LAV or AGS for the Medium
Brigade?
Michael K. Robel
© 2000
While
the popular attention is fixed on the possibility of wheeled combat vehicles
for the Army’s new medium brigades, tracked vehicles, such as the venerable
M113 and the M8 Armored Gun System are also in combination.
Adopting
the M113 and AGS would have some advantages in that the Army has lots of M113s
still in use and a many spare parts for them.
The M8 was type classified and ready for production when it was
cancelled and so is not readily available.
The main disadvantage of these two vehicles is they do not have common
repair parts; something that hopefully buying a system of wheeled vehicles will
provide. Recent developments in the
evaluation process indicate that a mixture of tracks and wheels may be
acceptable or another series of vehicles, not necessarily of the same family.
This
AAR takes a look at how the LAV based organization fares compared to an
M113/AGS organization against a BTR-80/T-80 regiment.
Vehicle Comparison
At
first glance, from a comparison of TACOPS lethality values, the observer would
expect these two organizations to perform pretty much the same. The M113/AGS lethality is 7471 points as
compared to the LAV battalion’s 7377points.
(The scenario lethality values are slightly more due to the inclusion of
a platoon of TOW launchers for each scenario.)
The
significant difference here is the armament and armor of the LAV versus the
M113 (The BFV and the BTR-80 are shown for comparison as well.) Note the LAVIII is better protected than the
M2.
Table 1Vehicle Armor
|
Vehicle |
Front Armor |
Side Armor |
Rear Armor |
M113
|
20 |
16 |
16 |
|
LAV
III ISC (+) |
60 |
40 |
35 |
|
AGS
Level II Armor (KE) |
90 |
50 |
40 |
|
LAV-AG[1] |
30 |
22 |
7 |
|
M2A2 |
40 |
30 |
20 |
|
BTR-80 |
20 |
7 |
5 |
Table 2 Weapon Lethality
|
Weapon / Range |
0 Meters |
1250 |
2500 |
3000 |
M2 .50 cal
|
.95
/ 30mm[2] |
.60
/ 23mm |
.10
/ 35mm |
XXX |
|
25mm |
.95
/ 70mm |
.50
/ 55mm (1500m) |
.2
/ 45mm |
.05
/ 40mm |
|
TOW |
.60
/ 1400mm |
.90
/ 1400 mm (1500 m) |
.90
/ 1400mm |
.90
/ 1400mm |
|
105mm[3] |
.90
/ 590 mm |
.8
/ 575mm (1500mm) |
.50
/540mm |
.15
/ 520mm |
|
14.5mm
MG |
.95
/ 35mm |
.66
/ 20mm |
.1
/ 10mm |
XXX |
As
can be seen, the LAV III is both better protected and more lethal than the M113
while the M8 Level II is much better armored and armed that the LAV-AG. It is the M8’s armor and reach that makes the
M8/M113 battalion more lethal, but overall, in spite of the lethality score, it
seems the LAV organization is better protected and more lethal overall.
Organizational
Comparison
For
this test, the defensive scenario based on TF Gallagher was used again. Just as for the “To dig or not to dig?” AAR,
two scenarios were tested. One in which
the TF was dug in and one in which is was not.
Each was played five times and the scenario was ended when either the US
force reached 50% lethality value or the OPFOR was reduced to 60%. Except for substituting M113 variants and
M8s for the different LAV variants, the two organizations were structured the
same. The OPFOR was a BTR-80/T-80
Regiment.
Without
engineer support, the M113/AGS organization did rather poorly. Its lethality, on average was diminished to
an average of 3828 (47.6%) out of 8027, with its high being 3999 (49.8%) and
its low being 3897 (48.5%). On average
it had 88 (48.3%) systems left out of 152, its high being 96 (52%), and its low
being 73 (40.1%). It attritted the
OPFOR to an average lethality score of 9896.4 (46.4%) out of 21298 and reduced
the total weapons systems to an average of 142 out of 344 (41.3%).
When
dug in, the battalion’s performance was much better. Average lethality at the end was 4932 (61.5%), with a high of
6208 (72%) and a low of 3895 (48.5%), while attriting the OPFOR to an average
of 9135 (42.8). (Table
3)
These
results compare to an average LAV lethality value (without engineer support) of
4094 out of 8027 (51%) and attrited the OPFOR to 9330 out of 21298 (43%). With Engineer support, the LAVs ended at an
average of 4639 out of 8027 (57%) and attrited the OPFOR to 7687 / 21298 (36%).
(Table
4)
Observations and
Conclusions
- Engineer support once
again made about a 10% difference in the survivability of the organization
when defending.
- When terrain permits,
use keyhole positions and positions where you let the enemy go by in order
to get flank and rear shots and to reduce the likelihood of return
fire. Careful use of terrain is
required to nullify the extreme range of OPFOR ATGMs.
- On average, the LAV
battalion appears to have faired better both in terms of survivability and
in inflicting casualties on the attacking OPFOR force. I attribute this to the overall better
armor of the LAV force, together with the lethality of the 25mm cannon
when compared to the .50 caliber machine gun of the M113.
- In an age where our
casualty tolerance is very low, it appears that we should field a force
that both protects our soldiers and enables them to inflict sufficient
casualties to defeat the enemy. It
therefore appears that the position of achieving decisive results with
dismounted infantry with armored vehicles in support is mistaken, and that
the force must have sufficient fires to kill the enemy at long range
before he reaches the close in knife fight of less than 1,000 meters.
- The M113/AGS force is
more vulnerable to artillery fire than the LAV force.
Recommendations
- Provide an engineer
battalion as the minimum size engineer force for the medium brigade,
ensuring it has a mix of mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability
equipment.
- The primary combat
vehicle of the battalion, whether it is an M113 or a LAV, must be armed
with a 25mm cannon or larger in order to provide sufficient support to the
dismounted infantry force and kill the enemy’s supporting vehicles before
they close to within 1,000 meters.
-
Table
3 BLUFOR Lethality
Table
4 OPFOR Lethality versus Blue
Organization
