Al Qaeda Shifts from Professionalism to Probability
by James Dunnigan
April 3, 2004

In late March, and early April, 2004, there were numerous arrests of Islamic terrorists in Britain, the Philippines, Central Asia (Uzbekistan), Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Spain and Italy that have revealed an interesting pattern. While most of these groups had someone who underwent training in al Qaeda's Afghan camps, or training camps established elsewhere by other groups (Hizbollah, Hamas, Jemaah Islamiah,) few of these local terrorist cells were in touch with others. Al Qaeda was always a decentralized organization, but now, with most of it's senior leadership dead or captured, and no nation willing to host the organization, the thousands of eager al Qaeda recruits are taking their orders from cryptic announcements on al Jazeera and local Islamic radical preachers.  Investigators (of Islamic expatriate communities), and interrogators (of captured terrorists) have found that most terrorist activity is intense discussions of what is going to be done. Lots of talk, little action. The increasing number of self-made terrorists talk too much, train too little and plan operations poorly. But al Qaedas strategy takes this into account. No matter if hundreds of terrorist cells spend most of their time drinking coffee, it only takes a few to get their act together and pull off a massive attack. But the lack of large scale training facilities (like the Afghanistan camps) greatly reduces the number of attacks, and increases the number of al Qaeda supporters arrested.

One thing you learn (or should learn if you're paying attention) in a terrorist training camp is that you've got to keep quiet while planning an operation. The group in Spain that set off the March 11th bombs kept quiet. All these other groups have not, and were caught. Al Qaeda is well aware of the fact that they have not been able to launch a successful attack in the United States since September 11, 2001. But al Qaeda also knows that most countries are not willing to keep allocating expensive police resources to monitor terrorist activity. Eventually the Europeans will slack off, and the terrorists will be able to recruit, train and plan with less chance of arrest.

The recent sudden surge of arrests was caused, to an extent, by the March 11 attack. It was felt that terror groups that were already being watched might be encouraged to move quickly ahead with an attack, to capitalize on the fear generated by the March 11 deaths. The March 11 attack had another impact on the other terrorist groups, it encouraged them and increased the "chatter" on the Internet and in other channels (informants, phone taps) about the splendid impact (for the Islamic cause) the March 11 attack had and wouldn't be wonderful if we could see more of these operations. 

The terrorist suspects rounded up were largely young, inexperienced and self-taught in the techniques of terrorism. There have been more bomb making accidents recently, with young bomb makers, using instructions obtained from the Internet, making mistakes and blowing themselves up. It's a new generation of Islamic terrorists that comprise most of what is loosely called "al Qaeda." There are fewer veterans of the 1980s Afghan war with Russia to provide guidance and supervision. The new generation is less professional, as well as younger. Those with experience have obtained it in more recent wars, such as the one in Algeria and Egypt during the 1990s (in both cases, Islamic radicals versus the government), wars that the Islamic radicals lost.

The new generation of Islamic terrorists not only have a history of failure, but also lack access to the training camps in Afghanistan. Those camps, and the numerous instructors they contained, made a big difference. One advantage of the camps was that students could build bombs, and then detonate them. You can't do that unless you have control over a large chunk of real estate, and possess a large budget.

While terrorist training still takes place, it does so with fewer trained instructors and much less extensive facilities. Meeting in city apartments, or remote villages  and camps in places like Pakistan, Indonesia or the Philippines, one or two al Qaeda instructors pass on terrorist skills, while looking over their shoulders for a police or army raid. The "Afghani" (veterans of the 1980s Afghanistan fighting who joined al Qaeda) are disappearing at a rapid rate. These fellow are getting older, and keep getting caught. Many opt to quietly retire, while some go deeper into the criminal underground that is used to help finance and support terrorist operations. Al Qaeda's training camps definitely raised the technical level of Islamic terrorists, and the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan has knocked down the skill level of the terrorists out there.

There were some training camps in Iraq, which are now out of action. But the ones in Lebanon, Pakistani Kashmir and Iran are still operating, but these operations are reluctant to train too many al Qaeda operatives. Do that, and when some of these guys get captured (which is almost inevitable these days), you risk a visit from the American Special Forces, Rangers, and worse.

Historically, the "next generation" of any violent movement takes a beating and most of its members, and nearly all of those in the next generation, look for a new cause. So by the end of the decade, Islamic militant terrorism will probably be seen as a dead end in the Islamic world. But in the meantime, if you have enough young wannbes out there trying to kill for the cause, some of them will get lucky.

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