November 7, 2014:
People in the West are greatly alarmed and concerned about Islamic terrorism. This fear is largely misplaced and a product of modern media, not the reality of what is going on in the Islamic world. The fact is that well over 90 percent of Islamic terrorism victims are Moslems. In 2013 that was more like 99 percent. Although there has been a huge increase in Islamic terrorist activity since September 11, 2001, it has mainly been directed at other Moslems. For the last century there has been growing incidence of Islamic terrorism and this is largely the result of the many ancient and unresolved religious disputes in Islam, plus modern technology. The tech allowed Moslems to travel more freely and allowed Moslem nations to do more business with the spectacularly successful economies in the West. Finally, there is oil wealth, which makes it possible for large numbers of Moslems to migrate from their poorly run countries to the more prosperous and pleasant West. The last of these to arrive was the oil wealth and that made it easy for Moslem rebels to blame the West for “supporting” (by paying for the oil rather than just taking it) the local Moslem tyrants. These threats led to some attacks in the most notably the ones on September 11, 2001. But overall, the Islamic terrorism was largely directed at other Moslems. There is much talk about attacking the West but the vast majority of the attacks are still, as they have been for over a thousand years, against fellow Moslems.
Looking at the Islamic terrorism situation as an historical event you see that the current outbreak began in the 19th century, as Western influences began to be felt throughout the Islamic world. There followed the collapse of Turkish control in the Middle East, the rise of radical socialism (fascism and communism) which were both attractive to many Moslem radicals. Finally there were the efforts by the newly (in the 1970s) wealthy Saudi kingdom to spread its own form of conservative Islam as far as possible.
At the core of this war is an Arabs family feud over which forms of Islamic radicalism are acceptable and which are to be condemned as Islamic terrorism, heresy or whatever. The main dispute is between those who consider “moderates” like the Moslem Brotherhood an acceptable Islamic conservative group and others (like Saudi Arabia) that identifies the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. This is the continuation of a centuries old struggle over what the most acceptable form of Islamic conservatism is.
At the center of this dispute is Saudi Arabia and its effort to defend its form of Islamic government. Saudi Arabia has long supported Islamic conservative groups. Yet in 2013 the Saudis came out against the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and against al Qaeda two decades earlier. At the same time the Saudis have no problem supporting Islamic radicals in Syria, including some who belong to al Qaeda.
What this demonstrates is how the Saud family only supports Islamic radicals who agree that the Saud family should be in charge (of Saudi Arabia and as a leader of the Islamic world). Islamic radicals that change their minds about this arrangement became enemies of Saudi Arabia and its many Moslem allies. Thus the Saudis supported al Qaeda until al Qaeda decided that the Sauds were not Islamic enough to be in charge. That led to a dispute in the 1990s that escalated in 2003 and, so far, the Sauds are winning. The Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt has always been hostile to the Sauds and that has been reciprocated. This was made worse by the fact that the current head of al Qaeda was once a leader in the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood. This was made worse as the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood won a 2012 election in Egypt and promptly got cozy with Iran, the archenemy of Saudi Arabia and Sunni Moslems in general.
What was actually going on here was not a dispute over Islam but over Egyptians showing how they should be the leader of the Islamic world and not Saudi Arabia. Although Islam was founded by Arabs in what is now Saudi Arabia, Egypt has always had the most Moslems, Islamic universities and religious scholars. To the Egyptians the Saudis are a bunch of desert bumpkins who got lucky with all that oil wealth and now believe that makes them more deserving of a leadership role than the Egyptians.
Iran is especially feared by the Saudis because the Iranians are not Arabs (but rather Indo-European, like most Europeans and Indians) and are openly hostile to the majority (80 percent) form of Islam (Sunni) espoused by the Saudis. The Iranians are Shia, a smaller (about 10 percent of Moslems) sect that conservative Sunnis consider heretics. After several major wars over the issue there was something of a truce and for the last few centuries Moslem leaders have played down this antagonism. But the mutual hatred remains, and in the last few decades Iranian Shia leaders have become increasingly aggressive in claiming that Shia should control the Moslem holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as all that oil the Arabs now possess.
The two holy cities are in Saudi Arabia and have been administered by the Saud family for nearly a century. Saudi Arabia also contains the largest oil reserves in the world. The Sauds want to keep things the way they are and have been increasingly aggressive in blocking Iranian moves against Saudi dominance. That’s why the Saudis support Islamic radicals in Syria, even though many of these Islamic terrorists want more radical Moslems running Saudi Arabia (and removing “Saudi” from the name of Arabia). Despite all this opposition the Sauds continue to hold firmly onto power. This is all because of one man.
Saudi Arabia was very much the creation of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. Born in 1876, his father Abdul Rahman (1855-1928) and the rest of the Saud clan were driven from the Saud hometown of Riyadh in 1891 by a rival clan. Taking refuge in Kuwait, Abdul Aziz eventually organized a small group of followers and retook Riyadh in 1902. This pleased his father immensely and Abdul Aziz was given more power and control over the family’s fortunes.
Abdul Aziz not only acted like the founder of a kingdom, he also looked the part. Standing nearly two meters (nearly seven feet) tall, he had an athletic build, a hypnotic gaze, and an endearing demeanor. His hospitality, bravery, and diplomacy were legendary. He dispensed justice in a fair and wise manner. He was the kind of leader the Bedouin had little trouble following. Abdul Aziz also had a knack for turning enemies into allies. More importantly, in this part of the world, Abdul Aziz was a devout Moslem. This was his key asset in uniting the many tribes and clans of Arabia. Islam was the only thing all these, often antagonistic, groups could agree on. Moreover the Sauds had been followers of the strict Wahhabi sect of Islam since the 1700's and Abdul Aziz was strict enough in his religious practices to win the approval of the most orthodox Moslems. That changed in the 1970s.
Early in the 20th century one of the more conservative Moslem groups was a warrior brotherhood called the Ikhwan. This group had been prominent in the early history of Wahhabism but had died out by the late 1800's. The original Ikhwan was drawn from settled Arabs. The early 20th century revival was among the nomadic Bedouin. When the new Ikhwan came to Abdul Aziz's attention, he first checked them out to make sure they were the real thing and then provided money, weapons, and other aid. With the support of the powerful and popular Abdul Aziz, the Ikhwan became the Saudi shock troops. The Ikhwan warriors were fierce and disdainful of death. They behaved as if they were reincarnations of the 7th century Arab warriors who spread Islam from the Atlantic to the Pacific. By furnishing land (or, rather, oases and their invaluable water) for the Ikhwan warriors to build their fortified mosques, Abdul Aziz soon had (by 1917) 200 Ikhwan settlements populated by 250,000 people (60,000 of them warriors). But the fervor of the Ikhwan could get out of hand. The orthodoxy of the Ikhwan rejected most modern devices. Everything that was not mentioned in the Koran was suspect and subject to destruction by the Ikhwan zealots. The rifle was a curious exception. The Ikhwan provided the glue that kept the Saudi alliance together during the 1920's as the Saudis conquered the remaining independent tribes and clans of Arabia.
Abdul Aziz proved himself once more when it came time to get the Ikhwan to follow orders. By 1926, the Saudi forces had defeated all those who stood in the way of Arabian unification (at least in terms of Saudi Arabia’s current borders). The holy cities of Mecca and Medina were taken, along with the Red Sea coast. Abdul Aziz judged it imprudent to attempt the conquest of the more populous Yemen, or the British protected emirates along the Persian Gulf coast. Kuwait was left alone because of the aid the Kuwaitis had provided when the Saud clan was in need. The British also guaranteed (and guarded) the borders of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The Ikhwan cared nothing for these restrictions. In response to that disdain, Abdul Aziz spent two years fighting the Ikhwan, eventually bringing them to heel without leaving lasting tensions in the kingdom.
One of the principal means of keeping the orthodox Muslims on his side was to enforce a strict brand of orthodoxy in the kingdom. The "religious police" Westerners hear about are the modern day Ikhwan. But instead of riding off, rifle in hand, to destroy the non-religious, the modern day Ikhwan swing canes at anyone rash, or careless, enough to appear irreligious in public. These latter day Ikhwan are becoming more troublesome and very unpopular with most Saudis. If the Sauds decide to act, after consulting religious and tribal leaders, they will suppress the “Ikhwan” once more. In the meantime, the Saudis have placed more limits on the power of the religious police.
In 1932 Abdul Aziz declared the Saudi controlled lands to be the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For the first time in over a thousand years Arabia was, more or less, firmly united. Yemen and the Persian Gulf emirates, protected by the British, were acknowledged as free from any further attempts at Saudi conquest. For the next twenty years Abdul Aziz prepared his 20 sons (eventually to number 43, including those who died as infants) to carry on his work. This work, then as now, consisted primarily in safeguarding the Moslem holy places and keeping the Saud family in power.
Abdul Aziz conquered his kingdom as a religious act and it was as a servant of Allah that the Sauds would continue to hold it. At the official founding of the kingdom in 1932 there was as yet no oil wealth for the Saudis to contend with. The major oil discoveries did not come until the late 1930's, and significant oil wealth did not appear until a decade later (after World War II). Huge wealth did not arrive until the 1970s, when a newly formed (with Saudi assistance) oil cartel jacked up the price of oil and kept it high. At that point things began to change in unexpected ways.
It was up to Abdul Aziz's sons to contend with the mixed blessings of oil riches while still maintaining the religious foundations the house of Saud was built on. It's up to the senior members of the Saud family to decide who the next king is and the choice will say much about where the kingdom, and Islam, is headed. The Sauds are expected to continue being the best friends and worst enemies of Islamic terrorists.
All this is tolerable to the Egyptians when it just involves ruling Saudi Arabia, but the Egyptians do not agree with the idea that an Arab king should be the head of Islam simply because he has a lot of oil wealth and administers the most holy Islamic shrines. Both the Sauds and Moslem Brotherhood agree that Moslem nations should be run using Islamic (Sharia) law. The problem is that the Saudis have been doing so since the 1930s while the Moslem Brotherhood (or any of their fellow Islamic radicals) has not been able to establish their form of Islamic government anywhere. That’s because most Egyptians (and Moslems) oppose it and there are always some factions within the Moslem Brotherhood that support the use of violence (terrorism) to impose Islamic rule on Egypt. The Sauds agree that Egypt needs Islamic government, they don’t agree with the use of terrorism to achieve that goal, if only because many Islamic terrorists want to use terrorism to replace the Sauds with a more radical Islamic government.
At the moment most Arabs back Saudi Arabian attitudes towards the Moslem Brotherhood and other Islamic conservatives and radicals. At the same time most of these Arabs tolerate the Islamic terrorist groups fighting for (and sometimes against) the Syrian rebels or in support of other local interests. The Saudis, as conservative as they are, have attracted the ire of a growing number of even more radical groups. This is an ancient problem in the Islamic world and despite attempts to drag in outsiders, the bloodshed will continue to be largely among Moslems.