by Austin Bay
March 29, 2006
The latest quip accusation that the United States "rushed to
war" with Saddam's Iraq conveniently ignores 12 years of combat, terror and
Perhaps The Slow War -- Saddam's war against the U.N.-mandated
sanctions and inspections regimen that halted Operation Desert Storm -- has
slipped from public historical memory. It shouldn't, for The Slow War is the
long, violent bridge connecting Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
From March 1991 to March 2003, Saddam fought The Slow War
savvily and savagely, utilizing an array of political, military and economic
ploys. Moreover, by early 2003, Saddam believed he was winning.
The Iraqi dictator had reasons to make that calculation. Recall
the fall of 2002 -- and the growing realization that the entire post-Desert
Storm sanctions regimen had withered. The curious lack of political will on
the part of key Security Council members (France and Russia) to keep Saddam
properly caged was increasingly evident.
What the world didn't know, and wouldn't learn until early 2004
when the Iraqi Interim Government began naming names, was how effectively
Saddam had corrupted the Oil for Food program. Oil for Food, a program
designed to provide food and medicine for the Iraqi people, had in fact
become an insidious economic weapon in The Slow War, used to buy political
influence and corrode the entire sanctions policy.
A recent article in "The Economist" quoted former Saddam crony
Tariq Aziz as telling interrogators that Saddam had given France and Russia
millions of dollars in contracts "with the implied understanding that their
political posture ... would be pro-Iraqi." In other words, mass murderer
Saddam was bribing his way to a political victory that would have reversed
his battlefield defeat in Desert Storm.
A post-9/11 irony also encouraged Saddam's view that he was
winning The Slow War: Al-Qaida used the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia as a recruiting tool for terrorists. Those troops and support
facilities played a key role in maintaining the sanctions regimen. The
United States was in a strategic political bind. Remain in Saudi Arabia and
enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning Saddam, or give
superficial credence to al-Qaida's global agit-prop campaign that U.S.
troops threatened Mecca.
Slow doesn't mean "not dangerous." Fighting The Slow War was
tough duty, requiring fast reactions and quick decisions.
U.S. and British pilots patrolling the northern and southern
"no-fly" zones over Iraq called their missions exactly what they were:
combat missions. In 1997, I spoke with a pair of U.S. Air Force pilots who
had been flying missions in the northern zone.
"We're painted all the time," one young captain told me. He was
referring to Iraqi air defense units "painting" his aircraft with radar. The
pilot's preferred response was an immediate volley of missiles and bombs to
suppress Iraqi defenses. However, my chagrined source said the rules of
engagement regarding the location of Iraqi defenses sometimes limited his
Iraqis would position anti-aircraft weapons near a mosque or a
school, and a counter-attack risked damaging those "peaceful" buildings. An
off-target missile handed Saddam an easy and emotionally effective
propaganda victory of the ilk, "See, the bad Americans bomb mosques and kill
Of course, the no-fly zone in the north was created to keep
Saddam from committing further genocide against the Kurds, but an explosion
and a crater make for great television images -- a sensational immediacy --
that obscured the terrible facts.
I argued in early 2003 that the Bush administration needed to
end The Slow War with a victory. Enforcing the U.N.'s Desert Storm mandates
mattered. Those resolutions demanded that Saddam end his depredations
against ethnic and religious groups in Iraq (Kurds and Shias) and required
him to end (completely) his weapons of mass destruction programs. He also
had to destroy WMD delivery systems.
Though no WMDs turned up, Saddam failed to cooperate with the
inspection regimen and was in violation of the other requirements. Besides,
it was past time to pull the dictators' guns away from the heads of Arab
moderates. Toppling Saddam began the reconfiguration of the Middle East, a
dangerous, expensive process, but one that is laying the foundation for true
states, where the consent of the governed creates legitimacy and where
terrorists are prosecuted, not promoted.