| The situation in Iran so resembles other popular revolutions that it is startling. Reference to the French Revolution of 1789 here has relevance. The Jacobins under the leadership of Robespierre who seized power in 1789 were initially popular just like the fundamentalists under Khomeini. Like the fundamentalists, they were also the scourge of other nations because of their desire to export revolution. Nevertheless there was a conservative backlash to the excesses of the revolution (The Terror). Radical rightists killed the leftist Robespierre and put the conservative Barras on the throne. Shortly thereafter a crisis of legitimacy arose.
The same thing happened in Iran. After Khomeini died, a successor had to be named if the Islamic Republic were to survive. Just like France, radical rightists used the opportunity to seize power and put a conservative, Ali Khamenei, on the throne. Like France, a crisis of legitimacy gradually arose.
The ousting of Robespierre and ascendancy of Barras caused a change in the radical left (the montagnards-Jacobins) who then moderated their position and called for greater democratization. Royalists appeared out of the woodwork and had to be put down by General Bonaparte in a "whiff of grapeshot." Bonaparte eventually triumphed by seizing power thus halting Jacobin and royalist attempts at revision and democratic reform.
Iran is in a similar position. Khamenei, like Barras, is a conservative and is an illegitimate leader. He lacks popular support and his leadership has proved wanting. Like the Jacobins, the formerly radical leftists and centrists, Khatami and his supporters, have responded by moderating their positions in the hopes of gaining power vis-a-vis the democratic elements of the system (ie., through the ballot box and popular elections), and/or by fostering popular uprisings. This effort has been stiffled by the conservative courts and Khamenei.
The only way for Iran to remain an Islamic "revolutionary" state in the future is for it to revert to Bonapartism. This is the only realistic solution for Khamenei and his supporters. It was for this reason that Bonaparte claimed to be "the fulfullment of the revolution." In his mind, he prevented the triumph of counter-revolutionary elements (royalists).
If popular revolts continue then the radical rightists would have to save the revolution in a "whiff of grapeshot." The right would have to find a popular leader and then give him power. Thus he could claim to be the savior of the revolution. This would entail ultimately replacing Khamenei(who is unpopular) with someone who is popular (either by coup or by nominating him as successor to the faqihship--supreme religious leader). It appears that Khamenei knows this and thus desperately tries to hang onto power. He is trying to wait out the opposition and then name a popular successor! Unfortunately for him there does not seem to be such a person in his camp. Likewise, he is appointed for life and thus is too young to hand over power to a popular successor at this time. So he waits!
Thus the problem for the conservative camp is: Who will succeed Khamenei and can he be found in time? If a popular leader is not found and found quickly, then Islamic Iran will fail. The reformists, by pressing for greater democratic freedom will ultimatlely undermine the Islamic character of the state since modern secular democracy is antithetical to the fusion of church and state.
Let us hope that those advocating for a secular republic keep doing what they are doing! It seems to be placing alot of pressure on Khamenei who frequently tries to rally the unpopular and ostracized conservatives grass roots movement. Khamenei is clearly trying to use the potential of a US/Iraq War to rally anti-Americanism and thus pro-regime support. That is his strategy! Will this allow him to hang onto the reins of power long enough to find a successor? Let us hope not! |
