The FAS links I provided are replication of an official US governemental report .They are not written by FAS but by US governement. Do you know that Patriot PAC3 contain French eletronic: "The Patriot PAC-III and Medium Extended Range Defense System (MEADS) missile seeker uses a Ka-band coupled cavity TWT that is currently produced by Thales in France. VE is the only RF technology that can meet the combined requirements for high peak and average power at Ka-band within the small available volume. CPI is qualifying a competing design under ManTech funding to provide a domestic production source" http://www.acq.osd.mil/aged/AGED_VE_STAR.pdf This is official US governement! To say you, no, US are not ALWAYS top technology ! I can provide you other exemple US top systems embedding french key components. Do you know France is leader in frequency synthesis ABOVE USA? For ELINT : Now we have similar aircraft of RC135 also.Exemple: http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/dc8-sarigue.htm (Electronic is brand new - delivered in 2000) or -160G Gabriel The C-160G Gabriel configures an ELINT subsystem provided by Thomson-CSF Radars & Contre-Mesures for detection, analysis and location of radar sources with a COMINT subsystem provided by Thomson-CSF Communications for detection, interception, classification, listening-in, analysis and location of radio transmitters. Thomson-CSF Radars & Contre-Mesures has also developed complete SIGINT electronic intelligence systems for integration on board the C-160 and similar aircraft. Special features include wingtip pods with UHF/DF blade antennas, a group of five large blade antennas on top of the forward fuselage, a blister fairing on each side of the rear fuselage, and a retractable dome, under the forward fuselage. The rear cabin houses 4 SIGINT operators, 8 COMINT operators and a SIGINT Director. The aircraft carries an ELINT subsystem provided by Thompson-CSF Radars & Contremesures for detectiom, analysis and location of radar sources, together with a COMINT subsystem provided by Thompson-CSF Communications for detection, interception, classification, listening-in, analysis and location of radio transmitters.

I do not pretend France has currently means of the same scale of USA by numbers (you have 14 RC135, we have 3 similar planes).But we have significants means and on very high tech level. We can scale up in case of threat because we design and produce our self. It was only the point.

I mean, seriously. Taking out even 1 or 2 carriers is near impossible! Anti-Ship Missiles People always talk about these as the end all killers of Carriers. Yet, both sides have to historical proof. However, Anti-ship missiles require alot of accurate targetting data. You don't just magically shoot one in an area where a CVN is. You rely on satellites, EW aircraft, etc. The only nation ever capable of doing this was the now defunct Soviet Union. No one has the capabilities required. Sea-mines Again, not useful in blue ocean. Only used in Littorals. US CBGs have adequate methods to beat this. The "China" scenario Take a nation with a large ammount of Anti-Ship missiles and a 2nd rate air force. US merely uses Ohio SSGNs and Virginia SSNs to hit fixed missile sites and airfields while Carrier strike aircraft hit targets in the confusion. US hurts enemy severely in conventional terms and mops up.

"I mean, seriously. Taking out even 1 or 2 carriers is near impossible!" you obviously haven't looked at whats been coming out of the USN in the last 2-3 years - USNI, NSL have all said that its possible to lose a carrier and its escorts in current capability threats. carriers aren't invincible - and thats a completely separate issue to stating that the US is weak. The US is not weak, but it has capability gaps just like everyone else does. The only difference is that the US has better technological and numerical mass to absorb and overlap any losses. I've sat in a room with 450 other people while CINCPAC talked about a reality check on losing assets in a shooting war if minimums are not met. Minimums are not being met.

I've great regard for your overall intellect and, specifically, knowledge on naval matters. Your comments leave me with the impression that CINCPAC, at least, is unaffected by hubris. Having spent (I'm guessing) a significant amount of time with ship commanders (what-at least Commander in rank?)on up, do you note a blithe dismissal of adversary capabilities within the ranks of these type officers? Do you note that these men are anything less than sober when assessing capabilities and threats-both ours and opponents? I ask because, more than anything else, it is the conclusion I drew from Mr. Thompson's comments. I'd like to believe that our navy is constructed with ships that can generally fill our mission requirements, and that it is led by men who've soberly assessed both current and emerging threats- both with systems and nations. We've the largest naval budget, I'm sure, in the world. By far. If our leadership is as sober as I hope and maybe implied by your reference to the CINCPAC comments, where's the disconnect? Sober, prudent leadership coupled to a large budget should achieve a navy of some high quality. Are we trying to do too much with (as large as our budget may be)too little? Is our shipbuilding philosophy generally technically unsound? Have our estimates of requirements for ship types missed the mark-either in assessing our primary system threats or in over-reliance on certain skillsets and platforms as some panacea? My understanding is limited here, but platforms take some considerable time between drawing board and operational deployment. At one time (Soviet era)it seemed that "comparative advantage" was used to define who built what. We emphasized capital ships at the expense of mine-sweepers and diesel subs, relying upon our allies to fill those gaps. Is the U.S. Navy experiencing some "hangover" from this, perhaps, continuing legacy in a world of quietly shifting allegiances and emerging threats? If so, have we began taking aspirin yet? Can America count on British, Dutch, and Australian diesels- or Japanese ASW platforms, as example, as part of our collective war-fighting mix? In absolute terms, I'd suspect not, lest they'd be flying our flag, not theirs. Is it possible, therefore, for even America to construct a system of systems that addresses all contingencies with equal aplomb? And to man and train to uniformly exceptional standards across this rather extensive spectrum of contingencies? Sorry for all the questions, but few here have their finger on the pulse of the U.S. Navy quite like you, and I'd enjoy reading where you believe the problem(s) exists.

"do you note a blithe dismissal of adversary capabilities within the ranks of these type officers? " I've never met one US senior naval officer who was dismissive of an adversaries capabilities. without doubt they have all shown some considerable respect and are well aware of their own vulnerabilities. They have been without a doubt, realistic and respectful of their adversaries. Even when there are discussions about overmatch, they never ever get into the pecker competition and "over do it", Its always been professional caution. "Do you note that these men are anything less than sober when assessing capabilities and threats-both ours and opponents?" they're straight up and honest. I've only seen unbridled gung-ho attitudes from junior ranks. Most officers I've met have been absolutely cautious when opening their mouths. They obviously think before talking. "We've the largest naval budget, I'm sure, in the world. By far. If our leadership is as sober as I hope and maybe implied by your reference to the CINCPAC comments, where's the disconnect? Sober, prudent leadership coupled to a large budget should achieve a navy of some high quality." I tend to think that the disconnect is in defining the adversary and future mission requirements. encumbent govts have a huge influence on how that journey unfolds, and its where totalitarian states have a clear advantage. the military states what they want, and in the case of their military, they invariably get it. (I'm using china as the example here). China is a classic example, their last Naval Chief was pro-carrier, so there was some confusion as to when and where they would roll out aircraft carriers. that predominately meant countering with an anti-shipping capability. However, when he was rolled over, the new Chief is pro submarines. The carrier was put on the back burner and they went into overdrive to produce lots of subs. - he's philosophically pro Russian in naval doctrine. The prev was Pro-USN in doctrine. If you consider that both doctrines are really miles apart - you can see where it can cause confusion for anyone wanting to counter the threat. To some extent, I think the USN might have succumbed to countering the door in front of them to the detriment of having absolute flexibility to be able to challenge all contenders. They've moved beyond Jackie Fishers clear vision which was a benchmark for force capability. I think that vision is still relevant, but its always harder to manage on a diminsihing budget. "Are we trying to do too much with (as large as our budget may be)too little? Is our shipbuilding philosophy generally technically unsound? Have our estimates of requirements for ship types missed the mark-either in assessing our primary system threats or in over-reliance on certain skillsets and platforms as some panacea? " any shipbuilding should be requirements driven, and then congress needs to stick behind it. I really think that the malaise being exhibited by the US ship building industry is primarily the fault of people in congress. eg, if congress doesn't sign off on X number of skimmers and Y number of subs per year - then the industry will decay and ultimately decline. In fact, congress should really be paying attention to the assessment that the USN did on the RN and the UK shipping industry - its pointed, accurate and timely. It's not my Navy ;) But if it was me I'd be spending a lot more money on ASW, MCM and long range strike. Its fine to argue that the US is the biggest baddest combined arms solution on the planet - but if you don't have all the chess pieces in place all the time, then sooner or later someone will wedge the gap. On that basis, I do think that the CSF has lost a lot of local authority. "Can America count on British, Dutch, and Australian diesels- or Japanese ASW platforms, as example, as part of our collective war-fighting mix? In absolute terms, I'd suspect not, lest they'd be flying our flag, not theirs. Is it possible, therefore, for even America to construct a system of systems that addresses all contingencies with equal aplomb? And to man and train to uniformly exceptional standards across this rather extensive spectrum of contingencies?" All nations will react in their own interests, but I would hazard a guess that unless the POTUS became absolutely deranged and couldn't establish coherent due cause for an action, that every one of those nations would demonstrate some form of support depedning on the threat. In some respects the issue of common structures is already happening, eg common training processes, common equipment, sympathetic equipment, shared facilities. there is also some innovation being applied to "future proofing" like the "1000 Ship Navy" concept, which appears to have generated universal support in principle from the bulk of professional Int'l Navies.

Thanks for your considered response. I've read DREADNOUGHT and CASTLES OF STEEL (particularly interesting for the Jellicoe/Beatty tiff)and I'm sure Massie talked about Fisher, yet I know little of his "vision". I guess some re-reading is required to understand this premise better. You mention the PLAN and the dilemma they've faced between two competing concepts of deployment. As I recall the "cold war", there seems an implicit acceptance of USN predominance, instead focusing the Soviet Navy operations (aside from "boomers") as an adjunct to Red Army operations in western Europe- closing the SLOCs between Europe and the U.S. Equally, much of N.A.T.O. (to include U.S. attack subs and CBGs) seemed aimed at both maintaining the G.I.U.K. barrier system and a Norwegian Sea presence as a threat to the Kola peninsula. Both ours and the Soviet operational premises seem sound in that regard, at the time. China, however, may have force projection ambitions that might mitigate against the Soviet model. Is the PLAN too, to some extent, focused on the door in front of them (USN) at the expense of their long-view force projection ambitions? Do you foresee this near-term defensive focus limiting their ability to conceptually transition themselves into a force-projection player? Thanks again.

"China, however, may have force projection ambitions that might mitigate against the Soviet model. " personally, I think China is a long way off from being able to provide a coherent force projection capability. any force projection that they currently have requires them to have absolute overmatch in theatre within a very short time frame - if they are exposed to an attritive battle, then I can't see them going home intact. If anything it means that they might go tertiary so as to not "lose face". "Is the PLAN too, to some extent, focused on the door in front of them (USN) at the expense of their long-view force projection ambitions? " if they're truly committed to a blue water trans oceanic capabilty where they can visibly show presence and protect their SLOCs and trade routes at will - then I'm sure they're going about it the wrong way. Their primary requirement as a trading nation is protection of the SLOCS and visible deterrence. Submarines, for all their capability don't do that. Submarines do however cause disruption rather than gun boat diplomacy. "Do you foresee this near-term defensive focus limiting their ability to conceptually transition themselves into a force-projection player? " I really don't think that the chinese have demonstrated any coherence in their naval construction - and the fact that it has suddenly changed direction with the change of Command shows that its subject to whim. Changing from a CSF model to a Russian/WW2 German submarine emphasised model is more than just a platform change - it requires a doctrine shift as well. That really seems to hilight a degree of undertainty as to what they're doing. It also means that their force projection requirements are "challenged". What will be interesting is whether they make deliberate efforts to develop fast amphibious/transport roles. At the moment they have minimal capacity to effectively undertake any expeditionary roles. In a sense, thats a good sign, but thats counterbalanced by their quest to ramp up submarine builds. It also means to me that the USN has to make some very very deliberate and remedial steps to claw back an offensive ASW and ASuW capability.

I wondered about the whimsical dalliance between one end of the spectrum and the other. Only a totalitarian state could tolerate a 180 degree shift that quickly, and still (certainly) requiring some rather intense internal scrutiny/justification. "...an offensive ASW and ASuW capability." By OFFENSIVE, do you actually mean AGGRESSIVE, as both would seem inherantly defensive operations though not necessarily "passive" by execution? " ...but thats counterbalanced by their quest to ramp up submarine builds." If relating to Taiwan, it has to be reassuring that fast sea-lift remains a lowered priority for the PLAN. If no emphasis there, though, how do sub hulls mitigate against low priority for fast sea-lift ships? No cause for a CSF to steam to Taiwan as the actual threat of invasion is minimal. Therefore no opportunity to be interdicted by a PLAN diesel sub screen. Subs without fast transport might indicate Chinese interest in something other than Taiwan? You wrote of the "disruptive" character associated with submarine doctrine, noting the inability of subs to "fly the flag". If not combat relating to Taiwan, where's the utility for these submarines? Thanks again, gf.

In this topic we are not speaking about current capacibilities but short term future. "Anti-Ship Missiles People always talk about these as the end all killers of Carriers. Yet, both sides have to historical proof. Anti-ship missiles require alot of accurate targetting data. You don't just magically shoot one in an area where a CVN is. You rely on satellites, EW aircraft, etc." Yes and so what.it is clear that several nations have possibility (technological and industrial) to implement such system in few years. Whatever small staellites, dedicated UAV, or OTH radars. Or cooperative antiship missiles finding: the first antiship missile which detect carrier transmit coordinates to followings missiles and remote center. "The only nation ever capable of doing this was the now defunct Soviet Union. No one has the capabilities required. " France can do it within 3 years.We have supersonic low RCS nuclear missile of 600 km range for ASMP-A which can be easily converted in a nuclear or conventional antiship version using a derivative of MM40 block 3 autodirector and then mass produced. Moreover a carrier has a limited set of fighters.When they have lost most of their fighters they are pretty vulnerables. Other means exist like tactical antiship ballistic missiles with smart sumunitions fired at 3000 km.A rain of cluster bombs on a carrier deck is likely to have ugly effects.Chinese are trying to develop that as iranians. "Sea-mines" Again, not useful in blue ocean. Only used in Littorals. US CBGs have adequate methods to beat this." Well depth sea captor mine are an interesting possibility: A dormant torpedoes 200 m under surface waiting for a carrier in its vicinity. China has not the technology to field currently a set of capable sytemes .it could change within 15 years. To get the possibility of killing numerous US carrier is only a question of politcal will for the few nations able to do it with adequate technology. You have no problem because these nations are all your ally (except Russia).