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Subject: What Can We Do To Fix The US Army?
Softwar    2/13/2009 3:50:26 PM
Besides spares and maint. - Let's go with aviation equipment for starters - the Army needs a replacement for the remaining UH-1 choppers, a new light observation chopper to replace aging Kiowas, upgrades to the AH-64 force, and a new series of heavy lift choppers (or more Chinooks) to maintain air mobile levels. Now armor - we need to upgrade the Stryker and add more to replace low armored HUMVEEs in front line service. Ground transport - better armored trucks seem to be in order here. Artillery - can someone please finallly pick a SP 155 platform that makes sense?? Infantry - we have the M-4 procurement to complete and Geeezzz Louise... replace the 9 MM pistol with the 1911. Buy more 50 cals. Improve local intell - small UAVs, trained translators and handlers instead of tearing around town trying to be nasty. ID systems for both captured enemy as well as friendly forces. Training and logistical support - develop and deploy small unit tactics - these were very ineffective especially in urban environments. A NTC for small unit and urban warfare is in order here. Make use of combat experience vets instead of simply letting them wander off. We did that in WII and Korea - it works and saves lives. Instead, we muster them out after being assured they will not go bezerk and pop a cap in someone. Leadership!!! The patrol and plaster tactics used during OIF took too many casualties and left guys with their butts hanging out without proper communications, air support or control. Officers were slow to utilize unmanned/robot systems - instead they opted to bust down doors with the old bad-ass entry and shoot 'em up. Top brass are more interested in micro managing unit activity than trying to supply them with the tools and turning them loose.
 
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HERALD1357    The FACT is the evidence-not your assertions, JFKY.    2/17/2009 12:33:44 PM

 

You keep talking about the Anaconda Plan, as IF it was the battle plan adopted by the US in the Civil War, and as IF it were an actual war plan, a la the Schlieffen Plan. The US ended up putting pressure on the Confederacy yes, on multiple fronts, but I have yet to read anyone claiming it was the result of the Anaconda Plan, plus the Confederacy was fatally weakened not by the Anaconda Plan but by the loss of the Mississippi River and the division of the Confederacy. You overstate the importance of the March to the Sea, and an idea is NOT a Plan. Winfield Scott had the ?Idea? of pressuring the Confederacy using the Union?s exterior lines, and greater manpower and economic power. That?s not a ?plan? that?s an idea for a strategy. A Plan is the Schlieffen Plan, that allocated resources, made time and phase lines for advances, and the like.


 


Next, you keep talking about War Plan Orange, as an example of pre-war planning done right?WHICH War Plan Orange do you mean? The one where we hold onto Guam and the Philippines or the ones where we lose them? The one that has the US fleet advancing in a pell-mell rush across the Pacific or the one that takes a longer more gradual approach? There were MANY ?War Plan Oranges.? So, War Plan Orange is NOT an example of pre-war planning that bore great fruit?SOME War Plan Oranges were and some were very bad plans, and anyway it was the Rainbow Plans that ?won? the Second World War, not the Orange Plans?.now if you mean that pre-war planning foresaw many of the challenges and developed ideas to overcome the challenges of a war with Japan, then YES, pre-war planning was of inestimable value. But, no, no pre-war War Plan Orange saw the defeat of Japan.


You need to READ.
 
http://faculty.umf.maine.edu/%7Ewalters/web%20232/Anaconda_Plan.jpg" width="576" height="446" /> 
 
http://www.factasy.com/civil_war/files/images/1_0.preview.jpg" width="640" height="492" /> 
 
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/st/%7Epbugler/Wpo1.GIF" width="682" height="428" /> 
 
http://www.warchat.org/pictures/pacific_war_map.jpg" width="700" height="686" /> 
 
WHERE WAS THE CRITICAL DECISIVE BATTLE IN THE PACIFIC BATTLE SPACE?
 
See Guam?
 
Both plans evolved  as time went on in details, but the main outlines remained the same.
 
Same ultimate  axes of advice; same ultimate strategic outlines. 

Don't obfuscate the discussion and don't try to negate HISTORY.
 
Herald
 
 
 
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DarthAmerica       2/17/2009 12:58:53 PM
It's a complete detachment from reality to suggest that the US Army wasn't VERY QUICK to adapt to the trend in UAV's. It's a complete detachment from reality to suggest our leadership and training sent us inadequately prepared for war. It's a complete detachment from reality that there is this huge push to go up to 4 or 5 maneuver battalions. It's a complete detachment from reality to suggest that our lines of communication are not secure such that it affects operations. It's just pure fantasy that we need am M9 replacement. The M9 is a fine pistol and suitable for the job and should definitely be on the lowest priority of crap the U.S. Army needs fixed. Has anyone bothered to check out how many M9's and 92FS are in military law enforcement hands? Or how much of a hassle it would be to switch ammo to .45 ACP? Don't get me wrong, I'd prefer a Glock 19 personally but I have ZERO problem with being issued an M9 which I've used for over a decade. Pistols do come in handy for EOF and when you have to work in close proximity to potential enemies, in vehicles, on Camels, Crawling around or when in a FOB where being armed is required at all times.

Also, for goodness sake. Stop mentioning OIF casualty numbers as an indication of how dire the situation is. If you average them out you would find that the chances of getting yourself killed or wounded over there are pretty low compared to past conflicts.


-DA 
 
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JFKY    Herald...   2/17/2009 1:11:33 PM
Wow a map showing the South and that was the "the plan"...the Anaconda Plan was an idea, not a plan...the Schlieffen Plan was a plan, Operation Overlord was a Plan...Anaconda was an idea, an good one, but an idea.  No more or less than Keane's "plan" for a surge in Iraq.  Petraeus, Odierno, Kilcullen, and their staffs took the idea of more troops and created a PLAN.  Scott understood that the Civil War was not going to be over quickly and that the way to defeat the Confederacy was by applying full court pressure.  That's not a "plan" thats the concept of operation, the plan is Paragraph 3, "execution"....Orders by Grant to Meade circa 1864 and their elaboration by the staff of the Army of the Potomac is a "plan."
 
And War plan Orange was a SET of plans...I acknowledge that the plans generally got the essentials of the defeat of Japan right, but War Plan Orange didn't defeat Japan, because you haven't specified WHICH years version is "the" plan you are nominating....I've read the same book you have, and you'll note that the plan evolved and oscillated thru the years.  Or have you forgotten the "Royal Road" or the "thru Ticket to Manila"?
 
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strat-T21C       2/17/2009 1:17:08 PM
What's the ratio's out there? In Afghanistan for some contingents it's what 15000-20000 for 100? Not too shabby. The training for most is fine I've seen the US just dominate the field along with other forces doing just as well.
As for arty, I personally like the PZ2000, what a piece of kit!
 
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strat-T21C       2/17/2009 1:21:21 PM
As for War Planning, that's all it is, planning. A commander can never have ONE course of action, in Battle Proceedure a commander makes 3 COA and then goes with the best once all back breif's are complete. ( even theatre commanders must back breif their superiors). Finally, in the end, " NO PLAN SURVIVES CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY"
 
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strat-T21C       2/17/2009 1:26:34 PM
Should have put this in with my last.
After contact, the plan usually goes to shit and it's improvise and junior leadership. Hence my critique earlier (not to be critical of the US in a personal way, but to be objective, professionally as a foriegner) that the Army must allow more freedom of action to the above mentioned jr. leadrership.
 
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HERALD1357    Wow: yes a MAP.   2/17/2009 1:50:57 PM

Wow a map showing the South and that was the "the plan"...the Anaconda Plan was an idea, not a plan...the Schlieffen Plan was a plan, Operation Overlord was a Plan...Anaconda was an idea, an good one, but an idea.  No more or less than Keane's "plan" for a surge in Iraq.  Petraeus, Odierno, Kilcullen, and their staffs took the idea of more troops and created a PLAN.  Scott understood that the Civil War was not going to be over quickly and that the way to defeat the Confederacy was by applying full court pressure.  That's not a "plan" thats the concept of operation, the plan is Paragraph 3, "execution"....Orders by Grant to Meade circa 1864 and their elaboration by the staff of the Army of the Potomac is a "plan."

 

And War plan Orange was a SET of plans...I acknowledge that the plans generally got the essentials of the defeat of Japan right, but War Plan Orange didn't defeat Japan, because you haven't specified WHICH years version is "the" plan you are nominating....I've read the same book you have, and you'll note that the plan evolved and oscillated thru the years.  Or have you forgotten the "Royal Road" or the "thru Ticket to Manila"?

Some of you should learn to read one. (SARCASM.)
 
I used the1914 Plan Orange and the 1945 PACIFIC CAMPAIGN to illustrate that a battlespace has its own characteristics that astute planners recognize and exploit in attack and defense no matter the technology..
 
JFKY, the various Orange plans didn't really vary THAT much, so your red herring is REJECTED.
 
Herald 
 
 
 
 
 
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verong       2/17/2009 2:11:38 PM

Should have put this in with my last.

After contact, the plan usually goes to shit and it's improvise and junior leadership. Hence my critique earlier (not to be critical of the US in a personal way, but to be objective, professionally as a foriegner) that the Army must allow more freedom of action to the above mentioned jr. leadrership.



Yes but the Generals left the window wide open to insurgency. It was my idea of 9 armored humvee brigades back by two  of Styrkers and three brigade equivalent Air Assault brigades that was turned into the ops plan that worked. The Army was not prepared fully for the extent of internal hatred that was unleashed once the Iraqis started vying for power.
 
Sincerely,
 
Keith
 
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JFKY    Herald...   2/17/2009 2:11:53 PM
Uh yeah they did, you might want to take up reading the BOOKS as well as a map...in some we try to defend the Philipines in othres we write the Philipines off...in some plans the US Navy rushes to Manila, inothers it didn't.
 
Your definiton of "plan" is a poor one...I grant that all the US pre-war planning had the proper concept of operations, and foresaw the broad outlines of the Japan's defeat...it did not however make a Plan, yo know where units are tasked with specific missions to be accomplished by specific times.
 
The Joint Chiefs issued plans and directives, and the various CinC's carreid them out, creating plans...but what the War Plan Oranges did was to provide ideas on how to defeat Japan and where Japan would be forced/chose to fight it's Decisive Battle.  And a lot of the planning assumptions were very good, no doubt.  As at least one work says, though, one planning assumption was wrong, the US would have time to create a new battle fleet, as the US began to re-arm in 1940, not in 1942....
The US navy and US Army did get a lot right in their pre-war thining and planning, but it was not A War plan orange that produced victory...
 
Especially as victory in the Pacific was achieved in the Guadacanal/New Guinea Theatre, not in the decisive fleet battle in or around the Japanese Home Islands.
 
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DarthAmerica       2/17/2009 2:29:16 PM

Should have put this in with my last.

After contact, the plan usually goes to shit and it's improvise and junior leadership. Hence my critique earlier (not to be critical of the US in a personal way, but to be objective, professionally as a foriegner) that the Army must allow more freedom of action to the above mentioned jr. leadrership.

Which is why put so much time into our Senior E-4's, Junior NCO's and Junior Officers. THEY have to make the decisions in the field based on the information the commander can deduce from his map recon. They are the eyes that see through the fog of war. They are the reason why we are able to do so well with so few troops. This applies to a lot of NATO and Allied Armies.

Anyone with even a fraction of experience in the field knows that in places like Iraq/Afghanistan more often than not it's a young NCO making the decisions out there once the mission. These are very highly capable men and women and this includes our reserve components and even the USAF/USN who also find themselves performing non-traditional roles carrying rifles! This includes some EA-6 and F/A-18 pilots and ground crew turned ground pounder for lack of gainful employment!!!

-DA
 
 
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