I misunderstood.

      

Some have a different take on Fletcher's not launching all of his aircraft, and that is his desire not to throw all of his aircraft at the spotted enemy carriers when one was still undiscovered. Not to mention Spruance already launched nearly all of his aircraft. Something had to be kept for a target of opportunity. Fletcher could not have known the Mistcher's group would fail so horribly. I have mixed feelings. Keeping the strike aircraft on deck is a sure way to lose them. However, if you do find a carrier that was previously undiscovered then what?

 

I think you're right. Fletcher played not to lose. But then again, that is exactly the position he was in at the beginning of the war. The USN could ill afford to lose carriers, early in the war. 

 

I'm not sure what you mean by "Fletcher had no luck at all?" IIRC VB-3 claimed Soryu, and I think it was VS-3 planes that finally sighted the Hiryu. The best coordinated attack from the USN was the Yorktown's air wing.

 

I disagree that Spruance ran his own show during Midway. Spruance's movements prior to the first strike were station-keeping. He didn't charge after the enemy and he did not launch until ordered. The actual execution of the strike was left up to Spruance, but that is to be expected. If FJF had ordered him to fly a specific number of aircraft, I think that would have been micromanagement.

Some have a different take on Fletcher's not launching all of his aircraft, and that is his desire not to throw all of his aircraft at the spotted enemy carriers when one was still undiscovered. Not to mention Spruance already launched nearly all of his aircraft. Something had to be kept for a target of opportunity. Fletcher could not have known the Mistcher's group would fail so horribly. I have mixed feelings. Keeping the strike aircraft on deck is a sure way to lose them. However, if you do find a carrier that was previously undiscovered then what?

 

You eat an air strike. Seriously, though, what can you do, but go with what your own training, new combat experience, and exercises tell you? You have to clear your decks of everything except fighters and you have strike with everything you have as soon as you are in range at that stage of carrier warfare qwhen you have an identified target. The enemy aircraft carriers have to be disabled; or you will face inevitable enemy retaliation as he follows your strike back. That is what Coral Sea and US exercises, to that point, actually showed. 

 

I think you're right. Fletcher played not to lose. But then again, that is exactly the position he was in at the beginning of the war. The USN could ill afford to lose carriers, early in the war. 

 

And that was what JFKY argued strenuously. The problem I see, was that at Guadalcanal, Fletcher mistimed his innate caution, for once, just around the disaster of Savo Island; when we needed his air power and a little aggression to offset Mikawa, either before or after Mikawa's speed run, and that may be actually why Fletcher was moved to Alaska after he was wounded in the Eastern Solomons. In retrospect this was probably a huge command mistake as I think he, Fletcher, could have fought a better Santa Cruz than Kincaid did, and he, Fletcher, may have had enough counterweight and experience not to allow the Halsey mistake with Wasp, or to make that lunatic charge out of the CACTUS.air power circle at Santa Cruz..    

 

I'm not sure what you mean by "Fletcher had no luck at all?" IIRC VB-3 claimed Soryu, and I think it was VS-3 planes that finally sighted the Hiryu. The best coordinated attack from the USN was the Yorktown's air wing.

 

Agreed. What I meant was that if Yorktown's strike didn't have to divert to Soryu (because of Nautilus' dud torpedoes and Hornet's failed strike), or if Fletcher had committed everything he had in a huge gamble, then Hiryu, not Soryu would be the victim and then Fletcher could have clean swept the board.  That was the difference for me.. Spruance gambled and Fletcher didn't. Better admiral made a better call. Luck favors the intelligently bold. By the way, I do not fault Fletcher for his caution, I just note that that wasn't the time for it.    .

 

I disagree that Spruance ran his own show during Midway. Spruance's movements prior to the first strike were station-keeping. He didn't charge after the enemy and he did not launch until ordered. The actual execution of the strike was left up to Spruance, but that is to be expected. If FJF had ordered him to fly a specific number of aircraft, I think that would have been micromanagement.

 

 

Information reading 

 

You can see that I have nothing good to say about Miles Browning.

 

 

If after Yorktown had worked up speed after the first attack, then Fletcher had ordered her to run like hell, and clear the battle area?

 

 

Majority of US carrier force before launch of Essex class were ships originally built as large light (Lexington class) or heavy cruisers (Independence class), and they proved to be very successful (1 out of 2 Lexingtons and 1 out of 9 Independence's sunk).

Where I could find some details about Midway and Illustrious classes except on Wikipedia? (I found few articles on wikipedia which contained erroneous data so I prefer to check data i find there if possible).

 

Beyond the poor typing try that if you want to spend some cash.

And that was what JFKY argued strenuously. The problem I see, was that at Guadalcanal, Fletcher mistimed his innate caution, for once, just around the disaster of Savo Island; when we needed his air power and a little aggression to offset Mikawa, either before or after Mikawa's speed run, and that may be actually why Fletcher was moved to Alaska after he was wounded in the Eastern Solomons. In retrospect this was probably a huge command mistake as I think he, Fletcher, could have fought a better Santa Cruz than Kincaid did, and he, Fletcher, may have had enough counterweight and experience not to allow the Halsey mistake with Wasp, or to make that lunatic charge out of the CACTUS.air power circle at Santa Cruz.

 

-What I will never understand is why the admiral on the carrier got blamed for a poorly fought surface action. As a Surface Warfare Officer in the USN, it bugs the crap out of me. The deployment around Savo was all wrong. Why divide your forces? Not to mention the general lack of practice in nighttime ops and the general lack of TTP development around a new system (i.e. radar). What really bugs me is how fast we put crap on our ships today without developing proper TTP.

 

 

But I digress. Let's talk about what FJF knew.

 

At 1837 he received a message from Canberra that placed three CAs, three DDs and two seaplane tenders 320nm NW of Lunga. That sighting occurred earlier at 1025 that day.

Crutchley adopted an ASW disposition, which from his point of view, made sense. I can't explain the chaos and confusion of the Allied command setup and the galf dozen mussed contact reports, but once again, when you don't train for battle, it shows.  Radar was so new I don't think the Navy undertstood tropical weather effects beam refraction or beam scatter effect just from choppy wave action.

Which attack do you exactly refer to?

Herald

 

Yorktown was disabled by torpedo plane attack, but it was sunk by Japanese sub I-168 along with destroyer Hayman who was towing him back to Pearl Harbor.

You missed the point? The I-168 found a stopped target after the second Hiryu attack. Towed out and the I-168 would never have found her.

 

Herald

Hayman was towing Yoorktown at wery low speed and it run at I-168 which was part of Japanese submarine barricade near Midway.

 

Expensive half day delay.