|
|
The War On Terror: Enemy
| Click here to send the text of this page to a friend. | Click here to return to the The War On Terror index/archive. |
Ethnic Split in al Qaeda
by James Dunnigan May 18, 2005
Discussion Board on this DLS topic
May 16, 2005: Al Qaeda members are turning on each other because of ethnic
tensions. One of al Qaeda’s weaknesses is that it is dominated by Arabs. This
often causes resentment when the non-Arabs find themselves left out of decision
making, or on the short end when it comes to distribution of resources. This was
first seen in Afghanistan, where the al Qaeda Arabs made themselves very
unpopular several years before September 11, 2001. Now the bad feelings have
spread to Pakistan. There, the hundreds of al Qaeda members hiding out in tribal
areas along the Afghan border, have split along ethnic lines. The Arab al Qaeda,
who still have access to lots of cash, have made themselves very unpopular with
the al Qaeda members from Central Asia. The Central Asians, particularly Islamic
radicals from Uzbekistan, always felt this was their turf, and that the Arab al
Qaeda should recognize that, and not throw their weight, and money, around in a
disrespectful (to the Uzbeks) manner. Apparently, some of the recent al Qaeda
leaders captured in Pakistan were the result of non-Arab al Qaeda giving up
information they could have kept to themselves.
The Arabs do have an attitude problem. In Afghanistan, they viewed the
Afghans as a bunch of uneducated hicks, and the Afghans picked up on this. It’s
true that many of the senior Arab al Qaeda were well educated, much better than
the average Afghan, but they would have been wise to keep any feelings of
superiority to themselves. But they didn’t, and while there appear to have been
attempts to act more diplomatically after al Qaeda survivors were driven into
Pakistan, this didn’t last. The basic problem was self-preservation. The
Pakistani army and intelligence forces came down hard on al Qaeda after the
terrorists declared war on the Pakistani government in 2002, killed hundreds of
Pakistanis in terrorist attacks and made several assassination attempts on the
Pakistani president. When the Pakistani army showed up in the tribal territories
last year, many of the tribes were no longer willing to host the terrorists. The
army had never come into the tribal territories before, and the tribes knew the
soldiers were there now because of the al Qaeda threat to the government. The
tribes could understand that, and knew that the army meant business. The army
was also willing to negotiate, and eventually get out of the territories if the
al Qaeda members were handed over. Some tribes, or tribesmen, refused to do
this. But there were fewer hiding places now, and the Arabs used their greater
cash resources to save themselves, at the expense of Central Asian terrorists.
Whatever bad feelings that existed between the Arabs and Central Asians before,
now became much worse. This led to captured Central Asians giving up information
on where Arab al Qaeda might be. This, combined with information obtained from
tribesmen and other captured terrorists, led to the round up of dozens of key al
Qaeda leaders in the past month.
|
 See Jim Dunnigan's interviewed about his latest book The Perfect Soldier on ireadnet.com
 The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of Us Warfare by James F. Dunnigan
More Books by James Dunnigan |