|Nuclear Warfare: Variables and Precepts
Deterrence must be made 100 percent reliable
It is important that we understand that until recent year developments with regard to Pakistan becoming the first terror sponsoring nation to acquire nuclear weapons, we have had 100 percent reliable deterrence. There have been some tense moments but the deterrence model has held up rather nicely. That said, it is imperative that the international community take steps to make Pakistan an anomaly situation rather than a trend in order to return to the relatively safe parameters of reliable deterrence for a finite period of time. One can expect Russia, an ally of Iran to take steps to try and prevent a return to normalcy, as they stand to gain in region specific influence should Iran become the second terror sponsoring nation to acquire nuclear weapons, therefore placing themselves in a position to challenge Pakistan for regional supremacy in the Middle East. This occurrence must be avoided at all costs.
Deterrence must fail eventually, and probably will fail totally
The precedent set by Pakistan has brought us to a place where it is inevitable that deterrence will fail eventually, as it will be difficult to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Islamic fundamentalist nations without going to war with one of them or their proxy war partners. This partner will undoubtedly be Russia due to the fact that they have the most to gain by the regional instability that will potentially eliminate the gap of disparity that points to American dominance in the Middle East. Because of these factors, there is a high probability that deterrence will fail totally due to the fact that America is already involved in a protracted two front war in Iraq and Afghanistan. These issues can potentially allow Islamic fundamentalist nations to limit Americas options concerning war through the use of proxy war provocations that are geared towards stretching the defenses of America.
Nuclear war can be reliably limited
There is no doubt that both America and Russia have the technology to engage in a reliably limited form of nuclear war. However, it remains to be seen whether or not they have the discipline to show restraint when faced with the cyclical ebb and flow nature of war. Each nuclear exchange will have a significant effect on the other nations ability to maintain region specific dominance therefore weakening their global status as well. America and Russia would be inclined to stay within the parameters of limited nuclear war in order to prevent the ascension of one or more conventional nuclear powers that could possibly fill the void left by America or Russia in a particular region across the globe. This assessment is based on the premise that Iran is not successful in making the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Islamic Fundamentalist nations a trend by establishing their own nuclear deterrent.
There is no possibility of a limited war
Should any tensions erupt between Russia and America at a time where Iran has been successful in acquiring nuclear weapons, the probability of maintaining a limited war will have dissipated. In this scenario, Iran can be expected to engage in provocative actions that will require decisive action, therefore, providing Russia with ammunition for widening any conflict between themselves and America in order to facilitate concessions from America. A nuclear Iran will undoubtedly motivate Pakistan to revert to its terror sponsoring past in order to assert its dominance over theatre occurrences in the Middle East These factors along with the monumental task of fighting the global war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan will prevent America from staying within the confines of a cost efficient and limited form of nuclear war with Russia. Clearly, America must either prevent Iran and any other socially irresponsible nation from acquiring nuclear weapons or force them into disarmament in the infancy stage of its nuclear weapons development.