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How to Take Apart a Terrorist Network
International terrorist organizations are
nothing new. They have existed since the 11th century. The first one, back when
the world was a smaller place, was the Hassassins (or "hashasheen") of 11th
century Iran. A minor noble with a grudge and excellent organizational skills
created a network of suicide assassins that were used for many decades until the
Mongols came along and destroyed their “impregnable” mountain fortress. The
Mongols were not afraid of suicide assassins, but were annoyed by them. Back
then, annoying the Mongols was almost always fatal. Our current crop of suicide
terrorists do not have a single fortress to go after, so the Mongol approach of
overwhelming force applied to one objective will not work. But the fearless
Mongol attitude towards terrorism should be remembered. By the 19th
century we had the first modern international terrorist network; the anarchist
movement. This was one of the several collectivist movements to come out of the
19th century (along with the more lethal fascist and communist ideologies.)
Anarchists believed that "property is theft" and a hundred years ago were
killing quite a few crowned and elected heads of state (including U.S. president
McKinley.) Bombings were also used, against capitalist targets (like Wall
Street, where thirty were killed by a 1920 explosion.) Most Anarchists were
peaceful (if loud), and the small radical faction had plenty of places to hide.
Many innocents were imprisoned and several executed in the mania to suppress the
radical anarchists. None of these efforts succeeded. What killed the anarchist
movement, and it's radicals was old age (the original 1890s crop were not
completely replaced), police action (some were caught), improved working
conditions and working conditions and Stalin (who ordered the communists to kill
their Anarchist allies to eliminate a suspected rival during the Spanish Civil
war.) There are still a few anarchists left, but most are academic twits who
would rather preach than act, or street thugs who take their anarchy
literally. Religiously inspired suicidal radicals are not new, but they
usually appear in the form of large, organized, groups. Think the original
armies of Islam (led by men who knew the Prophet Mohammed personally) or the
Crusades (instigated by popes). Religious do not like fanatics, as they are
usually heretical as well. Such is the case with most of the current crop of
Islamic radical terrorists. The religious beliefs of these murderers is
condemned by the mainline Islamic clergy. But if you attack these radicals, you
inspire a feeling among many Moslems that Islam itself is being attacked. Just
as the anarchists hid among working class people who did not agree with
anarchist ideas, so do the Islamic radicals seek refuge among Moslems. This is
why the anarchists did not hurt working class folks (not always successfully)
and the Islamic radicals try to spare Moslems (again, with mixed success.) But
the people get the message. These radicals may be SOBs, but they are OUR
SOBs. In short, there has not been any successful effort in the past to
destroy an organization like the one we face now. But that's mainly because
there have been so few challenges like this. The campaign can be won, for any
threat that appears can be dealt with. Success will be measured by small
victories, not large ones. The Bin Laden organization is just that kind of
challenge. It is highly organized as well as being well dispersed. But like any
man made structure, it's many components can be attacked and destroyed or
damaged. To begin with, there is Afghanistan, which contains the
training camps that provide volunteers with the skills and knowledge that make
them so lethal. The camps can easily be destroyed by B-52s flying out of Diego
Garcia (3,000 miles to the south) and carpet bombing them. But then we can
expect the camps to be rebuilt in populated areas, as the terrorists know the
U.S. reluctance to kill civilians. But this was commonly done during most wars
in the last century. Civilians living near military installations quickly
realized they did so at their own risk. Many left, and many of those who didn't,
died. And then there is the option of invading Afghanistan. This is
often seen as a hopeless proposition because "Afghanistan has never been
conquered." That is not true. Afghanistan has been invaded and conquered many
times. In fact, Afghanistan is, geographically and ethnically, part of more
powerful nearby empires. Eastern Afghanistan has often been controlled by one
Indian empire or another. Western Afghanistan has likewise been part of Iranian
empires in the past (and most of the people living there today speak a dialect
of Iranian as a result.) But the main reason Afghanistan exists is because
there's not a lot worth conquering. The locals live a tough life, and are a
pretty rough bunch as a result. So are similar peoples (Indo-Aryan and Turkic
nomads) living to the north of Afghanistan. The main reason any nearby empire
bothered to march into Afghanistan was to preserve the valuable trade routes
(the "Silk Road") to China. Normally, the merchants would pay protection money
to the various Afghan tribes along the route and everyone was content to leave
it at that. But when one or more tribes would not stay bought, Iranian (usually)
or Indian armies would march north to punish the tribes. That done, the army
would return south. There was not reason to garrison Afghanistan. There was, so
to speak, no there there. But now there is a sanctuary for terrorists. An
American army can march in and, amid much bloodshed (Afghan's are not
bulletproof), a traditional arrangement can be reached; bombs or bread. For the
last few year, about half the famine relief aid going to Afghanistan has been
paid for by America. If the Afghans want more relief from the current three year
drought, they can keep the terrorists out. Remember, Afghanistan is not a
nation, but a collection of hundreds of tribes, clans and towns that are often
at war with their neighbors. Some will make a deal, the ones that don't get
bombed when terrorists are found operating in their midst. The terrorists
believe that Americans have no stomach for this approach. And they may be right.
But as long as terrorists operate in Afghanistan, Americans die at
home. The rest of the terror network is vulnerable to less violent
attacks. Other nations that tolerate terrorist training camps have historically
been more hospitable to the "bombs or bread" approach. The only exception is
Iraq, which may require an invasion (bombs alone won't do it.) Iraq's neighbors,
willing to lift UN sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s, are not as
enthusiastic with that approach anymore. There have been shooting incidents on
the Iraq/Saudi border. Iraq has stepped up it's attacks on Iran (via Iranian
rebels based in Iraq) and insisting that Kuwait is a lost province that must be
returned to the motherland. Invading Iraq while promising the removal of Saddam
and his Baath party, and the subsequent removal of UN sanctions, would have a
fair amount of popularity among the majority of the populating (the much abused
Shias and Kurds.) The elimination of the open camps, which would now have
to operate underground (and less efficiently) would leave the most difficult to
find part of the network. Thousands of Bin Laden trained terrorists exist in
Islamic and non-Islamic nations. They control millions of dollars in cash and
hundreds of caches of explosives, weapons and other equipment. But without the
camps, it is much more difficult for the terrorists to build, or obtain,
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The dispersed network is vulnerable to
detection and being taken apart one terrorist, or cell of terrorists, at a time.
This requires the cooperation of many nations with local terrorists. These local
concerns, and the realization that the local terrorists might be more vulnerable
with international help and cooperation, is an attractive proposition to many
governments. This can work, as it has worked against international criminal
organizations. And then there's the religious angle. The terrorists play
this one well, for they do believe they are on a sacred mission. But most other
Moslems do not agree with the terrorists. Yes, there is resentment against the
West, and even more resentment against the dictators and autocrats that run most
Moslem nations. Anti-terrorists efforts are just going to have to live with
this. The religious angle has been more bark than bite, and when you are dealing
with terrorists who have so much blood on their hands, it doesn't take a
theologian to figure out whose side God is really on.
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