Thanks macawman. My degree is in History with a concentration in post WWII European history. I actually don't work in the field at all (I'm Chief Security Officer of a medium sized company now), but I still remember most of it. Some of the reality of the Cold War vs. the public perception is very interesting. Even the Western leaders understanding of what was happening in the USSR was not really in touch with reality. Soviet actions and intentions were being interpreted based on a Stalinist style cult of personality leadership, rather than the incredible conservativism of the bureaucratic leadership that actually existed.

Mike_Golf is right...attacking side has the advantage, and that advantage is called initiative. However, Maneuver is applicable to both offence and defence. Superior numbers requiired in offence are only against static defenders because such attacks have a hiigh cost to the attacker. Russians suffered heavy casualties because even in the first days of the WW2 the units would counterattack against all good sense, or because they were unaware of the general situation. From Moskow onwards the Russians did however try to conduct offencive maneuver operations, but...and here we get back to the LEADERSHIP...many offcers were new to the job, including from Front commanders down to platoon level. It took until 1943 operations in Ukraine to define doctrine, and educate officers, restructure the units, and produce requred equipment. We have to remember that while it took 3 months to train a German tank crew member, the Russinas turned one out every 8 days. Those that survived got better. The Soviet literature EVERYWHERE emphasises use of initiative at every level of command. HOWEVER...dsplay of initiative must logically remain a part of some defined planing process with a start and an objective. Example: Tk Rgt 123 wait for MR Rgt 456 to break through enemy line x - y and advance through to point H to deny objectve B to enemy. Thereafter operate to support MR Rgt 789 in capturing height 987 and hold it until 6:50 h or until relieved. There is in these orders a scope for initiiative within the greater scope of activity unknown to the regmental commander. Should he decide that holding height 876 is more advantageous, he may undo careful planing of the Front commander to position an early warnng radar installation there, and the radar unit may arrive to find enemy troops still in pocession of their site. There is always context. Sometimes initiative works and sometimes it doesn't. It was implied that the Germans lost the war because of Hitler, but ULTMATELLY, someone had to make decisions. Had there not been Hitler, would Germany have gone to war? And if not, would it have stood up to a Soviet/Polish attack in 1941? So the point is, the admirers of German Heers can't have it both ways. The Red Army fought the way it could, recovered from disasters, learned from mistakes, and defeated the Germans. They developed better equpment (simpler and easier to produce, train in use of, effective and easier to maintain and repair), and they produced officers who led large formations against determned and sklled enemy for 2 years. Kursk was not a return to WW1. It was from start of desgin an offencive operation. However, from the time STAVKA found out German plans, they made use of whatever means to retard German offencive capacity prior to counterattack. Nothing wrong with that. Cheers Greg

Just as in WW2, 2 issues governed success or falure of WP attack on NATO, or NATO attack on WP (someting no one considers for some reason), and these are warning via intelligence systems and logistics..."head and tail" as I call them. Most diiscuss teeth and claws (and muscle). WP troops were traned to operate in radio silence. The cause of this was German General Lieb and Goebles. However, the satelite technology created to watch over Soviet missile forces also delivered (by 1970s) intelligence on troop movement. Of coure there are ways to get around that, and secretly deploy large numbers of troops into front line by Soviet Union. The problem was deserters that such a call up would create iin the WP armies. Even n the German Army, after defeating half of Europe, a deserter made his way over to the Russians on the eve of Barbarossa. By the late 60s NATO could be mobilized in hours, and by the 80s, under an hour. that is not enough time to achieve surprise because max arty ranges would not reach may places they should from cold starts. However, surprise is not what most think it is. I am absolutely sure that the offencive would have begun with massive saboutage campaign throughout NATO (and France). The actual attack would begin 24 hours later while NATO commanders stood and watched helplessly and unable to react. Cheers

Nuclear weapons were not a possiblity from 1959 onwards for the Soviets because it defeated the point of securing the European economic objectve of such an offencive.

Part 2 of my previous post. Power stations would be disabled and base power supply cut. Logiistc faclities would have been disabled or destroyed. Airports and airstrips would be cratered and towers destroyed. All intelligence gathering sites and units in NATO would be attacked. Aircraft would be attacked in their hangers, and ships at their berths. These attacks would have been carred out n the US as well because entry to US was as easy as walking in. Many Reforger faclities would have been attacked BEFORE the troops got a chance to get into the air. Preposition sites were known, and would have been attacked early on by air assets.While all this sabotage is going on, major airports would have ben attacked by airborne troops thhat flew in dressed as civilians on a late night flight when there are fewer people at the airports. In an hour other 'regular' flights going elsewhere would land to renforce these troops, and some would seek to attack national places of command and control. When early morning arrived, the NATO commanders would have a hoste of problems to worry about, then, when the troops are making their way out to the staging areas with no prospect of reinforcements and maybe not even resupply, the WP would strike. NATO movements would be watched, and reported using existing telephone lines, now dead for NATO, but tapable, and beyond monitoring at last initially. NATO troops are hit before they deploy and with considerable precision before they reach staging areas. WP Air commanders sacrifce air supriority in the first few hours because they know that NATO fighters will have to be usd in ground attack mode later as the WP ground forces overwhealm NATO groound troops, and air superiority will be assured. WP offencive starts to roll across Germany, but in stead of strkiing at the Low Countries, WP punch s delivered via neutral Austria into the Southern Flank of the NATO Central Front causng the US Troops to defend on two fronts while Germans mobilize. In operation "Suvorov", Swiss Alps passes are captured by WP troops, and forces begn to arrive n Southern Germany and France on D+2/3. Italian government resigns and a new Communist governmet assumes power. All Italian troops are recalled. As the Germans and French race South, offencive "Peter the Great" is launched in the North towards the Channel. All this time the CENTAG forces are kept occupied through probing attacks. There are no sudden defeats, and the UN begins to negotiate. On D+5 the German/French forces seemingly halt the thrust through the Alps when a massive offencive suddenly materializes opposite the German held front. A Punch (NOT shock as often translated) Army and two Tank Armies materialize and drive a hole in CENTAG some 120km wide, penetrating 60km in 3 hours. Commuunications are cut, and there is nothing to halt them because the Frnch are still trtying to restore communications (rail/road) to Germany from sabotage attack. In the UN, Soviets demand withdrawal of US and British forces to their national territories n return for full withdrawal from NATO territory, and disalluton of NATO as well as WP. It would have been 3 days to Presidential elections in the US before Reagan's expected 2nd election, but since he suspended Congress, and there are daily casualtiy reports and retreats by US troops, the pressure is on to negotiate. Thatcher flies too Washington to see Reagan, but her aircraft is shot down by a Dutch destroyer by mistake. There is turmoil in the Tores over leadrship. British troops are instructed to go on defencive.

Ford/Carter period would have been even easier and from 64 to 79 UK had mostly Labour Prme Ministers with exception of Heath.

Surprisemove, the scenario you suggest was highly unlikely. First, striking the US would invite retaliation against the USSR proper and they knew it. Second, it would recast the conflict from a theater operational conflict to a strategic conflict, which the USSR could not fight and win, and they knew it. Third, the attacks through Austria, Northern Italy and Switzerland are extremely unlikely to have been successful. That is some of the most rugged and mountainous terrain on earth. The Red Army was not geared for that kind of combat, nor did they have the forces to spare from the main theater of Germany. Finally, the Red Army just wasn't that innovative. Even at the height of their skill and ability in 1944 and 1945 they weren't that innovative. They were a steamroller that ground straight ahead into Central Europe not a fencing master. And historically speaking the German Army of WW1, arguably far superior operationally and tactically, tried to use the same region to flank the French. They outfought the Italians and made some progress but were never able to get through the mountains and fight the war of manuever they hoped for. I really don't think your scenarios are at all reasonable. And honestly, in 1975 they didn't need to do that. They could have ruptured the Northag/Centag seam quite easily and struck deep to the Rhine without all the complexity of your scenario. Additionally, I think you over estimate the success and value of the commando and sabotage attacks you speak of.

Great discussion here gentlemen with many good posts! Unfortunatelly I don't normally read much of the other threads as those on the armour board so it seems like everything worth saying, that came on my mind while reading the topic line, has been said. And more. Just had to post this since good discussions like this are pretty scarce nowadays...