David Glantz (I believe)has postulated that there was an intent on Stalin's part to attack the Germans, and that plans had been exercised to this effect. I'm sure that's true, however, what nation wouldn't have formulated offensive plans as an option. Still, that plans exist and are exercised is no clear indication of Soviet intentions. My guess as to the best net result for the Germans still leans towards the pre-emptive assault as ultimately executed. Soviet forces were completely unbalanced as a result. Moreover, their force disposition in late June, 1941 did little to support either an offensive or defensive plan.

Agreed, S-2. I posit that the incompetence of the Soviet army can not have been unknown to Uncle Joe the day before Barbarossa launched. I suspect that any Soviet moves to invade German territory would have waited until the army was ready for it, which might have taken several years. But, them Commies... never the most sensible, y'know, yup, uh huh.

The Winter War of 1940 manifested the incompetence of the Soviet Red Army but then Stalin apparently preferred a loyal to a competent, in the interrum, Red Army having purged its officer corps. He murdered at the beginning of that purge Mikhail Tukhachevsky who some have written was the greatest general since Napolean. Now was that sensible? I believe it was probable that to Stalin, a war between Hitler and the Entente countries would turn into another WWI bloodbath which would bleed both sides white and leave them vulnerable to a Soviet incursion and I believe Stalin could find other rationalizations for preparing a move on Europe.

"...Would Germany have been wiser to prepare for and wait for a Soviet attack on it first whereupon it would count on out maneuvering the Soviet attacking forces, trapping them and anhilating them and launching a counterstroke?" Back to your original question, the answer is "no". It ultimately made little difference to the German Army, as was proved between 22 June- 10 August, 1941, when German forces enveloped and destroyed several Soviet armies in huge cauldron battles of annihilation along the Dnieper River bend and the Minsk-Smolensk axis. Soviet operational manuever theory and practice had clearly not caught up to each other by the summer of 1941, either in the defense or offense. In addition to the operational incompetence of the Soviet senior level staffs (division to front), the tactical incompetence at the brigade/regiment level downward was utterly abysmal. Had the Soviets attacked first, in my opinion, it is dubious that they would have been technically capable of crossing their lines of departure in the absence of any defense, much less a Wehrmacht ready and waiting.

I'd agree the Barbarossa plan was better. While the Wehrmacht & Luftwaffe would have been improved by waiting, the proportional improvement would have been greater amoung the Soviet Armys. Waiting would have risked giving the initiative to the Red Army at all levels from tactical thru stratigic. More important the economy of the Reich was running on thin ice. Maintaning 100+ divsions & comparable Luftwaffe formations, and appropriate production of new weapons was a serious strain. Even if the bulk of the Wehrmacht was demobilized and weapons production scaled back Nazi economic policies may have crashed by 1942. My take is Stalin expected the war between France & Germany to last through 1942 exahusting both. At the appropriate moment, sometime between mid 1941 and mid 43 he would have intervened with the object of destroying Germany and its satilite states. A final war to mop up the weak preiphery of Western Europe may have been projected for post 1943. What could make all this wrong would be the condition of the Soviet Army. The purges did not end until 1939 and recovery appears to have been very slow. The training for every class of reservist was clearly abysmal. I also see indications that the doctrine or tactics of the Red Army at all levels were simply bad. That is even where the active or standing units were well trained, they were trained in the wrong methods for fighting the experinced Wehrmacht. So in either case there is the possibility that a incomptetent Red Army would be attacking a skilled but economicly weak German military.

The Soviet Army at the time moved like a glacier. I know, "The Mighty Steamroller"-but it was true in the first part of the war. Therefore it couldn't have done this.
A pre-emption requires considerable amount of diplomatic risk and thus cannot really be done unless one is sure the blow will be crippling.  Of course one can argue that diplomacy was becoming academic at that point as all the great powers were locked in mortal combat. On the other hand Stalin might not have gotten US support.
The strictly military risks in any case were not worth the reward. There was no possibility that the Russians could have made more then a piddly saliant. The Germans would have come back roaring and it is hard to see what the point would have been. The Russians would have been better off keeping a tripwire on the border and strong reserves in back to meet the oncoming Germans in a gigantic series of meeting engagements. The Germans might have refrained(unlikly but you take your chance while it is there), if they did not they would have at least been given a warmer welcome to Mother Russia.

I guess what I had in mind was the question, would the Germans have found it easier to annihilate the Russian army in a giant defensive rather than in a giant offensive battle.

Or, had someone with a better understanding of statemanship and military matters than Hitler been the German commander-in-chief, could Germany have dealt more safely and expeditiously with the USSR menace by preparing their mechanized military instrument and waiting for the Soviets to commit themselves to an order of battle which could be easily cut up through rapidly mobile manuvers.

The moral advantage would have been with the defending Germans being seen as the defenders of civilization. An annihilation of the Soviet force would have had a demoralizing effect in the Soviet Union with Stalin and even the Communist system being seen by Russians as intolerably incompetent and corrupt. Had the Germans played their cards right they could have been invited to invade.

But of course in this case, the Germans wouldn't have been intent on seizing the Russian land and enslaving its inhabitants.