My thoughts on the MX-Peacekeeper deactivation 9/19/2005 11:57:48 AM Today (September 19, 2005) the US Air Force is deactivating the last of what is arguable one of the most effective and controversial strategic nuclear deterrent, the MX Peacekeeper (LGM-118) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) -snip- Indeed, every time I see the name "Peacekeeper" I laugh at the thought of President Reagan on SNL (Saturday Night Live) trying to "push the button".

I assume, for the US to keep older missiles, but retire the newer ones, that either the older ones have had extensive modernisation, or the newer ones don't actually work?

"I assume, for the US to keep older missiles, but retire the newer ones, that either the older ones have had extensive modernization, or the newer ones don't actually work?" More a case of Peacekeeper not needed. The Peacekeeper was developed to counter the Soviet SS18, which were being built in sufficient numbers to allow the Soviets to launch a first strike BOOB (Bolt out of the blue) attack using 250-350 SS18's (10 warheads ea.) plus assorted older versions of MIRV'd ICBMs. Such an attack would have eliminated about 85-95% of the Minuteman missile force, (assuming we didn't launch on warning) leaving the US NCA with too few hard kill capable warheads to threaten the remaining USSR ICBM force, which would have still numbered 800-900 or so missiles. A scary scenario which put tremendous pressure on the US NCA to maintain a high level of alertness and preparedness to quickly determine the authenticity of an attack warning and generate a correct response. It essentially was developing into a need to "Launch 'em or lose 'em", scenario with little ability or time to tailor a response to what might be a "limited" USSR attack profile. This limiting of options, was what started the development of the Peacekeeper. The Peacekeeper was designed to increase the quantity of remaining warheads, with the potential to also provide the US NCA with it's own BOOB counter ICBM force. It essentially forced the USSR to the negotiating table for nuke reduction talks. The theory now is that we do not need such a force level and structure. START treaties have drastically reduced the numbers of warheads aimed at us, including an elimination of Russian ICBM's with MIRV's. Thus the current concept is to have a sufficient number of single warhead ICBM's (Minuteman's) in the inventory, with the single warhead making ea. Minuteman a less valuable target. Peacekeeper, while a more accurate missile, is also costly to maintain, especially as it requires a completely different logistics support network, all the while providing for the same capability as Minuteman (single warhead ONLY as per treaty). Peecekeeper was also retrofitted into existing Minuteman II silos at FE Warren AFB facilities, whose electronics/CCC systems were older and less reliable then updated systems used by some Minuteman III's. Thus it's been deactivated SB

>The Peacekeeper was developed to counter the Soviet SS18, which were being >built in sufficient numbers to allow the Soviets to launch a first strike BOOB >(Bolt out of the blue) attack using 250-350 SS18's (10 warheads ea.) plus >assorted older versions of MIRV'd ICBMs. Such an attack would have >eliminated about 85-95% of the Minuteman missile force, (assuming we >didn't launch on warning) leaving the US NCA with too few hard kill capable >warheads to threaten the remaining USSR ICBM force, which would have still >numbered 800-900 or so missiles. >A scary scenario which put tremendous pressure on the US NCA to maintain a >high level of alertness and preparedness to quickly determine the authenticity >of an attack warning and generate a correct response How was destroying the US land based missiles a scary scenario, warrenting launching on unverified indications of an attack? Given that there would have been more than sufficient warhead on SLBMs to have vaporized every major city in the USSR and eastern block nations? Then there would have also been the bombers, air launched cruise missiles and nuclear tomahawks And that isn't even dragging in the French, British and probably Chinese nuclear forces into it as they likely would have been. Oh, and I almost forgot about the nuclear cruise missiles and Perishing IIs that were located in Europe. Forgot about the gravity nukes on the carriers! Damm. Destroying the US's land based missile force would have accomplished pretty much nothing other than to have irradiated a lot of good farmland. This is the reason we had a strategic "triad", though quite frankly we really could have dispensed with pretty much everything except the SLBMs and still have had a more than sufficient deterance given that it was pretty much impossible to have located or sunk a sufficient number of them to have stopped them from turning the Warsaw Pact countries into glassy, glowing, wastelands. The whole "missile" gap and such was complete BS, even if every last land based US missile had been destroyed, there still would have been plenty of US nukes left over to wipe out the Soviets.

The potential for the USSR to quickly eliminate a portion of the triad made the response planning difficult for those responsible to advising the NCA as to how to strike back. The triad actually was not equal, in that each system had advantages and weaknesses. The ICBMs, and SLBMs could not be recalled once launched, as could the bombers, but until B2, the bombers were not certain to hit every, or even most of their targets, as example. There were many other examples of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the assorted delivery systems. Losing a portion, such as the bulk of the warheads that could eliminate hardened ICBM silo's, launch centers, as well as hardened command centers, left the US NCA planners with the only option of bombers that could, if they survived the USSR air defenses, hit hardened targets, or to launch the SLBM's, which were broad area target weapons only - I.E. cities, industrial complexes, non hardened military facilities, etc... This essentially backed the US NCA into a corner in terms of response. Let's say the USSR launches an attack that is obviously oriented to eliminating the US strategic systems, but avoids urban areas and the bulk of the US military/industrial systems. Granted that any such attack is devastating (read Whitley Streibers Warday). The NCA would rather not respond with the only option now open - an iffy bomber attack against hardened targets, combined with a city killing SLBM attack (Note that the bomber attacks could not possibly take out sufficient ICBM silos in any sort of useful time frame). Yes, it's a response, but not one the NCA wants as it's "seen" as an escalation, with a similar response from the USSR. Remember too, that the planners hoped to “control” a nuclear war. Having options reduced created a loss of control. Note that there was also a great deal of recognition that any concept of control was hopeless once the shooting started, but the attempt needed to be made, none the less. SB