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North Korea and UN Weapons Inspections
by Tom Holsinger December 11, 2002
The Bush Administration furthered many other American interests when it obtained a new UN Security Council resolution concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The UN might not be necessary to advance American vital interests, but it is often useful, and that utility should be preserved. We'd have destroyed whatever effectiveness as the UN has for us had we not sought the further resolution on Iraq.
What is about to happen to Iraq will be a useful horrible example of the consequences of defying UN weapons inspections. Other shaky tyrannical regimes with weapons of mass destruction will have definite reason to fear a similar fate, and may try to avoid it by behaving better. That can only help American interests, which alone shows the Bush Administration's wisdom in seeking the new Security Council resolution. But this is not the only benefit we've won.
America has many foreign interests which can be best served with the assistance of foreign governments who might balk, or demand too high a price, without a Security Council resolution to provide additional motivation or cover from their domestic political factions. Compliance with such resolutions also provides the indecisive with a path of least resistance.
Here is a possible example concerning North Korea which, while hypothetical and certainly speculative, demonstrates how Security Council resolutions can serve important American interests. Assume that our goal is to induce North Korea to give up all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or to terminate its current regime, if not its independent existence, by relatively non-violent means if it refuses to give up its WMD.
North Korea is outright weird by any standards - a Communist monarchy pretty much sealed off to outside view, subjected to a government-induced famine of ten years standing which killed, and is killing, millions (10-15% of its population), and whose economy seems to have pretty much collapsed. How its regime continues to survive is not known - comparisons to similar vicious tyrannies indicate that North Korea is a hollow shell ready to be toppled by the first significant push from inside or outside.
And it is quite vulnerable to blockade, particularly blockade of oil and coal imports. North Korea has minimal oil production and domestic coal production has collapsed. An argument can be made that its regime will collapse soon even if we permit a trickle of food and fuel aid - there are indications of panic by North Korea's government with winter coming on.
Assume the U.S. government seeks a UN Security Council resolution requiring North Korea to deliver all its WMD and production equipment to appropriate international agencies for removal from the country, and to permit effective inspections by UN teams to verify compliance. Such a resolution would probably pass in the climate expected after publication of the incriminating archives of American-occupied Iraq.
Enforcing this hypothetical (for now) resolution if North Korea refuses to comply would be a quite different matter. Economic sanctions aka blockade, perhaps backed by limited military force, would be the most we could possibly obtain, but fuel &food sanctions could be very effective given geography. North Korea's border with South Korea is a minefield (literally) with limited, easily controlled and quite public access. Russia's short border with North Korea is easily watched and Russia's government is cooperative. North Korean sea and international air access is easily blockaded provided some force is used - the U.S. would have minimal difficulty doing so given UN authorization.
China's cooperation would be necessary for effective blockade, which is where a UN resolution for economic sanctions would be most useful, if not absolutely necessary. China's government has difficulty making any important foreign policy decisions at all and, in particular, decisions which benefit the U.S. Having the UN make the decision for them helps get around both problems. China has in the past quietly given North Korea some food and fuel as aid, but this has tailed off for many reasons, including China's increasing capitalist policies.
Some or several Chinese factions would probably resume a trickle of fuel/food aid to North Korea regardless, but it is unlikely this would be enough to matter absent a governmental-level decision involving all the other factions. Compliance with the Security Council resolution on sanctions would be the path of least resistance. The price the US might have to pay China for not vetoing this resolution would be far less than for securing blockade of the Chinese/North Korean border absent a UN resolution.
North Korea would then have the choice of giving UN inspectors access to its most jealously guarded facilities, with probable fatal consequences for its current regime, or blockade, total collapse and certain fatal military rebellion. We shouldn't start this process until we have decided how to finish it. A titanic international rescue effort to feed North Korea's starving people and restore a minimal economy would be necessary, plus an agreement with China, Japan and South Korea on a follow-on regime, perhaps a demilitarized unified Korea. We don't need to have those in hand when we start, but the Bush Administration should have decided what outcomes it wants and devised tentative plans on how to get there.
We should wish for such problems given less pleasant and more likely alternatives. We really need the UN here, and it is available because President Bush made the right call on the UN and Iraq.
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