Tomcat vs the Hornet

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gf0012-aus Tomcat vs the Hornet 1/11/2004 9:14:00 PM

I'm one of those who think that the Tomcat was a far better solution and that instead of investing in a new plane, the Tomcat had far greater development potential left. It could travel further, carry more and could fly faster in certain parameters. The Hornet (or Bug as we call it in Australia) started life as a lightweight fighter as per the F17 cobra specs, it blew out on specs, got fat and then ended up in a MMA/MRCA role. The Tomcat could have been weaseled and still be an active puncher. But, this is all personal bias.... ;)

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Mark F Oh no, not again 1/14/2004 3:33:14 PM

Besides the fact this has been hashed to death in every internet forum where the topic is likely to come up, isn't it also a bit late? This was topical 10 years ago. Today it is ancient history.

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Aardwolf RE:Tomcat vs the Hornet 1/14/2004 10:12:04 PM

That question has been discussed in _NUMEROUS_ other threads on this site alone. There never should have even _been_ an F-18. Although an equivalent, lighter, land-based F-17 variant would have been a good export prospect.

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Mark F Curious then... 1/15/2004 8:34:11 PM

...that while the heavier F/A-18 became a bonified success on the home and export markets, the F-18L (the developed land-based YF-17) never found a buyer.

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human7 RE:Tomcat vs the Hornet What Mark F does not understand... 1/17/2004 6:48:17 AM

There are constantly newcomers to this website. If a topic was debated in the past, does this mean this topic can never be debated again? Also, as for this topic being deemed ancient history, for all of us taxpayers its important for us to learn the mistakes of the past so that our politicans do not make the same mistakes again.

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Mark F What's the point of a discussion 1/17/2004 7:00:04 AM

You already seem to have the answers. And yes, this is a very old, very, very tired subject.

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Sherwood Rehashing a thread 1/17/2004 11:11:45 AM

I've returned to following miltary affairs, after a couple of decades absence, so I find the rehashing useful. I don't think a rehashed topic is that much of a waste of space as I notive they are much shorter than topical ones. Regards

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bwest Sort of Rehashing a thread 1/17/2004 12:16:09 PM

Ok, then instead of rehashing an old thread, why don't we divert the current one to a related topic. How many of you feel that F-14 drivers have been sold down the river in not having an upgrade to use amraam? (I am familiar with the budgetary reasons related to the Superhornet development). Anyone feel that, especially in light of the Navy recently deciding to drop the use of AIM-54, the F-14 would be at a distinct disadvantage in any air to air conflict (relying on older sparrows) such as it would encounter with Chinese Su-27s in a defense of Taiwan?

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leoinnyc RE:Sort of Rehashing a thread 1/17/2004 1:54:42 PM

Yes. I agree completely regarding amraam. The whole Tomcat/Hornet thing makes me frustrated and sad. The Hornet has been fine ("fine" meaning dissapointing but adequate) but the Tomcat is a fantastic plane that would have had enormous potential with better attack avionics. Now the Navy has no dedicated, convincing air superiority platform, andd will soon have two attack platforms -- the lame-ass Hornet and the F-35. The F-35 will probably be employed differently than the Hornet, to maximize its stealth and keep its high tech ass away from potshots. However, the most important thing is that the Navy has essentially ceeded the Air Superiority/OAO mission to the Air Force. This has major implications for the way we use carriers (are they just extra air bases to use after the Air Force has made sure that the skies are safe? Then what's the point?) and raises questions about the Navy's faith in, and reliance on AEGIS, etc. to defend the fleet. A much better arrangement would have been two main platforms, an upgraded Tomcat for Defensive Air Operations and CAS with PGMs a la Iraq and Afghanistan, with the F-35 for Deep Strike and Offensive Air Operations (i.e. missions where stealth is important). But it's no surprise that we are where we are -- this is what happens when you make a service so afraid that it won't get ANYTHING that it feels it has to jump at the chance just tto get SOMETHING and then of course ends up with just that: something -- the Hornet.

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Mark F I disagree completely 1/17/2004 7:07:00 PM

In spite of the Tomcat's 20 year reign as the undisputed king on the carriers, in actual combat the Hornet has proven far more reliable, more economical, and more useful with a far greater range of capabilities than the Tomcat. Many of the percieved shortcomings of the Hornet are just that.

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bwest RE:I disagree completely 1/17/2004 11:06:36 PM

Ok, all of this may or not be true, and I appreciate the range of insights and opinions on the matter, but now we're heading back down the path of rehashing the old thread and argument. Not to be disrespectful, but I think we know, after reading this and other threads, where everyone stands on the question of the relative virtue of the Tomcat vs the Hornet. My question is: in the few remaining years left of service with the F-14, do you think the prospects of seeing the Tomcat upgraded with amraam are realistic or not, and if we see a situation in which Tomcat pilots end up going into battle ill prepared in the air to air role and with resulting losses, how many heads at Navair and the Pentagon are going to roll? Does anyone know any Tomcat pilots and understand how THEY feel directly on the matter?

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Mark F RE:I disagree completely 1/18/2004 3:26:05 PM

I think the AMRAAM upgrade would require a MIL-STD-1760 databus if I'm not mistaken. No way that's gonna happen as such an upgrade was already rejected once before back in 1996. It is doubtful whether this will have any meaningful effect on fleet operations. The last Tomcat squadrons will have disbanded within 5 years. We already have Tomcat free airwings at sea now. Those Tomcat's still extant will also be supported by AMRAAM equipped Hornet's anyway for the limited air threat they are likely to face. Since Tomcat's have been relegated to bomb-trucks for the most part in recent years, the chance for air-to-air combat for them would be rare at any rate. Irregardless of all that, America's C3I dominance is more important than any missile in air combat anyway. As a practical matter, adding AMRAAM capability to a platform that is being withdrawn from service and is unlikely to be used in air-to-air engagements anyway is probably unsound.

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JJFS RE:I disagree completely, Mark F 1/18/2004 6:08:34 PM

The only reason the hornet has amassed a superior combat record is that it's been FAVORED by the navy leadership. It has no inherent, air frame based advantages over the F-14, other than maybe dogfighting. The F-14 can carry a larger payload, detect enemy aircraft at a greater range, and fly a great deal faster and further than either the F-18c or the superhornet. The navy should have built a strike tomcat instead of the superhornet. Just look at the difference in capability between an F-16 and an F-15E. Bigger planes make better bombers.

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Mark F RE:I disagree completely, JJFS 1/18/2004 9:26:01 PM

This will bring us back into the dreaded "Tomcat vs. Hornet" debate, but at least it will do so with useful information, instead of blanket statements implying the USN had a bias against the F-14 (patently untrue BTW). Rather than randomly picking out one or two (possibly minor) capabilities and declaring a winner like most people as is so often the case with this issue, lets think big picture. First, a little history to get everyone on the same page. At the height of the Cold War a typical Carrier Air Wing (there were variations) might have 24 F-14A/B interceptors, 24 F/A-18A/B light strike fighters, 10 A-6E long range night/all-weather strike aircraft plus 20 or so odd supporting aircraft. By 1990 the A-6E was getting very old and hard to maintain. It was also slow and not very agile making it vulnerable. Instead of new build A-6F's the Navy decided on an all-new replacement for the A-6 around 1988 called the A-12. This horribly mismanaged program however, died mercifully in 1991 leading to a requirement for an alternate long-range strike fighter which became first the A-X and later the A/F-X program. This died in 1993. Meanwhile back at the ranch, there was also a need to replace the now-aging F-14 Tomcat's and this resulted in NATF - a Naval equivilant to what became the Air Force's F-22. It died too. By this time the Navy had already committed to a longer ranged advanced Hornet derivative as an interim type and by default this aircraft - what we know today as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (referred to as SH from now on) became the de-facto replacement for the already retiring A-6's and the soon-to-retire early model Hornets and eventually all Tomcats. With time lost due to the failure of prior programs, upgrading an existing aircraft was the only practical solution on both cost and timescale grounds. Question is, was the Hornet derivative the right aircraft? To the Hornet-haters there was only one obvious choice - the Tomcat. Believe it or not, the Tomcat was looked at and rejected. Why? Let's find out. To the Tomcat crowd the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as they are concerned automatically makes the Hornet and SH inferior. Almost invariably the entire arguement against the SH boils down to these arguements. But why? Are these factors really that important? A more detailed examination of the issue suggests not. Now granted, the F-14 is dead-sexy and for for 2-decades it dominated carrier air wings with much more glamour and perceived importance than the lowly ?light strike fighter? Hornets. It was in all the PR campaigns and recruiting posters. Movies were made featuring it. All the attention culminating in a very large, powerful and influential "F-14 Mafia". Why the Tomcat was considered so important is a little hard to grasp when looked at objectivley since it is ostensibly a defensive weapon system deployed on a platform (the carrier) that is primarily offensively oriented. But nevertheless, the F-14 without question ruled carrier decks in the 70's and 80's. So much for the idea that the Hornet was a favored aircraft, but I digress... The Tomcat's job during the Cold War was to defend the carrier from attack by swarms of Soviet Tu?22M bombers armed with long range AS-6 anti-ship missiles. The F-14/AWG-9/AIM-54 combination was the only thing going that could defend against this threat, which required intercpetion as much as 4-500 miles out from the CVBG. While the true very effectiveness of the Tomcat's very long range AWG-9/APG-71/Pheonix weapon system has become the subject of considerable doubt, one thing that is not is that the threat it was designed for no longer exists. Today?s naval emphasis is in the littorals where the most likely air threat to the carrier is a small number of strike-fighter aircraft armed with an Exocet type weapon. Against this threat the SH is probably superior to the F-14 thus the SH is the more appropriate aircraft to the needs of today. In other words, the threat has changed and the means of addressing that threat should change with it. Yes it is true that AMRAAM can not match the "brochure" range of Pheonix, at least not in current versions (future updates could potentially shoot further than AIM-54), it is widely regarded as a more effective weapon and coupled to APG-65/73 - widely regarded as the best current-generation fighter radars in the world - makes for a formidable deterrent to today's likely threats. No current Tomcat can not carry AMRAAM, limiting them to the old and questionable AIM-7 and AIM-54. How exactly is this better in air-to-air combat? The now-retired A-6 was of course no fighter. It was the Navy's premier night/all-weather strike aircraft. The Hornet can, with its SAR ground mapping radar and FLIR strike at night and in bad weather, just not with as many weapons and as far away from the carier. So, with the demise of the A-6 and its intended replacement the Carrier Air Wing had no night/all-weather long range strike capability. As early as the late 1980's F-14A/B/D?s were proposed for upgrade to perform this mission, even before the SH program was initiated. Unfortunately, things never really worked out. A multi-role capability for the F-14 was probably seen (quite rightly) by the Tomcat community as necessary to keep the aircraft relevant in the post-Cold War world. The F-14D was already equipped to carry dumb bombs (although lacking the necessary software to do anything useful with them) but this was not used until well into the 90's (when the necessary software was installed). Earlier A/B models had no no such capability at all. Trials with day/clear weather only F-14A/B ?Bombcats? began in 1987 but it took until 1992 for weapons clearance trials to conclude, the aircraft being cleared for Mk 83/84 iron bombs, CBU?s and LGB?s. However, the aircraft were limited to day/clear-weather bombing missions (and thus by no means were they true replacements for the A-6) and required laser designation from a 3rd party aircraft when using LGB's (ie: from the Hornet). All this bought were some more bomb-haulers with nothing like the strike capability of even the C/D Hornet, so in spite of all the attention these "upgrades" recieved, the actual additional capability achieved was really very limited. Thus the Joint Conference Comittee on the FY94 Defense Authorization Act direted the Navy to add "F-15E equivilant capability" to the F-14. Note this was initiated AFTER the SH program had been authorized 2 years earlier. A Navy initiated a $2.5 billion two-stage upgrade for the A/B Tomcats that in Stage 1 would have improved fatigue life, pit displays, defensive systems, and added digital avionics and new mission computers. In essence, it would have made the aircraft more compatible with the D models. The second stage, called "Block 1" would have added a built-in FLIR, NVG pit, and further enhanced defensive countermeasures. The result still lacked anything appraching the F/A-18C's night/adverse weather strike capability and could not carry such vital weapons as HARM, Harpoon, SLAM, Maverick or Walleye (or the later JDAM and JSOW). As an alternative for an interim A-6 replacement pending arrival of the SH, a 4-phase $9.2 billion Grummman proposal known as the F/A-14D upgrade was studied (AKA "Phase II). The first phase would have added to 210 Tomcats; F-110 engines, new computers with memory upgrade, attack FLIR, digital MIL STD 1760 databus, new pit displays, and frontal RCS reductions. This apparently would have cost $2.5 billion. Next would come NVG compatible displays, new HUD, digital moving map, and AN/ALE-50 towed decoys. The next stage added F-15E radar modes while the last phase added JDAM and JSOW capability. Applying all the upgrades only to the 53 F-14D's was also studied. It would have cost $1.5 billion. The Navy declared the program unaffordable. The Chairmen of both the Senate and House subcomittee's on Appropriations and the Armed Services Comittee's of both houses were extremely critical of the proposal. For one thing, none of the first phase upgraded aircraft would be available until 1999, just two years before the SH and the program was touted as an interim capability to fill the gap between the A-6 withdrawal in 1997 and the introduction of the SH. They also claimed rightly that the upgrades from the initial $2.5 billion of the first phase would not give anything approaching F-15E equivilant capability, and in fact offered no capability (other than range) not already offered by the F-/A-18C. For example, none of the upgrades even included a ground-mapping synthetic aperture radar, limiting all but the 53 F-14D's to clear-weather ground attack missions. The upgrades again did not include the ability to launch important weapons such as SLAM, Maverick, HARM, Harpoon or Walleye. Congressional criticism was for naught anyway as the Navy had already reached similar conclusions and canned the program. Instead, the Navy wired 157 A/B models for LANTIRN to allow self-designation of LGB's and give a rudimentary night/limited all-weather strike capability. This capability debuted in 1996. JDAM integration was finally achieved (just) in time for OEF in 2002 but the avionics upgrades needed for true night/all-weather strike have never been fitted making even the latest spec aircraft very much inferior in every aspect except range and payload to even the existing C/D Hornet for strike missions. The avionics just aren't in the same legue. Even F-14D models with some SAR modes for the APG-71 radar and LANTIRN are still very much inferior to the A-6, let alone the Hornet as all-weather strike aircraft. Beyond upgrades there were proposed actual dedicated multi-role or strike versions of the Tomcat as true A-6 replacements (and SH alternatives). Quickstrike was a limited-modification F-14D proposed by Grumman as an A-6 replacement (it would not have replaced the requirement for SH). This had LANTIRN pods, NVG pit and additional modes for the APG-71 as well as additional weapons stations. It would have added considerable attack capability to the baseline F-14D. In a Congressional review however, Quickstrike was judged inferior to the F/A-18C since its radar lacked the ground-mapping modes of the APG-65 on the Hornet and could only carry LGB's, not other varieties of smart weapons. Super Tomcat 21 followed as a proposal to replace the A-6 and F-14A/B/D, It was an alternative to the failed NATF, claiming to offer 90% of the required capability at 60% of the cost. It was essentially Quickstrike with an ISAR version of APG-71 and helmet mounted sights, increased internal fuel and improved engines offering supercruise capability and thrust vectoring. A further development as Attack Super Tomcat 21 with further increased internal fuel and other improvements, most importantly the attack radar from the A-12 replacing APG-71. The Navy judged this proposal too expensive and proceeded with SH instead. And that?s about it. You can't say the Tomcat didn't get a chance. When the Tomcat and A-6 were created their mission was a Cold War mission against the Soviet menace. This emphasized long-range, blue water operations. By 1994 the Navy admitted that missions had changed and the SecNav stated that 85% of all expected targets would be within 320km/200 miles of the coast - thus even within range of the F/A-18C with typical payload. For example, the C carrying four Mk 83's and external tanks has an un-refueled mission radius of 547km/340 miles, while the SH comes in at 837km/520 miles. The Tomcat (presumably F-14D) in the same profile is estimated to have a radius of 1,200km/750 miles. This looks great but the Navy regards this as irrelevant, given the expected missions. For situations where greater range is required the Tomahawk (1,300km) or Air Force bombers would be used, thus the greater range of the Tomcat is not required, making the range arguement in favor of the Tomcat academic, since it is not the requirement of the customer. Also arguing against an upgraded F-14 are its flawed 1960's-vintage airframe design. While generally a good handler, it does possess some very nasty flying qualities which have over the years resulted in numerous accidents and casualties. It also has poor bring-back capability, not to mention maintenance and reliability issues. Let us not forget that the F-14 itself was the result of VFX, a crash emergency program to get something, anything, into service quickly after the failure of the F-111. It is far from exceptional or perfect. For example, operational experience has shown that in a given strike package at least one Tomcat with abort with technical problems while this is extremely rare with the Hornet. The SH?s cost per flying hour is also half that of the F-14. That?s huge. Beyond the chimpanzee issues like range, long-range BVR and payload there are the more esoteric but equally if not more important issues of necessary mission avionics, improvements in man-hours per flight hour, MTBF, flight control problems at high alpha, stores carriage, operational cost per flight hour, room for future growth and obviously unit cost, much of which we have at least touched on already. While all of these issues are of critical importance to Navy planners, they rarely come up in internet Tomcat vs. Hornet discussions. Even barring those issues, in a world where avionics, weapons systems and targeting are arguably more important than the platform that carries them, would the more expensive, less reliable Tomcat have been a better choice? Arguements could be made for it, but I haven?t found a convincing one yet. Compared to SH the F-14 is more expensive, more maintenance intensive, and less reliable than SH. Its air-to-air capabilities have been the subject of much criticism in the last few years, it is aerodynamically flawed and avionics challenged without monumental upgrade. Even then it is restricted from carrying some types of important weapons. On the plus side it has greater payload, at least with the types of weapons it can carry, and greater range (which is largely irrelevant anyway). Not terribly convincing overall. Sorry but, SH was the best aircraft that could be had under the circumstances - not perfect by any means but good enough, and better than the alternatives at what it is actually being asked to do.

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