As I said, CVAW strength is more a function, today, of Budget and poor Aviation Decisions made at the end of the Cold War, decisions about programs, not Carriers, Thomas. 

 

Still 64 a/c are better than 40, and these 64 a/c can probably do more than the 70-90 of a Cold War CVAW, in terms of striking power, due to the use of PGM.  But the wings do lack the F-14 Fleet Defense capability.

Retaining a reduced air wing during peace time makes a lot of sense - that during times of duress there is a platform big enough, with sufficient stores and manpower that is capable of maintaining high sortie rates for a considerable time.  

 

I agree that it's a shame the F-14 is gone, it was my personal favourite of the F-teens, a beautiful thoroughbred design - I can appreciate the decisions that led to its eventual retirement but I also wonder what that platform might have ended up looking like if it had been given the same sort of attention as the hornet.. 

 

I would just add that PGM's don't fundamentally alter anything, strike sorties may be more efficient but far less so in a heavily contested environment where air-dominance isn't established - the air wing makes up a more important part of the CBG layered defenses than any of the escorts, the capacity offered by the 100kt designs is crucial to survivability.  

 

R 

 

 

 

 

Well - for the time being it is not so much the number of aircraft, that I'm worried about - you could bring some out of mothballing - the concern in that direction is the number of trained pilots.

 

The longer term worry is number of decks.

A conflict with the chinese would bring carriers to that area, which would denude other parts of the ocean of carriers.

China is indeed an argument; but lets be careful not overstating that case.

The risk is a conflict with China simultaneously with other smaller conflicts - which are very likely, partly as a consequence of China trying to secure their imports, partly as every ambitious rebel would have a field day with both China and USA occupied with each other.

 

I'm not to concerned about lauch capacity, as 2010 fighter bomber has a productivity - mesured in tons of TNT delivered on target (and not scattered around the general country side) - of say - 5-6 times a fighter of 1990.

 

Another thing is what you saw in Libya:

Still not a lot of evidence, for all the talk...want to talk about seaworthiness, defense, fuel capacity, ordnance capacity, and the ability of a low tonnage CV to operate F/A-18 a/c or smaller. The relative manning levels, and escorts?

 

Until then you might as well just shut up.

Another thing being missed in this discussion is while strike missions per aircraft are more effective not everything a carrier does is power projection.  At some point the USN might have to actually fight someone with effective forces and require large numbers of offensive or even defensive anti air sorties.  The need for asw might increase in future to the point where dedicated carrier asw patrol aircraft are required again.  A carrier offers many potential capabilities even if they are not at the moment being utilized.

 

The US has to think very long term.  We build one or two SSN's a year and given 50 years of operation a carrier roughly every 5 years.  If a threat emerges requiring more aircraft on our carriers we can respond to that far more quickly by putting more aircraft on board than building more carrier task forces which require additional carriers, surface escorts, SSN's, and underway replenishment ships.  In fact if someone made a very careful study on how to save money by lowering force structure while retaining the capacity to quickly expand it the conclusion reached would be to lower the size of the air wing while retaining the heart of the task forces.  Which is exactly what he USN did starting in the 1990's.

Hi LB

 

 

Your first paragraph is kind of what I had in mind when i wrote my post (Page 9, post 4). Exept that yours is definitively more clear. I am curious to see how its gonna be answered cause I didn't feel my post had be understood.

 

About what you said in the second paragraph, I think I understand and agree. I Would only had that carrier might get build at a slower pace in the future, given the economic restriction and the lack of treat. Its not a big deal as long as the knowledge and expertise is preserved.

 

Having less carrier only mean that USN might not be eable to deal with multiple high level treat all around the globe at the same time. And since the end of USSR that kind of treat I don't see that happening. Worst case scenario, America might have to rely on allies to defend Atlantic.

 

SP didn't had a "hot" topic like this in quite a long time. Keep it up.

 

 

 

Red                  

 

About what you said in the second paragraph, I think I understand and agree. I Would only had that carrier might get build at a slower pace in the future, given the economic restriction and the lack of treat. Its not a big deal as long as the knowledge and expertise is preserved.

 

Having less carrier only mean that USN might not be eable to deal with multiple high level treat all around the globe at the same time. And since the end of USSR that kind of treat I don't see that happening. Worst case scenario, America might have to rely on allies to defend Atlantic.

 

SP didn't had a "hot" topic like this in quite a long time. Keep it up.

 

 

 

Red                  

LB's first point.

Of course a carrier has more missions than one. As long as you have the Nimitz-class - you use them as well, as you can according to the mission at hand.

But you don't build carriers with the explicit purpose of rescuing embassy staff in case of a revolution. What scenario do you design carriers for?

My point is that the USNavy with the Ford-class designs for a worst case Soviet attack. Splendid - those carriers have not only been designed, but they are actually in service - known as the Nimitz.-class.

But that scenario is hardly likely in the next 20 years - dispite Chinese ambitions. Is the Nimitz-class (or the Ford-class for that matter) the best vessel to fight the Chinese? Definately not!

If for no other reason then because a further concentration on the big carrier is not affordable.

If nothing else a circling "Deathstar" around China is not likely to be attacked directly - provided the Chinese aren't inexcusably stupid, which might very well be; but it is not a sound planning assumption.

If the Chinese have one ion of intelligence, they will of course not attack the USNavy where it is strongest - they are not necessarily senile WW1 generals that throw massive infantry assaults against heavily fortified positions.

 

To LB's second point.

Of course you draw down the force level on the carriers in the present circumstances - which will leave the capacity to almost double the force with the same speed as it takes to train pilots and bring fighters out of mothballing.

But it seems likely, that need is already catered for in the next 20-30 years.

The Ford-class is basically just a better Nimitz-class with some rationalisation in the number of "bird-handlers".

The problem is the NEW yet unbuild carriers! What conflict should they be designed for?

 

Maybe new ships should be build for the likely conflicts within the next 20 years? Just a suggestion. If the past is the best reference - then start building dreadnoughts to fight at Jutland.

 

Maybe build a carrier for smaller conflicts - in fact a carrier TASK force for smaller conflicts.

The Royal Navy did all right in the Falklands war - to low on air-defence; but by and large. It is not necessarily the size that is decisive.

 

From the USNavy home page:

Lets take the other tack - I will start with the weak spot:

The Ticonderoga-class. Who needs it? It can take out most minor navies singlehandedly several times over. Reminds me of the Russian "carriers".

To me it is the perfect ship for sinking a chinese invasion force en route to Taiwan - possibly with some air protection - from land or sea. Protecting the carrier? Excuse me - an invasion fleet is liable to invade, not attack carriers. The ship that Japan needed at the invasion of the Phillipenes.

 

Could the job of protecting the carrier not be distributed among the other ships in the task force.

The problem is here that the Arleigh Burke is a very good ship from the reports I have heard. Now a successor to Arligh Burke could perhaps be a tad bigger - and do the job of the Arligh Burke AND Ticonderoga.

Instead they build the Zumwaldt sailing so close to shore, that it would be nowhere near the carrier - and not able to protect the carrier.

 

Attack submarine? The Seawolf would be perfect - but it won't - as it was cancelled for beeing to expensive - and in all likelyhood an overkill except guarding the "gap" between Greenland and Spitsbergen.

 

In the near term - to provide more power projection capability - AND better dominance of the sea.

Why not let a Ticonderoga-class  be at the core: It can take out most rougue nations navies at the drop of the presidents hat.

As I count it there are 22 Ticonderogas - that could better employed. If a minimal air cover is needed around South Africa or Ghana - then the Harriers could deal (perhaps with small modification)  with the air force of Cameroun. Off-load the Marines from a Wasp class.

Is it a perfect solution - definately NOT; but is at hand.

My point being: Build a small carrier with perhaps 40 aircraft to deal with Hugo Chavez and chaps of his ilk.

There is likely to be more Chavez and Gadaffi types around in the future simultaneously - and using one carrier task force pr. pain in the butt - the USA will run out of carriers if something like the arabian spring spreads and get ugly.

Can the present carrier force deal with it? No. Even carriers have a hard time being two places at the same time.

You don't need a sledgehammer to krack a nut - and ordinary claw hammer will do the job.

 

Now I'm not advocating invading Venezuela - that is a political decision - but when is f.i. China likely to become nasty? Perhaps when the carriers are busy spanking obstinate bottoms in remote places?

 

Another joke of an analysis.

 

The gems:

 

"Protecting the carrier? Excuse me - an invasion fleet is liable to invade, not attack carriers"

 

And you worked in planning? So you wouldn't expect the PLAAF to use the tactics that the Pentagon has highlighted in numerous annual reports on Chinese military developments, namely CBG saturation? Do you not think that part of an "invasion" is removing the hostile air threat, or causing it to remain out of useful range.

 

strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/...

 

That link to a thread here less than a year ago covers a similar discussion on carrier sizes.

 

I apologise for my tone on the last thread but surely anyone must understand that the arguments relating to scaling, support, survivability, replenishment, stores, surge capacity are actually more important than a very subjective view of future mission requirements. 

 

Even if Thomas was right in his view that the future threat is relatively benign the most efficient way to deal with it is STILL with larger carriers, your views on defensive arrangements are so incredibly glib for someone who would ultimately be talking about defense of capital assets and thousands of lives. 

 

R 

 

The reality of the situation is Seawolf was superseded by the Virginia class and the follow on DDG is in fact DDG-51 flight III.  All the CG's, DDG's, and SSN's, carry various numbers of Tomahawk's and focusing on one ship type for cruise missile strike is misleading.

 

The continued call for USN carriers to be far smaller ignoring every argument presented as to why this is not a good idea has simply become silly.  It's a false premise that smaller carriers save money and continuing to state a 40 aircraft air wing can fill every required mission is both tiresome and not supported by recent history.  The USN had 5 different carriers conducting operations over Afghanistan within a period of months of the conflict.  Smaller will not always get the job done.  It's simply a false theoretical construct that the USN can afford different classes of carriers and send a notionally smaller one to some minor conflict.  The USN has ten carrier task forces that go through an intricate dance of deployment, operations, maintenance, and training.  There is no luxury of operating different types.