Two American Traditions in the War On Terror
by Tom Holsinger
October 28, 2002

Many commentators familiar with American history are rightly concerned that the American people might not be willing to continue the war on terror long enough to perform a thorough attitude adjustment on an Arab tribal culture which well pre-dates Islam. They err in feeling that the result might be cessation of the effort and reversion to isolationism. This arises in part because of a short-sighted focus on America’s most recent major war, in Vietnam, but also because these commentators don't understand the bloody obvious (i.e., they assume that the terrorists will stop attacking us just because we stop fighting them), let alone long-term American traits in war.

They are not alone – the Bush Administration and foreign governments make many of the same mistakes. The latters’ are understandable – they necessarily have to view events in terms of their domestic concerns or they risk losing power. The Bush Administration’s neglect of these issues is, however, a potential threat to its goals and existence, and unjustifiable given the heroic events on United Airlines Flight 93. The latter and the atavistic public response to it – expressed in a spontaneously created shrine at the crash site – was unmistakable proof that some exceptionally powerful American traditions remain very close to the surface.

Failure to recognize these traditions, and address the factors which might rouse the American people to direct involvement in the war on terror, could result in America and the world becoming a much uglier and more dangerous place. This almost happened in 1945 when the U.S. government decided, if Japan did not surrender after being nuked, to commit genocide by spraying Japan's cities with poison gas. And then invade while continuing to gas all Japanese possible – civilians included. Japan survived only because it surrendered. See the republished article, When a Democracy Chose Genocide, now appearing in the Strategy & Politics archive.

This appalling prospect is made possible by a major element, or "meme", in American nationalism called "Jacksonian" in Walter Russell Mead's Special Providence, named after President Andrew Jackson. Development of the Jacksonian meme is well described in David Hackett Fisher's Albion's Seed. Most Americans are blends of the memes identified in these and related books - few are all one or another and the blends vary according to the situation. The Jacksonian meme has historically tended to become dominant during war among individuals and the nation overall. Its major wartime expressions include utter ruthlessness towards enemies perceived as not abiding by accepted rules of conduct (by bloody-minded Jacksonian standards), insistence on conclusive victory and impatience.

Jacksonianism was definitely dominant in the war against Japan (see John Dower's War Without Mercy), though the decision for genocide incorporated additional factors, not least that suicidal Japanese attacks and resistance had dehumanized them to us. Terrorist suicide attacks could get us into that dark place again. The possibility of genocidal events in the war on terror should not be dismissed given these similarities - few in 1939 perceived 1945.

The tradition epitomized by Flight 93 is quite different and 2500 years older - of classic Western Civilization at its dawn – free citizens who, together, comprise their “polis” and defend it with their individual lives as the expression of their corporate selves. This tradition has and does lie closer to the surface in America than elsewhere in the West due to a combination of deeper traits in American nationalism - self-reliance, individualism, etc.

The most common expressions of America's version of this Western tradition have been voluntary associations to defend against community threats, both temporary (posses & vigilantes) and organized - militias and volunteer firemen. Flight 93 showed that such associations arise from deeply held American traits and can be aroused in ordinary Americans by the appearance of domestic threats which their governments are unable or unwilling to confront.

The Bush Administration's peril here lies in the fact that the American people may themselves spontaneously attack domestic threats if it won't, and then vote it from office. Repeated examples exist of the American people acting to protect their communities and country without waiting for their governments. The most significant occurred in 1861 when the federal government asserted control over internal security after widespread attacks by pro-Union vigilantes on Confederate sympathizers in northern and border states. The 1942 internment of Japanese-Americans is ominously instructive. California historian Kevin Starr noted that federal motivations included fear of vigilante attacks on Japanese-Americans incited by a disgraceful hate campaign of the Hearst newspaper chain.

The Bush Administration's repeated denunciations of hate speech and deeds against Muslim immigrants shows some awareness of this issue, but its domestic security actions show it is clueless about the potential danger's extent. If the American people suffer truly major losses from foreign terrorism, they may well require that non-citizen Arab Muslim immigrants (rightly or wrongly perceived as sheltering terrorists) be interned and possibly expelled en masse, using a combination of political pressure and vigilante attacks to force a weakened government to do their will. Such internment/expulsion would have immense foreign consquences.

The Bush Administration can minimize this possibility by convincing the American people that it is not necessary for their protection. The best means is obviously prevention of further mass fatality attacks, with effective publicly demonstrated security measures being second. The latter is a disaster area. Public opinion here is primarily based on daily in-their-faces confrontations with ludicrously ineffective, offensive, demeaning airport security. Other, more dangerous but less obvious, examples exist of federal indifference to homeland security. These make the public more rather than less likely to expel Arab immigrants, while running over the Bush Administration, in the event of further mass fatality terrorism here.

The war on terror won't end until the American people are safe at home, because they have the power and will to utterly end their enemies' societies. Domestic and foreign governments ignore the American people at their peril.

Next - Coping With American Nationalism in the War on Terror.