In the United States the Falklands War is seen as a throwback to the old colonial conflicts of the 19th century, or the "banana wars" of the early part of the 20th century.  After WWII most conflicts were viewed through a Cold War prism.  The East vs. West struggle was almost always an underlying factor with communist countries supporting one side, and the West supporting the other.  The Falklands War was different.  Argentina did not have close ties with the Soviet Union, and none of its military equipment was of Soviet origin.  Many Western nations, especially the United States, were uncertain at first how to deal with this issue since Cold War politics weren't involved, other than the diversion of UK forces to the South Atlantic and the political implications of a British defeat in the campaign.  The United States tried to mediate a diplomatic solution, but once that failed they threw their support behind the British. 

 

I'm sure there are lots of books out there detailing the British side of the conflict, but I would recommend The Fight for the  'Malvinas' by Martin Middlebrook, which talks about the conflict from the Argentinian perspective.  Argentinians enthusiastically embraced the war when Argentinian commandoes and marines initially took the Falklands.  Those elite troops were soon replaced with conscripts, who then had to dig in under miserable conditions and wait for the coming British invasion force.  The Argentinian naval and air force pilots were (and probably still are) regarded as heroes by the Argentinians, and with good reason.  The Argie fighter and bomber jocks flew some tough missions and managed to deal the British Navy fits.  In fact, with enough aircraft the Argies could have conceivably stopped the British fleet, or at least made it a lot more costly for the Brits.  Perhaps you could explore scenarios in which the Argentinians were able to actually win the conflict. 

 

At the risk of kissing up, I would also highly recommend one of the early (1984) editions of A Quick and Dirty Guide to War by James F. Dunnigan.  It provides a thorough examination of the conflict and discusses the regional implications. 

 

Good luck. 

The interaction of the inner world of nations and the outer world....all together too often people focus on one or the other.  Britain "invited" invasion by the draw down of its forces, but refusing to negotiate the issue...why did Britain believe it could present the Junta with a defenseless Falklands/Malvinas and not get an attack?  Why did Britain decide that negotiating a solution wasn't worth it?  Why did the British think (their inner world), why did their politics drive their actions the way it did?

 

The Argentines were no better.  What Inner World decisions and actions forced their invasion?  Why did the Junta think it worth the risk to attack Britain?

 

Bottom-Line: an examination of the decision-making of both nations might be interesting, why did each set of policy makers decide that their courses of action made sense, politically, within each nation? 

 

Alternatively, one might examine the LOGISTICS of the war, not the "The 2 Para Bn. proved it's manhood at Goose Green" sort of thing but seeing if you can determine why 15,000 Argentines got beaten by 5,000 Brit's...I'd imagine it had a lot to do with professionalism and logistics, the Argentines were without a lot of gear, weapons, food and ammunition, why?  What did the Brit's do better in this field, bearing in mind that Britain was 8,000-10,000 kilometres away and Argentina was only 400 kilometres away from the battlefield.

I think they were worried about a chilean invasion as to why the commandoes left.

From what I have read that was the reasoning put forward.

 

Some what ifs:

 

 

  The UK military had suffered through years of budget cuts and both the Fearless and Intrepid were in danger of being sold to other countries along with planned cuts in its carrier force.  At the same time Argentina was upgrading its Navy with both new aircraft and ships.   What if Argentina had waited about a year longer it would have been stronger while the Royal navy would have grown weaker?

What if the Argentinean navy had ventured out with a carrier task force to reduce the range its aircraft had to fly?

What if the Argentineans had built up a large force of aircraft based in the Falklands before the British task force had arrived?

What if the Argentineans had F-4 Phantoms instead of Mirage IIIs and/or some decent in flight refueling capability?  

What if the Argentinean navy had ventured out with a carrier task force to reduce the range its aircraft had to fly?

What if the Argentineans had built up a large force of aircraft based in the Falklands before the British task force had arrived?

What if the Argentineans had F-4 Phantoms instead of Mirage IIIs and/or some decent in flight refueling capability?  

Is this a realistic possibility?  Why or why not?  Who would have provided these F-4's?  As a US item,  are they subject to export restrictions?  Why would the US have allowed their export?  How much would they have cost?  How long would it have taken to make them operational, in a meaningful sense?

Where did the money for the Argentine Navy go in the period prior to the Malvinas/Falklands War?  Is there a reason that the Veinticinco de Mayo was inoperable?

The De Mayo was operational and had a strike on deck  but could not launch due to weather.  After the sinking of the  Belgrano the Argentinian Navy withdrew and stayed in port.

 

Why did the Argentine Armed Forces act as they did?  What was their strategy/world view?  Did Argentina have the capacity to increase the capabilities of the Falklands air field to support combat air craft?  If it did, why did it not?  Did the dispatch of the SSN's deter any effort to build-up Argentine forces?  Could an air bridge have been established to supplement or supplant sea deliveries?

The airfield at Stanley certianly could have handled Mirage III and A-4s despite a stike by Vulcan bombers (that the UK pulled out of retirement) early in the war.

Maybe the threat from Chilie motavited them to keep more aircraft clase to home.  Don't have a good answer for this one.

Argentina was able to get some C-130 flights into Stanely but they did not have the number of aircraft  nor the air superiority necessary for such a bridgehead.

 

Is this a realistic possibility?  Why or why not?  Who would have provided these F-4's?  As a US item,  are they subject to export restrictions?  Why would the US have allowed their export?  How much would they have cost?  How long would it have taken to make them operational, in a meaningful sense?

Was the CV operational?  I believe it was limited in it's speed, due to engine room problems, and could NOT launch strike a/c...that is why the Etendards and A-4's were land based...this may be untrue.  Please demonstrate truth or falsity?  Why did the Argentine navy go to war with its primary surface vessel unable to perform, if in fact it was an engineering casualty?

According to this link the Veinticinco de Mayo was operationaland and at sea early in the war but withdrew to port after the sinking of the Belgrano. It did attempt to launch a strike at the UK Task Force but weather prevented the launch.

 

http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/an1.html

"Another irony of war must be mentioned at this point. When the Argentines had bought the Veinticinco de Mayo they had sailed down the English Channel, during which the ship was given a demonstration of the Harrier and its capabilities. They decided to buy the Skyhawk instead, which were now ship-bound by the weather conditions. However, the Harriers with their short take off capability could still operate."