The impression I've gotten was that Germany had a major issue with logistics and supply in general, practically from the beginning of the war. They were attacking without the economic foundation needed to fully supply their combat units with medium tanks, let alone supply their supply chain with motorized transport.

 

The importance of logistics cannot be underestimated for any force, but it is especially critical for Artillery. Fire discipline can make up for shortages at the cost of reducing its firepower, but to get the most out of an artillery unit it needs a very robust and continuous supply of ammunition. Thus it seems to me that while the US Artillery was noted for its excellence in technology and technique, logistics played an enormous role in its capability as well.

Ker:

 

Thank you for yoru reply wherein you asked: "Dose anyone have that kind of information about German practice through Dunkirk.  Particularly paratroopers and snipers."

 

I use as a reference German Squad Tactics In WWII by Matthew Gajkowski. I think it is quite good. However there is a bewildering array of infantry TO&E's in the WWII German Armed Forces. As far as I can make out at the time of Dunkirk the most common German Rifle Squad (10-men) was organized on paper into a 3-man Machine Gun "Trup and a 5-man Rifle "Trup"with a Squad and Deputy Squad Leaders as follows:

 

Squad (Gruppen)Leader - machine pistol

 

MG Trup:

 

Machine Gunner - MG 34

Assistant Guner - pistol

Ammo Bearer - pistol

 

Rifle Trup:

 

5-Riflemen - K98

 

Deputy Squad Leader - K98

 

The German Parachute Squad was authorized 12-soliders with two Light Machine Guns. At the beginning of the war the German Paratroop Riflemen were armed with the K98 but later they were issed the FG42 assault rifle which fired the same 7.92 round as the K98 but with a automatic capability (wow). This provided the Parachute Rifle Squad with an enormous fire power capability as evidenced by their performance at, among other places, Monte Cassino.

 

The German Air Force controlled the Paratroopers. The German Army controlled the "Air Lnading" troops. I do not really understand the difference between the two organizations.

 

I know nothing about early German Snipers.

 

I will try to post on tactics later.

 

Regards;

 

Richard

Not sure entirely Herald, I believe that "Air Landing" referred to being air delivered, via JU-52, as "Get on the plane and get off the plane in Greece."  There was one Air landing Division, the 22nd IIRC, but it was never deployed in that role, or mayhap it was in 1940, but the Crete Operation involved not the 22nd Air Landing, but a Mountain Division.   In fact, it was felt that the Mountain Unit was a more than adequate substitute, for the single Air Landing Division, that might not be in the theatre that needed the air landing capacity.  In fact, the fact that a mountain division was used at Crete would suggest that in fact Air Landing did NOT refer to gliders, but rather to light infantry delivered to an air field by Aircraft.  The air field having been previously captured by paratroops.

"And only because Germany declared War on the US in 1941, still doesnt have anything to do with German Artillery. ".....You're right, it really doesn't have anything to do with German artillery.

 

.... "You again see the whole War just from your little American Perspective, from 1943 on.  The Second World War started in 1939, and not just with the American involvement in it.  By the point the first American Soldier fired the first shot on a German in WW2, the German Army had already lost 2 million men and 1/2 of its equipment. "

 

So what's your point in bringing that up, and my "little American perspective"? Does that have anything to do with German artillery?

Ker:

 

My sources on this matter are:

 

Beyond The Beaches by Balkonski

On Infantry by English

German Squad Tactics In WWII by Gajkowski

 

Also field experience with post war German Jagers.

 

Early German Rifle Squad tactics were based on surprise. Ideally every round should come as a surprise to the enemy. In order to acheive this ideal a huge emphasis was placed on the training of the German Squad Leader. I think it was British Field Marshal Alexaner who opinied that the Germans seemed to have an "endless" supply of good junior leaders.

 

The early German Rifle Squad tactics were built around the light machine gun ("LMG") in this case the MG34. It was simply a superb weapon. Light (26 lbs) with a high rate of fire (1200 rpm) and very reliable with a quick change weapon it outclassed anything the good guys had. The K (K was for "short") 98 rifle which was first introduced in 1898. It was considered very much a secondary weapon. Only the LMG was important. The Squad Leader personally controlled the LMG. The rest of the Squad was there to protect it, resupply it or otherwise support the LMG.

 

This was the exact opposite situation from the U.S. Rifle Squad wherein the Rifleman were armed with the relatively moder M1 but the squad automatic weapon was the 1919 BAR and the BAR was supposed to support the Riflemen. (Note in Normandy in 1944, on paper, a U.S. Rifle Company had only two machine guns while a German Rifle Company had 15 machine guns).

 

The Germans gave the Rifle Squad Leader a lot of latitude. He was issued "mission" type orders which told him "what" to do but not "how" to do it.

 

An example of tactics. The Squad would approach their objective in a snake like file using the graound to cover their approach and being careful not to present a straight file that would be vulberable to enfilading fires. The Squad Leader ("SL") would lead followed by the LMG Trup, then the Rifle Trup then the Assistant Squad Leader ("ASL") .

 

The SL would halt the Squad under cover, go forward to reconoiter and then come back to brief his men. If for instance he decided to put his squad "on line" and build a fire base, he would personally position the LMG and the Riflemen would come up in pairs left and right of the gun. The ASL would go to the "weak" flank. The Squad would open fire for a set number of rounds then withdraw into dead ground before moving to another firing position. The Squad members were encouraged to constantly talk to one another. SLA Marshall said that a German Squad in the advance sounded liek a soccer team brining the ball down filed to the opposing goal.

 

In the early part of the war the German infantry handled their opposite numbers very roughly. Fortunately the Red Army proved to have emmense manpower resources (I think Churchill said that the Red Army "ripped the guts" out of the German Army) and the USA had emmense material resources.

 

Regards

 

Richard W

 

 

You didn't bring up all of that to make apoint about German artillery, you brought it up because of my "little American perception". The starting date of WW2 had nothing to do with the original discussion, nor did my perspective, wether it be of the pax Americana type or not.

 

If you want to believe the swift conquest of Europe was because of German artillery, go ahead. I tend to believe it was because some innovative German officers took some good ideas from British WW1 and mixed it with their own ingenuity, resulting in a combined arms military that was tactically superior to the allies. The Luftwaffe had quite a bit to do with early German sucesses, and indeed, many of their early sucesses in the Soviet Union. The Soviets never had air superiority in the east except in late 1944/early 1945. If you want to deny the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe in the invasion of Poland and Fall Gelb, go ahead. And again, if you believe that German artillery was used as effectively as the Western allies, you're welcome to believe that.

In their order of effectiveness:

1) US artillery, massive, relatively speaking, fast, responsive and accurate

2) British, massive, fast, responsive, not as accurate as US artillery

3) German artillery, not as numerous, not as many shells, accurate, but not as timely as the US or British

4) Soviet, massive, not as accurate and not as responsive, in indirect fire (which is why the USSR had so many regimental guns and SU's-direct fire support)

 

Someone mentioned that US infantry units were woefully undermanned...I might respond with so what?  So were their Wehrmacht or Red Army counter-parts.  Read Dunn's or Glantz's work on the Red Army.  Most Red Army divisions were at 30-40% of their authorized strength.  I doubt that the Wehrmacht was any much better off.  I would argue, in fact, that overall, the US Army had a better strength ratio than either of these two militaries.