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Subject: ww2 Yamato vs Iowa class
capt soap    9/17/2005 12:55:11 PM
How would this fight turn out? the Iowa's 16 inch guns against the Yamato 18 guns? The iowa had radar,which one would sink the other 1 on 1.
 
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Leech       7/24/2009 5:15:22 AM
Majority of US carrier force before launch of Essex class were ships originally built as large light (Lexington class) or heavy cruisers (Independence class), and they proved to be very successful (1 out of 2 Lexingtons and 1 out of 9 Independence's sunk).
Where I could find some details about Midway and Illustrious classes except on Wikipedia? (I found few articles on wikipedia which contained erroneous data so I prefer to check data i find there if possible).
 
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JFKY       7/24/2009 6:47:36 AM
 
Beyond the poor typing try that if you want to spend some cash.
 
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benellim4       7/24/2009 7:39:06 PM
And that was what JFKY argued strenuously. The problem I see, was that at Guadalcanal, Fletcher mistimed his innate caution, for once, just around the disaster of Savo Island; when we needed his air power and a little aggression to offset Mikawa, either before or after Mikawa's speed run, and that may be actually why Fletcher was moved to Alaska after he was wounded in the Eastern Solomons. In retrospect this was probably a huge command mistake as I think he, Fletcher, could have fought a better Santa Cruz than Kincaid did, and he, Fletcher, may have had enough counterweight and experience not to allow the Halsey mistake with Wasp, or to make that lunatic charge out of the CACTUS.air power circle at Santa Cruz.
 
-What I will never understand is why the admiral on the carrier got blamed for a poorly fought surface action. As a Surface Warfare Officer in the USN, it bugs the crap out of me. The deployment around Savo was all wrong. Why divide your forces? Not to mention the general lack of practice in nighttime ops and the general lack of TTP development around a new system (i.e. radar). What really bugs me is how fast we put crap on our ships today without developing proper TTP.
 
 
But I digress. Let's talk about what FJF knew.
 
At 1837 he received a message from Canberra that placed three CAs, three DDs and two seaplane tenders 320nm NW of Lunga. That sighting occurred earlier at 1025 that day.

At 2047 on the night of the 8th of August he received a sighting report from 1101 that day of two CAs, one CL, and one smaller ship. That sighting report was only seven miles from a 1025 sighting report, which could easily lead one to the conclusion that the two aircraft spotted the same force.
 
Fletcher actually wanted to strike, but was talked out of it by Ramsey. This isn't unheard of for FJF. Not being an aviator, FJF often relied upon his flagship's CO for aviation advice. The question becomes did Ramsey offer good or bad advice? (Considering there was little moon, I think it was probably the correct advice). If Ramsey offered bad advice then the question becomes did Fletcher's lack of aviation experience cause him not to be aggressive enough?
 
By 0230 the morning of the 9th Mikawa's force was hauling ass at 30 knots, away from Savo.
 
At 0330 Fletcher received permission from Ghormley to leave to refuel. Both FJF and Ghormley thought the other had better situational awareness.
 
After 0634 (after sunrise) did the communications watch officer, George Clapp, bring FJF the news of the battle off of Savo.
 
The argument that FJF was not aggressive enough has to be based on the lack of a strike on the 8+ hour old sightings the night before Savo. Any other strike against Mikawa's CAs is just closing the barn door after the horse has already left. 
 
The real goat of Savo is not FJF. It was the sorry state of the USN surface force.


 
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Herald12345       7/28/2009 4:29:24 AM

And that was what JFKY argued strenuously. The problem I see, was that at Guadalcanal, Fletcher mistimed his innate caution, for once, just around the disaster of Savo Island; when we needed his air power and a little aggression to offset Mikawa, either before or after Mikawa's speed run, and that may be actually why Fletcher was moved to Alaska after he was wounded in the Eastern Solomons. In retrospect this was probably a huge command mistake as I think he, Fletcher, could have fought a better Santa Cruz than Kincaid did, and he, Fletcher, may have had enough counterweight and experience not to allow the Halsey mistake with Wasp, or to make that lunatic charge out of the CACTUS.air power circle at Santa Cruz.

-What I will never understand is why the admiral on the carrier got blamed for a poorly fought surface action. As a Surface Warfare Officer in the USN, it bugs the crap out of me. The deployment around Savo was all wrong. Why divide your forces? Not to mention the general lack of practice in nighttime ops and the general lack of TTP development around a new system (i.e. radar). What really bugs me is how fast we put crap on our ships today without developing proper TTP.

Crutchley adopted an ASW disposition, which from his point of view, made sense. I can't explain the chaos and confusion of the Allied command setup and the galf dozen mussed contact reports, but once again, when you don't train for battle, it shows. 
Radar was so new I don't think the Navy undertstood tropical weather effects beam refraction or beam scatter effect just from choppy wave action.
  
But I digress. Let's talk about what FJF knew.

Okay

At 1837 he received a message from Canberra that placed three CAs, three DDs and two seaplane tenders 320nm NW of Lunga. That sighting occurred earlier at 1025 that day.

At 2047 on the night of the 8th of August he received a sighting report
from 1101 that day of two CAs, one CL, and one smaller ship. That
sighting report was only seven miles from a 1025 sighting report, which
could easily lead one to the conclusion that the two aircraft spotted
the same force.

True enough. Mikawa scattered his ships in two groups to create confusion amoing the Allied aerial scouts his lookouts saw.

 
Fletcher actually wanted to strike, but was talked out of it by Ramsey. This isn't unheard of for FJF. Not being an aviator, FJF often relied upon his flagship's CO for aviation advice. The question becomes did Ramsey offer good or bad advice? (Considering there was little moon, I think it was probably the correct advice). If Ramsey offered bad advice then the question becomes did Fletcher's lack of aviation experience cause him not to be aggressive enough?

Maybe it was the lack of his own organic reconnaissance that he could user to check? The cofused Turner, and the befuddled McCain who exchanged messages over covering the Slot with seaplane reconnaissance (Yirner requested and McCain failed to provide) didn't help Fletcher's blood pressure either.

 
By 0230 the morning of the 9th Mikawa's force was hauling ass at 30 knots, away from Savo.

By then the communication shambles was complete.
 
At 0330 Fletcher received permission from Ghormley to leave to refuel. Both FJF and Ghormley thought the other had better situational awareness.

And both were wrong.. The Marines sitting on the hills overlooking the captured air field on Gueadacanal had a clearer idea of who did what to whom that night, than the Navy did.
 
After 0634 (after sunrise) did the communications watch officer, George Clapp, bring FJF the news of the battle off of Savo.

I wonder about that. What was the Captain of the Chicago doing? Well he knew what he did. He shot himself.

The argument that FJF was not aggressive enough has to be based on the lack of a strike on the 8+ hour old sightings the night before Savo. Any other strike against Mikawa's CAs is just closing the barn door after the horse has already left. 

 It would have helped.. Those same cruisers were going to bite us  again, but I fault the command
 
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Leech    RE: Might have helped...   7/28/2009 9:05:23 AM

If after Yorktown had worked up speed after the first attack, then Fletcher had ordered her to run like hell, and clear the battle area?

Which attack do you exactly refer to?

 
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Herald12345    Hiryu's first on her of course.   7/29/2009 5:58:22 AM




If after Yorktown had worked up speed after the first attack, then Fletcher had ordered her to run like hell, and clear the battle area?




Which attack do you exactly refer to?



At that point, Yorktown had a big hole in the flight deck. The immediate need was to get her out of there and back to Pearl. 

Herald
 
 
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Leech       7/29/2009 6:09:51 AM
Yorktown was disabled by torpedo plane attack, but it was sunk by Japanese sub I-168 along with destroyer Hayman who was towing him back to Pearl Harbor.
 
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Herald12345       7/31/2009 12:00:03 AM

Yorktown was disabled by torpedo plane attack, but it was sunk by Japanese sub I-168 along with destroyer Hayman who was towing him back to Pearl Harbor.

You missed the point? The I-168 found a stopped target after the second Hiryu attack. Towed out and the I-168 would never have found her.
 
Herald
 
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Leech       8/1/2009 3:44:50 AM




Yorktown was disabled by torpedo plane attack, but it was sunk by Japanese sub I-168 along with destroyer Hayman who was towing him back to Pearl Harbor.




You missed the point? The I-168 found a stopped target after the second Hiryu attack. Towed out and the I-168 would never have found her.

 

Herald



Hayman was towing Yoorktown at wery low speed and it run at I-168 which was part of Japanese submarine barricade near Midway.
 
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Herald12345    Study the timeline.   8/1/2009 4:33:39 AM









Yorktown was disabled by torpedo plane attack, but it was sunk by Japanese sub I-168 along with destroyer Hayman who was towing him back to Pearl Harbor.










You missed the point? The I-168 found a stopped target after the second Hiryu attack. Towed out and the I-168 would never have found her.



 



Herald









Hayman was towing Yoorktown at wery low speed and it run at I-168 which was part of Japanese submarine barricade near Midway.


 
Expensive half day delay.
 
 
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