it be? Or are you proposing leaving Saddam in power, lifting the sanctions regime, ending the no fly no go zones, and ignoring Iraqs failure to honor the terms ending the 1991 war? Why is it wise and just and safe to do things of that nature?

Actually, you are quite wrong about France. The French know quite well what kind of war this is, and they are very insecure about it. They are terrified of trouble from people living in, or regularly traveling in, France and its territories. But the French have long played very dangerous games for profit - it is French sonar on new Chinese submarines, French radar in China's radar network, French engineers who reengineered the Han and Xia nuclear power plants. After all - China is not France's problem - and in a way - if China distracts the USA it gives France more relative influence elsewhere. The French play a very cold form of realpolitik. But Iraq was a very special case. France had a lot to hide - and the idea we would get the documents out about it was one they really hoped to hide. It was a dangerous and short sighted policy to sell what they sold, but even if they regretted it, it could not be undone. However, when the German Foreign Minister said Europe must "do whatever it takes to insure the USA does not lose this war" the French Foreign Minister joined in the consensus that he was right. We are getting cooperation, partially because we are not insisting on getting headlines advertising it. France is not the enemy, and people who refuse to consider ANY effective policy action are more of a problem than France is.

In an ideal world, as I view it, the regional and UN security organizations would take effective action in a timely way to such an extent it would not be necessary to act independently from them. But the most critical regional organization (CENTO or some equal) does not exist, and the structure of the UN Security Council often mitigates against effective action. The case of Iraq is indeed scandalous, and in several respects, but most of those scandles are UN related, not US related. The oil for food program was very corruptly run, and apparently itself a reason to oppose ending the regime - to delay the truth coming out. The Russians and French played very partisan games to preserve their profits, which were large because they were cheating, and breaking the rules, in a situation where there were few other places Iraq could go shopping. China actually wanted the war, and had hoped for it much earlier: it just played a clever hand of letting us buy them off. [See Willy Wo Lap Lam of the South China Morning Post in 1991 for a clear articulation of the Chinese policy and goals]. All of this is far from a simple focus on the crises at hand, or even on the underlieing causes of those crises. It is not so much that the USA is the policeman of the world. The USA just is a citizen in the world. It may be ideal for the police to arrest a criminal, but you may have to act in their absense. Your right to do so cannot be taken away, and neither can our national rights to act in our defense be taken away. I would prefer to act collectively - but the operative word is ACT. UNLESS many nations, including France, are willing to ACT in a TIMELY and EFFECTIVE way, we no longer have the luxury of dithering and not acting. We are not yet effective enough. But we have made a fair beginning, we have hurt several enemies in sevaral countries, and we seem to have fooled the enemy into fighting largely on our terms. [Fighting us in a war zone is pretty much our dream come true. Wait and see - when we are fighting in your neighborhood you may wish for the days of fighting in Baghdad. And if you want to see fighting on your street, keep weakening the political support of the only effective war policy in the world at this time.]

Amen - we are indeed awaiting to hear what your superior strategy is to take the offensive and end the war in the near - rather than distant - term? [Rebrooku] If Bush et al are unwise, share your wisdom: what would have been wise? And I hope it is not in the form "do nothing except study intel reports and seek extradition, freezing of funds, etc." This is a war, one we took a long time to take serously. The best defense is usually a strong offense. What is your better, faster, more humane and internationally popular policy?

Rumsfield asked, quite seriously, "what are we doing wrong?" I trust leaders who are wise enough to ask such questions much more than critics who have no respect for them at all. I happen to disagree with the good Secretary on North Korea, in detail, and in some respects, on the alliance with Pakistan and certain Central Asian nations, and on the timing of the invasion of Iraq. But I am far from sure I am right and he is wrong on all of these matters, even with the benefit of hindsight. I am much less impressed with Rebrooku because he is NOT respectful of people of this sort who have been very careful and deliberative and consultative about what our policy ought to be. It is wrong to expect a policy involving literally thousands of people at the formation level to be, in every detail, what you would write, all alone. And it is wrong to think, if you wrote all alone you would do half as well as our national security institutions have done. I - often accused of arrogance in my own right - never suffered under the illusion I could write unaided a policy superior in every respect. I find the unreasonable criticism of the policy actually formed, and the processes that formed it, a combination of ignorant (of the processes and the facts on the ground) and arrogant (no need to become informed - just criticize everything automatically - assuming they didn't do it properly - even if they might have done).

“Well, I think you misread this one. The analogy offered is the peace and stability and economic integration brought about in Europe after WW2 by the presence of U.S. military bases on the front lines of the cold war..” They were not bases established in countries actively involved in civil war. There are other dissimilarities, but that alone makes the point that the original point was pointless. But, it does beg another, more appropriate comparison. Vietnam. “Why were they different? What is different about nation building and reconstruction in Iraq,…” Same answer. We build it, they blow it up, just like, right, Vietnam. “The Iraqi people are not stupid. The very level of dissatisfaction with U.S. troops "occupying" their country, and the extreme suspicion of the interrim government gives proof to the lie that the eventual government elected will be a sham government which is only a stooge of the U.S.” Yup, and they vast majority want the U.S. out. So, a truly democratically elected government, without coercion, would immediately ask the U.S. to withdraw, and there goes the Grand Strategy. “Furthermore, you seem to suggest that the U.S. will be responsible for setting up a Stasi like organization, and a one party system of rule, and ruthlessly persecuting the local population to keep them under our thumb. “ Doesn’t look like much choice if we want to execute the Grand Strategy. But, Abu Ghraib was a good beginning stab at it. Only trouble was whistle blowers, who have since been severely convinced whistle blowing is a bad idea, so I suppose we could try it again after an acceptable waiting period. “This is what I mean by the irrational assignment of U.S. motives and methods to historically very evil organizations.” I did not assign a moral condemnation to it, you did. I only made a point of comparison to a more similar situation for the purpose of reminding us that the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe eventually proved impractical and failed. I will leave the morality of it to you. “The Grand Strategy, if it works, and there is no guarantee, will not only put the U.S. in a position to influence the Middle East to reform their governments, and create a better life for their peoples (and we want this not just because we're the good guys - but because it will give people less reason to be terrorists…” So far, it seems to be having the opposite effect. I see no reason it will not continue to do so and have heard no arguments that clearly contradict that view. In fact, as I said it just becomes all the more clear the more proponents of the Grand Strategy argue for it, that it will create more anti-American violence, not less. “If the pressure cooker that is Iran boils over and the people overthrow the Mullahs…” Not while were on their doorstep threatening invasion. And, if we militarily strike their nuclear program, they WILL retaliate, probably by directly and openly supporting Shia ant-American violence in Iraq, which will force us to invade Iran, which will lead to a truly brutal and debilitating civil war that will rival Vietnam. Oh boy, this Grand Strategy looks better and better. NOT. “Then, the U.S. will turn to China and say, ok, your move..." Wow, WWIII, how nice.

"Are you dense Rebrooku? Realpolitik was not comparing the strategy of WWII to the strategy of our day." Right, that was also my point for why the analogy didn't hold. And, you should reconsider the personal insults if you really want clarity. “My nightmares, at least, did not come to pass: (1) I feared a crusade against Islam itself, and demonizing of the enemy…” The Grand Strategy says to Muslims, “If you can not police your own then we will bring you all to heel”. So it is not technically a Crusade against Islam, but is only a Neocrusade against Islam. Looks like we have answered the original message of this thread.

“It almost appears you are not speaking rational English. But perhaps it is what most serious disagreements usually boil down to: symantics. I think you simply are saying, in a very disrespectful way, that you don't agree with the definition of who the enemy is….” It is not “very disrespectful” just because I disagree that the Grand Strategy is likely to lead us over a cliff.

"Actually, you are quite wrong about France. The French know quite well what kind of war this is, and they are very insecure about it. They are terrified of trouble from people living in, or regularly traveling in, France and its territories." I am quite right to say the French disagree with the Grand Strategy. The present French government is Conservative, not Neoconservative. In so far as the French selling arms to potential enemies, you're going to make THAT argument in comparison to U.S. policy? Well, OK, two wrongs don't make a right. Of course that makes as much sense to this discussion as throwing in three left turns around the block do. (skippy ain't got nothin' on me!)