April 24, 2024
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April 24, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 30 Inspector General (IG) Introduction The inspector general performs an important function of providing �eyes and ears� for the commanding general and continues to execute the IG missions of assistance, inspections, investigations, teaching, and training in a wartime environment. Although the mission of the IG does not change from peacetime to wartime, the execution of certain aspects of IG activities can be a rapid departure from what is normally conducted at home station. Lessons Learned
Issue: Coordination with home station IG to work IG cases. Discussion: The majority of cases that the deployed IG conducts with home station IGs are nonsupport cases (soldiers in violation of AR 608-99, Family Support). Peacetime coordination with units is very well defined and easily conducted. With the IG team conducting split-based operations between Fort Stewart and Iraq, we noted several discrepancies on how we were passing cases to forward deployed commanders; the type of information or lack of information that was passed; and the lack of a tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for case identification (a case numbering system). Recommendation: Establish an internal IG office standing operating procedure (SOP) for split-based operations for home station and deployed IGs. Additionally, conduct pre-deployment briefings or discussions with brigade and battalion commanders on the procedures that will be used to handle nonsupport cases. Issue: The IG team did not conduct a deliberate MDMP concurrent with operational plans. better refined lift requirements, connectivity issues, and other problems and could have conducted better coordination to mitigate/minimize these issues prior to line of departure (LD). Recommendation: Ensure that the IG team conducts an MDMP with a focus on logistics and communications issues and coordinate issues prior to LD. Issue: The IG team did not have sufficient connectivity to more effectively disseminate assessments and other information pertinent to commanders. Discussion: The IG team conducted various assessments prior to and after the division�s movement north into Iraq. These assessments included: Soldier Basic Knowledge, which assessed soldier skills on a variety of critical tasks; Force XXI battle command brigade and below � Blue Force Tracker (FBCB2-BFT), which assessed user-level competence and system operability issues; force protection, which assessed guard force knowledge and procedures while the division was in the camps and assembly areas; and other assessments. At the time of the dissemination of each assessment, the IG team did not have SIPRNET connectivity, but rather relied on the G1 or the division rear command post (DREAR) staff judge advocates (SJAs) SIPRNET connectivity to disseminate the information. While effective, it did not facilitate cross-talk between users of the information and the IG for clarification or answering questions. Recommendation: Ensure that the IG team has a computer accredited for SIPRNET access in order to maximize dissemination of information of value to commanders, as well as allow cross-talk via email to recipients of the information. Issue: Use of logistic convoys to visit units and make observations. Discussion: Because the IG team had only one high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), it had to rely on logistics convoys traveling to and from brigade combat team locations. This was an effective means of moving on the battlefield because it provided the IG an excellent opportunity to see, in detail, various aspects of the division�s system of resupplying units. Additionally, the duration of these round trips between the division main command post (DMAIN) or DREAR (usually 2 days) allowed the IG an opportunity to talk to senior leaders, as well as junior soldiers to identify concerns and perceptions. Recommendation: To maximize this transportation asset, ensure the IG coordinates with the commander of logistic units (usually the forward support battalions) to identify link up points and when convoy briefings will occurDiscussion: Once in theater, the IG team should have conducted an MDMP to identify possible shortcomings, issues, and coordination that the deploying IG team would have to conduct prior to the beginning of hostilities. By conducting an MDMP, we could have better refined lift requirements, connectivity issues, and other problems and could have conducted better coordination to mitigate/minimize these issues prior to line of departure (LD). Recommendation: Ensure that the IG team conducts an MDMP with a focus on logistics and communications issues and coordinate issues prior to LD. Issue: The IG team did not have sufficient connectivity to more effectively disseminate assessments and other information pertinent to commanders. Discussion: The IG team conducted various assessments prior to and after the division�s movement north into Iraq. These assessments included: Soldier Basic Knowledge, which assessed soldier skills on a variety of critical tasks; Force XXI battle command brigade and below � Blue Force Tracker (FBCB2-BFT), which assessed user-level competence and system operability issues; force protection, which assessed guard force knowledge and procedures while the division was in the camps and assembly areas; and other assessments. At the time of the dissemination of each assessment, the IG team did not have SIPRNET connectivity, but rather relied on the G1 or the division rear command post (DREAR) staff judge advocates (SJAs) SIPRNET connectivity to disseminate the information. While effective, it did not facilitate cross-talk between users of the information and the IG for clarification or answering questions. Recommendation: Ensure that the IG team has a computer accredited for SIPRNET access in order to maximize dissemination of information of value to commanders, as well as allow cross-talk via email to recipients of the information. Issue: Use of logistic convoys to visit units and make observations. Discussion: Because the IG team had only one high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), it had to rely on logistics convoys traveling to and from brigade combat team locations. This was an effective means of moving on the battlefield because it provided the IG an excellent opportunity to see, in detail, various aspects of the division�s system of resupplying units. Additionally, the duration of these round trips between the division main command post (DMAIN) or DREAR (usually 2 days) allowed the IG an opportunity to talk to senior leaders, as well as junior soldiers to identify concerns and perceptions. Recommendation: To maximize this transportation asset, ensure the IG coordinates with the commander of logistic units (usually the forward support battalions) to identify link up points and when convoy briefings will occur Return to Table of Contents |
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