Fire and movement is one of the founding principles of assault doctrine, and can be applied all the way from two men covering each other in street fighting right up to higher formations. The defender will seek to disrupt the assault on his position with accurate fire against the attacking troops. To diminish the effect of his defensive fire requires a greater weight of offensive fire to be directed at the defenders. This should encourage them to take cover, even if only temporarily. During this disturbance, the assault troops attempt to close the distance to the enemy line and launch into the close battle.
For the U S Army in WW II you had to look at the company and platoon, not squad.
The basis for all tactics for the US Army in WW II was something called the holding attack. From platoon through division, the US Army infantry was organized into 3s (3 platoons per company, 3 companies per battalion, etc) with additional support units assigned as augmentation.
The doctrine was for one unit to maneuver to contact with the enemy and conduct a holding attack to fix the enemy into place. A second element then maneuvers and tries to find a flank in order to attack a weak spot. Finally the final third is kept in reserve to exploit success or to pass through and maintain momentum.
This same concept was kept from platoon through division and corps. It was a simple doctrine which worked for a rapidly mobilized Army with a worldwide mission. It also lent itself well to an Army which, primarily, was designed to be offensive in nature.
American Rifle Company (1944-45)
3 Rifle Platoons
3 Rifle Squads
10 x M1 Rifle
1 x BAR
1 x 1903 Springfield Rifle or M1 Garand
Heavy Weapons Platoon
3 Bazooka Sections
1 x Bazooka
2 LMG Sections
1 x .30 cal LMG
3 Mortar Sections
1 x 60mm Light Mortar
1 x .50 cal HMG
The US infantry in the ETO also suffered quantity as well as quality problems in 1944 1945. It was burdened by a chronic shortage of replacements, McNair?s stupid individual replacement system and the siphoning off of quality personnel into more technical specialties (Air Corps ,communications etc.).
Added to this was the lost of the ?old? experienced infantry soldiers. As the Army expanded many were given opportunities to transfer to other branches such as the Air Corps with a chance to immediate promotion to NCO or even to officer.
So poor was the situation that one Infantry commander complained that he lacked qualified officers and NCOS because? everybody higher than a moron? had been pulled out of his unit.(The procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops , by Robert Palmer, pp 16-19)
?on 1 December 1944 the Third Army was under strength in infantrymen by the equivalent of 55 rifle companies. ?
?The crisis reached a peak in January 1945, when the full extent of the casualties resulting from the Battle of the Bulge were felt. Stringent economy measures and a reorganization of the replacement pool improved matters in February. However, it must be said that the only thing that finally solved the problem was the end of the war.? http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/cavalry.aspx
General Patton even went so far as to complain that his Infantry units were incapable of any sort of maneuver bellow Battalion level due to the shortage of quality Officers and NCOs. He recommended the use of only the most basic of tactics, the Marching Fire you speak of. (War has I knew it, George S Patton, pp 293)
Patton was so discouraged by their performance of US infantry the he felt the French criticism of US infantry in WWI still applied in WWII (The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; The American infantry needs all it can get?. (The Patton Papers, pp. 521)
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