of that long diatribe you neglect to mention, HALSEY WON...Halsey's forces triumphed...ole'Ghormley was worried about keeping Guadalcanal.  He was INEFFECTIVE.  Halsey was EFFECTIVE, if not particularly efficient...and it was Halsey that advanced up the Slot.  In conjunction with Macarthur it was HALSEY who neutralized Rabaul. 

In conjunction with MacArthur it was HALSEY that destroyed the IJN light surface forces and gutted IJN  Naval Air power.  It WAS who made it impossible for the IJN to stop the Tarawa invasion, by tying up and attriting Japanese Carrier Aviation. 

 

It was Halsey, with MacArthur who so damaged IJN Naval Aviation that it NEVER was a real threat after the Solomons/New Guinea Campaign(s).  It was Halsey that set the stage for the Battle of the Philippine Sea, by destroying IJN Naval Aviation.

 

You kind of neglect that portion of the history don't you Herald?  Facts, such nasty difficult things aren't they?

 

Bottom-Line: for the period 1941-43 Halsey was the most successful operation naval commander the USN had...Nimitz was a great CinC, but he commanded NOTHING-he chose PERSONNEL.  Time-after-Time, it was Halsey that CHOSEN to advance the US forces in the Solomons.  Not not McClellan, not a Burnside, a Meade or so....I'd say.  Very Mahanian, you'd think you'd like Halsey, Herald.  He focused on the Japanese FLEET, not the mission objective...get back to us on how a Mahanian guy like Halsey is an idiot, within the bounds of Mahan's focus on Battle to destroy the Enemy Fleet as the prime focus of Naval Operations.  You're almost sounding like Julian Corbett now....

I think Henderson was shot up by battleships once....

Anyway, tell me why the loss of Wasp was Halsey's fault. 

Loss report.

Then let's play a different game.  Back to Yamato (remember her?)   Suppose instead of Kirishima, it was Yamato the night that Halsey sent Lee in. For fun, let's say that events unfolded the same way - DD's hammered, South Dakota beat up and Washington forgotten about. What happens if it's Yamato that Washington opens up on at close range? I assume that Yamato would have been able to withstand the initial damage better than Kirishima and she would have been able to punch back. 

What does that close in punch-out look like? It's one of those rare moments where there could have been a true one on one between BB's...Washington vs Yamato at a couple miles distance. 

Gruesome, something like this:

Again, assumes that events would have unfolded the same way, but with the bigger ship in place of the Battlecruiser...(not sure that Yamato had the speed to get down the slot and back before daylight, but that's a different question)

The Yamato turned like a pig in mud. Torpedo planes would have a field day with her, if the Washington didn't kill her first..

Anyone? 

 

 

 

One question that comes up is, how many hits 14" and larger, did the South Dakota actually suffer? Reports indicate that the South Dakota had a lot of damage, (almost) all of it superficial (meaning outside the main armor). This points to hits 8" and smaller, suggesting that substituting the Yamato for the Kirishima would have made no difference.

Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.

After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.

Strategic vision, which of course makes Spruance the better admiral, since he was at his worst, Fletcher's tactical equal.

Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.

 

After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.



Halsey was a simpleton. He had his place because he provided good press, the more reserved Fletcher and Spurance did not, which got the home front inovled. But in reality, if I had to pick an admiral to fight a carrier battle he would be nearly last on my list.

I don't put Fletcher ahead of Spruance even after all the recent revisionism, mostly because of the overall performance records compared to each other, to me, still shows Spruance the better operational artist and admiral, but I've read the last year or so of flood of action reports that hit Hyperwar and Syracuse University. Fletcher comes off better and better compared to everyone except Spruance. He seems to have run a good naval staff setup of his own as you described.     

However,  I would argue that FJF understood the strategic consequences of his decisions all too well. As any commander who is outnumbered and entrusted with a key resource does.

 

Spruance may have understood the strategic situation better. We'll never know. Spruance didn't command when carriers were scarce, with the brief exception being at Midway when three Japanese carriers were already sunk or sinking, and FJF didn't command when he had resources enough to pursue a *robust* offensive.