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Subject: Special Purpose MAGTF-Afghanistan
SCCOMarine 11/18/2008 10:46:38 PM

Back in Sept when the 24th MEU gained then returned control of southern Helmand Province to the British & Task Force 2/7 returned some of its provinces to the ANA & ANP; the 24th MEU's Ground Combat Element, 1st BN 6th Marines, returned home. When this happened Task Force 2/7 & the 24th MEU combined forces. TF 2/7 joined the MEU's HQ Command Element(CE), Air Combat Element (ACE), & Combat Logistics Element (CLE), as the new Ground Combat Element (GCE) to become SPMAGTF-Afghanistan. The Marines were dispersed in Platoon and sometimes Squad sized elements. Operating at up to 70 miles apart they attached to local ANP stations to conduct mentoring & conducting COIN Ops. BN 2/7 alone was responsible for Controlling an Area of over 10,000 sq. miles before joining the MEU. In the coming weeks SPMAGTF-A will conduct a RIP (relief in place). Turning the CE over to the CE fr/ Regimental Combat Team 3rd Marines. The GCE will be 3rd BN, 8th Marines. ACE will be a Composite Sqdr fr/ Miramar. CLE will be 3rd Logistics BN fr/ Hawaii. The Marines have done to Helmand, Garmsir, & Farah the same that they've done in Al Anbar; chased them out of their provinces & sent them into other AO's. In Iraq Petraeus modified the Marine's Strategy to fit the other AO's & spread it across the rest of the country. Hopefully now as CentCom Cmdr he does the same.

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SCCOMarine 11/19/2008 9:47:02 AM

Marines, ANP fight side-by-side to combat terrorism

11/5/2008 By Ray Lewis,

BALA BALUK, Farah Province, Afghanistan — Bala Baluk, a place where insurgents frequently terrorized Afghan residents, is now much safer due to the cooperative efforts of U.S. Marines and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

After months of training and fighting alongside each other, the Marines and local police have forged a common bond in their efforts to drive out insurgents who have carried out malicious attacks against coalition forces.

Through counterinsurgency and continuous security operations, the ANP and "Gunfighters" of Company G, Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Afghanistan, have brought calm to a once volatile region. Decreased enemy activity here is evidence that the Marines and ANP have struck fear into the hearts of enemy forces that now seem reluctant to carry out more vicious attacks.

"Their will has been broken," said 1st Lt. Peter R. Dixon, an infantry officer assigned to Golf Company's 2nd Platoon. "They won't fight us because they have learned some hard lessons."

Dixon said he has received several reports from informants who say the insurgents are terrified of the Marines and that they don't want them here in Afghanistan. Efforts to rattle residents and disrupt peace in this part of Afghanistan have proven futile, as the Marines and ANP continue to dominate all opposing forces.

Because the insurgents know they cannot match the Marines, they seek to harm them by placing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their path of travel. Other tactics used by the insurgents include firing mortars and launching rocket attacks against the Marines and local police.

"We know how great our Marines are, so we know they're going to perform courageously under fire. But, the enemy was quite surprised," said Dixon, an Atherton, Calif., native. "They were shocked when they first started fighting us."

Fighting has been fierce throughout Golf Company's area of operations. While the Gunfighters are confident in their ability to overpower the insurgents and drive them away to help Afghan residents, the price of success has not come cheap. Both sides have suffered combat losses.

"Engaging the enemy together has created a unique and distinct bond between us and the ANP," said Staff Sgt. Carlos J. Hernandez, a platoon sergeant for Golf?s 2nd Platoon and Los Angeles native. "We fought right beside them. We lost people; they lost people. Yet, we kept pushing forward."

In reflecting on the intense fighting against insurgents during the beginning phase of this deployment, Hernandez said several Marines and ANP officers were wounded following an ambush against his platoon. After caring for those injured, the Marines returned to the village with the ANP to seek out the insurgents.

"We made sure not to shoot where there were buildings or non-enemy personnel," Hernandez said. "We were meticulous with our fire discipline; we took the Afghan people and the village into consideration."

Later, the Marines held a "shura," or meeting, with local villagers. There, the people thanked the Marines for keeping them safe as they conducted combat operations.

The Marines and ANP have made headway within the community by suppressing the enemy and restoring security. Still, many locals remain hesitant to trust the Marines. Because Afghan residents have been threatened by insurgents for decades, many have lost hope that their quality of life will improve.

"At first the people were timid. So, we talked to the village elders, held shuras with them, and sought out ways to help improve their situation. Once they saw that we were here to help them, they began opening up and coming around us more," said Cpl. Oscar L. Garza, a squad leader and Corpus Christi, Texas native.

With increased protection from the ANP, coupled with support from Golf Company Marines serving throughout this region, many residents are denying the insurgents occupancy and telling them to leave their community. As the people witness the joint effort between the Marines and ANP to keep weapons and fighters away from their doorsteps, Garza said they are now beginning to show signs of trust.

Since the Marines arrived in April and began training with the ANP in support of Operation Endur

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SCCOMarine 11/21/2008 7:39:53 PM

The Marines were dispersed in Platoon and sometimes Squad sized elements. Operating at up to 70 miles apart they attached to local ANP stations to conduct mentoring & conducting COIN Ops. BN 2/7 alone was responsible for Controlling an Area of over 10,000 sq. miles before joining the MEU.

The Marines have done to Helmand & Farah the same that they've done in Al Anbar; chased them out of their provinces & sent them into other AO's.

In Iraq Petraeus modified the Marine's Strategy to fit the other AO's & spread it across the rest of the country. Hopefully now as CentCom Cmdr he does the same.

The 2/7 dispersed in small units used a 2-pronged strategy to take back the Districts in the Provinces. One was called In-District Reform and the other was called the Focused District Development Program.

The programs were designed to put Marine boots on the ground broadly across all Districts to have immediate effect on the enemy denying them any safe havens or areas to regroup or recouperate. The programs called for recruiting of only Quality local Afghan men, even if that meant low turn out, to go thru an intense 8-week boot camp put on by the Marines & then be embedded in local Joint Marine/Afghan Unit for OJT before eventually letting them take over.

IDR was used in the most violent districts and left the Marines totally responsible for COIN and Civic Actions, later working in the newly minted ANA. IDR areas were heavily contested & the majority of the time was spent in Ops constantly controlling the Battle Space.

The FDD called for the Marines partnering w/ the ANCOP, Afghan Civil Order Police, a more highly trained cadre in the ANA. Once the ANA recruits moved to OJT they partnered w/ the Marines and the ANCOPs, eventually the Marines would pull out and leave the ANA to be further Mentored by the ANCOP. In many of the ANCOP districts was where much of the construction took place & the Marines could eventually pull completely out of those Districts.

Many Know-It-Alls will read this & say, "big deal, thats the same thing thats done in all COIN Ops incl'ding the one's already being performed in A-stan now." The difference is in the sublte nuances in the Marine's two programs. The same as the were subtle differences in the Marines COIN in Iraq & what was being done in the rest of the country.

PPL thought big deal then, until they started seeing Sunni tribes turn 1 by1 w/the Awakening in '06. They also saw the 'big deal' when the Marine trained Sunni IA Brigades began recking shop & being requested all over Iraq to put down all rebellions, when the Force Recon trained Black Scorpions of the Al Hilla SWAT was one of the most requested Iraqi Special Tactics Unit in Iraq.

I'll have more on the IDR & FDD and other security gains & programs coming in the form of articles and transcripts on the thread.

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SCCOMarine Change of Plans 11/22/2008 12:16:33 AM

Marines got more than they bargained for in Afghanistan

By Tony Perry Los Angeles Times
November 22, 2008

Reporting from Operating Base Delaram, Afghanistan -- The Marines of the Two-Seven were not even supposed to deploy to Afghanistan. Their original destination was Iraq, and when they were sent here in April as a stopgap measure to help an overwhelmed NATO force, the plan had been to spend the time mentoring Afghan national police.

It didn't turn out that way.

Instead of training policemen, the lightly equipped 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division found itself engaged in firefights with insurgent units of 100 or more fighters. They faced Taliban snipers and roadside bombs.

Twenty members of the 1,000-member battalion died in combat.

"It definitely was a lot worse than we expected," said Cpl. James Flores, 22, of Thousand Oaks. "A lot more active." The Two-Seven has begun returning to its desert base in Twentynine Palms; the bulk will be home by early December. The members take credit for leaving behind 800 trained Afghan police, hundreds of dead Taliban fighters and nascent diplomacy with village leaders.

They served notice that the Marines were back in Afghanistan to stay.

Based in part on the experiences of the Two-Seven and the grit of its individual members, Marine Corps officials are planning to greatly expand their numbers here -- an unexpected result of a deployment that wasn't even supposed to be.

A replacement task force will consist of about 2,300 troops, more than double the size of the Two-Seven's initial deployment. It will include infantry from Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, an air wing from Miramar Marine Corps Air Station in San Diego and a headquarters unit from Hawaii -- a "special air-ground" task force with all the gear, air power and other assets the Two-Seven lacked when it arrived.

An unspecified number of Marine special operators are also in Afghanistan.

Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland, commander of the Marine Force Central Command, said he would like 15,000 Marines sent here soon "to crush the enemies of Afghanistan."

That was never part of the plan. When Commandant Gen. James T. Conway first suggested that Marines be shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates rejected the idea.

Months later, under pressure to bolster North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in Afghanistan's troubled south, Gates relented. He agreed to send the Two-Seven to Helmand province and deploy the much larger 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Lejeune several hundred miles to the east.

The seven-month deployment, Gates said, was a "one time" only deal.

The last-minute move meant the Marines were not accompanied by their usual combat weaponry and gear: heavy artillery, tanks, aircraft, a full-scale supply system and a full reconnaissance unit.

Like the Army, the Marine Corps was already stretched thin on equipment and manpower. The Two-Seven's basic mission -- mentoring the Afghan national police in sprawling Helmand -- was not expected to involve continuous combat.

But the Marines were repeatedly attacked as they established forward bases in the region and began to make contact with local villagers. Before long, the fighting overshadowed the mentoring. Though they had expected to be tested by the Taliban in an area where much of the poppy crop that funds the insurgents is grown, they had not anticipated the intensity of the conflict.

For six months, the Two-Seven had more members killed and wounded -- about 150 -- than did the 20,000 Marines deployed in Iraq. It also did its share of killing.

A Marine sniper killed 12 insurgents in one battle alone, and since arriving in Afghanistan has killed 28, Marine officials said.

"Our guys were running and gunning so fast that the up-tempo was crushing," said Lt. Col. Rick Hall, the battalion commander.

Because of the ferocity of the fighting, Marine officials began providing helicopters and other supplies needed by the Two-Seven. The choppers were transferred from Iraq.

Meanwhile, the efforts to recruit and train Afghan police officers were beset by corruption and narcotics. In one class of 100 recruits, 35 were

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SCCOMarine A New Strategy For Afghanistan 11/25/2008 8:29:45 PM

....Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland, commander of the Marine Force Central Command, said he would like 15,000 Marines sent here soon "to crush the enemies of Afghanistan."

That was never part of the plan. When Commandant Gen. James T. Conway first suggested that Marines be shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates rejected the idea.

Months later, under pressure to bolster North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in Afghanistan's troubled south, Gates relented. He agreed to send the Two-Seven to Helmand province and deploy the much larger 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Lejeune several hundred miles to the east.

The seven-month deployment, Gates said, was a "one time" only deal....

K.I.M. when the Marines pacified Al Anbar and the violence dropped over 90% by Dec. '06. By the Summer of '07 everybody fr/ the Boot Lance Corporals & Privates up to the 4 star Commandant started feeling the Combat Itch & was ready to move on to the Next Conflict.

Realizing by Summer '07 that the Sec. Gains were pretty permanent and that it would take at least a yr to pass the proper channels & redeploy they internally started drawing up plans to for a New Strategy in Afghanistan.

In the Fall of '07 when they made their plans public & made an early pitch to SECDEF Gates it caught everyone including him off guard b/c everyone thought the Marines were planning to redeploy home, rest, reset, & enjoy the accolades fr/their success in Anbar.

He was so caught off guard he totally shut the Marine Proposal down before even looking at it saying that he hadn't had time to really look over the proposal, but any Marine units being sent to Afghanistan would happen after his tenure as SECDEF .....SLAM!

But Opportunity & Need were on the Marine's Side

By Dec 07 Gates fell well short of gathering up the the Additional NATO Forces that he would need to stem the Talibans Spring Offensive by over 5,000 of the needed 7,500troops.

The Commandant again made his pitch but this time for a Trial Force of 3,500 Marines to fill in for the 5,000 until the NATO troops could be rallied, but it was also as a Proof of Concept of their New Strategy to him. 2400 to act as a COIN Assault Force & 1200 to act as a Mentoring & Embedded Training Force.

Gates defying the Marines, but also annoyed at their seemed persistance at publicly bucking him, Boldly announced that, "it would only be a one-time 7month deployment". To which the CMC replied, "Sir the Commanders on the Ground are going to fall in love with my Marines and ask one thing, for more Marines".

Two Months into their deployment the Marines had the Taliban on the run & the Commanders asked for more Marines, Gates said NO, so they asked for at least extension to which he said, "it would be something that I would be Loathe to extend the Marines past their 7month deployment".

A month later, loathe it or not, he did & by the end of the summer after seeing all the gains made in 5mths time was forced to give sreious Consideration to the Marine's Strategy.

Using the Foothold established by 2/7 & the 24th MEU, now expanding under SPMAGTF-A it could eventually lead to a full 15,000man Marine Expeditionary Brigade probably based out of Southern & Western Afghanistan to carry it out.

Only the next 3-4mths will tell.

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SCCOMarine 11/28/2008 3:56:14 PM

**'Friendly until friendly doesn't get it done'**

Marine general tapped by Obama for security adviser post is regarded as smooth, bipartisan

By ROBERT BURNS and RICHARD LARDNER Associated Press Nov. 27, 2008

WASHINGTON — In late summer 1979 a Marine named James L. Jones arrived on Capitol Hill for a new assignment as advocate for Marine programs in the Senate. His boss was a Navy officer and fellow Vietnam vet who showed Jones the political ropes and became a lifelong friend — John McCain.

Today, Jones, who retired as a four-star general last year after 40 years in the Marines, is on track to begin answering to another new boss: the man who denied McCain his dream of becoming president.

As national security adviser in President-elect Barack Obama's White House, Jones would have a deep well of experience from which to draw as the new commander in chief confronts not just the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but also the nearly inevitable pop-up threats to U.S. security interests.

Jones, 64, is expected to be announced by Obama next week as part of the president-elect's national security team, along with Robert Gates as secretary of defense and Hillary Rodham Clinton as secretary of state.

Advised Obama, McCain

Obama, with limited foreign policy experience, would benefit from Jones' "natural calm and leadership instincts," says retired Marine Gen. Peter Pace, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has known Jones for 38 years.

"He gets to the heart of an issue very quickly and does it in a way that is very inclusive of everybody around him," Pace says.

Jones has impeccable military credentials, an ambassador's polish and an imposing physical presence at 6-foot-4. As a former top commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Europe — his last assignment before retiring from the military in early 2007 — he's a respected figure in many foreign capitals.

He also is seen as bipartisan. When former Republican Sen. William Cohen was defense secretary during President Bill Clinton's second term, Jones was Cohen's senior military assistant. During the presidential campaign, Jones informally advised both Obama and McCain on national security issues.

In the view of those who know Jones well, he would bring to the White House an unusual combination of qualities that make him a respected voice on some of the most complex security issues of his time. Last year, for example, he led a commission that advised Congress on progress in training Iraqi security forces.

"Jim Jones has always been a notch or two above everybody," says Les Palm, a retired two-star Marine general who has known Jones since 1974. "He's a good tactician, obviously, in a fight. But he also has a rare combination of being a strategic thinker and a statesman."

John Hamre, who was the deputy defense secretary when Jones was Cohen's military aide, says Obama chose wisely.

"Jim is a wise and highly experienced intellect," Hamre said. "He will be close — geographically and intellectually — to the president-elect."

The job of national security adviser doesn't require Senate confirmation nor does it come with the muscle of a large federal agency. But the adviser has an office in the West Wing of the White House and briefs the president regularly — often several times a day — on the most pressing military, diplomatic and economic issues. Jones' voice may well be the last Obama hears before making crucial decisions.

Smooth, but 'hard as nails'

Jones will be responsible for ensuring that the Defense, State, and Justice departments, and the CIA, all work together to do what the president wants.

"He's a very smooth, diplomatic guy, but he's hard as nails too," says retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, who first met Jones in 1991 during a U.S.-led humanitarian relief operation in northern Iraq and Turkey.

"Jones works friendly until friendly doesn't get it done anymore," Garner says. "And then you're dealing with a great big guy you really don't want to be on the opposite side of."

And he's known for a sense of humor. By reputation, Jones is a tough guy with a light touch, less rigid than many who rise to the top in the U.S. military.

A favorite Jones joke is about an Air Force captain who narrowly escaped injury while riding horseback; he was saved when a Marine sergeant shopping at Wal-Mart saw him and quickly unplugged the horse.

"It's OK to have fun in the Marine Corps," he told stern-faced Marines in Germany, just days after he be

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SCCOMarine 12/3/2008 3:06:42 AM

Marine Makes Insurgents Pay the Price

Marines Turn the Tables Outgunned 30 to 250

November 18, 2008

by James M. Mercure

FARAH PROVINCE, Afghanistan — In the city of Shewan, approximately 250 insurgents ambushed 30 Marines and paid a heavy price for it.

Shewan has historically been a safe haven for insurgents, who used to plan and stage attacks against Coalition Forces in the Bala Baluk district.

The city is home to several major insurgent leaders. Reports indicate that more than 250 full time fighters reside in the city and in the surrounding villages.

Shewan had been a thorn in the side of Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Afghanistan throughout the Marines' deployment here in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, because it controls an important supply route into the Bala Baluk district. Opening the route was key to continuing combat operations in the area.

"The day started out with a 10-kilometer patrol with elements mounted and dismounted, so by the time we got to Shewan, we were pretty beat," said a designated marksman who requested to remain unidentified. "Our vehicles came under a barrage of enemy RPGs (rocket propelled grenades) and machine gun fire. One of our 'humvees' was disabled from RPG fire, and the Marines inside dismounted and laid down suppression fire so they could evacuate a Marine who was knocked unconscious from the blast."

The vicious attack that left the humvee destroyed and several of the Marines pinned down in the kill zone sparked an intense eight-hour battle as the platoon desperately fought to recover their comrades. After recovering the Marines trapped in the kill zone, another platoon sergeant personally led numerous attacks on enemy fortified positions while the platoon fought house to house and trench to trench in order to clear through the enemy ambush site.

"The biggest thing to take from that day is what Marines can accomplish when they're given the opportunity to fight," the sniper said. "A small group of Marines met a numerically superior force and embarrassed them in their own backyard. The insurgents told the townspeople that they were stronger than the Americans, and that day we showed them they were wrong."

During the battle, the designated marksman single handedly thwarted a company-sized enemy RPG and machinegun ambush by reportedly killing 20 enemy fighters with his accurate precision fire. He selflessly exposed himself time and again to intense enemy fire during a critical point in the eight-hour battle for Shewan in order to kill any enemy combatants who attempted to engage or maneuver on the Marines in the kill zone. What made his actions even more impressive was the fact that he didn't miss any shots, despite the enemies' rounds impacting within a foot of his fighting position.

"I was in my own little world," the young corporal said. "I wasn't even aware of a lot of the rounds impacting near my position, because I was concentrating so hard on making sure my rounds were on target."

After calling for close-air support, the small group of Marines pushed forward and broke the enemies' spirit as many of them dropped their weapons and fled the battlefield. At the end of the battle, the Marines had reduced an enemy stronghold, killed more than 50 insurgents and wounded several more.

"I didn't realize how many bad guys there were until we had broken through the enemies' lines and forced them to retreat. It was roughly 250 insurgents against 30 of us," the corporal said. "It was a good day for the Marine Corps. We killed a lot of bad guys, and none of our guys were seriously injured."

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SCCOMarine 12/5/2008 3:12:13 PM

Marines drafting plan to send more troops to Afghanistan

Top officers have met repeatedly to consider deploying 15,000 Marines to join the 30,000 U.S. troops already there to fight the Taliban and other insurgents.

By Tony Perry November 24, 2008

Reporting from Marine Headquarters At Al Asad, Iraq -- Marine Corps leaders are devising a plan to send thousands of additional combat troops to Afghanistan to wage aggressive warfare against the Taliban that they expect could take years.

The Marines would like to deploy more than 15,000 troops if Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, newly named head of the U.S. Central Command, approve. About 2,300 Marines have already been sent to Afghanistan to replace units from Twentynine Palms, Calif., and Camp Lejeune, N.C., that are returning home after eight months.

The Marine proposal was sharpened during a series of meetings in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bahrain in the last week involving generals and other top officers. Marine Commandant Gen. James T. Conway was in contact with a group headed by Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland, commanding general of the Marine Force Central Command, traveling from base to base.

"Treat every day as a combat mission," Helland wrote in a battle plan for one of his commanders. "Have a plan to kill the enemy hiding among the innocent."

The Marines have long made no secret of their desire to depart from Iraq and redeploy to Afghanistan, where they were the first conventional U.S. troops in 2001 to invade the country to assist local forces in toppling the Taliban regime.

Finding troops will not be easy unless there is a significant drawdown in Iraq, where Marines have been deployed to Anbar province, west of Baghdad, since 2004. The Marines have about 22,000 troops in the sprawling province, assigned mostly to back up Iraqi security forces if the Sunni Arab insurgency attempts to rebound.

Maj. Gen. John Kelly, the top Marine in Iraq, who met with Helland last week, said there could be a significant reduction in Anbar within months without endangering progress made toward routing the insurgency and strengthening the Iraqi economy, political structure and security forces.

Kelly, in an interview, said his views were not prompted by the Marine Corps' desire to redeploy to Afghanistan.

"All my recommendations and decisions have nothing to do with Afghanistan," said Kelly, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). "I'm absolutely focused on Iraq. I work 20-hour days. I don't have time to read about Afghanistan."

Marine leaders say the fight in Afghanistan will be different from the conflict in Iraq, where the Marines teamed with Sunni tribal sheiks to crush the insurgency and bring a measure of stability to the province.

In his orders to Col. Duffy White, commander of an air-ground task force deployed recently to Afghanistan, Helland warned that Afghanistan would be different because of its terrain, politics and culture and the presence of the coalition formed by NATO, the Afghan army and the U.S.

Iraq veterans should not be allowed to rest on the laurels of their success in Anbar, wrote the blunt-spoken Midwesterner and combat veteran of Vietnam. "Once a mistake is made, the excuse 'This is how we did it in Iraq' will not suffice," Helland wrote.

If upper officers are keen on going to Afghanistan, so are many of the young Marines in Iraq. As Helland met with corporals and sergeants there, several offered to reenlist if they could be assured of going to Afghanistan, where they face a much higher probability of engaging in combat.

For the Marines, there is a sense of unfinished business in Afghanistan. In early December 2001, soon after the Taliban government was routed, Marines were part of a plan to attack the mountains of the Tora Bora region where Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was believed to be.

But as Marines waited at Kandahar airport to board helicopters, U.S. officials called off the attack, preferring that Afghan forces finish the task of capturing or killing Bin Laden and his top lieutenants. Instead, Bin Laden and many of the others escaped and are still at large.

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SCCOMarine 11/27/2009 8:29:16 AM

The First Marine RCT ever sent to Afghanistan concludes historic deployment

The most significant Marine Corps operation since the Battle of Fallujah in 2004 and the largest helicopter insertion since the Vietnam War took place July 2 as Marines spread out into the Helmand River valley to secure what was called one of the most violent provinces in all of Afghanistan at the time.

Regimental Combat Team 3 spearheaded Operation Khanjar ? designed to deliver a swift and lethal blow to the insurgency as the name of the operation, "Strike of the Sword," suggests ? marking the highly-anticipated unleashing of a strengthened Marine Corps force here.

3rd Marine Regiment deployed in November 2008 as the command element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force ? Afghanistan, which encompassed just more than 2,000 Marines and sailors who served as a bridging force for the larger Marine Expeditionary Brigade that took control in May. After turning over authority to the MEB, 3rd Marines became the headquarters of RCT-3, the MEB's ground combat element.

Although Operation Khanjar was extremely successful, a great deal of work still needed to be accomplished. Several follow-on clearing operations ensued in some areas to weed out Taliban militants and give Afghan civilians the security and freedom of movement required to participate in the Aug. 20 national and provincial elections. In several areas, Marines were able to immediately transition from offensive operations to a more humanitarian mission by establishing positive relationships with local elders and setting conditions for development.

The Marines understood that progress in a counterinsurgency struggle takes place in three phases ? clearing, holding and building. Some steps would occur more rapidly in certain regions, and each population center would provide unique challenges. The one thing that remained constant through all areas is the Marines' focus on protecting the civilian population. All RCT-3 subordinate commands experienced a unique environment but adapted to their specific situations and took the initiative from the insurgency.

1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment

What was once Taliban controlled real estate, Nawa district was wrested from insurgents by RCT-3's Marines in June and July.

1/5 arrived in country in June, established their headquarters at Forward Operating Base Geronimo and swiftly pushed their troops forward to Patrol Base Jaker, located adjacent to the Nawa district center, to begin work with the British soldiers who had been stationed there since March.

The day they got there, the Marines joined the fight to defend the patrol base. Daily firefights with insurgents were a part of the routine for the British soldiers and advanced party of Marines, until July 2, when the rest of the battalion, along with other elements of RCT-3, conducted a helicopter insertion behind Taliban lines.

On July 19, two weeks later, Marines and Afghan police and soldiers facilitated a large tribal shura at the governor's compound in Nawa distict. A shura is a meeting where locals voice their opinions and concerns to leaders who have the power to change things.

Lt. Col. William McCollough, commanding officer of 1/5, said, "This was the first time in over a year that this many elders felt safe enough to travel to the district center and make their concerns known."

McCollough informed the assembled elders that the Marines had been asked by the governor of Helmand province, Mohammad Gulab Mangal, to introduce themselves throughout the district, so they should expect the Marines to approach them in a friendly manner. And the Marines made good on their promise in spite of periodic insurgent attacks and random IED attacks, meeting residents in some of the district's most remote areas while providing security side by side with Afghan soldiers and police.

The challenge of earning the Afghan people's trust was successfully demonstrated as attainable a month later, on Aug. 23.

A joint morning patrol of Afghan soldiers and Marines was surprised by a premature IED blast less than a quarter mile down the road they were traveling on. The patrol's corpsman, Petty Officer 3rd Class Carlos A. Tobar, and squad leader, Sgt. Sean M. Cain treated a little boy and an older man for injuries they had received in the blast. The next day, the Marines patrolling through fields near where the incident took place were told by a farmer that the older man had pulled the kite string detonator on

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SCCOMarine 4/21/2012 1:24:54 AM

When this happened Task Force 2/7 & the 24th MEU combined forces. TF 2/7 joined the MEU's HQ Command Element(CE), Air Combat Element (ACE), & Combat Logistics Element (CLE), as the new Ground Combat Element (GCE) to become SPMAGTF-Afghanistan.

The Marines were dispersed in Platoon and sometimes Squad sized elements. Operating at up to 70 miles apart they attached to local ANP stations to conduct mentoring & conducting COIN Ops. BN 2/7 alone was responsible for Controlling an Area of over 10,000 sq. miles before joining the MEU.

In the coming weeks SPMAGTF-A will conduct a RIP (relief in place). Turning the CE over to the CE fr/ Regimental Combat Team 3rd Marines. The GCE will be 3rd BN, 8th Marines. ACE will be a Composite Sqdr fr/ Miramar. CLE will be 3rd Logistics BN fr/ Hawaii.

The Marines have done to Helmand, Garmsir, & Farah the same that they've done in Al Anbar; chased them out of their provinces & sent them into other AO's.

In Iraq Petraeus modified the Marine's Strategy to fit the other AO's & spread it across the rest of the country. Hopefully now as CentCom Cmdr he does the same.

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