Post this on the Military History forum and you'll get great analysis from some dedicated, well informed military historians like AlbanyRifles, or karl. . I do not have their professional education, but here is what I have read: 

 

1) Washington, D.C. was just as close to Confederate armies as Richmond, Virginia was to the Army of the Potomac. This meant that any attack on Richmond could be aborted by a corresponding attack on Washington. Lee and Jackson exploited this many times.

2) Firepower (artillery and rifled muskets) tended to favor the defensive. In addition to this, the area around Richmond was very heavily fortified. Attacking forces suffered horrendous casualties (400,000+ Union dead, versus 200,000+ Confederate). It took iron-willed ruthlessness to persevere in the face of those casualties. Many generals simply couldn't do this (McClellen comes to mind).  

3) The Union had to attack in order to win the war,  the Confederacy only had to survive the attacks. Confederate generals had a simpler task

4) It took a  first rate combination of generals (Grant and Sherman) to cut through this Gordian knot, and an iron-willed commander-in-chief to keep feeding them the resources they needed. 

 

 

All of that plus incompetent generals, using the wrong tactics, and micromanagement from Washington. 

 

McClellan was too afraid that his precious Army of the Potomac might get, y'know, hurt kept him from taking Richmond when he was within 20 miles of the place.  Lee saw the weakness and masterfully exploited it; despite the fact that Lee's army took proportionately more casualties in the Seven Days' Battles, it was McClellan that hauled ass.  At Antietam, McClellan allowed himself to be fought to a draw against an army trapped against a river and one that he outnumbered at least 3 to 1.  Pope was worthless, and easily outmanuevered by Stonewall Jackson.  Burnside at least admitted he was incompetent, and then went out and proved it at Fredericksburg.  Hooker was a fine corps commander and came up with a brilliant plan, then got frightened by his own success.  Lee was able to move faster at Chancellorsville, but the battle never should have been fought there.  (I give Meade a break because he was thrown into command in a defensive battle, and it was Grant's overall direction he followed for the rest of the war.)

 

Grant recognized something that no Union commander in the east apparently did: Richmond was nice to have, but it was Lee's Army of Northern Virginia that was the target.  Destroy Lee, you get Richmond.  Napoleon would've seen it instantly.  Lincoln saw it before most (which was why he blew his top when McClellan didn't seal the deal at Antietam and Meade didn't pursue after Gettysburg).  Grant didn't get any closer to McClellan to Richmond before February 1865, but by that time the AoNV had been crippled through constant battle.

 

Poor tactics was partially to blame too.  Everyone was trying to make like Napoleon on a tactical battlefield that now included rifles, and on a strategic level in an area much bigger than anyplace Boney ever campaigned on, with the exception of Russia.  A Prussian army couldn't recover from a disaster like Jena-Auerstadt, because there weren't many places to run in Prussia.  A Confederate Army could suffer a defeat like Gettysburg, retreat 100 miles, and still be in position to cover Richmond and resupply as needed.  Grant and Sherman threw out Jomini and did their own thing, and were probably closer to what Napoleon would've done anyway.

 

Finally, while Lincoln proved to be a quick study in strategy and eventually cured himself of the micromanagement bug, Stanton and the other Radical Republicans never did.  There was way too much pressure put on Union generals to produce instantly or suffer the consequences.  When Stanton bitched about Grant's casualty rate, Grant ignored him and trusted Lincoln to back him up.  (In the Union's defense, Jefferson Davis was just as bad at micromanaging.  Lee was generally able to ignore him as well, but it wasn't from a lack of trying on Davis' part.)

 

And naturally we should also mention that Robert E. Lee was just a damned fine general, and had some great subordinates in Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart to back him up.

 

 

Lincoln was a master strategist but he was no Winfield Scott. He did not realize that his generals had to worry about Human fatigue, supply and movement factors. McClellan's army was shot up at Antietam, out of ammunition, he was low on horses, his cavalry just showed him that they were no good, the infantry were totally exhausted, and he had twenty thousand wounded on his hands. There was no gung ho left.

 

 Meade at Gettysburg faced far worse factors. This does not excuse their  final shove failures, but it does explain about what those AoP generals actually thought when they sat on the battlefield and let the ANV get away.  Lee, you must remember, for example, simply  abandoned many of his wounded to Union care as an impediment many times to slow the Union down. At Malvern Hill McClellan fought to recover his casualties before he evacuated. Lee would have abandoned like he did at Antietam. Real nice bastard, that guy, Lee, turned out to be.

Not bloody likely. Sherman was a Clauswitzian, and Grant sort of stumbled into the guy when Sherman introduced Grant to the author's books. The real strategist of the Civil War besides Lincoln was Winfield Scott, who sort of laid out the Anaconda Plan and educated Lincoln enough to use it. Before Seapower was even a concept to Mahan, an ARMY general and a President used it. Scott could also read a map and he knew war economics. Very modern American general that one. Probably the best the US had in the 19th Century. 

Let's not rewrite history. Ir was Lincoln, who changed generals more often than Churchill, with just as disastrous results. The only reason that Grant made it, was that even when Grant faced a disaster as bad as Antietam, as he did at Shiloh, and did as McClellan did, (sat on the battlefield after a draw, letting the enemy escape), he didn't make excuses and try to dictate policy or make political pronouncements. He just reported facts, didn't retreat, and tended to the military problems he faced.   

Jackson was steady and ruthless, something you will not see matched in a Civil War general, again, until Sheridan. Longstreet was a good defensive corps commander who personifies the Peter Principle, that people rise to the level of their own incompetence. Stuart was just a bloody idiot-all dash, insubordinate, and no brains at all.  Wade Hampton was FAR superior. 

I'm not a history guru, but wasn't the last attack on Richmond, the one that almost made it, pulled back because Lee kept dressing his smaller units in different uniforms  and flags and marching around in a loop to make the Union think that the force was much larger?

Actually, no.  That was Magruder at Yorktown.  McClellan dithered in front of Richmond long enough for Lee to attack him first.

 

Some interesting points, Hamlicar.  I can tell you're no fan of Marse Robert!  Personally, I think Lee was a superb defensive commander, but not suited to offense: whenever he was confronted with an enemy on better ground, he just charged straight at them.  When the attack invariably failed (Malvern Hill, Pickett's Charge), he would say "God's will" as if that excused poor generalship.  (Though in his defense, he did initially claim correctly that Pickett's Charge was his fault.)  Lee also suffered from strategic myopia--the CSA would've been better served if Lee had sent a corps or two to go relieve Vicksburg, rather than invade Pennsylvania.

 

Disagree with you on Longstreet, who I think is underrated.  He knew ground, which was why he spent most of the second day of Gettysburg trying to talk Lee out of attacking. 

 

Agree with you on Stuart, who I think is overrated.  While Stuart could and did manuever cavalry quite well (and wasn't a half bad corps commander either; he took over for Jackson at Chancellorsville and did pretty good), he was also an egomaniac who was more concerned with publicity-grabbing stunts than doing his job.  Hampton was good; Forrest may have been the best, though Forrest's reputation has been deservedly tarnished by the fact that he was also a racist SOB who should've been shot for war crimes.

 

Agree with you to a certain extent on Winfield Scott.  The Anaconda Plan was brilliant, but it rested too much on the idea that the South really didn't want to secede and would quickly pack it in once the blockade was enacted and the Mississippi taken.  He reflected the views of Jomini that geometry and logic would win a campaign, when Napoleon held that the target was the enemy's army.  All that aside, Scott gets overlooked far too often--even Wellington didn't think he had a prayer of taking Mexico City.

 

Strongly disagree with you on Antietam, agree completely with you on Gettysburg.  McClellan had two entire corps that were untouched and fresh, which he could've sent in either late or the next day, crushing Lee; he didn't use them because he thought Lee outnumbered him (as usual).  Lincoln removed him for that mistake.  Meade really didn't have anything left after Gettysburg, so I think he can be excused for not pursuing Lee.  I think Lincoln realized it too, which was why he never sent the scathing letter to Meade he had intended to.  Still, I think Lincoln was a better strategist than people give him credit--he was far better than Jefferson Davis, anyway.

 

He was too much cavalier and not enough cavalry I think. Hampton was a professional. Again that is my opinion. He could command if someone watched him like Lee did at Chancellorsville, but you couldn't give him an independent command at all. All you could do with him was babysit him and keep him close where you correct hos mistakes. Its not like he could conduct independent operations in support like Grierson or Forrest or conduct a proper campaign like Jackson or Sheridam.

Antietam is just my opinion. I can see where when out of ammo, 20,000 wounded, no cavalry, no horses, and a river in front of you held by a still intact Confederate Army with nightfall's approach, could make you say "wait a minute" even if you had 40,000 fresh infantry, and you knew you had three to two odds in your favor. A night river crossing is just too dangerous under those conditions. What if you guessed wrong where to cross and Lee has 10,000 reserves waiting for just a stunt?  We are talking six to one odds at the point of contact in a ruber crossing to carry it off in daylight..  Things in a night attack, are not that simple or ordered. Next day pursuit after Lee retreats; IF you have cavalry you can trust, sure: but McClellan didn't have that either. I think here for once, he made the right call. 

Exactly how effective was Anaconda Plan? CSA's major military equipment and supply were made in England then smuggled into Southern States. Given the duration of the conflict and the intensity of each campaign, they must have required huge amount of artillery pieces and ammunition. How did they get that amount of war supply with meager "smuggle" through the blockade?

It took a long time to build the river flotillas and blue water navy. Plus, the start lines were the Tennessee, Cumberland, Ohio and Missouri Rivers. The southern coastline held some two hundred working ports which the Union Army proceeded to reduce one by one by amphibious assault or overland attack. Try imagining blockading the Mediterranean European coast  starting with 30 ships and 30,000 troops, and conducting a land war down the Dauube River with the goal of reaching Vienna so that you can invade northern Italy and take Florence when your start position geographically and technologically is 1860 Russia.

 

Scott to McClellan        

 

 

 

To answer your question, YelliChink, most of the South's military materiel was either home-grown or captured.  Considering they had very little industrial base, the CSA really worked some miracles.

 

Hamlicar, Scott may not have read Jomini's theories (he was already out of West Point before Jomini's theories became popular), but the Anaconda Plan was sort-of Jomini in nature.  Probably it would fit better into BH Liddell-Hart's theories of indirect warfare (of course, BH wasn't even alive yet).  Scott was taking the long view, but the CSA had time on their side.  I don't agree with keeping him on--Scott himself took himself out of the picture because he was just too old and too sick; he kept falling asleep in staff meetings.  Halleck was dismal as a field commander and also caught the micromanagement bug, but he was a good staff man.

 

Lee did intend Gettysburg as a spoiler, but he should've realized that nothing short of a direct attack would've shaken Grant loose from Vicksburg.  Johnson was already in Jackson, trying to form an army after Grant beat hell out of him coming up from the river crossing.  The South was really in bad shape, but I stand by my assertion that Lee couldn't win the war in Pennsylvania, but he damn sure could lose it at Vicksburg.

 

I see your point about Longstreet at Gettysburg, but trying to flank Meade was better than trying to attack him head on.  Their best bet was actually to pull back to the mountains and let Meade attack the ANV (what Buford feared would happen), but with Lee determined to attack, Longstreet's idea was better than nothing.

 

Glad you mentioned Grierson.  I think people don't hear enough about him--we hear about the Stuarts and Custers instead.

 

Lee's specialty in the USA had been military engineering. He was expert in the area of fortifications.

 

IIRC, it has been said that Lee's army made the most use of the spade in erecting field fortifications since the Roman army.

 

 

I guess that I was impressed by Liddel Hart's theories on the strategy of the indirect approach.

 

His contention was that any direct approach upon Richmond would be the least economical approach given a natural advantage, down through history, inherent in defense over offense and given that the opposing army would be expecting it. Of course as Timon stated, the weapons used during the Civil War yielded a much greater than normal advantage of defense over offense.

 

Hart's analysis was that Sherman's march to the sea and subsequent approach towards Richmond from the south was the undoing of Lee. That is, the approach of the federals from the west was critical.  It isolated the Confederacy north of Georgia from the rest and helped to demoralize Lee's army.

 

 

 

"McClellan was too afraid that his precious Army of the Potomac might get, y'know, hurt kept him from taking Richmond when he was within 20 miles of the place.  Lee saw the weakness and masterfully exploited it; despite the fact that Lee's army took proportionately more casualties in the Seven Days' Battles, it was McClellan that hauled ass. "

 

I wonder about this often stated criticism of McClellan.

 

Clearly the war conformed to a siege as a model. The North were the besiegers and the South were the besieged.

 

The north had no pressure to hurry things up beyond political or public opinion. Time was mainly on its side.

 

The South had to deliver some knockout blow in the field or resign itself to eventual defeat. The US Navy's blockade guaranteed that. And it probably couldn't hope to destroy all federal forces in the field so a knockout blow would have to precipitate a demoralization of support for the war in the North and possibly earn it foreign recognition.

 

If what I have written is true, then what sense would it have made for the North to risk a very fledgling army to chance? Isn't that what stung the Roman army at the beginning of the Hannibalic War?

 

The South had the best generals, the best horsemen and the best riflemen. It was the best prepared to risk an all out engagement at the beginning of the war. To be aggressive for McClellan would have been to play to the South's advantages.

 

Maybe McClellan was not a Sherman or a Thomas or a Sheridan, or a Hooker or a Burnside but he was probably the right man for that particular situation. He turned his command from "feather merchants" into a fighting force that had a chance of surviving. That was a milestone the North could not have won the war without passing.

 

 

I don't think Scott attended West Point. I think it was William and Mary. The Blackhawk War sort of set the political and military mold for him and taught him lessons about how to dictate a peace as well as to maintain and use armies in the field.  (the cholera epidemic he caused was such a teaching disaster.). If I could see Jomini in Scott's  actions, 

 The American Way of War.

  where? More likely Dernnis Mahan is the source 

You're probably right, but what good would it do to throw thirty thousand men away? This was the likely outcome if Grant was offered that gift to chew up.  And we still have no general to use them.  One of the reasons that Hiohbson couldn't raise a relief from the scattered Confederate forces in his department was because Davis refused to give him the command authority he needed.