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New Strategy - Wargames at Discount Prices
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Subject:
Leo
Mark F
5/9/2004 10:44:29 PM
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A while ago you brought up the Falklands. Even though it falls just outside your arbitrary 20-year limit on historical precedent that we are apparently allowed to fall back on, this conflict is worth taking a closer look at since it did feature;
A). A 5-battalion strength amphibious assault and
B). A fair amount of NSFS.
Grytviken
Although NGFS alone was responsible for subduing the Argentine force there, resulting in the landing force taking them prisoner without a firefight, an EX-171 class projectile would not have been necessary for this operation.
That's why the USN has no plans to have ERGM replace all other projectiles in the inventory.
May 1
3 Harrier's each attack the airfields and Stanley and Goose Green causing little damage but having one Harrier badly hit as a result. HMS Glamorgan, Alacrity and Arrow closed the coast to within 12 miles to bombard Stanley airfield by grid square. They were attacked by four Mirage jet's which damaged two ships slightly and forced them to withdraw. It was the last time the RN shelled the coast in daylight.
If the RN had an EX-171 type projectile in the inventory both of these raids could have been conducted safely from outside the range of hostile aircraft and with more damage to the enemy as a result.
Night NGFS missions, harassment missions fired at grid squares became a regular routine but Argentine forces responded with 105mm and 155mm gunfire and eventually, MM.38 Exocet missiles which had a terrible impact on morale but more importantly damaged the destroyer HMS Glamorgan, killing 13 of her crew. An EX-171 type weapon would not have required RN ships to expose themselves to these types of threats.
Costly and ineffective air attacks against Stanley airfield could have been reduced by using EX-171 to selectively take out the 35mm gun and Rapier defenses, allowing Harriers to make more effective attack runs to take out the runway itself.
San Carlos Water
When the assault force enterend Falkland Sound and the entrance to San Carlos water, they were observed by and fired upon by a group of 60 Argentine soldiers with two 81mm mortars and two 105mm recoiless rifles on Fanning Head. Even though these forces were not dug in, the frigate designated to take out this position with 4.5-inch naval gunfire failed to achieve any useful hits or inflict any casualties in a bombardment that included a quick burst of 20 rounds followed by a period of sustained fire that averaged 1 rpm. With an EX-171 type round there is no reason to suspect this position could not have been reduced with just a few rounds and well before the British assault force came within view of its inhabitants.
The battle of Goose Green
When 2 Para was tasked to attack and take Goose Green the available logistics meant only 2 of 8 available 81mm mortars and 3 of the 6 105mm howitzers (with about 1 hours ammunition) that would normally be tasked to the battlion could be used in support of the operation. To make up this shortcoming the frigate HMS Arrow was tasked to provide NGFS - her single 4.5-inch gun being more than equal to the 3 missing 105mm guns. Problem was, Arrow would have to leave the protection of San Carlos Water and steam into Benton Loch in order to fire on the Argentine positions. This meant the attack had to begin at night and she would have to leave after the opening phase as being caught by herself in restricted waters would have made the ship extremely vulnerable to Argentine air attack. If the RN had possessed an EX-171 class munition, multiple frigates could have provided fire support for the operation without ever having to leave the relative safety and mutual protection of San Carlos. This would not only provide additional firepower that would have been much appreciated by the otherwise grossly under-supported 2-Para, but also redundancy as actual experience was to show HMS Arrow's gun jammed at a critical point in the battle and she had to withdraw early. These ships could also have engaged target sets Arrow could not as the greater accuracy of an EX-171 type munition would allow it to be employed closer to friendly troops or civilians. Many of the Argentine positions and heavy weapons were scattered amongst the buildings of the village. Since high winds could cause conventional artillery to miss its aimpoint by up to 800 meters, having a round that will land where you tell it to can be very helpful.
The support of multiple warships guns would have allowed the battery of three 105mm guns to carry an ammunition mix other than just HE. As things were because of the limited ammo they could take, HE was all they took and Arrow was relied on for smoke and illumination. When her gun went down there was no fallback available.
Before you start your airpower arguement recall that the weather at sea that night precluded any air support. Preperatory strikes by Sea Harriers in the days before resulted in the loss of a few Pucara's and minor damage to the airfield, but no damage to the defenses and the loss of 2 Harriers.
How is that for cost-effective?
When the Harriers did show up again, about 12 hours or so after the battle began and a full hour and a half after the call for an airstrike, concerns over collateral damage caused all three aircraft to miss their primary target - a pair of 35mm AA guns. This target could certainly have been taken out by a few EX-171 type munitions with little difficulty or risk to pilots as these same guns had been responsible for earlier Harrier losses.
The March on Stanley
Those same ships that could have supported the Goose Green operations from San Carlos could have also supported the entire advance across East Falkland all the way to the outskirts of Port Stanley. This could have been most crucial indeed as the land artillery deployed for the operation - 4 battery's of six 105mm Light Guns each had to be moved by helicopter if they were to go anywhere and the troops certainly could not advance without artillery support. Moving just one artillery battery and 500 rounds of ammunition (1/10th the requirement per gun) took 85 1-hour Sea King sorties and the invasion force had lost most of its helicopter lift on the Atlantic Conveyor. The extra support from the Navy would have no doubt been most welcome.
The Battle for the Mountains
Combined arms proved crucial here. A combination of air support, armour, artillery and naval gunfire that had not existed at Goose Green prevailed here. Still, NGFS could only be provided at night due to the threat of air attack and even attack from land. The attack on Glamorgan, occurring as she provided support to 45 Commando at Two Sisters/Mt Harriet could have been avoided completely if EX-171 type ammunition had been available. The unique ability of EX-171 to attack reverse slopes and to be fired in close proximity to friendly forces could have also been very decisive in this rough terrain.
Do amphibious assaults still happen when you least expect them? Yup. Does naval surface fire support prove useful? Could an EX-171 type projectile offer significant tactical advantages and reduce risks to our own forces while acting as a serious force-mulitplier? You bet!
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