1)      The USNavy is building ships that are to big, to expensive, to late. This means they are stuck with a force build to fight Gorshkovs navy.  You always inherit a substantial part of the Navy build to the specifications of a war already won.  The war was won 20 years ago – does the USN then ask what the next enemy will be? Nope – they take the present generation of ships and design them x% larger and more costly. This will eventually become too expensive.

In effect reducing  the number of ships at sea.

That is why I used the Danish navy as an example: Denmark has reduced the number of ships (though not really – but that is another story), but increased the number and size (from ambitious rowing boats) of ships AT SEA.

2)      I am a great believer in the task force composed of different vessels, but if you build all the vessels to expensively – you will end up with fewer ships and task forces.

What would you rather have? Two fleets centered around an 80 aircraft carrier or three fleets with a 40 aircraft carrier. Other vessels scaled as well.

This will mean, that you can use the third fleet as an reserve and concentrate force according to the tactical principles – and maintain the 80 aircraft where you need them plus maintaining control.

The first question a president ask in time of crisis is: “Where are the carriers?” If the cost spiral continues the answer will be:  “What carrier?”

3)      The punch of a 1989 80 plane carrier is not necessarily heavier than a 2010 40 plane carrier – which is the effective complement of the 1989 carrier today.

4)      The prolonged (and increasing) gestation period of advanced and costly ships puts you behind schedule for rationalizing ships complement. I saw the British are refurbishing old frigates with a complement of 173 – a Peder  Skram-class had 193 after rebuild I 1989 (the one that made a direct hit on a summer cottage with a Harpoon) – an Ivar Huitfeld – class of 2012 will have 101.

5)      Thus both the punch increase and the manning decrease simultaneously.

6)      A greater number of fleets will again give the possibility to adapt the ships in the fleet to waters and mission: F.i. even pissed a Danish admiral would not dream of using a Flyvefisken – class north of Greenland.  (he would however – if I’m not mistaken – use a Knud Rasmussen in the Baltic – provided severe icing).

To some other points:

A)     I don´t want more subs – I want more task forces with subs! But that I don’t get (or rather the USA won’t get them) if the jerks keep building ships to defeat an already dead enemy – just oversize.

I won’t get them if they take 10 years mulling over their own splendor and bitching over how misunderstood they are – and then another 10 years to build the bloody contraption – ending up with another one ship class and lingering on operationally with the antiques - because the shipyard equivalent of a pyramid is so expensive to build, operate and maintain, that it is all I’m going to get.

B)      The Air Force made the same mistake in the 1950’ies and 1960’ies when they tried to build a replacement for the B-52: The B-70 didn’t fly very well (overly ambitious), the B-58 flew (but not for long – to specialized), the B-1 nearly newer flew (and then only in a downsized version), the B-2 occasionally fly there are so few of them, that each departure is an occasion for a parade!

Guess what? The B-52 still flies with pilots whose grandfather flew them.

C)      As to make the Chinese waste money – which never has been any concern of theirs – I’m all for it; but why make let them define the terms. Have balanced forces that you compose according to mission  - we do it by plugging in different containers on board – but if that’s to advanced for you, then alter the collection of ships.

D)     My concern was not so much surveillance as the ability to concentrate force at the decisive point in time and space.

E)      As to the rising sun of China – please! Given China is vast and thus difficult to turn around economically: Keep your planning horizon as short as possible. Cut steel on ships that are operational in 5 years. At the present: When the ship is build it is probably outdated, delayed due to endless modifications during build and wildly over any pretense of a budget.

Some Danish admirals have a peculiar approach to procurement. Peder Tordenskiold (I know a Norwegean) was promoted to vice admiral - in spite of he never set to see with more than two small ships. Returning after the fracas was quite another matter as he habitually returned with prizes - at times quite a lot. That was a first: A selffinancing admiral!

Vedel had quite a different approach: Realising his garagesale collection of junk would never survive a good sneeze - he pulled the plug on all of them. A) The germans had a hell of job clearing the harbour of obstacles and B) Letting the yanks pay for the replacements after the war.

Wang will go over in history as the first admiral that was on budget - ever.

 

As an aside: Wang teamed up with Maersk - cost controller per excellance: Always quality - and letting the yard pay him for ordering ships! The 20 new tripple E ships (I guess it will be called the Marie Celeste-class - you know - sailing around without crew) are probably financed by the Deawoo - interest? What a rediculous concept!

 

That just might explain WHY the USA does not have a merchant fleet worth mentioning. That might also explain WHY Absalon has sailed to the Horn of Africa - asset management in Wall Street yuckspeak.

 

For our Australian readers: Maersk has build the new operahouse in Copenhagen - on budget. Danish architects are quite good - they just need a firm hand - VERY firm - and goading with a pickax. Yes it is also build smack in the middle of the harbour - and the stage arrangement has an uncanny resemblence to a containership: Why muck around with stagehands during interval? Lift the stage up and shove another in under it!

to one of the snide remarks.

 

The Thetis-class has a complement of 60+ depending on mission. That's one thing; but more pertinent: 3 of the 4 are constantly at sea (now reduced to 2 due to the receeding ice).

This give Danish sailors lots of seatime - and I mean lots.

Furthermore really many smaller patrollers for the Baltic sea, where large ships are a bit clumbsy.

 

This give the average officer an early opportunity to get command. And lots of hours in command.

Having pride in your nation and navy is fine.  The Thetis class is a 22 knot ice reinforced ocean patrol vessel.  In the US it would be a coast guard cutter.  The Danish Navy has 3,400 personnel 16 ships and a couple dozen smaller vessels.  The USCG has 42,000 active personnel and 244 cutters.  The USCG is about twice the size of the Danish Military and an order of magnitude larger than the Danish Navy. 

 

Comparing the Danish Navy to the USN is simply ridiculous on myriad levels.  The USN is two orders of magnitude larger in order to undertake it's global responsibilities that bear no relationship to those of Denmark.  The combined navies of Europe are not remotely capable of projecting the same level of power as the USN. 

 

Frankly Europe does not pull it's weight militarily and hasn't in a long time.  I'm sure there are many laudable aspects of the Royal Danish Navy but given Denmark can't even be bothered to hit the NATO minimum of 2% GDP (it's 1.4%) and in fact maintains more of a coast guard than a navy it's getting a bit tiresome hearing about what a poor job the USN does in comparison to the Danish Navy.

 

 

 

This give Danish sailors lots of seatime - and I mean lots.

Furthermore really many smaller patrollers for the Baltic sea, where large ships are a bit clumbsy.

 

This give the average officer an early opportunity to get command. And lots of hours in command.

I point to central principles that are of essence

 

a) How you train.

b) How you command and plan.

c) How you arm and spend money.

 

These factors are the same irrespective of size.

 

To a:

There is no real substitute to seatime for naval personel. There is no real substitute for command experience. Rather be no. 1 in a hamlet, than no. 2 in Rome.

To what extend do you get wiser from training.

 

To b:

Do you adapt to lesson learned and tactical and technological developments? Or do you still sail with full canvas in line astern into shoaling waters?

What sort of conflict are you planning on? And particularly: How can you plan so as to avoid conflict (killing people and loose ships) and STILL achieve your objectives?

The best warplans are never executed: The mere existence of them might have kept you from costly mistakes and given the potential enemy pause for thought: Is the likely result worth the cost?

That is at present the big problem with Al Qiada: They have no rational concept of what they want to achieve. Is a fundamentalistic islamic state going to achive heaven on earth - it is rumoured, that even Gaddaffi - when torn from his rathole - wasn't entirely convinced, that he had played his cards right. Secondly the cost: I don't think Osama bin Ladens lifestyle can be judged a success by any standard - it is known that special forces crashing through the door can be detrimental to your health.

 

To c:

Do you use the ships you have efficiently and do you get the ships you need? Or are you klinging to yesterdays solutions to yesteryears problem - just because they are there. Do you persist in past mistakes (or rather suboptimisations) because you have spend all your money on white elephants?

 

It is not that I am particularly patriotic; but You are a fool. A fool that spews venom at everything, that is beyond Your comprehension - which means pretty much everything. It is not because I'm anti-republican; but Sarah Palin and associates are the best argument pro Obama! The president could not whis for better opponents.

 

I'm nothing in particular - and this is a forum, that once had some intelligent discussions - oh how deeply it has fallen!

 

Of course it is not uplifting to You, that I consistently prove You ignorant, overestimating Your qualities (I haven't found them - so they are well hidden - if existing) and an obnoxious looser.

 

No my concern is quite another: The sorry state of the USNavy - and particularly its commanders of flagrank.

One thing is the money wasted, that could have been spend dealing with the economic crisis.

More serious is the slow suicide the USNavy is committing which is disconcerting if and when a new serious enemy arise. It takes 40 years to make an admiral - and if all the prospects of promise are squashed before their time that will cost more dearly than a few Wall Street bums.

Is there a Hyman Rickover in the making? A bastard if ever You saw one; but an effective (if expensive) admiral.

 

Where the comparison between the USA and Denmark is inappropriate is: We are a small nation that cannot afford the waste of talent. Not that we haven't had our share of duds - they are generally in the majority (some even dangerously so) - but we HAVE managed to produce unorthodox and efficient admirals when we needed them.

The army generals have generally been of mediocre quality - at best. I can point to 2-3 capable generals in the past century - and screaming idiots with no other positive qualities, than they never got drunk in the mess.

The airforce has not produced one single talent (talents died in accidents in the 1950'ies and 1960'ies). The only one that had a good track record - literarely - was a medium distance runner that won in the olympics - not necessarily a particular quality in a general.

 

 

Ignoring your endless unwarranted ad-hominems directed at LB for a moment, read what GF has said again, read what LB has said again.

 

The central point you are making is that the USN is still optimised for a multi-theatre high-intensity conflict involving layered CBG's operating at capacity, a role that you ASSERT is no longer relevant to the threat.

 

And that is the problem, it is an assertion by you that you are unwilling to support with any analysis whatsoever except for endless evangelising about the Danish navy - you don't see the PRC as a rising power to be taken seriously, you don't seem to have any conception of just how much resources even a relatively small conflict requires from the USN, and you don't seem to have any interest in actually supporting these arguments you make with anything other than really quite plebian gems like your assertion that two CBG's is enough to deter China, or that smaller CBG's are more efficient. 

 

Hey well you know best, that's right, you don't need to look in to the support craft, supply ships, SSN's, frigates, destroyers, that a CBG requires irrespective of the "size" of its capital ship - you don't need to provide any support to your arguments, you don't need to work out whether it actually ends up costing the same or more for a reduced capability, you don't need to do any of this because you are so incredibly intelligent that doing such meaningless analysis is beneath you, thus you continue to trot off endless "facts" that are instead just you very biased and uncritical analysis that you then expect others not only to take very seriously.

 

Seriously, come back with something other than this waffle about the Danish Navy, you have offered absolutely not one shred to assert that the same rules apply to the sorts of missions the USN expects to be tasked with or the amount of force-projection it needs to be able to allocate in extremis - this is your problem, you think that the world is still fighting another cold war, when in actual fact it is looking ahead with some trepidation to the rise of the PRC among others. 

 

Next time you post stop acting like a damn drama-queen and come back with something of merit that supports your arguments rather than more defensive wailing and gnashing - you need to:

 

a) provide some form of evidence that a smaller carrier design is cheaper or more flexible to operate.

b) provide evidence that the support requirements for such a carrier design are in fact cheaper, specifically with regard to stores etc.

c) provide evidence that operating more CBG's with attendant ^^ support is cheaper than operating larger capital ships that have double or even triple the surge capacity per carrier. 

d) provide some meaningful threat analysis for PRC air and naval capabilities now and perhaps 20 years into the future at a minimum.

 

R

 

1) China is rising; but there will be time to optimise the navy to meet this threat: 20 years is a very long time.

My point is: Development time for a ship class does not have to be 20 years. 5 years from first steel cut to operational ship.

A Nimitz class took from 5-7 years to build, so it is not building time as such.

It is the design that takes time. And incredibly no lessons learned since the arbitrary date of 1989 (incidentally the same year Seawolf ´was laid down.) when the Soviet Union collapsed.

George Bush class similar.

So it is not the building time, that is killing you - as such.

 

2) To illustrate where the real problems are I refer to Wikepeda - not that it is the gospel truth - as an indication.

Zumwaldt... 

 First of all, I think I saw that originally it was a replacement for the Ohio-class battleships for the use for shore bombardment.

What truth there is to that allegation, I cannot wouch for; but the mere thought does reveal - rather too muchs rear view mirror.

Secondly everything but the gallay zink is brand new technology - which is in itself a recipy for disaster.

Threat evaluation: