SSBNs No Longer a Secure Deterrent - How to Ensure a Secure Minimum Deterrent

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Subject: SSBNs No Longer a Secure Deterrent - How to Ensure a Secure Minimum Deterrent
Roman 2/4/2007 5:24:18 PM

SSBNs have long been regarded as the most secure leg of the nuclear triad providing a nuclear deterrent. As a result, some countries, and I am mostly thinking of Britain, have switched to a nuclear deterrent based solely on SSBNs. Recently, though, news of new technologies in submarine detection have begun surfacing. Some, such those described in the recent SP article, rely merely on major improvements in passive sonar technology, but others introduce wholly new forms of detection, including those based on shining 'laser' beams into the sea and detecting submarines on that basis (I am guessing through relfection patterns, but I am no expert). This is not to say that SSBNs will suddenly be easily foundable and destructible. I have, however, started to believe SSBNs or other submarine-based forms of nuclear deterrence relying in the undetectibility/stealth of submarines will become more vulnerable, as multipronged approaches to submarine detection begin to proliferate in the years to come. So, in the light of this, how would you ensure that the nuclear deterrents (of whichever country) remain secure? I guess nothing beats diversification and having a full nuclear triad with multiple types of approaches withing each leg of the triad (e.g. both hardened silo and mobile ICBMs for the land leg). This ensures that even if new technologies increase the vulnerability of one part of the deterrent the other parts compensate for it, but it is a very expensive solution. What would your suggestions be to deal with the issue?

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gf0012-aust 6/2/2007 8:59:20 AM

I still think that having only 4 submarines with 12 missiles each carry the entire deterrent is very risky in this regard: It is sufficient to find or track right from port just two submarines (the maximum number that will be at sea at any one time - those in port can be destroyed relatively easily) to be able to completely destroy such a deterrent.

you're making a logistics assumption based on normal rotation and availability slots - when wartime timeframes change those numbers significantly.

the other thing to note is that USS Florida (for example) was fulfilling SSGN roles as a mule prior to hull modification. In other words, any SSBN can be used for some of the SSGN roles. Some functionality based on post SSGN modded hull sectioning would be lost, but some strike capability could still be achieved. In fact modding the hull just for VLCM would be easier to achieve than a full SOC sympathetic hull mod. In real terms, if the USN decided to fast track SSGN's as a Block 2 type mod (sans SPECOPS mods), they could deploy additional boats pretty rapidly.

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french stratege 6/2/2007 9:27:04 AM

"You know where are they?"

Yes, you almost always know where they are. Such complexes are very difficult to construct covertly.

Almost!

In fact it is impossible to know every bunkers.A 1000 sqm bunker is enough to protect high level command.

It can be build covertly for example in digging under an existing facility to mask from satellites and removing materials by anonymous trucks.Or to combine with the building of a civilian underground parking lot...Or to use a command plane in war time (France has 4 ASTARTE planes)....

A what depth?
To give example of France, we have bunkers depth enough like Mont Verdun under 1000 meters of rock."

This should not really matter too much. A megaton, or even a 500kt warhead in an underground detonation mode (even just a few meters undeground) will produce shockwaves that will collapse the bunker or at least destroy access physical, communications, air intakes, etc. to the bunker.

False.Such underground bunkers are studied to resist to a more than 20 megaton blast with muliple layers of high resistance concrete shields to dissipate shockwaves.And you don't know exactly the underground location and bunker configuration.And maybe this country has also command post on anomymous trucks in the countryside.

Why leaders should stay in their palace in war time?

"And chain of command have several back up to run the country even president is killed."

That does not matter so much for the purposes of a deterrence. The point is that the leaders will have a personal stake in not chosing to strike country X, because they and their familis personnaly will get killed. It will be little consolation to them that there are backups to take their place.

Their families would be protected as well.If you have only few warheads to strike this country, they need only to send them in countryside.

How many warheads would be needed would depend on the survivability of the launchers. I still think that having only 4 submarines with 12 missiles each carry the entire deterrent is very risky in this regard: It is sufficient to find or track right from port just two submarines (the maximum number that will be at sea at any one time - those in port can be destroyed relatively easily) to be able to completely destroy such a deterrent.

First if you have 4 submarines, you need only 3 missiles set as one submarine is almost always unavailable due to maintenance constraints.

Now to be credible you need very good submarine and some good SSN and ASM frigate to protect them at exit.

Each time one of our SSBN exit, a whole fleet of several mineclearers, some ASM frigates with very good sonar as well some dedicated some ship with towed ULF sonar active and passive are used.Then add a SSN or even a second SSBN to act as decoy before coming back to harbor.The SSBN at sea will come back once the exit of the SSBN have been secured.It is almost impossible to track a top SSBN when weather is bad due to high background noise level.

But I agree that having some few mobile ICBM hidden in the country is a good back up.If they are few and of the same type of the SLBM (SLBM on a mobile launcher), it is possible to hide the program as a black program and keep this capacity secret.You use only the spare SLBM and deploy this capacity only in war time.

Or you can have some launchers or even silos hidden in a barn of a anonymous civilian farm in the countryside.

Indeed you build always more SLBM than the 3 set number at least for test and training.

But the only credible deterrent for a first use agaisnt a country which can destroy your population, is a counterforce deterrent.You would use your missile against ennemy population only as a retaliation of an attack on your own population.

It is the policy of France and UK.And it is why we invested in accurate SLBM at great price.

Destroying a hundred key facilities as air base, depots, harbours, ministry buildings, some key plants and oil refineries...would cripple the opposite armed forces for years.Then we would keep two hundred warheads as a deterrent for an attack on our own population.

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Roman 6/6/2007 12:43:16 PM

you're making a logistics assumption based on normal rotation and availability slots - when wartime timeframes change those numbers significantly.

Well, my logistics assumption is based on the worst case scenario of rapid deterioration of tensions not leaving the time to adjust the normal deployment cycle by increasing maintenance ahead of time to allow for greater simultaneous sorties of SSBNs. I feel this is not unreasonable, since the whole point of nuclear deterrence is to deter worst case scenarios. Nonetheless, your point that the logistics cycle can be adjusted for wartime is a good one and is duly noted.

I am not sure I understand the point you are trying to make with the SSGNs and how it relates to nuclear deterrence. Could you please clarify?

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Roman 6/6/2007 1:17:14 PM

[quote]In fact it is impossible to know every bunkers.A 1000 sqm bunker is enough to protect high level command.[/quote]

Hmm, what personnel would you consider to comprise high level command whose survival is essential in a nuclear (or other WMD or even harsh conventional strike or a major catastrophe) war?

[quote]It can be build covertly for example in digging under an existing facility to mask from satellites and removing materials by anonymous trucks.Or to combine with the building of a civilian underground parking lot...Or to use a command plane in war time (France has 4 ASTARTE planes).... [/quote]

I am still sceptical about the possibility of building a vast underground complex covertly. The scale of digging required and the amount of material that must be removed is just too large.

As to the planes, the EMP effect should take care of them, even if they leave the area of blast zones prior to the start of the nuclear war.

[quote]False.Such underground bunkers are studied to resist to a more than 20 megaton blast with muliple layers of high resistance concrete shields to dissipate shockwaves.And you don't know exactly the underground location and bunker configuration.And maybe this country has also command post on anomymous trucks in the countryside.

Why leaders should stay in their palace in war time?[/quote]

I am not assuming leaders will stay in their palace; I am assuming they will move to nuclear bunkers.

I have trouble imagining how any underground bunker can resist a 20Mt blast, particularly if it is a subsurface explosion (just a few meters underground is enough to transfer a large proportion of the energy to shockwaves). While the crater created by the explosion might not extend to the depth of a very deep bunker, the shockwaves would surely collapse such a bunker and along with other effects of the explosion would collapse/seal/destroy/contaminate air intake shafts, access tunnels, communications lines, etcetera.

[quote]Their families would be protected as well.If you have only few warheads to strike this country, they need only to send them in countryside.[/quote]

Ok, this is a fair point about their families being protected from the nuclear blasts themselves. They would not, however, be protected from the strikes against environmental support systems (such as the strikes on river sources that I proposed, though I don't know about their efficacy and nobody has commented on that). They would also be vulnerable to potential of revenge of an enraged populace of a collapsing country.

[quote]First if you have 4 submarines, you need only 3 missiles set as one submarine is almost always unavailable due to maintenance constraints.[/quote]

Good point, though this does not add anything to your nuclear strike potential.

[quote]Now to be credible you need very good submarine and some good SSN and ASM frigate to protect them at exit.

That makes sense. How many ASW frigates, SSNs and minesweepers do you need to be certain that you can clear a given area of potentially hostile submarines and mines?

Perhaps an installation of passive listening arrays in and around the egresses that the exiting SSBN has to traverse would also help to ensure that the submarine is not tracked from the outset. The problem is that the potential enemy can also install such listening devices in the area.

[quote]But I agree that having some few mobile ICBM hidden in the country is a good back up.If they are few and of the same type of the SLBM (SLBM on a mobile launcher), it is possible to hide the program as a black program and keep this capacity secret.You use only the spare SLBM and deploy this capacity only in war time.[/quote]

This is an excellent idea and may solve the problem of one's own people tracking the mobile ICBMs in peacetime if one's country is democratic and densely populated.

[quote]Or you can have some launchers or even silos hidden in a barn of a anonymous civilian farm in the countryside.[/quote]

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french stratege 6/6/2007 4:29:06 PM

If talking about a nuclear power, do you seriously believe it would not strike back with nuclear weapons after a hundred warheads dropped on its territory?

Yes (on your military targets as well since its population can be still targeted in reprisal) but he can not invade anymore or sustain big operation and have loss its military potential on world stage.

On hidding underground bunkers:

A when you dig a tunnel, you don't know where he goes exactly.You can have an entrance in a point, then a tunnel with curves and the main bunker at 3 km of main entrance.You don't know in an area which can be several sqkm where is the bunker.Then you can drill secondary exit to the surface well hidden.

On resistance:

A 10 000 PSI (pound per square inch) pressure resistant bunker can resist to a 100 Megatons H bomb at 1000 m if well designed. So impossible to destroy them.

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french stratege 6/6/2007 6:47:48 PM

So impossible to destroy them IF buried at 1000 m depth of course.

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Herald1234 6/6/2007 8:20:55 PM

If talking about a nuclear power, do you seriously believe it would not strike back with nuclear weapons after a hundred warheads dropped on its territory?

On hidding underground bunkers:

On resistance:

A 10 000 PSI (pound per square inch) pressure resistant bunker can resist to a 100 Megatons H bomb at 1000 m if well designed. So impossible to destroy them.

Surface burst fireball radius thermal event plus neutron sleeting. Where do you get your physics; FS?

Just for an example; a half megaton ground contact airburst has a fireball radius of 530 meters. You do know what that means?

Never mind the ground surface contact vaporization caused by the 30,000 K fireball boundary temperature at fadeout after four seconds direct thermal loading.

Surface impact by a half megaton device will destroy any hardened shelter caught in the thermally [X ray] induced underground shockwave. NO AMOUNT OF UNDERGROUND SHELTER HARDENING DEFENDS AGAINST THIS SHOCKWAVE within its considerable effective radius. Hence the decision to incorporate an earth penetrating warhead designs in many nuclear powers' arsenals.

These warheads' yields are not large to produce kill effects. They don't have to be. The shelter collapse effects can be guaranteed with tens of kiloton yield weapons within a few hundred meters of the warhead earth penetrating impact and delayed detonation.

10,000 psi at 1000 meters provides safety ? That is a joke.

Herald

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french stratege 6/6/2007 8:47:18 PM

It is false Herald.

I know enough on effect of nukes to say you that what I said is true.

Nuclear bunker buster weapons can not dammage well designed bunkers if underground enough.Point.

During decades we have improved CEP of missile to damage silos.

Nothing today can destroy a well designed 1000 m underground bunker with shocwave dissipation screens.Nothing.

On the fireball , when you target a silo the silo external part is well inside the fireball which vaporize external layers producing a shock wave that internal structures and dampers can amortize.

Even hardened silo survive and top part emerge from a crater when explosion is very close.The problem is that the silo can it self slant in the crater and the missile can not be fired or door opened

Now imagine what technology allow on well undergound bunkers.

Now you can dream about a 1000 megaton bunker buster coming at 20 km per seconds!

Nuclear bunker buster weapons are good for old or simple bunkers and not very deep.

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