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Subject: The Moscow Option 1941 Summer
taylorjohn21    5/15/2005 1:34:47 PM
What would have happened if Army Group Centre had continued its offensive towards Moscow in August/September 1941? A lot has been written about this subject and the consensus of opinion seems to be that the Germans had no other choice but to divert their panzer forces to the flanks before renewing their offensive against Moscow and that even if Moscow had fallen this would have no made difference to the final outcome of the war on the Eastern Front. I've gone into this question in great detail taking into account all the relavent factors (composition of forces, supply, terrain, transportation etc) and from what I have found I believe the current consensus to be misguided. Not only would the Germans have taken Moscow in the Summer/Autumn 1941, but the fall of the capital of the USSR would have a decisive impact on the war on the Eastern Front.
 
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editor    RE:The Moscow Option 1941 Summer   5/15/2005 5:12:50 PM
Besides the psychoiogical impact - and there would have been some - I think that Moscow as a rail hub would have been critical. Their logistics were (and still are) a mess as it was, and it would have crippled them. On the other hand, there's a difference in "wouldn't have affected the outcome" and "same result". I think the Red Army would have still won, but it would have dragged on even longer, and been even more brutal. The US transports that were sent over likewise definitely sped up their victory and probably saved lives.
 
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taylorjohn21    RE:The Moscow Option 1941 Summer   5/15/2005 8:14:41 PM
Moscow was the centre of the transport net in European Russia and although there were lateral rail lines connecting the northern and southern theatres of the front, they were single track lines with a low transport capacity. The most important rail traffic was directed through Moscow. The only other major rail network in European Russia was located in the Donets basin (southern Ukraine). I do believe that the fall of Moscow in the Summer/Autumn 1941 would have had a decisive impact on the war on the Eastern Front because of the context in which it would have occurred. It would have proceeded and (most likely) been followed by a succession of huge Soviet military defeats – (Soviet casualties in the first 6 months of the war amounted to nearly 6 million!!). Given the nature of the Soviet state under Stalin where power was centralized in the hands of one man ruling from a capital which, at that time, was considered to be the centre of world revolution the psychological/symbolic impact on the ordinary Red Army soldier of Stalin actually having vacate the Kremlin would have been enormous. Also, bear in mind, that in 1941, America had not entered the war – so there was no realistic prospect of a second front or the arrival of significant western aid. Also, consider that during this period there was no indication that the Red Army would be able to improve its combat performance against the Wehrmacht. The Soviet reserves from the Eastern USSR that were deployed against the German Army in the Winter of 41/42 were for the most part unavailable during the Summer/Autumn 41 – they were either still being formed or guarding against a possible renewed attack by the Japanese. I find, that when historians debate this issue they do so with the benefit of hindsight - that is, they take into account the subsequent course of events from late 41 through to 45 – but none of what later happened could have been apparent in the Summer/Autumn of 1941.
 
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editor    RE:The Moscow Option 1941 Summer   5/17/2005 5:14:00 PM
The other huge assumption that people tend to make is that Stalin would always eventually give the military a freer hand and that Hitler would always choke. Maybe the loss of Moscow would have changed that as well. I know the train stations in Donetsk pretty well. If you ever get the chance to go there, see what other options are available instead. Though coming from coal country, seeing slag heaps in the middle of town is impressive in its own wierd way... Psychologically the Societs would certainly have drawn upon the parallels with the Napoleonic invasion, so I think they could have handled the loss to some degree. The psychological impact would have been substantial, though, no doubt. The occupation force tied down in Moscow would have eaten up significant resources. What do you think would have been the next target? Would throwing more at Leningrad have made sense? Or once Moscow falls, then swing south?
 
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taylorjohn21    RE:Moscow Revisited Summer 1941   5/18/2005 8:29:37 AM
Historians often cite the fall of Moscow in 1812 and Napoleon’s subsequent defeat in Russia to show that even if the Germans had captured Moscow in 1941 it would not have changed the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front. I don’t believe this comparison to be entirely valid. The Moscow which existed in 1812 was not the same Moscow that had come into existence in 1941. During the nineteenth century Moscow had essentially been a provincial town, but by 1941, it had emerged as the political/communications hub of the Soviet state at which all the spokes of the Stalinist power machine came together. I agree that the capture of Moscow would have tied down considerable German resources and this might well have restricted the scale and scope of operations that the German planned on other sectors of the front. However, what I think is important to consider, is that the loss of the USSR’s main communications/transport centre would have severely impeded the Red Army’s ability to counteract subsequent Germans advances for the remainder of 1941 and probably well into 1942. It is this command and control paralysis which combined with the loss of the most important symbol of Stalin’s power in Russia that made capture of Moscow so important. One can well argue – as nearly all historians now do - that given the subsequent course of events in WWII (America’s entry into the war, the huge Anglo-American lend-lease program to the USSR, the allied second front in western Europe, Hitler’s war direction, German occupation policies etc etc………), German defeat was inevitable. However, as I stated in my first thread none of the above was readily apparent during the period in question - it is within the context of the Summer/Autumn 1941 that the fall of Moscow would have had such a dramatic impact.
 
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editor    RE:Moscow Revisited Summer 1941   5/18/2005 7:17:43 PM
The comparison to the Napoleonic campaign was only about the extent of the psychological effect. But the psychological effect of Moscow's fall on the leaders themselves might have had an effect on the way the war was handled by both of them. My guess is that you wold have seen fewer moves towards the Red Army's relative independence and the straightjacketing of the Wehrmacht. That alone would have dragged out the war. There's plenty to point at that the logistics system was bad/non-existent in '41. The retreat eastward, when allowed, was so haphazard that they couldn't get out of their own way. A friend of mine here in Kyiv is a logistics professor, and one of his favorite jokes is about 'Soviet logistics', which he was assured did exist. Funny thing is, we figured out that Antonov did well because of the need to move actions that the antiquated rail system couldn't handle - like moving troops quickly. And if that rail system was seen as antiquated in 1952 - the year he first got into paying attention to this stuff, what was it in 1942? Merely old? Even if the trains could move, forget anything like speed. So the fall of Moscow would have created an even larger need for anti-partisan operations on the part of the Germans, and probably an even greater need for US logistical support on the part of the Russians.Without the trains creaking along, the only option would have been to focus more on air transport, which would have been more vulnerable. To change the topic a bit - if you want to blaspheme here, tell them that the Red Army didn't win, but that the Nazi's lost. What do you think? Was it mostly the blunders on the German side, or more the massive Red Army effort? We can agree that the failure to take Moscow was a huge mistake, and whether it cost the Germans the war or not is a good question. But was it just one in a series of mistakes or the principal error?
 
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taylorjohn21    RE:Moscow Revisted Summer 1941   5/19/2005 9:08:23 AM
The comparison to the Napoleonic campaign was only about the extent of the psychological effect. But the psychological effect of Moscow's fall on the leaders themselves might have had an effect on the way the war was handled by both of them. My guess is that you wold have seen fewer moves towards the Red Army's relative independence and the straightjacketing of the Wehrmacht. That alone would have dragged out the war. There's plenty to point at that the logistics system was bad/non-existent in '41. The retreat eastward, when allowed, was so haphazard that they couldn't get out of their own way. A friend of mine here in Kyiv is a logistics professor, and one of his favorite jokes is about 'Soviet logistics', which he was assured did exist. Funny thing is, we figured out that Antonov did well because of the need to move actions that the antiquated rail system couldn't handle - like moving troops quickly. And if that rail system was seen as antiquated in 1952 - the year he first got into paying attention to this stuff, what was it in 1942? Merely old? Even if the trains could move, forget anything like speed. So the fall of Moscow would have created an even larger need for anti-partisan operations on the part of the Germans, and probably an even greater need for US logistical support on the part of the Russians.Without the trains creaking along, the only option would have been to focus more on air transport, which would have been more vulnerable. To change the topic a bit - if you want to blaspheme here, tell them that the Red Army didn't win, but that the Nazi's lost. What do you think? Was it mostly the blunders on the German side, or more the massive Red Army effort? We can agree that the failure to take Moscow was a huge mistake, and whether it cost the Germans the war or not is a good question. But was it just one in a series of mistakes or the principal error? When analysing the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front in WW2, one aspect is generally ignored. In WW1, Imperial Germany fought simultaneously on three fronts for nearly 3 years – only a third of her forces were engaged on the Eastern Front. By 1917, Russia was exhausted and sued for a humiliating peace. By contrast, in WW2, for the first two years of the war on the Eastern Front, around four fifths of Germany’s forces were deployed there. Yet, by 1945, Germany had been totally defeated by the Red Army. This is even more remarkable when you consider that in the first 6 months the war on the Eastern Front Soviet military casualties were 2x higher (5-6 million) than for the Imperial Russian Army throughout WW1 (2-3 million). Leaving aside the political and social differences between Tsarist Russia/Soviet Union and Imperial/Nazi Germany the above facts do pose the question as why Germany was so thoroughly defeated on the Eastern Front in WW2. In my opinion, part of the reason lies in the way the war was conducted on the German side. When Adolph Hitler launched the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 this new conflict was designed not just as a ‘conventional’ war between two armies but was construed as a ‘war of annihilation’. This ‘war of annihilation’ found expression not only in the widespread slaughter of civilians behind the frontline (something which began almost immediately after the Germans invaded), but also affected the conduct of operations. As an example, directives were issued proscribing that Moscow and Leningrad were not to be taken but instead surrounded and ‘razed to the ground by artillery and aircraft fire’. Hitler’s insistence at the end 1941 that the Wehrmacht remain on the offensive throughout the Winter (in spite of the collapse of the German supply system) can been seen as another instance of how the theme of a ‘war of annihilation’ permeated into the way military operations were conducted. Later on in the war the Wehrmacht was rendered immobile and vulnerable to encirclement and destruction by the Red Army as it was forced, on Hitler’s direct orders, to defend overextended fronts with inadequate forces. Therefore, I believe it is within the context of this ‘war of annihilation’ that the decision not to continue the advance on Moscow in Summer 41 should be seen. One final point regarding Moscow. It is a widely held view that the Germans were prevented from capturing Moscow in October 41 by the onset of bad weather. My careful reading of the military situation maps for around this period shows this to be untrue. The weather turned bad in the Moscow area towards the end of the second week of October. Army Group Centre launched operation ‘Typhoon’ at the beginning of October and had broken through the Soviet defences west of Moscow by the 4/5 October – however, no panzer/motorized forces were subsequently directed towards an advance on the Soviet capital. Instead, they were engaged either in holding large bodies of encircled Soviet troops or diverted to other g
 
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taylorjohn21    RE:Moscow Revisted Summer 1941 - ignore previous thread   5/19/2005 9:09:52 AM
When analysing the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front in WW2, one aspect is generally ignored. In WW1, Imperial Germany fought simultaneously on three fronts for nearly 3 years – only a third of her forces were engaged on the Eastern Front. By 1917, Russia was exhausted and sued for a humiliating peace. By contrast, in WW2, for the first two years of the war on the Eastern Front, around four fifths of Germany’s forces were deployed there. Yet, by 1945, Germany had been totally defeated by the Red Army. This is even more remarkable when you consider that in the first 6 months the war on the Eastern Front Soviet military casualties were 2x higher (5-6 million) than for the Imperial Russian Army throughout WW1 (2-3 million). Leaving aside the political and social differences between Tsarist Russia/Soviet Union and Imperial/Nazi Germany the above facts do pose the question as why Germany was so thoroughly defeated on the Eastern Front in WW2. In my opinion, part of the reason lies in the way the war was conducted on the German side. When Adolph Hitler launched the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 this new conflict was designed not just as a ‘conventional’ war between two armies but was construed as a ‘war of annihilation’. This ‘war of annihilation’ found expression not only in the widespread slaughter of civilians behind the frontline (something which began almost immediately after the Germans invaded), but also affected the conduct of operations. As an example, directives were issued proscribing that Moscow and Leningrad were not to be taken but instead surrounded and ‘razed to the ground by artillery and aircraft fire’. Hitler’s insistence at the end 1941 that the Wehrmacht remain on the offensive throughout the Winter (in spite of the collapse of the German supply system) can been seen as another instance of how the theme of a ‘war of annihilation’ permeated into the way military operations were conducted. Later on in the war the Wehrmacht was rendered immobile and vulnerable to encirclement and destruction by the Red Army as it was forced, on Hitler’s direct orders, to defend overextended fronts with inadequate forces. Therefore, I believe it is within the context of this ‘war of annihilation’ that the decision not to continue the advance on Moscow in Summer 41 should be seen. One final point regarding Moscow. It is a widely held view that the Germans were prevented from capturing Moscow in October 41 by the onset of bad weather. My careful reading of the military situation maps for around this period shows this to be untrue. The weather turned bad in the Moscow area towards the end of the second week of October. Army Group Centre launched operation ‘Typhoon’ at the beginning of October and had broken through the Soviet defences west of Moscow by the 4/5 October – however, no panzer/motorized forces were subsequently directed towards an advance on the Soviet capital. Instead, they were engaged either in holding large bodies of encircled Soviet troops or diverted to other geographical objectives.
 
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CJH    RE:The Moscow Option 1941 Summer   5/20/2005 5:51:22 PM
I have to agree with you that the fall of Moscow would indeed have been effective. I have read it was Hitler's decision based on economics to prefer the seizure of the wheat belt and the Donets basin, etc. to the seizure of Moscow as a political objective but that the generals wanted to press on to Moscow. The most decisive effect of the fall of Moscow would have been moral. I would have demoralized the party leadership. It would have imboldened all of those who hated Stalin and his NKVD to go over to the Germans or to engage in resistance. Of course, Hitler's biggest mistake in the east may have been his not incorporating the liberated Soviets into his forces. It may have caused the western allies not to put much confidence in the Soviet Union's participation in the war. It may have encouraged the Japanese to resume their effort to conquer the Soviet far east. Moscow was a major railway hub. The Germans might have used it to advance on Leningrad from the southeast and cut it off entirely from the Russians. Leningrad produced T34 tanks right through the siege. It may have helped with logistics in a German advance on the Caucasus.
 
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taylorjohn21    RE:The Moscow Option 1941 Summer   5/21/2005 5:44:53 PM
To be historically accurate, around the middle of August, part of PanzerGroup 3 was detached from Army Centre and sent North to assist in the encirclement of Leningrad while most of PanzerGroup 2 was diverted South to help defeat the Red Army forces blocking the German advance through the Ukraine. This was accompanied by a similar redeployment of the Luftwaffe to support the advance of the flanks. The remaining motorized forces left to Army Group Centre were either held in reserve or used to bolster threatened sections of the central front. The decision to divert Army Group Centre's motorized forces to the flanks meant, in effect, dispersing the German Army's main striking power over hundreds of miles of endless forests, marshes, swamps etc.
 
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Constantine XI    RE:The Moscow Option 1941 Summer   5/22/2005 9:03:32 PM
It is an interesting point to ponder. Yet I think a more valid question might be would the Russians be able to win if Stalin had been killed or captured. I think the capture of Moscow would have caused some serious logistical problems and alot of shock, but I doubt it would break the will of such a tenacious people to fight. The shocking cruelty of the Nazis with their industrial scale massacres of Soviet people provided plenty of motivation to join the partisans for the sake of individual hatred. The Soviets had already, in an incrdible feat of determined forward planning, moved the bulk of their manufacturing and armaments production to the East of the Urals. With the loss of Moscow the Russians still had plenty of resources and more than enough determination to fight. The vast lands of the USSR would tie down plenty of Nazi troops and I suspect they would be slowly wasted by the guerilla tactics of an implacably hostile population. Yet at the core of the cult of the Soviet people's loyalty was Stalin, and had he been killed or captured a degree of demoralization far worse than the loss of Moscow would set in. The Soviet propaganda was saturated with the cult of Stalin. I think that the loss of Stalin and/or of Moscow would have resulted in alot of demoralization and a less coordinated grip by the Politburo on military activities, but the Russians were in this for the long-haul and had the resources to fight a protracted partisan struggle combined with conventional warfare which would have defeated the Nazis eventually.
 
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