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Subject: German naval strategy in WW1
Aussiegunneragain    5/24/2009 6:36:08 AM
I'm interested in exploring the pro's, con's and possibilities of an alternative German Naval Strategy in WW1. To me it seems that the strategy that the German High Command adopted was an integral part of why they couldn't break the British blockade, bought the American's into the war and consequently lost. As I'm sure most people here know the High Seas Fleet was much smaller than the British Grand Fleet and the German high command were retiscient about engaging the Royal Navy directly. Instead they tried to lure parts of the Grand Fleet out of Scapa Flow through hit and run shore bombardment raids with Battle Cruisers on English Coastal towns and destroy them, wearing down the British Fleet bit by bit. The problem with this as I see it was that there was in reality very little strategic value in the shore bombardment missions themselves, the battles that resulted like Jutland were inconclusive and killing civilians just enraged the British public and international opinion. While their later resort to unrestricted submarine warfare had a strategic impact on the British war effort, the killing of civilians by submariners including neutrals played a big part in bringing the US into the war and ultimately losing it for Germany. What I a wondering is if an alternative strategy concentrating on the use of the 5 battle cruisers in a surface raiding role might have allowed the Germans to impact more on shipping to and from Britain, without killing civilians and bringing the US into the War? None of the Battle Cruisers were less than a knot slower than their RN equivelents so it is reasonable to assume that they would have been able to make the dash out through the North Sea and to the Atlantic. There they would have been able to conduct hit and run attacks on convoy's, with minimal chances of being caught by the 9 RN equivilents. To my way of thinking it would have forced the RN to deploy all of its battle cruisers into the Atlantic to hunt for the German ships and a fair number of the RN battleships in the convoy escort role to protect against the battlecruisers. They could have still used submarines against the convoy's, but instead of hitting the merchantmen they could have concentrated on sinking the escorting battleships and reporting the position of the convey to nearby battle cruisers waiting to pounce. The net effect of this is that shipping to and from Britain would have been interdicted without killing civilians and bringing the US into the war, and the British fleet would have been worn down to the point where the High Seas Fleet's battleships could sortie against the remainder with a higher degree of confidence of winning and breaking the blockade. Finally I'd suggest that had the German's emphasised further battle cruiser rather than submarine production before and once the war commenced, then the strategy would have had an even greater chance of success. Thoughts? (positive, critical, alternative all welcome?)
 
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JFKY    Dude   6/2/2009 4:23:14 PM
It didn't bring Sweden into the war in 1940  and the Germans WON that campaign...after they get their clock cleaned the Swedes might come into the war, AGAINST the Germans!
 
Stick with Missile Engagement Ranges and Telemetry Updates, because you are NOT coming off as the Great War Leader in this debate.
 
For a guy who says look at history, you don't look at history...
 
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Herald12345    1914 and 1940 were different.   6/2/2009 7:20:30 PM
Stick to the capabilities, politics, and the realities of each time period or next you will have submarines sailing into those Fjords BLIND without depth sounding gear to lay mines like Tancredo tried.
 
Herald. 
 
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JFKY    Yeah Herald   6/2/2009 7:42:37 PM
In 1940 the Germans had the Luftwaffe to drive off the Brit's AND they won the 1940 May-June Campaign...the combination of the two produced a VICTORY for Germany in 1940-in Norway.  Had the Luftwaffe NOT been there to drive off the RN and the British and French not been under pressure in France to withdraw from Norway, it would have been a draw or an Allied VICTORY in 1940!  Since there was no air power, to speak of, and the Western Front was a bloody stalemate 1914/15 is even more INAUSPICIOUS for the Germans in 1914 than 1940.....
 
And at the end of 1940 Sweden did NOT join the Axis...But you have them signing up in 1914...sorry that doesn't make any sense. 
 
And for that matter, surface vessels could lay mines in the Leads and off the fjords holding the HSF...doesn't have to be submarines....Norwegian fleet anchorages, they certainly can't be called bases would lack the minefields and coast defense weapons to drive off smaller or even larger covering forces and mine forces.
 
Bottom-Line:  A move to Norway simply opens the HSF up to a dramatic sea defeat or a grinding Port Arthur defeat, by moving the HSF from its secure docks and lines of supply, to a bunch of unsurveyed, un-netted, unprotected anchorages in Norway, subject to Norwegian/British ground interdiction....
 
PS: the 1940 Campaign crippled the Kriegsmarine  It's not going to be any different, except in the size of the casualty list(s) in 1914.  In fact without air power the Kaisermarine is going to suffer a worse shellacking.  Only air power evened the odds, in terms of light AND heavy vessels the Grand Fleet held the naval advantage...the Brit's with French support could trade light vessels in a close blockade with the HSF and if the HSF came out for fleet action it would be soundly defeated....the U-bootes are and mines that so bothered the Grand Fleet facing the HSF based in Kiel and Wilhemshaven would be neutered in Norway....because THEY'RE BACK IN GERMANY!  The U-bootes have to transit TO the battlefield, making them less efficient as AMBUSH WEAPONS...and the mines have to be transported, in their thousands from the docks in Germany, several thousand kilometres over a contested sea...it gives the Grand Fleet a whole lot more room to maneuver.
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Tancred   6/3/2009 5:58:55 AM

Aussie the plan you describe is kinda like the one the WW2 plan Z was designed to support. But there are some problems. In no particular order.

I don't doubt that there would have been problems. However the fact remains that the plan that they eventually went to had greater problems, it didn't work and it bought the US into the war. In contrast this one might have worked so it would have been worth a shot. 

5 cruisers in the first 10 weeks yes, but it?s really 4 in an afternoon (the Live Bait Squadron) and a total of 8 ships in the first 8 months all in the southern North sea/channel. I don?t think you can extrapolate from that given the limited number (38 all types in 1914) of U boats and the limited range that they could have seriously damaged the blockade capability which was mostly the 20 odd AMC as soon as they could be fitted out but could equally have been a armed trawler with a flare gun and a CL over the horizon. Why didn?t they? ? they did have the range if not the loiter time and were not doing much else in the first year of the war so I suspect it was because they could not deploy that far except on special ops.
 
The U-Boats of the time were quite capable of operating for reasonably periods in the part of the North Sea that I am talking about, from Scapa Flow over to Norway (although operating near Scapa would have been best). After all, U-20 (built 1913) hit the Lusitiana off Ireland which is much further away. As for the numbers of cruisers sunk, there would undoubtedly have been many more had the Germans not switched to sinking merchantmen. As for armed trawlers, how long do you think they would last against the German cruisers and destroyers sortieing against the patrol line, once the cruiser force has been decimated?

 Emden is misleading as the main route closed was Ceylon to Singapore and that for a month followed by routes west of Ceylon again for a month. Its not a critical area and as far as British strength is concerned caused no reinforcement except an AMC. The 60 ships hunting are the 60 ships that happened to be in the area with not much else to do. It was three of them that caused Emden to shift its operational area. And the Indian Ocean is not as densly trafficked or patrolled as the eastern atlantic. Much easier to hide (Diego Garcia did not know there was a war on for 3 months I think).

The RN does not have to disperse to hunt the raider if its an Emden. All it has to do is convoy and assign an 8? or a pair of 6? cruisers to escort each convoy, thus maintaining the force in the northern north sea. Fleet list shows 101 cruisers excluding the Aus, NZ and Canadian pacific squadrons, (and the French and Russian navies) in 1914 opposed to 41 German of which 5 are Spees squadron, 1 is in the Med and then flying, 3 in the Atlantic or transit to it and 7 in the Baltic. I have left out everyone?s BCs. Now this is all types and several are obsolete but there is at least a 2:1 cruiser superiority for the RN.
 
But the British didn't convoy their ships under the threat of U-Boat attack until their merchantmen were devestated in 1917, because it was considered "too defensive". What makes you think they would have done so for one cruiser? They would have spread their ships out all of the place looking for a raider, just like they did with the Emden and the Graf Spee in WW2. In any case if they did get a clue and start convoying that would tie up a couple of dozen cruisers that would otherwise have been used in the blockade. The British might have had 101 but they only put 35 to sea at Jutland (including 8 AC's), as a lot of their ships were in other theatres or tasked to units like the Hartwhich Force or the Dover Squadron. That sounds like a pretty good reason for the Germans to to put one out there to me and a pretty good reason for the British to try to hunt it down, instead of just convoying. 

Also the Germans have to come up with the way of doing four things in a coordinated manner Getting a raider out which is possible but assumes you can lose any tail or you get a BC on the chase on a hot trail. Dispersing the blockade, which the British would maintain at almost all costs and getting trade in, then getting the merchants out again rinse and repeat. The RN submarine force and light forces could have kept up the blockade accepted the wear and tear and which the raider has to avoid on the way out.

THe Germans wouldn't have had to act in a co-ordinated manner at all. The raider could get out by timing its run to go past the thickest part of the British patrol line at night. If it did get spotted it could just turn around and make a run for it, to make another run another
 
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Aussiegunneragain    JFKY   6/3/2009 6:05:19 AM
 
It's not A German convoy that does any good.  During the Second World War there were 15-20 convoys at sea, in the Atlantic...700-1000 convoys PER YEAR.  That's what it took to support Britain and the US in the War in Europe.  Even if Imperial Germany's needs were only 1/10 as large that is still 70-100 convoys a year...6 per month or 12 every other month!  One convoy MIGHT get thru, but not 70-100 per year.  So the HSF  isn't going to "break the blockade", UNLESS it defeats the Grand Fleet.
 
And the idea of convoys means the Grand Fleet knows where to find the HSF, and can engage it at the time and place of ITS choosing....the Grand Fleet would destroy the HSF.  It was larger, and had a greater throw weight of shell.  I believe it had a superiority of at least 50% in that regard.  Using Lanchester equations it becomes not 3:2 but 9:4 in combat power...the HSF must defeat the Grand Fleet in detail or from ambush, it must have the iniative, and element of surprise to survive and prosper.  A convoy robs the HSF of all that, it loses the iniative, it loses surprise, it's bound to the convoy...the Brit's will pin the HSF against the convoy and destroy it!
 
Like I said to Tancred I'm not talking about the German's using convoy's, I'm talking about individual merchantmen running a severely thinned out blockade. Once they'd taken a lot of losses the Brits wouldn't have sent the Grand Fleet as a unit out to try and pick up individual ships.
 
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JFKY    Tancred   6/3/2009 9:21:34 AM
Individual merchant men stand no chance against the cruiser line, thineed out or not...they are UNARMED!   A Convoy is the ONLY way to bring in supplies in any meaningful amount with any reasonable expectation of success.  The HSF escorts large numbers of merchantmen Germany....
 
I might add, that your idea of thinning the blockade out over 2 years means that Germany ahs to stagger along under the blockade until 1916...by then significant damage ahs been done tot he German economy.  Germany was hurting in the Winter of 1917, there were actual food shortages...I believe this was the "Turnip Winter"...so this thinned out blockade needs to be thinned out a lot sooner than 2 years.
 
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Aussiegunneragain       6/4/2009 10:00:38 AM

Individual merchant men stand no chance against the cruiser line, thineed out or not...they are UNARMED!   A Convoy is the ONLY way to bring in supplies in any meaningful amount with any reasonable expectation of success.  The HSF escorts large numbers of merchantmen Germany....
 
A lot of the merchantmen would be able to slip through a thinned out line at night. Also, if enough cruisers were destroyed or tied up on convoy protection tasks there is every chance that there wouldn't be one avaiable to hit a merchantman passing through the line. That only leaves destroyers which would also be thinned out by the German surface raids on the patrol line. They could have armed their merchant ships with deck guns to adequately defend against those.

I might add, that your idea of thinning the blockade out over 2 years means that Germany ahs to stagger along under the blockade until 1916...by then significant damage ahs been done tot he German economy.  Germany was hurting in the Winter of 1917, there were actual food shortages...I believe this was the "Turnip Winter"...so this thinned out blockade needs to be thinned out a lot sooner than 2 years.
 
Even if it took two years before the Germans destroyed enough British ships to allow the German merchant navy to operate it would make a difference. It took the British another two years after 1916 to force Germany to submit so the extra supplies would stave off defeat and the Germans would also have had the advantage of not having to fight the Americans as well. That combination of factors might have tipped the balance enough for a German win.
 
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mark.navy    German Strategy   4/25/2010 9:20:44 PM
Aussie,
 
The problem with your proposed strategy can be summed up in one word:  logistics.    Coal burning warships consumed massive amounts of coal.   I estimate that a German Battleship/cruiser of the era could steam out to about 2500nm from its base in Northern Germany at a speed of 10 kts and probably only half that distance at tactically useful speeds of 20-25 kts.    At best, the German Battlecruisers might be able to  operate  for a few days along the sea line of communications to the west of Britain before they would have to return to base.    During those few days,  they would have to locate, chase and destroy any convoys encountered.  The probablity of locating a convoy in the open ocean, before the days of open ocean aerial reconnaisance and radar, would have been slim and at best - time consuming......of  which time they had little of gven their limited coal supplies.  Colliers would have provided little respite as it took  days to recoal a warship and could very rarely be done in the storm tossed North Atlantic.  Additionally, you strategy assumes the 5 battlecruisers could slip through the British North Sea Blockade both coming and going.    Again, problematic given the amount of patrol vessels between Britain and Norway and their very effective intelligence service of the Royal Navy. 
 
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