Verification would be through national technical means. It is not perfect, but the great powers do spy on each other to a considerable degree and it is the best we can do and there are various facilitating measures for that in place such as the 'open skies agreement'.

I used to be one of them. I think tactical nuclear warfare at sea is the only form that is relatively "safe." No cities full of civilians to destroy. No forests or grasslands to set ablaze. Underwater bursts in deep water do not have much effect at even moderate ranges. But there are two practical problems with TNW at sea: 1) They were the easiest nuclear weapons to stea. And people did sometimes try to steal them. A US warship has remarkably little security in port. Probably too little in the age of terrorism, if it has nuclear weapons. 2) The nuclear threshhold is dangerous to cross. Many believe it will escalate in many cases. While I do not think it is a big problem, I am afraid to find out if I am wrong?

Well, I am glad you do not believe so any more... :) The risk of escalation in such a situation is significant, but even if escalation could be avoided in the short term, any use of nuclear weapons would be weaken the long-term norms against their use. PS. This reply is obviously to your last post - unfortunately I seem to be having some browser trouble lately and it prevents me from actually replying to your last post directly, so I have to click reply while reading a different post, which surprisingly seems to work. It is very strange and it happened several times in the last couple of days.

Mainly I believe nuclear weapons are not cost-effective in either of two different senses: 1) Political. It was obvious as far back as the 1960s that actually using battlefield nuclear weapons (as Gen. Westmoreland proposed to do) had far too high a political cost. If you think anti-war sentiment was strong as it was, imagine it if we had used TNW! 2) Economic. Nuclear weapons, measured in life cycle total cost terms, are very expensive. Total cost includes manufacture, disposal, security, delivery systems, etc. Given how often we use them tactically (zero times), if we ever use them once, the total cost of having that capability will not be justified by that one use. Far less funding could provide far more useful military assets. I combine this view of the basic problems of political and economic cost with the psychological and legal effects. Maintaining a tactical nuclear force means we set the example, and create the concept in law by use, that such weapons are legitimate instrumentalities of military-political power. Doing that is probably not in our best interests, long term. If we persist, some day another nation, following our example may choose to use them in ways we really do not like. Finally, I think there may be some risk of escalation associated with tactical weapons use. Why run it? Since it probably costs us political support for the war in many quarters, and since the funds we spend on the capability are not available for much more useful systems, and since it provides all states with an excuse to justify nuclear programs far more dangerous than we will like, it is a better deal to eshew these systems altogether. None of that changes the fact I believe that tactical weapons, if small, if used in unpopulated areas or at sea, are the only form of nuclear warfare that is completely legal, and in the sense able to do something of operational value, militaryily practical weapons. I still think tactical weapons are the ones that make the most sense of any class of nuclear weapons, from a traditional military point of view.

El Cid, I think we are more or less agreed on the matter. The only difference is that I think that even naval use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, because of the slippery slope, the weakening of norms against nuclear weapons and the risk of escalation that would result as well as the obvious political costs and the loss of public support both at home and abroad that such use would entail.