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Subject: Stealth detecting radar
Gerry    3/19/2008 6:24:37 PM
Rumers seem to abound on new Russian radars that can detect steathy aircraft. I.E. S-500 ADS, Yet I cannot find any definitive articles that deal with the technology. Is this a myth (born from wishful thinking) or real technology in the works?
 
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Herald12345       4/8/2008 5:08:20 AM





... Even a SPOON REST or FLAT FACE may well be able to detect, and even a LOW BLOW may well be able to lock onto, an LO aircraft when it's only a dozen miles away ...
 




Which is excatly the effect that concepts like celldar are using. Physics is physics - however it depends on how you use it ...



Trust me on this, the defense is as much a part of design as the attack. If the rest of the world is after a means to defeat LO  then its prime user probably is as aware of what it takes to defeat as anyone else is. That user has the advantage of knowing the EXACT  techspecs.

Therefore, that user probably is working the active EW  measures to smear LW radiation signal return.

Herald
 
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le_corsaire       4/8/2008 6:21:58 AM


Trust me on this, the defense is as much a part of design as the attack. If the rest of the world is after a means to defeat LO  then its prime user probably is as aware of what it takes to defeat as anyone else is. That user has the advantage of knowing the EXACT  techspecs.

There is no doubt about that - and also no doubt about a technological advantage by knowing the exact specs (or even having the systems available for studies and tests).

However, there is always the chance - especially for very advanced and highly engineered systems - that one accidentally gets outmaneuvered by older but more robust (because simpler) designs or by somehow unusual and improvised concepts. The latter might be hard and expensive to circumvent because they were not reflected (or with minor probability of occurence) in the initial design assumptions. This can indeed ruin a whole program, not from atechnological point of view but simply by economic scale effects.
 
 
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Herald12345    Quit true, but......   4/8/2008 6:51:23 AM
One trick pony gimmicks never overcome the sound application of operational experience and technology-in other words, the Russians may discover a trick they may think works; but they have to proprogate it to test it in the real world. The way this planet is wired  today, there is very little that radiates  that isn't detected and analyzed.

To be sure that they have something, the Russians have to test against their best guess of the LO technology.and test it a LOT, since i expect that even effective LO detectors will be like real radar, subject to all kinds of weird local effects such as moving background clutter, heat, garbage in the air, simple ionization sheer, sunspots, and what not.  Since the prime user also tests continuously now and listens for anything bizarre that is allied or hostile that is of EW origin, the net result is that tech surprise is less than operational surprise. I would suggest that even operational surprise against LO tech is not very likely since the physics almost demands a certain beehive hardware IADS box approach to establish a DATE cycle to acquire fixes sufficient for chase weapons to work. The prime user is going to notice those systems going into service and he will build his own.

Who are the veteran masters of signal  processing?  I'd say it would be the British, Dutch, and  Germans when it comes to detector systems with the Australians, and the Americans right in there neck and neck. Then you have the second tier, which includes Italy, Japan, Sweden, Israel, France, and also Russia, then you have everybody else a distant third.  

So you look at what the British do and the Dutch/Germans: if they sniff at something EW wise; the prime LO user jumps on it and tests it against his tech tree to see what the measure. After that the prime user has to countermeasure. I don't see the prime user not using some kind of EW countermeasures before he commits his LO  aircraft anyway. It just makesd good military  sense to Pearl Harbor an enemy IADS radar coverage before you commit an air force to battle.

Peel the onion before you eat it.

Herald

Intercept engagement is still not very likely given the signal threshholds and those parts of the EM spectrum which are the likely detector bands.that you will use against current LO tech.

Herald

 
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le_corsaire       4/8/2008 9:52:20 AM
Still a very tech centric view on the subject ... and a very expensive process compared to somebody using a large number of rather inexpensive and geographically distributed old/low-tech devices (or dual-use commercial equipment like the Celldar concept) as emitters and passive components plus high-capacity computing infrastructure (which is hard to detect).
I agree, the practical problem would be to somehow get access to real-live data or specifications of the target.
 
It is not about challenging technical superiority  - just whether inexpensive tactics can potentially create a threat level high enough to trigger expensive programs for countermeasures on the other side, thats problematic enough.
 
 
 
 
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le_corsaire       4/8/2008 10:03:50 AM
Still a very tech centric view on the subject ... and a very expensive process compared to somebody using a large number of rather inexpensive and geographically distributed old/low-tech devices (or dual-use commercial equipment like the Celldar concept) as emitters and passive components plus high-capacity computing infrastructure (which is hard to detect).
I agree, the practical problem would be to somehow get access to real-live data or specifications of the target.
 
It is not about challenging technical superiority  - just whether inexpensive tactics can potentially create a threat level high enough to trigger expensive programs for countermeasures on the other side, thats problematic enough.
 
 
 
 
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le_corsaire       4/8/2008 10:13:39 AM
Still a very tech centric view on the subject ... and a very expensive process compared to somebody using a large number of rather inexpensive and geographically distributed old/low-tech devices (or dual-use commercial equipment like the Celldar concept) as emitters and passive components plus high-capacity computing infrastructure (which is hard to detect).
I agree, the practical problem would be to somehow get access to real-live data or specifications of the target.
 
It is not about challenging technical superiority  - just whether inexpensive tactics can potentially create a threat level high enough to trigger expensive programs for countermeasures on the other side, thats problematic enough.
 
 
 
 
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reefdiver       4/8/2008 10:54:53 AM
I certainly can't speak to technical details, but some years ago I spent a couple of days on a dive boat with a former B-52 pilot who was shot down in I believe one of the Linebacker campaigns and spent some 9 months as a POW. IIRC his comments were that his B-52's ECM was excellent - even incredible -  but that ultimately the NV simply plotted headings and speed and more or less fired barrages in a blind but calculated fashion and hit him and others. Somewhat blind luck, but not quite.
 
Again, IIRC, During WWII the Germans and others at times employed huge sound gathering megaphone/microphone type devices to detect the sound of incoming aircraft. With arrays of these they could triangulate and determine headings of incoming aircraft and deploy defences appropriately.
 
My simplistic observation is that if you fly fairly predictable patterns there may be any number of ways to down even LO aircraft. It would seem wise tactics and intelligence will always be required.
 
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Herald12345    Le corsair.   4/9/2008 1:01:08 AM
Reefdiver and that very smart Serb colonel that killed that Night Hawk are both correct that if you throw enough garbage into the air along a predicted vector you will bring down your duck: hence shotguns.

The point is that if the duck shoots back, then he will develop anti-duckblind tactics and so the EW battle between the two sides begins.

It becomes economically moot whether the cost per unit in the IADS is low if you need 1000x of them to get one 'Duck:"

Herald

 
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displacedjim       4/9/2008 9:15:59 AM
The F-117 was not shot down because of some sort of shotgun approach.  That is not how the Serbs defended themselves.  They rarely fired unless they had someone deep in the heart of their engagement envelope, in part because they knew that firing would expose themselves to return fire, so they wanted to make any shot they took count.
 
Certainly old VHF radars like SPOON REST and TALL KING equipped with new "back ends" with modern processing capabilites present some degree of increased capability against LO airframes, and bi-static and multi-static approaches including the "Celldar" (cute name) concept definitely provide increased capability against LO airframes.  However, nothing so far has come close to being a serious threat.  As Herald said, we are by *NO* means oblivious to this increased threat, and nothing revealed so far has caught us in the least by surprise or is uncounter-able.
 
What passed for LO a couple decades ago may well become vulnerable again in some select scenarios in the near future, but we've already moved along nicely from where we used to be then.  The threat's air defenses are still trying to catch up to where we used to be.  Stealth absolutely is alive and well and represents about the single biggest force multiplier on our side, and will be for many, many years. 
 
 
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displacedjim       4/9/2008 9:26:10 AM
I typed and posted that a little too quickly.  I will modify my initial statement by acknowledging that the Serbs certainly did fire off small volleys of SAMs (like say three at a time) on occasions where it appeared to us they did not have any target engagement radar actually tracking a target, but it was not what I'd call an attempt to blaze away hoping that some random round might hit someone by chance.  Overall they followed a very reserved, cautious approach of cat-and-mouse, biding their time while looking for a rare opportunity to catch someone with a deliberate attack.
 
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