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Subject: WW11 What ifs?
Johnny Frost    7/11/2003 4:21:01 AM
What do people thoughts on the most interesting "What ifs" of ww11. I immediately think of Hitler not ordering his armour to overrun the Dunkirk and Calais beaches allowing BEF and French Forces to escape. Would this have changed the outcome? What about the decision to switch the targets from the airfields to the cities by the Germans in the battle of Britain. What if Hitler had pushed for Moscow and not the Caucuses in 1941. What if Japan had attacked Russia and not the US, from Manturia?
 
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god of war    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   7/29/2003 2:33:01 PM
A important question is, would Germany have had the nmanpower to occupy Russia, much less britan too. Germany had 1 million and 90 thousand troops in occupation duty in france, belgim, Norway, Holland, Denmark, and the balkans. they would have had to use 2 million troops occupying Russia and Britan. It would be a Vietnam to Germany. Hitler, being the idiot he was, would have decided to conquer Japan and lose a million there, but would need no troops in occupation duty. There would have been no Japenese. Hitlers chances of winning a fight with the US on US soil would have been so slim that even hitler would have avoided it. The US would have sent massive forces into China and attack north through occuppied Russia. No nation in the would short of India and China has the nampower to conquer and occupy the world.
 
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bsl    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   7/29/2003 11:31:51 PM
Germany wouldn't have tried to occupy all of the USSR. The Far East would have gone to Japan. Germany wanted: 1)Lebensraum (living room; i.e. new lands) They might have pushed all the "undesirables" of Europe, such as the Poles, east, or they might have tried to settle European Russia. But, they weren't thinking in terms of occupying Siberia. 2)Resources - The most important of which was oil. German needs could be satisfied by the Caspian oilfields, which lay south of the Urals, and north of Iran. The goal toward which the offensive of 1942 was aimed. This didn't mean the Germans had to be two and three thousand miles further east. 3)End of the "communist menace" This was accomplished by destroying the USSR. There was no need to annex the whole USSR. Indeed, a Russian government east of the Urals might have been considered an ally, in the long run.
 
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greytraveller    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   8/3/2003 10:35:44 PM
bsl has basically stated the best reasons for Japan Not attacking Pearl Harbor. Keeping America out of the War indefinately was probably not realistic. But the Japanese could have delayed the US entry into the war by as much as a year had the IJA concentrated on taking the Dutch East Indies (for oil) and India (which had a huge manpower reserve for the Commonwealth, industry and natural resources). Who knows what Germany and Japan could have accomplished in 1942 and early 1943 without the military might of the US geared up and in the war??
 
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greytraveller    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   8/3/2003 10:42:24 PM
Another big What If? What If the Germans had pursued a Mediterranean strategy by forcing the Italians to cooperate with the Wermacht in Lybia and Egypt? Rommel and the Afrika Corps did not show up in North Africa until the Spring of 1941. Yet the Italian offensive into Egypt began in September 1940! At that time the Commonwaelth only had 3 divisions defending all of Egypt. And only one of those divisions was armored. Yet the Italians did not press the offensive and it soon stalled. In December the British counterattacked, cleared out Egypt and eventually captured Tobruck and Benghazi and captured about 130,000 Italians!! The Germans missed their best chance to take Alexandria and close the Suez Canal. Apparently the German High Command never understood the importance of taking Egypt.
 
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bsl    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   8/3/2003 11:05:52 PM
gt, As best I understand what went on inside Japanese councils, the decision was, ultimately, that, in context of many months in which America under FDR ***led*** worldwide opposition to the Japanese war in China, Japan could not afford to risk sending the bulk of their mobile forces past the American military bases in the Phillipines without securing that threat along vital lines of communication. In this sense, FDR's policy of **political** opposition to Japan - there was no military action involved in any of this; "merely" political actions culminating in the international embargo on Japan which was the proximate cause of Japan's decision to widen it's Chinese war into a truly international fight - was what caused Japan to decide that it could not widen the war while ignoring America.
 
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bsl    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   8/3/2003 11:31:26 PM
gt, Re: Mediterranean Strategy Ah, now this is one I like to toss around, since I tend to feel it represented Germany's best chance to win the European War. The strategic environment is key, however. One needs a clear understanding of how the playing field laid out to understand the risks and the opportunities. The negative is fairly easy to explain. From the Axis point of view, the whole issue was one of logistics. Germany and Italy, combined, with all the little allies, lacked any substantial ability to control the Mediterranean sea or to move heavy forces across it and to support them. Their air forces were too short ranged, their navies too limited, and their merchant shipping too small. We need look no further than to the actual war in North Africa to see the problem. Let's ignore the early fighting, when Italy was largely on it's own, and move to the point when the Germans became seriously involved. Is there any real doubt that had Germany been ABLE to send and support more forces, under Rommel, that they would have? Take a close look at the size of the Afrika Corps. It was TINY compared to the size of forces involved in the move into Holland, the conquest of France, or Barbarossa. They weren't especially large compared to the size of the armies sent to conquer the Balkans, in the days just before Barbarossa, either. Why not? NOT because more forces couldn't be spared. Rommel didn't need another fifty divisions. He needed another FIVE divisions and that size force WAS available. The Axis couldn't move them across the Med, and even if they could, they couldn't keep them fueled and armed and fed. Even at the height of Axis power and the low ebb of the Allies, when Britain was pretty much on it's own, and fighting a war on four continents and five oceans, the Royal Navy was able to attack convoys crossing between Italy and Tunisia. They actually continued to CONTROL the waters off Egypt and Germany could never, ever close the Straights of Gibraltar, let alone the Suez Canal. The situation was absurd, from one point of view. Germany had enough soldiers to beat the British in Africa and the Middle East even if they had to attack with swords against machine guns. But, they couldn't bring them to bear where they were needed because they had no key to open the naval lock. But, the strategic POSSIBILITIES inherent in a Mediterranean strategy, from the Axis point of view, were immense. First, the British had a tremendously limited land force to control Egypt and the Middle East. What they had there wasn't always their best, either. Some were colonial forces indifferently equipped, rather than "modern" forces capable of fighting a mobile, armored campaign. The locals, our brothers in Allah, were simmering under British rule, and more than ripe for rebellion. In context, they were enough to defeat British forces in place if the British couldn't reinforce WITHOUT the Germans. And, the Germans WERE trying to induce them to rise against the British. Hitler had been developing a relationship, for instance, with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who openly supported him. Had the British lines in the Western desert of Egypt been broken, it is highly likely that the Germans would not have been stopped short of the Persian Gulf. And, at that point not only would Germany have won the oil they so desperately needed and WITHOUT having to go through the Red Army to get it, but the British would have lost the primary source of fuel for the Royal Navy. Other implications? If the Afrika Corps moved into Egypt, Britain would have lost all it's Mediterranean naval bases east of Gibraltar. Suez would have been closed. All of a sudden, the naval threat to Axis shipping would have dried up. Not disappeared, since the British would still have been able to send submarines through Gibraltar, and have had their base at Gibraltar left, but, the military challenge to the Axis would have greatly diminished. And, that means that the Axis COULD have marshalled what civilian shipping they had to support land operations. The Mediterranean, at that point, would have turned into interior lines of communications in any fight in East Africa or, much more importantly, the Middle East out to the Persian Gulf. IOW, getting supplies or troops from Germany to the oilfields would have been a nearly direct shot for the Axis. By train to a Med port, then across to Syria or Haifa, then by train to Mesopotamia. To accomplish the same voyage, the British would have had to go, by sea, all the way around the Cape of Africa then up the east coast of Africa. A tremendous imbalance. And, a voyage subject to attack by U-boats the whole way. Finally, consider the strategic implications with respect to the USSR. One of the major diplomatic failures of the Axis, in this era, was the failure to get Turkey into the war on their side. Turkey ha
 
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greytraveller    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... Thomas   8/8/2003 4:36:32 PM
It should be mentioned that the axis committed at leasst 2 major mistakes during their campaign in North Africa. The first was the inability of the Germans to support the Italians in 1940. Up through November 1940 the Britisn only had 3 divisions in Egypt (7th armored, an Indian infantry and an Australian division.) One or two panzer divisions would surely have been enough to take Alexandria, close the Suez canal and force the British Royal navy to vacate the eastern Med. Second mistake was the axis failre to take the island of Malta. Malta sat squarely on the axis sea and air supply routes to north Africa. The British based planes and submarines on that island and they took a devastating tool of German and Italian transport planes and fright carrying ships. This constant loss was a major factor in stopping Rommel's Afrika Corp at El Alamein and denying the axis Alexandria and Suez.
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:WW11 What ifs? ... greytraveller   8/10/2003 4:52:19 AM
The interesting thing about your two mistakes, is that its really one. As bsl pointed out, even if the Germans wanted to put more troops into North Africa, they had logistical problems. It was a problem they didn't want to have to deal with. Your second mistake, Malta, would have solved the first problem. They invaded the wrong island. Instead of Crete, it should have been Malta. But again, because North Africa was not a serious theater to Hitler, his mind was elsewhere. If Malta had been invaded, with the resources and effort that was used on Crete, it would have been a different war. The interdiction of the Axis supply line into North Africa would have been eliminated. Then, there would have been no reason not to give Rommel those extra divisions. And while its possible, its highly unlikely, anything could have stopped Rommel until he hit Iraq. From a military point of view, I wonder sometimes if this wasn't a bigger mistake than Russia.
 
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jlb    RE:NA: Shaka   8/10/2003 7:24:12 AM
Malta had almost nothing to do with the Axis supply problems in North Africa. The real problems were Alexandria and not enough trucks. Because of British control of the Eastern Med, Axis convoys could only really unload at Tripoli and supplies had then to be trucked up to the front. The Axis never had enough transport assets in north Africa and supplies actually piled up in Tripoli, so taking Malta would simply have led to slightly bigger stocks in Tripoli and wouldn't have changed the situation at the front. Even stretching the definition of "adequate", the Tobruk/Bardia area was about as far as the Axis could realistically supply the DAK. To go one better would have taken making a serious dent in the eastern front's motor pool. It's mostly because the OKW knew this that Rommel's initial orders specifically prohibited him from undertaking offensive operations. Of course the situation could have been much, much different if the Germans hadn't invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 and had concentrated on the Meditterranean theater instead.
 
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Shaka of Carthage    RE:NA: Shaka   8/10/2003 1:56:58 PM
You may have something there. At first I thought you meant Malta didn't interdict Axis supplies. But then I realized you meant that even without the interdiction, the Axis couldn't move the supplies. That sounds about right, since DAK always had a problem with its supplies. I always thought the supply problem was because there wasn't enough of it. Interesting point that there was enough, they just couldn't move it.
 
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