Army of Potomac question

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sentinel28a 10/18/2009 8:45:16 PM

To answer your question, YelliChink, most of the South's military materiel was either home-grown or captured. Considering they had very little industrial base, the CSA really worked some miracles.

Hamlicar, Scott may not have read Jomini's theories (he was already out of West Point before Jomini's theories became popular), but the Anaconda Plan was sort-of Jomini in nature. Probably it would fit better into BH Liddell-Hart's theories of indirect warfare (of course, BH wasn't even alive yet). Scott was taking the long view, but the CSA had time on their side. I don't agree with keeping him on--Scott himself took himself out of the picture because he was just too old and too sick; he kept falling asleep in staff meetings. Halleck was dismal as a field commander and also caught the micromanagement bug, but he was a good staff man.

Lee did intend Gettysburg as a spoiler, but he should've realized that nothing short of a direct attack would've shaken Grant loose from Vicksburg. Johnson was already in Jackson, trying to form an army after Grant beat hell out of him coming up from the river crossing. The South was really in bad shape, but I stand by my assertion that Lee couldn't win the war in Pennsylvania, but he damn sure could lose it at Vicksburg.

I see your point about Longstreet at Gettysburg, but trying to flank Meade was better than trying to attack him head on. Their best bet was actually to pull back to the mountains and let Meade attack the ANV (what Buford feared would happen), but with Lee determined to attack, Longstreet's idea was better than nothing.

Glad you mentioned Grierson. I think people don't hear enough about him--we hear about the Stuarts and Custers instead.

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CJH 10/18/2009 9:30:01 PM

Lee's specialty in the USA had been military engineering. He was expert in the area of fortifications.

IIRC, it has been said that Lee's army made the most use of the spade in erecting field fortifications since the Roman army.

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CJH 10/18/2009 9:48:01 PM

I guess that I was impressed by Liddel Hart's theories on the strategy of the indirect approach.

His contention was that any direct approach upon Richmond would be the least economical approach given a natural advantage, down through history, inherent in defense over offense and given that the opposing army would be expecting it. Of course as Timon stated, the weapons used during the Civil War yielded a much greater than normal advantage of defense over offense.

Hart's analysis was that Sherman's march to the sea and subsequent approach towards Richmond from the south was the undoing of Lee. That is, the approach of the federals from the west was critical. It isolated the Confederacy north of Georgia from the rest and helped to demoralize Lee's army.

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CJH 10/18/2009 10:17:56 PM

"McClellan was too afraid that his precious Army of the Potomac might get, y'know, hurt kept him from taking Richmond when he was within 20 miles of the place. Lee saw the weakness and masterfully exploited it; despite the fact that Lee's army took proportionately more casualties in the Seven Days' Battles, it was McClellan that hauled ass. "

I wonder about this often stated criticism of McClellan.

Clearly the war conformed to a siege as a model. The North were the besiegers and the South were the besieged.

The north had no pressure to hurry things up beyond political or public opinion. Time was mainly on its side.

The South had to deliver some knockout blow in the field or resign itself to eventual defeat. The US Navy's blockade guaranteed that. And it probably couldn't hope to destroy all federal forces in the field so a knockout blow would have to precipitate a demoralization of support for the war in the North and possibly earn it foreign recognition.

If what I have written is true, then what sense would it have made for the North to risk a very fledgling army to chance? Isn't that what stung the Roman army at the beginning of the Hannibalic War?

The South had the best generals, the best horsemen and the best riflemen. It was the best prepared to risk an all out engagement at the beginning of the war. To be aggressive for McClellan would have been to play to the South's advantages.

Maybe McClellan was not a Sherman or a Thomas or a Sheridan, or a Hooker or a Burnside but he was probably the right man for that particular situation. He turned his command from "feather merchants" into a fighting force that had a chance of surviving. That was a milestone the North could not have won the war without passing.

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Hamilcar 10/18/2009 10:30:22 PM

To answer your question, YelliChink, most of the South's military materiel was either home-grown or captured. Considering they had very little industrial base, the CSA really worked some miracles.

Works for me. The South did have cannon and gun foundries, just not anywhere near what the North had. Plus they had the Federal and State arsenals, they seized. There were over a hundred cannon sized in the Virginia state arsenals alone. Its not like they started from zero. In some ways, the Confederatres started with more war equipment than the Union since most CSA recruits had their own muskets and many Southern states had cavalry troops and small artllery parks for their state militias. The US Army had to replace most of its artillery park and raise its cavalry. .

I don't think Scott attended West Point. I think it was William and Mary. The Blackhawk War sort of set the political and military mold for him and taught him lessons about how to dictate a peace as well as to maintain and use armies in the field. (the cholera epidemic he caused was such a teaching disaster.). If I could see Jomini in Scott's actions,

The American Way of War....

where? More likely Dernnis Mahan is the source

You're probably right, but what good would it do to throw thirty thousand men away? This was the likely outcome if Grant was offered that gift to chew up. And we still have no general to use them. One of the reasons that Hiohbson couldn't raise a relief from the scattered Confederate forces in his department was because Davis refused to give him the command authority he needed.

I agree about falling back if it was a prepared position, but remember this was a meeting engagement. Once Heath committed Lee he was sort of stuck. The road net would scatter his concentrations if he chose the wrong routes. He could either fight where he was, or be scattered and destroyed if he moved west or south. He could either move east or north and stay concentrated. He chose East.

Glad you mentioned Grierson. I think people don't hear enough about him--we hear about the Stuarts and Custers instead.

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Hamilcar McClellan misused and "Beast" Butler. 10/18/2009 11:10:39 PM

I wonder about this often stated criticism of McClellan.

Its the standard armchair general criticism.

Clearly the war conformed to a siege as a model. The North were the besiegers and the South were the besieged.

I would see it more as a tear off a chunk at a time advance.

The north had no pressure to hurry things up beyond political or public opinion. Time was mainly on its side.

This was of the necessity compelled by amateurs trying to learn how to fight a war via OJT. The simplest way to win is to attrition the enemy to defeat. This is doubly true when most of the veteran leaders you had, join the rebels.

Scott figured it would take three years to build the fleet and take the ports. Makes Lee's Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns make more sense when you consider that timetable. Those generals were not that stupid.

If what I have written is true, then what sense would it have made for the North to risk a very fledgling army to chance? Isn't that what stung the Roman army at the beginning of the Hannibalic War?

If I can quote Scott's letter to McClellan.

The Anaconda Plan (Scott to McClellan)

Union Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Maryland, Eastern North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia (Except Southwestern), And West Virginia, From January 1, 1861, To June 30, 1865.--#3
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LI/1 [S# 107]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 3, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:

        SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.
        First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.
        Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gunboats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars

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sentinel28a 10/19/2009 1:53:42 AM

Without a doubt. I think even McClellan's worst detractors admit that he made the Army of the Potomac. Reading through my ancestor's old regimental history, they talk about how happy everyone was when they had heard (erroneously) that Little Mac was taking over from Hooker. When they heard it was Meade, it was kind of "Oh...well, I guess somebody's gotta lead us." They'd take Meade over Devil Dan Sickles, but only just.

(I don't think Hooker gets enough credit either, for cleaning up Burnside's mess and restoring the AoP. Hooker was just over his head in army command, but he was good with a corps.)

Butler, for all his abrasiveness, bloody shirt waving, and general assholishness, had some good points. He was also the first one to start emancipation, even if it was by baby steps and without Lincoln's authorization.

McClellan's biggest problem (besides his overweening ego and timidity in battle) was the fact that he cared too much for his men. Both Grant and Lee understood that war kills people and you have to make sacrifices to win. Mac didn't want to make that sacrifice. His plans tended to be good; it was just when bullets started flying that he got a case of the slows and a case of the nerves.

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Hamilcar 10/19/2009 10:22:01 AM

McClellan resembles Omar Bradley that way. He was a soldier's general who was tactically deficient, but a brilliant organizer.

(I don't think Hooker gets enough credit either, for cleaning up Burnside's mess and restoring the AoP. Hooker was just over his head in army command, but he was good with a corps.)

I don't know. Hooker was like P.T. Beauregard, a self-promoting no-good devious and thoroughly politically corrupt man, who connived against his fellow officers. Even in that army, you had toi be a team player as well as a good general to get things done. One of Lee's great strengths was that he built teams, where even incompetents, (Stuart) would try, so as not to let <Marse> Robert down again. Where was the subordinate support to help Hooker when he had his breakdown at Chancellorsville? Nowhere. His fellow officers saw how he back-stabbed Burnside and McClellan;and were happy to see him in a solo jam of his own making. THAT says a lot about the sorry man Hooker was, and what a sorry command setup the AoP had at the time.

Butler was just too politically abrasive and couldn't deliver as assigned. Lincoln could abide crooks who got the job done. Butler couldn't get the job done. Grant fired him.

Timid is acceptable, when the odds of success versus disaster <1/1. Lose the AoP and lose the war when the ANV takes Washington. There was only one Confederate General who had a remote chance of such a Cannae and that was Lee. It takes a Grant to bite and hang on while the rest of the US Army executes Anaconda.

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sentinel28a 10/19/2009 8:44:17 PM

Hooker in that respect was no better than Butler, but he did do a superb job in reorganizing the AoP. He was good enough as a corps commander that Grant retained him in the West, and Sam didn't suffer fools. Not for long, anyway.

Comparing McClellan to Bradley...I dunno. For whatever Mac's faults were, he was loved by his men well into 1863. Bradley was never loved; the "soldier's general" story was an invention of Ernie Pyle, who liked Bradley in North Africa and Sicily. Bradley didn't give a damn for the common soldier; if he had, he wouldn't have sacrificed so many of them in the Hurtegen Forest for no reason, or sacked commanders for the slightest infraction. Patton might have been an opinionated, egotistical SOB but his men were proud to have served under his command. I've never heard veterans say "Yeah, I was with Brad in North Africa" or "I was with Brad in Sicily!" It's always "I was with Patton!" One of the reasons why Bradley agreed to be the technical advisor to the movie Patton was because he saw an opportunity to feather his own nest, which is why much is made of Patton's supposed disinterest in his men's welfare, whereas Bradley is always shown alongside them and caring for them. The opposite was true. Bradley may not have ever slapped soldiers, but he had no problem ruining their careers or getting them killed rather than admit he had screwed up.

McClellan's biggest problem might have been that he cared too much for his men, though IMHO he was afraid of losing his position if he lost. (Well, admittedly he was right there.) Reading Mac's own recollections, it sounds to me that he started believing all the "Little Napoleon" stuff the media was shelling out, and then abruptly realized that Lee or Johnson might just beat the crap out of him if they met in battle. This may have been one reason why he was always demanding more forces or claiming his own were deficient--he wanted to have so many men that victory would be assured. (At least in his mind--forgetting of course that Hannibal was outnumbered at Cannae...)

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Hamilcar 10/20/2009 1:58:36 AM

Quite true. I wasn't clear. I said that Hooker suffered a breakdown at Chancellorsville. I should have said a mental breakdown. He was so over his head that he just shut down and couldn't function. Every other respect you are accurate to the extent, that the troops of his own corps loved him as much as the rest of the army loved McClellan. Weird eh? He did serve Grant well, and never gave Meade much grief. Maybe Chancellorsville taught him something about high command, and why loyalty up is important as well as down?

Patton was too emotional and intuitive about his job. That got him into trouble with the WW II PC crowd when it came to his speak his mind and show his heart style of generalship. (That includes the very political Eisenhower). I'm not going to comment about Ernie Pyle and Bradley's history rewrite of since I really don't know aboit that aspect. About Bradley's lack of tactical skill, the Bulge demonstrated just what an inept general he was. Patton from the South and Hodges from the North cl.osed the breach.

I used to be a McClellan dumper; until I began to look at the material he had, Human and technical. I would rather have Lee's troubles at the time than McClellan's You know how many SERGEANTS the US Army lost due to secession? Its lucky that a lot of the Irish immigrants who wound up in the AoP had former British Army service! Since much of the Regular Army was out West where Buchanan conveniently stranded them, McClellan had a rabble, not an Army when he started, and not much cadre to train them. Its a miracle McDowell was able to do anything with them at First Bull Run. Meanwhile where were all those Southern sergeants? Using the US Army Infantry Drill on those Carolina, and Georgia raw recruits.

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