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Subject: Chinese strategic nuclear arsenals - ICBM
cateyes    6/23/2004 1:55:49 PM
It's very hard to get accurate data regarding to Chinese strategic nuclear force. You have to take a guess work to estimate what kind of systems they have, let alone numbers. Since Chinese has a very different views from west on deterrence issue, they simply hide all the detail. So we can only take a guess, based on the public resources: DF-5: This liquid fuel type ICBM is the only official confirmed one, first generation Chinese ICBM with single warhead, mega ton level yield, entering into service in middle 80s. Some of them sit in silos(I saw one photo before), some stored in tunnels. China has unique geographic condition, with 70% of land covered by huge rock mountains, so it's natural for them to take that advantage. The 80s offical source confirmed the initial tunnel network was completed in early 80s. Some semi-official source stated that China obtained the fire on warning capability in 1984, with 5 command centers. As for number, I think 20 around ICBMs at the end of 80s is credible, which is disclosed by one high ranking offical in 1990, who escaped to US. Since China's main enemy is Soviet Union before 90s, most of their nuclear arsenals are in middle range. DF-5A: The information of this type ICBM is circulated for quite a time, but never being confirmed by offical source, and no photos/evidences exist. DF-5A is said upgraded from DF-5 in range, and multiple warhead capability. DF-31: This solid fuel mobile type ICBM came into public in 1999, and there are quite a lot photos/evidences about it circulated around. Interesting thing is that China never confirms in public it is an ICBM, only indirect evidence proves it. Sources said this type of ICBM started its deployment from 1996, and completed in 2001. DF-31 in early development stage, the Chinese text indicats ICBM: http://member.netease.com/~rxj/pic/df31f.jpg This scanned photo shows DF-31 in launch practice: http://military.myrice.com/weapoon/missile/df31-03.jpg DF-31 spotted in the field: http://military.myrice.com/weapoon/missile/df31-04.jpg Does this photo captured from Chinese TV show its deployment? http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/nwcCLIPART/FOREIGN_MIL_EQUIPMENT/Ballistic_Missiles/Other/ChineseDF3.jpg Also there are some DF-31 picutres captured in differenc places: DF-31 in parade, with labels on the vehicles: http://www.warchina.com/image/yb-df41a.jpg http://member.netease.com/~rxj/pic/df31.jpg http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/icbm/df31_1.jpg DF-31 spotted in the field, no labels on the vechicle: http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/icbm/df31_3.jpg http://pcwar.myrice.com/weapon/china/images/df31.jpg http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/icbm/df31_2.jpg claimed to be payload of the DF-31, not sure: http://member.netease.com/~rxj/pic/df31dt.jpg http://military.myrice.com/weapoon/missile/df31-02.jpg With these photos/evidence we can safely conclude that DF-31 has been in service, it not the Chinese tradition to put weapons not in service into public parade anyway. DF-31A/DF-41: There are some information around regarding these two types Chinese ICBMs, but never confirmed by the official like with DF31. DF-31A extends DF-31's range from 8000km to 12,000km. And DF-41 is a heavy type ICBM with a striking range to 14,000. There are tow pictures released to public, don't know from where. DF-31A, or DF-41? Looks qute similar to ss27. http://member.netease.com/~rxj/pic/df31a.jpg http://www.wforum.com/specials/upload/DF-41.jpg
 
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elcid    some crap about not taking them seriously    7/3/2004 11:02:05 PM
I have reported to you that two families of ballistic missiles are deployed with anti-shipping heads designed to purpose. How, exactly, can you take them seriously and not regard that as a problem? I have also reported to you that ONI says the concept of satellite detetion and direct missile control is feasible, and was once attempted by the Russians. How are you taking that seriously by saying you "know" it is "impossible" - when in fact you "know" it is indeed possible. The only uncertainty is if it has been developed and deployed? There is massive evidence the matter is under study and development, for well over a decade.
 
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elcid    I was talking about radar and not crows nest range   7/3/2004 11:07:11 PM
Why do you assume an anti-shipping attack would not come in on the deck - IF there was a concern about radar detection? And how do you simultaneously assume we will be passive, and at the same time be operating a radar (detectable at up to a thousand miles) able to detect a ballistic missile? If you operate the radar, the enemy can target your radar ship passively, and only needs to program the missile with range and bearing gates, come in low, and then home on the ship before there is time to react. A former SA-2, in anti-shipping mode, can fly at 5 to 15 meters, depending on sea state. You will detect it with about two seconds of flight time before impact. This is not enough time even for one person to react properly, much less to solve a fire control problem.
 
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gf0012-aust    I was talking about radar and not crows nest range   7/3/2004 11:12:42 PM
A surface wave radar system will detect a cruise missile coming in at sea level. Aren't you aware of US investment in such an australian system? The US has also purchased another Aust'n radar system that is active and used for land based CM detection. Last I was aware, there was a process of integrating that into Aegis. The technology exists, and has existed here for 3-4 years at least. There are Aust'n EW systems that are capable of sea level attacks - hence the US decision to invest in a number of Aust'n EW technologies in the last 6 months.
 
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displacedjim    RE:satellite real-time targetting line--we can't even do that with our guys,   7/3/2004 11:17:34 PM
"To say "we cannot so they cannot" seems to be obviously false reasoning. Did we ever try? It is not one of our concepts. Rather, it is a Russian concept, dating from the 1980s. One Russian system we understand was working on this at the time the USSR collapsed. To think that a derivitive of it or inspired by it could not have beed developed in 15 years is possible only if you have a much lower opinion of Chinese technology than I do. In any case, Chinese claims for such a system are now 5 years old, and at least one major think tank is crediting them with it since 2002." It is not obviously false, because we most certainly are very interested in real-time targetting of relocatable targets, and yes we do try. I do not think it is not possible; rather, I think it has not been done yet. It appears to me one significant reason we reach differing conclusions regarding Chinese capabilities is you place much more credence in Chinese claims than I do, and factor them into your analysis much more heavily than I do. Displacedjim
 
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displacedjim    RE:DF'ing those signals seems unlikely - and the Hobart's other attack   7/3/2004 11:28:58 PM
Don't misquote me, or at least try not to take me out of context. You said "Everyone was as sure as Jim no one knew their history like I did and it was a hundred to one shot anyone would try it." Here's my quote, in which I explicitly say locating a carrier via SIGINT is certainly believable, but that achieving the resolution necessary for economically targetting using only aimpoint-guided missiles is unlikely--this is obviously (or should be) in the context of a carrier that is hundreds of miles away from China, not a destroyer 15 miles offshore in range of 122mm artillery and hence the DF'd target box has grown proportionately bigger. "Locating them with SIGINT is certainly believable. I'd hope in wartime approaching the Chinese coast we'd tone it down to limit Chinese capability to do this, but it's possible. However, DF'ing those signals seems unlikely to me to resolve the carrier's target track down to the matter of hundreds of meters necessary for a spread as discussed above; leastwise, not if you want the spread to be less than dozens or scores or whatever of missiles." Displacedjim
 
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displacedjim    RE:the carrier group, as in detect and track    7/3/2004 11:39:25 PM
"Why not use maritime patrol aircraft? There is a Russian language joke among Bear crews: "We have sighted the enemy. Dosvedanya." Grim but probably true. It is the job of a maritime patrol plane to find the enemy and report. It does not have to get home to succeed. There is a picture of an IJN Emily off Okinawa, being shot down. The narrator opines "She had long enough to transmit position information, and thus to accomplish her primary mission." If you send out patrol aircraft, either they find a carrier or they don't. If they don't, it is not very likely they won't come home to try again. If they do, they can set up your attack with position, course and speed information." Yes, if the CBG is merrily sailing along, fat, dumb, and happy with no speed or course changes into the warzone over a matter of an hour at a time, then some patrol aircraft/vessel sighting relayed home, relayed to the missile brigade, could then give them an inkling of where to shoot. Once again, as I've said many times now, if they have RVs that can autonomously acquire the carrier on their way down, and if they receive target tip-off data good enough to drop it close enough to put the carrier in its seeker field-of-view, then yes, that's a big problem. However, that kind of "tracking" data is unlikely to be sufficiently accurate to use an economical number of SRBMs that aren't terminally homing. An error of just one mile in position must surely mean a few hundred RVs would be necessary to score some hits. A couple miles and China doesn't have enough in its inventory to attack even just one carrier one time. Displacedjim
 
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displacedjim    RE:some crap about not taking them seriously    7/3/2004 11:47:33 PM
"There is massive evidence the matter is under study and development, for well over a decade" ***Exactly!!!*** That's what I've been saying as well (although not necessarily about the time frame). If you're going to talk about what the PLA can do, then realize that means you're saying what the PLA can do right now--not next year. Here's what I said a couple days ago: "ElCid, as we've both posted before, the single biggest window of opportunity for the PLA opens if/when they gain an operational conventional warhead ballistic missile threat to Taiwan's IADS and our carriers." When that happens we are in grave trouble in a Taiwan/China scenario, as RVs whistling in at Mach 8 are pretty much unstoppable and about the only defense is to not let the PLA gain good enough targeting data to use them effectively. Displacedjim
 
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displacedjim    RE:I was talking about radar and not crows nest range   7/3/2004 11:56:48 PM
"Why do you assume an anti-shipping attack would not come in on the deck - IF there was a concern about radar detection? And how do you simultaneously assume we will be passive, and at the same time be operating a radar (detectable at up to a thousand miles) able to detect a ballistic missile? If you operate the radar, the enemy can target your radar ship passively, and only needs to program the missile with range and bearing gates, come in low, and then home on the ship before there is time to react. A former SA-2, in anti-shipping mode, can fly at 5 to 15 meters, depending on sea state. You will detect it with about two seconds of flight time before impact. This is not enough time even for one person to react properly, much less to solve a fire control problem." That's a pretty amazing conversion of an SA-2! However, while such a system is definitely a threat to be dealt with, I'm guessing an SA-2 flying that profile isn't going to have a range of much more than about 20nm. Even with some sort of improved motors, it's difficult to believe a sea-skimming range beyond 50nm. In any event, while dangerous to shipping in the Strait, not a threat to carrier ops. Displacedjim
 
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gf0012-aust    Ballistic missile detection   7/4/2004 12:21:19 AM
[IF there was a concern about radar detection? And how do you simultaneously assume we will be passive, and at the same time be operating a radar (detectable at up to a thousand miles) able to detect a ballistic missile? If you operate the radar, the enemy can target your radar ship passively] Because you don't need the CSF to detect the launch. The CSF is an end user of data handed off by other detection systems. What do you think space based systems were doing recently??
 
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elcid    Integrating new technology into the military   7/4/2004 3:53:04 AM
On the average, our gear is (always) remarkably old technology. It takes an average of 10-15 years to integrate a new idea into our system. The problem is more than technical - it is institutional. Until you understand how to use a new technology, and incorporate it effectively into actual operational practice, it is mere potential. Further, when you get down to the nitty gritty technical details, flat statements are more misleading than accurate, as a rule. Cruise missiles, in fact, always could be detected by radar, and we used radar aimed guns and missiles to shoot them down. [There is a British frigate that claims to have shot down an Exocet in 1982, and while it is usually not believed, I see no reason to doubt it. The IDF shot down a remarkable number in 1973 using 76 mm compact guns, so a late mark 4.5 inch ought to be up to it.] I did not mean to imply a cruise missile is never detected by any radar. In fact, set to the right scale, looking at raw radar data (a rare thing in the modern Navy), I can see a cruise missile on surface search radar. But I began life as a radar technician and became an electronic warfare engineer. That it is theoretically possible is almost meaningless on a real, present tense, US Navy warship: we often do not look at raw data any more and almost no one can tell you what the right range setting is. Solve both those problems, how do you get trained men to focus on radar screens hour after hour, day after day? You only get a brief warning. You don't know when you need to be paying attention. I will tell you frankly our people are poor watchstanders by historical and many foreign navy standards. Sail with the British, the Australians, the Japanese, the Israelis, to name a few I am sure of from direct observation, and you will come away saying "I had no idea how high the standards can be set." We tend to believe that the technology will save us, where the real secret lies in great attention to detail in all things. The idea the US is looking for some new cruise missile EW systems is not in dispute. The idea that these systems somehow protect us from ballistic anti-shipping missiles is a different matter. We have barely tried to deal with that problem, and what program we have is vastly scaled back, for the usual reason: it is expensive and no one is attacking so it is not clear we cannot get by on the cheap. The truth is we have the wrong SAM. We were never willing to buy the missile the navy wanted - the one with strong ECCM capabilities built in. [That missile was named Typhoon by the way]. We were not even willing to buy a much higher performing Army missile that would work with our AGEIS systems, making them 200-300 per cent more effective. [That missile is called Patriot]. Because we were too cheap and because no attack demonstrated the problems of the inherent limitations of our defenses. That lack of attacks does not make those inherent limitations go away. Read Norman Friedman, Normal Polmar, etc. for a grasp of the history of how and why we got where we are. But don't read expecting to learn all is nearly as good as it could be. At the moment - because of many decades of a cheap SAM policy - the USN lacks a SAM up to Russian performance standards (speaking of the missile itself). It is not even up to US Army standards, themselves not up to Russian standards. The age when you could assume a US system was guaranteed to be technically superior is past. We may have the potential for this to be so, but not if we won't do what we know we should do. Using missiles with known EW weaknesses in a mode that is understood to be vulnerable is not very clever technical strategy. [Basically, the old system was simple semi-active radar homing. It was hard to jam - because the missile would home on the jammer if it was powerful enough to overcome the beam. Now we command the missile, so it can "cut corners" and fly a more efficient profile, and for other reasons. But commands are inherently vulnerable. It is jamming commands that made German anti-shipping missiles relatively easy to defeat. Knowing this, the Typhoon was designed to not be easy to jam. But we never built it. That is the short and sweet oversimplified version of the story. But you can read it in US Cruisers by USNI if you want the drawn out details.]
 
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