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Subject: What Can We Do To Fix The US Army?
Softwar 2/13/2009 3:50:26 PM

Besides spares and maint. - Let's go with aviation equipment for starters - the Army needs a replacement for the remaining UH-1 choppers, a new light observation chopper to replace aging Kiowas, upgrades to the AH-64 force, and a new series of heavy lift choppers (or more Chinooks) to maintain air mobile levels. Now armor - we need to upgrade the Stryker and add more to replace low armored HUMVEEs in front line service. Ground transport - better armored trucks seem to be in order here. Artillery - can someone please finallly pick a SP 155 platform that makes sense?? Infantry - we have the M-4 procurement to complete and Geeezzz Louise... replace the 9 MM pistol with the 1911. Buy more 50 cals. Improve local intell - small UAVs, trained translators and handlers instead of tearing around town trying to be nasty. ID systems for both captured enemy as well as friendly forces. Training and logistical support - develop and deploy small unit tactics - these were very ineffective especially in urban environments. A NTC for small unit and urban warfare is in order here. Make use of combat experience vets instead of simply letting them wander off. We did that in WII and Korea - it works and saves lives. Instead, we muster them out after being assured they will not go bezerk and pop a cap in someone. Leadership!!! The patrol and plaster tactics used during OIF took too many casualties and left guys with their butts hanging out without proper communications, air support or control. Officers were slow to utilize unmanned/robot systems - instead they opted to bust down doors with the old bad-ass entry and shoot 'em up. Top brass are more interested in micro managing unit activity than trying to supply them with the tools and turning them loose.

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YelliChink 2/13/2009 4:45:44 PM

The reason UH-1 is still flying is because they are cheap. One of the problem with air mobility is that, the higher the operational tempo, the worse the decline of machines are. There are plans to buy more light helicopters for secondary jobs, and there are LCH plans to replace OH-58D. However, the real killer is that, why bother invest tonnes of money on systems that barely function better than existing ones, when unmanned drones are the future?

Strykers are good the way they are, while up-armored HMMWVs are bad idea. Up-armored HMMWV is no longer high mobility vehicle it designed to be. Instead, build and use MRAP for LCI/counterinsurgency is definitely better. Various flavors of MRAP somehow remind me of Sdkfz. 251.

There is nothing wrong with M9, and M1911 is way unfit for modern CQB. More bullets = BETTER. .45ACP is way expansive to stock, shoot, train and reload. 1911 is also too expansive to procure. If US Army and USMC are going to buy new handgun, they will be looking for polymer frame 9mm handguns. I think those new Ruger SR9 are pretty good, but Springfield XD is also great, and S&W M&P can get the job done as well. Otherwise, there are always Glock, SIG and H&K. One of the problem with military handguns is that they can't use JHP, HP or any other expanding rounds, and the law requires them to stick with FMJ. 9mm and .45ACP has similar penetrability, but, without expanding rounds, they both go right through human body, albeit one opens larger holes than the other. Indeed, .45ACP is beeter round than 9mm in terms of effectiveness, but not by that great margin.

Artillery is major weakness of US Army. It would have been a mistake to cancel Crusader, if NLOS-C can't come to service fast enough. US Army is now out-gunned by Germans, French, Brits, Russians (always) and Chinese (yes, the Chinese have better SPH). Granted that US artillery is more effective than Russians and Chinese due to doctrinal difference, it still doesn't make up for the deficiency from the system itself.

In my training, transportation is part of logistics (supply, mechanical, transportation and medical services). Armors reduce performance of a truck, which is measured by weight over milage, so it's better to use MRAP or M1117 escorts. It is not very difficult to build electronic supply service. Many did, including UBS, FedEx, Pea Pot, Wal Mart and Asian style 7-Eleven. Procurement and budgetary constraint are more of the problem than management. Requests for supply or parts are denied or delayed due to bureaucratic reasons or simply due to total lack of operational stock, even though emergency stock sits somewhere in plenty. M88A2 is getting old, and there might be some need for lighter recovery vehicles in the future.

Communication, engineering (both combat and noncombat) and NBC protection also need upgrade or re-organization. You can't expect to send-in SBCT or FCS units and support them with M48 chasis based engineer equipments or D9 bullzoder, which are waiting to load themselves on an HSV somewhere and will be on spot 14 days later.

Running an Army is like running a nomadic society, which is very difficult. I wouldn't say that I know enough of it, but it certainly won't hurt for talking about it.

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DarthAmerica 2/15/2009 6:17:10 PM

Is not an issue of training and leadership besides the usual things associated with a large organization. With regard to counterinsurgency war in, Iraq has turned out to be a remarkable success thus far. US military personnel interacting directly with Iraqi citizens has turned the country into a much safer place. Of course, there is occasional inappropriate behavior by individual soldiers. But it is dealt with very quickly.

Small unit leaders are given extraordinary amount of latitude in their ability to make decisions, in effect becoming strategic lieutenants. This concept extends down to the squad level. At more senior levels, leaders are required to consider the political implications of all decisions. However unlike conflicts past, the majority of the decision have been right.

I'm not exactly sure why the issue of training is even being questioned. Training can always be improved and without specific references, it's almost a given that this is mentioned. During after action reviews, soldiers are often asked not to mention training unless there is a specific example. Again this is the can always improve training. In the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, training is taken to an extreme. If anything less training would probably benefit the services at this point. Confirm this by visiting any mobilization site.

-DA

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HERALD1357 There is right training and WRONG training. 2/15/2009 6:35:54 PM

The French Army of 1940 was well trained.

The US Army of 2003 it can be argued was well trained.

Well led and trained RIGHT?

That is what we are debating.

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DarthAmerica 2/15/2009 7:09:20 PM

The French Army of 1940 was well trained.

The US Army of 2003 it can be argued was well trained.

Well led and trained RIGHT?

That is what we are debating.

Yes and it was trained well for the conventional phase of 2003 as well as the post conventional phase 2004-present. The equipment changed a little, so did the ROE, but other than that we were prepared and adjusted nicely to the requirements. The AMERICAN PUBLIC was not trained to recognize the realities of a protracted conflict with both conventional and unconventional phases. So when the KIA rate held at 1 to 6 per day for a few years people freaked when in fact nothing was wrong. We didn't change anything or do anything differently that we would have otherwise.

We are both well led and well trained and have been for a few decades now. Softwar's criticisms don't reflect reality on the ground.

-DA

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HERALD1357 Based on the fact that we have yet to finish Iraq after 5 years. 2/15/2009 7:30:04 PM

and I argue that it will take at least 10 years more to nail it down for certain; I don't think you have much of an argument.

Radical changes in our Army equipment and in small unit tactics and a totally INCOMPETENT high command read of the enemy as he began his roadside bomb campaign didn't escape my notice.

Just because I support rectification in Iraq doesn't mean.that I've lost my objectivity or don't notice things; very OBVIOUS things such as in the 2003 campaign, a lack of attention to LOC security.that dragged on into 2006 and still plagues our generals today. (Karachi to Kandahar Afghan supply line attacks, remember?)

Your argument collapses in the face of events.

Herald

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DarthAmerica 2/15/2009 8:08:31 PM

and I argue that it will take at least 10 years more to nail it down for certain; I don't think you have much of an argument.

I'd hope I do all things considered. But as always you are welcome to your own opinion.

Radical changes in our Army equipment and in small unit tactics and a totally INCOMPETENT high command read of the enemy as he began his roadside bomb campaign didn't escape my notice.

No, not totally incompetent. Thats a very blanket statement without any support. There were mistakes made by everyone from Private Soldier and up. But this is normal in war and has nothing to do with Softwars claims.

LOC security? With a force of that size over those distances? That had nothing to do with the "Army" and everything to so with the DoD and POTUS. I agree they misunderstood what they were getting into. But those errors go back into several admins and policy and again have nothing to do with Army training and leadership. If we spent a quarter of the time planning for COIN type wars as we did wishing we were fighting the PRC, the LOC issues would have been addresses as best they could. Understand, Iraq's logistics situation is FAR BETTER and DIFFERENT BEAST compared to land locked OEF. There is nothing that could have been done to stop the IED threats short of addressing the issue years ago and what has been done is highly effective. Those LOCs have been as secure as any in the history of our wars. Don't let the occasional IED in the news or TV spin it into seeming like supplies were disrupted in any significant way because that is not what happened AT ALL. There was ZERO lack of security in regard to that.

Your argument collapses in the face of events.

Not hardly. Get into specifics and I'll elaborate from the first or third person perspective. Again, I'm not arguing about the decisions of the policy makers, we can question that all day. The actually deployed Army personnel however have done an outstanding job with regard to these matters. Envy of the World is what I've been told be more Foreign Army Leaders than I can count on both hands.

Herald

Regards

-DA

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HERALD1357 Brief reply. 2/15/2009 8:43:16 PM

A student of history would have seen that a guerilla army will attack logistics the moment the invaders destroy the defending national army. A competent invader would have prepared for that before invading.

Basic negation.

Army Reserve seeks to toughen up training for part-time soldiers.

By Kennedy, Harold

Publication: National Defense

Date: Wednesday, December 1 2004

As reservists encounter tough fighting in Iraq, the Army is revamping training programs to better prepare these troops for combat, according to Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly.

Helmly serves both as head of the Army Reserve Command, headquartered at Fort McPherson, Ga., and as principal advisor to the Army chief of staff on reserve matters.

The planned reorganization, he said, is geared not only to producing more proficient warriors but also to lend a greater degree of stability in the unit rotation process.

Traditionally, the primary role of the reserve's 205,000 members is to support the Army's combat units, Helmly told a recent gathering of defense writers. If the Army needs additional combat soldiers, it usually gets them from the National Guard.

Reservists have been used to serving well behind the battle lines, Helmly explained. They were not trained for the kinds of assignments they have found in Iraq, where there are no front lines, but plenty of ambushes, roadside bombs and kidnappings.

"This is a hard war, and frankly, we inside the Army Reserve have not been properly prepared for it," Helmly conceded.

The Army Reserve resembles, in some ways, the National Guard, noted Col. William Hamilton, the reserve's deputy chief of staff for training. The difference is that Guard units are commanded ordinarily by state governors, while the reserve is a completely federal force, Hamilton told National Defense.

Like guardsmen, however, most reservists traditionally have expected to spend most of their enlistments performing non-combat duties near home, Helmly said. Their training has reinforced that expectation.

As active-duty soldiers, reservists receive their initial training during the Army's standard nine-week boot camp, where they learn the basics of military life, such as marching, introduction to weapons and physical fitness. They then go on to advanced individual training where they learn one of the 120 job skills available to reservists.

Once they are assigned to their units, reservists are required to attend one weekend of drills each month and two weeks of training each year. Traditionally, they have spent that time mostly on administrative matters and polishing military job skills, not combat techniques.

That began to change when Helmly took command of the Army Reserve in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. As a veteran of nearly four de

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DarthAmerica 2/15/2009 9:10:10 PM

A competent invader? Herald, the Army is a tool of the USG which has been looking for a USSR replacement since 1991. The Army prepared for war in accordance with policy and policy makers which until 9/11 didn't give a ferk about COIN. Even after 9/11 the general consensus was that Iraq would break down as it did during the first GW and cease to fight in any kind of coherent way. It did. The problem came because Iraq is a tribal nation and and religiously divided. Exploiters such as the Iranians and AQ used this to their advantage for a brief time until the U.S. Army/USMC stamped them out in coordination with the diplomats/Iranians. It's impossible to prepare for something like this if you haven't been set up that way well in advance.

Now then you can keep asserting for fifteen or so pages of pointless discussion, but why waste my time with that; when the Army, itself, says what I just told you?

I'm not asserting, I'm telling you what I witnessed because I've PHYSICALLY been involved through this entire process. I've told you before that things' changed on the ground. Reservist and Guardsmen are and have always been highly trained and for the most part come from the Active Army as I did. WHat happened is the nature of the combat changed, as did the type of enemy, or enemies rather and as that happened we changed our training to suit the conditions on the battlefield. I also told you the Army always considerers improving training a top priority and YOU should not take such a thing out of context. If you consider the words of a person who has been involved in the organization with direct experience in the places we are discussing, who's seen and participated in the training as both Officer and NCO a waste of your time then I don't know what to tell you except you do have your right to your opinion. However, when a soldier says the following...

"This is a hard war, and frankly, we inside the Army Reserve have not been properly prepared for it," Helmly conceded.

...what he means is that we went prepared to fight conventional wars like the rest of the DoD, but found out that those paradigms changed when Iran got involved and at that point we had to adjust our TTPs and training to have a more COIN oriented emphasis which as all can see we did and with minimal lose of life considering the magnitude of the conflict. I know because I know the person who said that.

This is no different from the USN having to learn to deal with suicide boats or the USAF learning to deal with MANPADS and Mortars near air bases. In war things have to be adjusted to on the fly and you cannot predict things like this usually. This has nothing to do with any specific flaws in Army training or leadership. The flaws are at the level of policy maker and voter.

-DA

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HERALD1357 Like I said, U'm not goiung to waste my time with you. 2/15/2009 9:17:48 PM

Until you can explain why the Army made the bonehead mistakes it made and that it admits, its useless to discuss this rationally with you. You are in the business of making excuses instead of addressing the issues.

How very Rumsfeld of you.

Herald

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verong 2/15/2009 10:48:06 PM

How very Rumsfeld of you.

Herald

Hey there,

the "USA Looked at Pearl Harbor as an example which means they did not just expect either /or!!!

I was behind the production of JSF, C-17 and armored humvee replacement which was the M-1117 ASV. My requirements for anti North Korean SF was a Coin Brigade of Armored humvees which was won by the M1117 ASV. It was not that we did not develope these tactics and equipment it was they were in to low a rate production to be useful quickly now we have them pouring off the assembly lines.

Sincerely,

Keith

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